Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jimmy Hang sued defendants RG Legacy I, LLC, 1899 Raymond LLC, and Arlene Rosales for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The RG Legacy parties filed a petition to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to arbitration agreements Jimmy entered on the decedent, Daniel Hang’s behalf when Daniel was admitted to a RG Legacy parties’ skilled nursing facility. Jimmy opposed the petition arguing, inter alia, Daniel had been indigent and his estate had no funds to pay arbitration fees and costs. Citing Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013), the trial court found Daniel was indigent at the time of his death and granted the petition to compel arbitration on the condition that, within 15 days, the RG Legacy parties agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs, or waive the right to arbitrate the matter. The RG Legacy parties did not agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs and instead filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed: substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Daniel’s indigence, and the trial court properly applied the holdings of Roldan and its progeny in ordering the RG Legacy parties to either agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs or waive arbitration. The RG Legacy parties’ refusal to so agree, within the time specified, effected the court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration. View "Hang v. RG Legacy I" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants St. Joseph Hospital and Catholic Health System of Long Island, Inc. for injuries he sustained at St. Joseph Hospital, where he was admitted in March 2020 with COVID-19. Plaintiff brought claims for malpractice, negligence, and gross negligence in New York state court. Defendants removed the case to the New York district court and moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants asserted state and federal immunities under the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (“EDTPA”) and the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”). The district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with directions to remand the case to state court. The court concluded that removal to federal court was improper because the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. First, Plaintiff’s state-law claims are not completely preempted by the PREP Act. Second, there is no jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute because Defendants did not “act under” a federal officer. Finally, Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise under” federal law. View "Solomon v. St. Joseph Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this products-liability suit against LG Chem, Ltd. (“LGC”) and LG Chem America, Inc. (“LGCA”), claiming that they negligently manufactured and distributed a battery that he used to power an electronic cigarette until the battery, and electronic cigarette both exploded in his mouth. Plaintiff sued LGC and LGCA in Hawaii state court, bringing various state-law claims related to the design, manufacture, labeling, advertising, and distribution of the subject battery. LGC and LGCA were timely removed from Hawaii state court to the District Court for the District of Hawaii and then moved to dismiss Yamashita’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Yamashita opposed the motions and moved for jurisdictional discovery. The district court denied Yamashita’s motion for jurisdictional discovery.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that Ford modified, but did not abolish, the requirement that a claim must arise out of or relate to a forum contact in order for a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. The panel explained that while LGC and LGCA’s Hawaii contacts clearly showed that they purposefully availed themselves of Hawaii law, they can only be subject to specific personal jurisdiction if Plaintiff’s injuries arose out of or related to those contacts. The panel held that Plaintiff had not shown that his injuries arose out of any contacts because he had not shown but-for causation. The panel concluded that the district court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery was not an abuse of discretion. View "MATT YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD., ET AL" on Justia Law

Jennifer Dell Peach sued, among others, Lester Thomas asserting claims arising from a multivehicle accident that took place after Thomas, a State trooper with the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, allegedly blocked both lanes of a highway to perform traffic stops of speeding drivers. Thomas moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied that motion. Thomas petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the ground of State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court determined that based solely on the arguments and evidence presented to the trial court, Thomas did not establish a clear legal right to an order granting his motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, Thomas's petition for the writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Lester Lee Thomas." on Justia Law

Jim Arthaud appeals a district court judgment granting Jim Fuglie’s motion to dismiss. Arthaud sued Fuglie, alleging Fuglie published a defamatory statement in his internet blog titled “A Bridge to Nowhere.” The blog was published in August 2018 on Fuglie’s website, “The Prairie Blog.” Arthaud brought suit on October 5, 2021, asserting he did not learn about the post until September 2021. Fuglie responded and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Arthaud’s claim was time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The district court subsequently granted the motion to dismiss, finding Arthaud’s claims were time barred under section 28-01-18(1) of the North Dakota Century Code regardless of whether the discovery rule applied in defamation cases. Arthaud argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should adopt the “discovery rule” when determining whether a litigant has timely brought a defamation claim. The Supreme Court held it was unnecessary to decide whether to adopt the discovery rule for defamation claims because the Uniform Single Publication Act precluded the discovery rule from applying to statements made to the public. View "Arthaud v. Fuglie" on Justia Law

Core and Main LP (“C&M”) supplies water, wastewater, storm drainage, and fire protection products and services to commercial and governmental customers. C&M acquired the assets of Minnesota Pipe and Equipment Company (“MPE”), which supplied the same products and services in areas of Minnesota and South Dakota. Defendant, one of the shareholders, was part of MPE’s management team. Defendant started work at Dakota Supply Group, Inc. (“DSG”), a C&M competitor. C&M brought a diversity action against Defendant and DSG, asserting breach of the Employment Agreement’s noncompete and confidentiality covenants, tortious interference, and related claims. The district court granted Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The main issue on appeal is whether the court correctly concluded that the Noncompetition Agreement was a later agreement and, therefore, its Entire Agreement provision superseded the restrictive covenants.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that the breach of contract and tortious interference claims turn on fact-intensive issues that cannot be determined on the pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of those claims and otherwise affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with C&M that it is at least plausible the two Agreements covered different subject matters, making Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal inappropriate. The Noncompetition Agreement restricting MPE shareholders from engaging or investing in a competing business was geographically broad, but its duration was precisely limited to a specific term for each restricted party. In addition, the court concluded that in the context of the multiple agreements that completed the Asset Purchase transaction, the term “prior or contemporaneous” in the Noncompetition Agreement’s Entire Agreement provision is ambiguous. View "Core and Main, LP v. Ron McCabe" on Justia Law

