Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Andrea Klein Gregg and the Huntsman-West Foundation (the Foundation) sued Melinda Susan Smith for general negligence, intentional tort, and premises liability after Gregg's personal property, stored at Dennis James Babcock's residence, went missing. Babcock, who lived alone on the premises, had allowed Gregg to store her items there. When their relationship ended, Gregg was initially denied access to retrieve her property. Upon gaining access, she found most of her property missing or damaged.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted Smith's motion for summary judgment, finding she had no duty to protect the personal property as she had no control over the premises or the property. The court also sustained Smith's evidentiary objections, excluding much of the plaintiffs' evidence as hearsay or lacking foundation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Smith had no legal duty to the plaintiffs regarding the personal property. The court found that Smith had no control over the premises or the property and that the plaintiffs failed to present admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact. The court also held that the claims of agency, mutual interest, joint venture, and ratification were not properly raised in the complaint and could not be considered.The main holding was that Smith owed no duty to the plaintiffs regarding the personal property, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in her favor. The court also affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence and the rejection of new legal theories not raised in the original complaint. View "Huntsman-West Foundation v. Smith" on Justia Law

Quintez Talley, an incarcerated individual, sought in forma pauperis (IFP) status to appeal without prepaying filing fees. The appellees argued that the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred Talley from proceeding IFP, claiming that three of his previous cases were dismissed on grounds that qualify as strikes under the PLRA. Talley contended that only one of these cases constituted a strike.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's federal claim for failure to state a claim and his medical malpractice claim for not complying with Pennsylvania procedural rules. The court did not dismiss the entire action on strike-qualifying grounds, so this case did not count as a strike. In another case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's complaint for failure to state a claim but granted him leave to amend. Talley did not amend within the deadline, but the court did not formally close the case before Talley filed his notice of appeal, so this case also did not count as a strike. In a third case, the same court dismissed Talley's claims for failure to state a claim and noted his failure to file a certificate of merit for his medical malpractice claim. This dismissal was on strike-qualifying grounds, making it a strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that only one of Talley's previous cases constituted a strike. The court held that the dismissal of the medical malpractice claim for procedural non-compliance did not qualify as a strike, and the case where Talley was given leave to amend but did not do so was not formally closed, thus not a strike. The court granted Talley's motion to proceed IFP, allowing him to appeal without prepaying filing fees. View "Talley v. Pillai" on Justia Law

A Florida resident, Sheri Sawyer, acting as the personal representative of her deceased son Thomas's estate, filed a product-liability lawsuit against Cooper Tire & Rubber Company in the Mobile Circuit Court. The case arose from a fatal single-vehicle accident in Mobile County, Alabama, where a tire manufactured by Cooper Tire allegedly experienced tread separation, causing the vehicle to crash. The tire was purchased in Alabama by Barbara Coggin, the mother of the driver, Joseph Coggin, both Alabama residents.Cooper Tire moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Alabama courts lacked specific personal jurisdiction over it due to insufficient suit-related contacts with Alabama. Sawyer countered that Cooper Tire's extensive business activities in Alabama, including the sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in question, established sufficient contacts. While the motion was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, which held that specific personal jurisdiction could exist even without a direct causal link between the defendant's forum activities and the plaintiff's claims.The Mobile Circuit Court granted Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss, concluding that Sawyer failed to show that Cooper Tire sold, distributed, or marketed the specific tire model in Alabama within three years before the accident. The court also noted that neither Sawyer nor her son were Alabama residents, reducing Alabama's interest in providing a forum for the case. Sawyer appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court's decision, applying the analytical framework from Ford. The court held that Cooper Tire's sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in Alabama "related to" Sawyer's claims, establishing specific personal jurisdiction. The court also found that the trial court's focus on the timing of Cooper Tire's contacts and Sawyer's residency was not dispositive. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical negligence claim brought by Janet Hild, the administrator of Scott Boldman's estate, against several medical professionals and entities, including Samaritan Health Partners and Good Samaritan Hospital. Boldman, who had multiple health issues, underwent an emergency appendectomy at Good Samaritan Hospital. Post-surgery, he became combative and removed his breathing tube, after which he soon died. Hild claimed that the anesthesia was improperly handled, causing Boldman's aggressive behavior and subsequent death. The hospital argued that Boldman self-extubated and suffered a cardiac arrest unrelated to the anesthesia.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The jury found that Sandra Ward, the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, was negligent in her care of Boldman. However, only the six jurors who found negligence were allowed to vote on whether Ward's negligence proximately caused Boldman's death. They concluded it did not. Hild filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that all jurors should have been allowed to vote on proximate cause. The trial court denied the motion.The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, holding that the trial court erred by not allowing all jurors to vote on proximate cause, and remanded the case for a new trial on specific issues. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the same-juror rule applies in all negligence cases where the jury answers sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence. This means the same three-fourths of jurors must concur on all elements for a valid verdict. The court reversed the Second District's decision to the extent it ordered a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of the hospital. View "Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner" on Justia Law

