Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Trent Berhow, while incarcerated at Western Missouri Correctional Center, fell from a ladder and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the state of Missouri, alleging that his supervisor's instructions created a dangerous condition leading to his injury. Berhow filed his suit more than a year after the incident, which brought into question the statute of limitations.Initially, Berhow sued the Missouri Department of Corrections. The department moved to dismiss the petition, citing the statute of limitations. Berhow then amended his petition to dismiss the department and add the state as the defendant. The Circuit Court of DeKalb County overruled the state's first motion for judgment on the pleadings but later sustained the state's renewed motion, which argued both sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations. Berhow's motion for sanctions was also effectively overruled by the circuit court.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Berhow's claim was barred by the statute of limitations under section 516.145, which requires actions against the Department of Corrections or any entity thereof to be brought within one year. The court reasoned that allowing Berhow to sue the state instead of the department would defeat the purpose of the statute, as the department acts on the state's behalf. The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that the statute of limitations barred Berhow's claim. View "Berhow v. State" on Justia Law

William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of the estates of his three deceased children, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) in October 2009, alleging a design defect caused an airplane crash that killed his children. In September 2012, CMI made an unapportioned offer of judgment for $300,000, which Lunn rejected. After a lengthy litigation process, a jury found in favor of CMI. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted in February 2021. CMI appealed, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the district court's decision.CMI then sought attorney's fees, claiming entitlement under the offer of judgment statute since the judgment was less than their offer. The district court denied the motion, ruling the unapportioned offer invalid. CMI appealed this decision. COCA affirmed the district court's ruling, referencing prior cases that required offers of judgment to be apportioned among plaintiffs to be valid.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case to address whether an offer of judgment under 12 O.S.2021, § 1101.1(A) must be apportioned among multiple plaintiffs. The court held that such offers must indeed be apportioned to allow each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. The court emphasized that unapportioned offers create confusion and hinder the plaintiffs' ability to assess the offer's value relative to their claims. Consequently, the court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling CMI's unapportioned offer invalid. View "Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Iran provided material support for a Taliban attack that killed thirty Americans, including Navy special forces operator Kraig Vickers. Vickers' family sued Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allows for such suits against state sponsors of terrorism. The district court awarded damages to most of Vickers' family but dismissed the claim of his daughter, K.E.F.V., who was born two months after his death.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held a three-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism that had provided material support for the attack. The court then determined damages for twenty-three plaintiffs and appointed special masters to recommend damages for the remaining plaintiffs, including the Vickers family. The special master recommended solatium damages for each family member, but the district court dismissed K.E.F.V.'s claim, stating that she could not recover solatium because she was born after her father's death.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the FSIA does not preclude after-born plaintiffs from recovering solatium and that well-established state tort law, including wrongful death statutes, supports the recovery of damages by children born after a parent's death. The court concluded that K.E.F.V. is entitled to solatium for the loss of her father's comfort and society, regardless of her birth date relative to his death. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "K.E.F.V. v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

An elderly woman with severely impaired cognitive functioning was a resident at a skilled nursing facility. While an employee was helping her shower, the employee took a personal video call and propped her phone in a way that displayed the resident’s nude body to the caller. The resident’s conservator sued the facility for invasion of privacy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the facility, and the plaintiff appealed. During the appeal, the resident died, and her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the complaint stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion and that the claim did not abate upon the resident’s death. The defendant facility was granted permission to appeal on the issue of abatement.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102, a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion does not abate upon the death of the person whose privacy was invaded. The court determined that the statutory exception for “wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” did not apply to this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the claim for intrusion upon seclusion did not abate upon the resident’s death and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Life Care Centers of America" on Justia Law

Yadira Ordonez, individually and as mother and next friend of her minor daughter, S.C.O., sued Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. (CFMI) in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries S.C.O. sustained from hot soup purchased at Capitol International Market. CFMI moved for summary judgment, claiming it did not operate the market. Ordonez opposed the motion and requested more time for discovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CFMI, and Ordonez appealed.The trial court entered summary judgment for CFMI, finding that CFMI did not operate the grocery store or the deli where the incident occurred. Ordonez argued that more discovery was needed, particularly the deposition of CFMI's owner, John Yim, to test the veracity of his statements. The trial court denied Ordonez's motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery and granted summary judgment to CFMI.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Ordonez's motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f) to take Yim's deposition. The court noted that the health department records and other evidence raised questions about CFMI's assertions that it had no employees and did not operate the grocery store or deli. The court concluded that Yim's deposition was critical to Ordonez's opposition to the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ordonez v. Capitol Farmers Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In December 2021, Officer Shelton Davis of the Montgomery Police Department, while pursuing a fleeing suspect, collided with Madilyn Shuford's vehicle at an intersection in Montgomery. Officer Davis was responding to a woman's plea for help, who claimed a man was trying to kill her. The suspect, Eugene Osborne Jr., fled in a vehicle, prompting Officer Davis to pursue him with activated lights and sirens. During the pursuit, Officer Davis slowed down at a red light but collided with Shuford's vehicle when she pulled into the intersection.Shuford sued the City of Montgomery and Officer Davis, alleging negligence and wanton conduct, and claimed the City was vicariously liable. The City and Officer Davis moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, and Ex parte Cranman. They provided evidence, including Officer Davis's affidavit and body camera footage, showing he was performing his duties with activated lights and sirens. Shuford opposed, arguing Officer Davis did not use proper signals and took unreasonable risks.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the summary judgment motion without explanation. The City and Officer Davis petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the denial and grant summary judgment based on immunity.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that Officer Davis was entitled to immunity as he was performing his law enforcement duties and exercising judgment. The court found no substantial evidence from Shuford to refute this. Consequently, the City was also entitled to immunity. The trial court was directed to enter summary judgment in favor of the City and Officer Davis. View "Shuford v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