A U.S. Postal Service (USPS) vehicle allegedly ran over A.M.L.’s foot on July 18, 2018. A.M.L.’s mother sent a Claim for Damage, Injury or Death (Standard Form 95) to USPS in August 2018. A year later, A.M.L.’s attorney sent a demand letter that set forth A.M.L.’s medical expenses. After USPS denied liability, A.M.L. (by and through her parent) filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that A.M.L. had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit. The district court dismissed the suit, and A.M.L. appealed, arguing that her claims satisfied the FTCA’s presentment requirement.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Sections 2672 and 2675(b) do not require that a claim set forth a single-dollar amount, but that it must express the maximum value of the asserted claim. Accordingly, the expression of a range complies with the statute’s requirements because it presents the maximum value of the claim. A.M.L.’s claim of “$250,000 to $275,000” thus presented a sum certain in compliance with the FTCA’s presentment requirement. View "A.M.L. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose from a medical malpractice action involving a partial foot amputation and sentinel lymph node biopsy (“SLNB”). John Beebe was diagnosed with aggressive melanoma on his foot. After his diagnosis, oncology specialists recommended a forefoot amputation and a SLNB. The SLNB involved the removal of a lymph node near John’s stomach to assist the oncologist with staging the cancer. Both procedures were performed at North Idaho Day Surgery, LLC, d/b/a Northwest Specialty Hospital (“NWSH”), after which the removed forefoot was placed into a pathology specimen bag and the lymph node was placed in a specimen cup. Purportedly, both specimens were subsequently placed in a second sealed bag, which was then placed in a locked drop box at NWSH for pickup by Incyte Pathology, Inc. Two days after the surgeries, NWSH received notice from Incyte that the lymph node was missing. NWSH subsequently searched the operating rooms, refrigerators, and the dumpster, but did not find the missing specimen. The Beebes filed a complaint against NWSH for medical malpractice and negligence and against Incyte for simple negligence. They later amended their complaint to add Cheryl’s claim for loss of consortium. The Beebes appealed the jury verdict in favor of NWSH, arguing the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for NWSH and dismissed Cheryl’s loss of consortium claim prior to trial. The Idaho Supree Court vacated the jury verdict because the district court gave a “but for” jury instruction on the issue of proximate cause instead of a “substantial factor” instruction. Further, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of Cheryl’s loss of consortium claim. View "Beebe v. North Idaho Day Surgery, LLC" on Justia Law

Christine and Thomas O'Holleran married in 2005. They had no children. In 2015, Christine filed for divorce and in her complaint alleged “[t]hat [Thomas] is guilty of physical and mental abuse toward [Christine], and such is sufficient that this marriage should be terminated at the fault of [Thomas].” In his response and counterclaim, Thomas requested a divorce on the grounds of habitual intemperance, extreme cruelty, and irreconcilable differences. Christine subsequently moved to amend her divorce complaint to add a tort claim for emotional and physical abuse and requested damages in excess of $10,000. In his answer to Christine’s amended complaint, Thomas asserted an affirmative defense arguing that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction to hear Christine’s tort claim. The magistrate court granted Christine’s motion to amend her complaint. The magistrate court held a bench trial on the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint, granting the divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, divided the parties’ real and personal property, and awarded Christine spousal maintenance. The decision did not address Christine’s tort claim. Thomas and Christine both filed motions to reconsider, but neither mentioned the magistrate court’s lack of findings and conclusions regarding Christine’s tort claim. Similarly, the magistrate court did not address Christine’s tort claim in its order denying reconsideration. The issue on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the magistrate court had authority to decide a tort claim by one spouse against another as an ancillary matter to a divorce proceeding. The Supreme Court determined Idaho Code sections 1-2208 and 1-2210 and I.C.A.R. 5 limited the case types that could be assigned to magistrate courts to those specified in the Seventh Judicial District’s order on local rules. That order did not give the magistrate court authority to decide civil cases seeking damages in excess of $10,000. Nor was the tort claim an ancillary matter to the divorce proceeding. Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined the magistrate court had authority to decide Christine’s tort claim. View "O'Holleran v. O'Holleran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a qui tam case on behalf of the State of California alleging Defendants and Respondents engaged in medical insurance fraud. Plaintiff asserted the alleged fraud victimized the state workers’ compensation system, including the State Compensation Insurance Fund, as well as Medi-Cal, and brought her action under the California False Claims Act (CFCA) and the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA). Plaintiff filed her qui tam complaint under seal and in camera as statutorily required. Before the matter reached trial, however, the trial court dismissed the action pursuant to the “five-year rule” set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment of dismissal, reinstated the action, and remanded it. The court held that the 962 days the action was kept under seal should have been excluded from the five-year period pursuant to Section 583.340(b). Further, the five-year period had not expired at the time the court dismissed the action. A five-year period totals 1,825 days. Adding to that period, the 962 days during which the action was under seal, the 712 days of the first stay and the 236 days of the second stay total 3,735 days. The date 3,735 days from the date Plaintiff filed her complaint (July 13, 2012) is October 3, 2022. Adding six months due to the COVID-19 emergency rule extends the period to April 3, 2023. Therefore, the trial court erred in prematurely dismissing Plaintiff’s action on February 24, 2021. View "State of Cal. ex. rel. Sills v. Gharib-Danesh" on Justia Law