Candace Hensley sustained injuries from a trip and fall accident at a Westin Hotel in Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 2, 2017. She and her husband, Timothy Hensley, filed a lawsuit in the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, against Westin Hotel and Westin Hotel Management, L.P. (WHM), alleging negligence and loss of consortium. Merritt Hospitality, LLC (Merritt) and WHM responded, asserting that Merritt was incorrectly named and that Westin Hotel was not a legal entity. The Hensleys amended their complaint to include Merritt and Marriott International, Inc. (Marriott). The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia based on diversity jurisdiction.Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, which had paid workers’ compensation benefits to Mrs. Hensley, intervened to protect its subrogation lien. The district court applied Indiana tort law and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they either did not control the hotel premises or lacked actual knowledge of the hazard. The court also dismissed Hartford’s claim, as it depended on the Hensleys' success. The Hensleys appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction when Hartford, an indispensable party, intervened, destroying complete diversity. The appellate court vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded the case with instructions to remand it to the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. The main holding was that Hartford’s intervention as a matter of right and its status as an indispensable party required the case to be remanded to state court due to the lack of complete diversity. View "Hensley v. Westin Hotel" on Justia Law

Wanda Bowling entered into a contract with the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission to manage its information technology functions. When the contract ended, Bowling allegedly withheld login information for three online accounts, leading the Commission to sue for breach of contract. Bowling counterclaimed for libel and misclassification of her employment status. The district court dismissed the misclassification counterclaim and granted summary judgment to the Commission on all other claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Bowling's counterclaim for misclassification and denied her motion to amend it, citing untimeliness. The court also granted summary judgment to the Commission on its breach of contract claim, concluding that Bowling's login information constituted intellectual property and that she had breached the contract by not certifying the erasure of confidential information. The court awarded the Commission $956.67 in damages. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment on Bowling's libel counterclaim, citing a qualified privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's finding of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission had adequately alleged damages exceeding $75,000. However, the appellate court found that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether the login information constituted intellectual property or other materials covered by the contract, and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the damages. Therefore, it reversed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Bowling's motion to amend her counterclaim for misclassification, finding no abuse of discretion.On the libel counterclaim, the appellate court agreed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on a qualified privilege without giving Bowling notice. However, it affirmed the summary judgment on the grounds that the Commission's statements were substantially true. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission v. Bowling" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Michael Wollan was admitted to Essentia Health and died two days later. Mary Wollan, on behalf of Michael's heirs, filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Essentia, seeking economic and noneconomic damages. The jury found Essentia at fault and a proximate cause of Michael's death, but also found a non-party at fault, allocating 25% fault to Essentia and 75% to the non-party. The jury awarded $500,657 in total damages, which included $116,657 in past economic damages.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, held a jury trial and entered a judgment against Essentia, including costs and disbursements totaling $639,292.06. Essentia's motion for a new trial was denied by the district court.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the jury's verdict inconsistent and irreconcilable, particularly the award of past economic damages, which exactly matched the amount requested by Wollan but did not align with the 25% fault allocation. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Essentia's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, noting that the jury's damage award was not supported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to the record.Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed other issues likely to arise on remand, including the admissibility of settlement evidence and the district court's exclusion of such evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 408. The court upheld the exclusion of settlement evidence, finding no abuse of discretion. The award of costs and disbursements was also reversed, consistent with the reversal of the judgment. View "Wollan v. Innovis Health" on Justia Law

Sarah Palin filed a defamation lawsuit against The New York Times and its former Opinion Editor, James Bennet, alleging that an editorial falsely linked her political action committee's map to the 2011 shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. The editorial claimed a "clear" and "direct" link between the map and the shooting, which Palin argued was defamatory.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Palin's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the case in 2019, finding that Palin had plausibly stated a defamation claim. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury deliberated but the district court dismissed the case again under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, ruling that Palin had not proven actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Despite this, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendants "not liable."The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's Rule 50 ruling improperly intruded on the jury's role by making credibility determinations and weighing evidence. The appellate court noted several trial errors, including the exclusion of relevant evidence, an inaccurate jury instruction, and jurors learning of the district court's Rule 50 dismissal during deliberations. These issues undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's Rule 50 judgment and the jury's verdict, remanding the case for a new trial. The appellate court emphasized the importance of the jury's role in determining credibility and weighing evidence, and found that the errors at trial necessitated a retrial. View "Palin v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

Marcus Cook petitioned for a temporary order of protection against his former girlfriend, Kim Elizabeth Bodine, alleging that she had repeatedly trespassed on his property and stalked him despite his demands for no contact. Cook's petition detailed several incidents, including Bodine entering his home uninvited, driving by his house, and being arrested for stalking. Based on these allegations, the Gallatin County Justice Court issued an ex parte temporary protective order and scheduled a hearing.At the hearing, Cook testified about the ongoing harassment and its impact on his life, including increased anxiety and changes to his daily routine. He presented evidence such as police citations and surveillance footage. Bodine, represented by counsel, did not testify but attempted to discredit Cook's claims through cross-examination and by presenting a GPS report suggesting she was not near Cook's home during one alleged incident. The Justice Court found Cook's testimony credible and issued a 10-year protective order against Bodine.Bodine appealed to the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the Justice Court's decision. She then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, arguing that the Justice Court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and that the evidence did not support the need for a long-term protective order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the Justice Court had made adequate oral findings and that substantial evidence supported the issuance of the protective order. The Court concluded that the Justice Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a 10-year protective order, given Bodine's pattern of conduct and the need to prevent further harm to Cook. The decision was affirmed. View "Cook v. Bodine" on Justia Law