Mara Lindsey was involved in a car accident where she was rear-ended by Carlos Pantoja, resulting in personal injuries. Lindsey sought compensation for her medical expenses and, after settling with Pantoja’s insurer for his policy limit of $50,000, she filed a claim with her own insurer, State Farm, under her underinsured motorist (UIM) policy. Dissatisfied with State Farm’s settlement offer of $689.58, Lindsey sued State Farm under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) for declarations regarding Pantoja’s liability, her damages, and her entitlement to UIM benefits. She also sued State Farm and its claims adjuster for Insurance Code violations, alleging bad faith in handling her claim.The trial court denied State Farm’s motions to abate the extracontractual claims and to quash the deposition notice of its corporate representative. The court of appeals denied State Farm’s mandamus petitions without substantive explanation. State Farm then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying State Farm’s motions. The court ruled that extracontractual claims must be abated until the insured obtains a favorable judgment on the UIM coverage, as these claims are dependent on the right to receive UIM benefits. The court also held that discovery on extracontractual matters is improper before establishing entitlement to UIM benefits. Additionally, the court found that State Farm had demonstrated that the deposition of its corporate representative was not proportional to the needs of the case, given the lack of personal knowledge and the burden of the proposed discovery.The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted State Farm’s petition for writ of mandamus, ordering the trial court to vacate its previous orders and grant State Farm’s motions to abate the extracontractual claims and to quash the deposition notice. View "IN RE STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

A Colorado real estate investment trust sued a Texas hedge fund and its employees for damages caused by an allegedly defamatory article published under a pseudonym. The claims were dismissed in Colorado federal court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trust then sued in Texas state court. The defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) and for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. The trial court granted both motions.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the trial court lacked authority to grant the TCPA motion after it was overruled by operation of law and that the defendants failed to conclusively establish that collateral estoppel barred the claims. The appellate court determined that the Colorado court's findings on personal jurisdiction did not preclude the Texas claims and that the addition of new defendants in Texas further demonstrated that the issues were not identical.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It agreed with the appellate court that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on their collateral estoppel defense. However, it found that the appellate court erred in holding that the order granting the TCPA motion was void. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the trial court's error in granting the TCPA motion outside the statutory deadline was harmless because it occurred within the time frame in which the defendants could have appealed the denial by operation of law. The case was remanded to the appellate court to address the TCPA motion on its merits. View "FIRST SABREPOINT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. v. FARMLAND PARTNERS INC." on Justia Law

A railroad worker, Phillip Morgan, committed suicide after experiencing months of alleged harassment by his supervisor at Union Pacific Railroad Company. His wife, Kera Morgan, acting as the administrator of his estate, filed a lawsuit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), seeking wrongful death damages. She claimed that the harassment and stress from his job led to Phillip's emotional distress and eventual suicide.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, concluding that Phillip's injuries were emotional and not tied to a physical impact or near physical harm, thus falling outside the scope of FELA. The court held that FELA did not cover emotional injuries unless there was a physical impact or the worker was in imminent danger of physical harm.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail v. Gottshall, FELA incorporates common law limits on compensable injuries. The court concluded that Phillip's emotional injuries, which led to his suicide, did not meet the "zone of danger" test established in Gottshall. This test requires that the worker must have been in immediate risk of physical impact or harm to recover for emotional injuries under FELA. Since Phillip's injuries were purely emotional and not tied to any physical impact or imminent threat of physical harm, the court ruled that FELA did not provide coverage for his case. View "Estate of Morgan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company" on Justia Law

In 2003, Sarah Ramey underwent a urethral dilation performed by Dr. Edward Dunne, which resulted in severe pain and subsequent debilitating medical conditions. Over the next fourteen years, Ramey sought medical advice from numerous doctors to determine the cause of her ailments. In 2017, Drs. Mario Castellanos and Lee Arnold Dellon linked her symptoms to the 2003 procedure. Ramey filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dunne and Foxhall Urology in 2019.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bifurcated trial to determine if Ramey’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The jury found that Ramey failed to file her suit within the three-year statute of limitations. Ramey then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its rulings and jury instructions. The trial court denied her motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ramey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Ramey had received medical opinions linking her symptoms to the urethral dilation before 2017. The court also found that Ramey waived her claim regarding the jury instructions by affirmatively agreeing to them during the trial.However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on the improper invocation of inquiry notice by appellees’ counsel during rebuttal closing arguments. The court found that the trial court’s corrective instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudicial impact of the improper argument. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ramey v. Foxhall Urology, Chartered" on Justia Law