Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Erasmo Paredes sustained an on-the-job injury in late 2019. He continued working for his employer, Schlumberger Technology Corp., until January 30, 2020. His employer's insurance carrier, Travelers Indemnity Company of America, provided voluntary medical treatment to Paredes from January 3, 2020, through February 14, 2020. Paredes's CC-Form 3 Claim for Compensation was filed on December 3, 2020, alleging an injury date of December 29, 2019. This claim was filed ten months after Paredes's last medical treatment, but within one year from the date of his injury. Travelers's counsel entered an appearance in the Workers' Compensation case on December 22, 2020. On February 18, 2021, the affidavit of Travelers's claims handler was filed with attachments indicating Travelers provided medical treatment to Paredes in the total amount of $1,371.47. No disability benefits were paid. On the same date, counsel for Travelers filed the CC-Form 10 Answer and Notice of Contested Issues on behalf of Schlumberger raising the defense of statute of limitations pursuant to Section 69(A)(1) of Title 85 A. 1 Schlumberger also denied compensable injuries, alleged pre-existing conditions pursuant to 85A O.S. Supp. 2019, § 2(9)(b)(6), and denied benefits. An ALJ issued an order that was filed on May 13, 2021, concluding that Paredes's claim was not barred by Section 69(A)(1). Schlumberger appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission"), and the parties filed written arguments. Oral argument before the Commission was held on January 14, 2022. The Commission, sitting en banc, affirmed the Decision of the ALJ by order filed January 18, 2022. Schlumberger appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court seeking review of the Commission's interpretation of 85A O.S. Supp. 2019, § 69(A)(1). Finding no error in the Commission's interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused and exploited from approximately 1978 to 1984, when he was between 12 and 17 years old, by Father P.M., a now-deceased Rhode Island priest. Plaintiff sued the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence (“RCB”), St. Anthony’s Church Corporation North Providence (“St. Anthony’s”), and a retired Bishop (together, “Defendants”) for various torts based on Defendants’ alleged role in enabling the abuse. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that New York’s long-arm statute did not permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. First, P.M. did not commit the alleged sexual abuse in New York as an agent of Defendants. Second, the alleged conduct is unrelated to Defendants’ business activities in New York. The court explained that Plaintiff argued that the nexus requirement is satisfied because Defendants’ alleged business activity, conducted through P.M., was the “factual cause” of P.M.’s sexual assault of “Plaintiff in New York.” But a chain of causation involving physical presence in New York does not, by itself, create a nexus between an otherwise unrelated tort claim and a business transaction. View "Philip Edwardo v. The Roman Catholic Bishop, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from Plaintiff’s suit against the City of Harahan (“the City”) for its alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In October 2019, the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”) Chief of Police determined that Plaintiff was guilty of numerous offenses. Plaintiff was entitled to a fifteen-day appeal window of the Chief’s disciplinary determinations. Plaintiff exercised his right to appeal a week after the charges. However, the Chief emailed the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s office (“JPDA”) to inform it of his disciplinary action against Plaintiff before he exercised his right. Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against the City for violation of his procedural due process rights, stigma-plus-infringement, and defamation. He included Louisiana state law claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The City moved to dismiss his Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(c). The primary issue is whether the district court erroneously determined that Plaintiff had a liberty interest in his “future employment as a law enforcement officer.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule 12(c) motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s alleged liberty interest in his career in law enforcement has no basis in Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent. Moreover, he does not provide a different constitutional anchor for this proposed liberty interest. Because he fails to state facts supporting the violation of a cognizable liberty interest, he fails to plead a due process violation. Furthermore, the court declined to address the adequacy of the process he received. View "Adams v. City of Harahan" on Justia Law

The Sabine River Authority of Louisiana ("SRA-L")was created as a conservation and reclamation district lying within the watershed of the Sabine River, by an act of the Louisiana legislature in 1950. The SRA subsequently entered into a joint venture with the Sabine River Authority, Texas ("SRA-T") to create a dam and reservoir, promote industrial development, and conserve water.Plaintiffs are Louisiana and Texas property owners who claimed that the SRAs violated their federal Fifth Amendment rights by opening spillway gates to relieve highwater levels in the reservoir during a rain event in March of 2016. Plaintiffs claimed the SRA's actions flooded their properties, causing significant property damage.The district court determined SRA-L was not an arm of the state and therefore was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. SRA-L appealed. Finding that the first Clark factor weighed in favor of sovereign immunity, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the remaining Clark factors weighed against sovereign immunity. Thus, the court held that, under he Eleventh Amendment, the SRA-L is not an "arm of the state." View "Bonin, et al v. Sabine River Authority" on Justia Law

In 2017, Charles Green was stabbed and killed. His body was found in a parking lot in front of an abandoned building. Deepak Jasco, LLC, owned and operated a convenience store in the adjacent lot. Luretha Green Palmer, Green’s sister and the executrix of his estate, filed a wrongful-death lawsuit and asserted a claim for premises liability based on negligent security. The circuit judge denied the motion for summary judgment, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal. Palmer did not allege that defendants had actual knowledge of the violent nature of Green’s attacker and offered no affidavit or evidence to establish this element. Instead, Palmer argued that Defendants were aware of an atmosphere of violence on their premises. Further, Palmer insisted that summary judgment was properly denied because there was a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute about whether Green was killed on Defendant’s premises at 1034 West Woodrow Wilson Drive and whether Deepak Jasco, LLC, exercised possession and control over the portion of the common parking lot where Green died from his injuries. The Mississippi Supreme Court did not agree with Palmer's contentions, finding she failed to establish an atmosphere of violence through police records of other instances of crime at or near the property in question, and that defendants owned or operated the property. With no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, the Court found defendants were entitled to summary judgment. View "Deepak Jasco, LLC, et al. v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Zurich American Insurance Company (“Defendant”) insured St. Joe Minerals Corporation (“St. Joe”) and its sole shareholder Fluor Corporation (“Plaintiff”) from 1981 to 1985. St. Joe operated a lead smelting plant in Herculaneum, Missouri. Residents of the town sued Fluor and St. Joe in the early 2000s, claiming that they had been injured by the plant’s release of lead and other toxins.Defendant agreed to defend the companies and paid out $9.87 million. Defendant also contributed more than $25 million to a settlement between St. Joe and the remaining plaintiffs. Plaintiff went to trial, lost in a jury trial, and then settled the claims for $300 million.Defendant filed for declaratory judgment against Plaintiff, who filed a counterclaim alleging bad faith failure to settle. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that the policy limited Defendant’s liability on a per-occurrence basis and that the $3.5 million per-occurrence limit had been exhausted by Defendant’s initial payments. The court also concluded that Defendant did not act in bad faith when it elected not to settle the claims against Plaintiff.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s policy-limits determination and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that an endorsement modified the limits of liability for comprehensive general liability, including bodily injury liability, to be on a per-claim basis. View "Fluor Corporation v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) and John Sandberg appealed a district court judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision on remand, entered after the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State by & through Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Sandberg (“Sandberg II”), 956 N.W.2d 342. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the ALJ had made conflicting and insufficient findings to support the finding that Sandberg’s claim was compensable and it was “unable to reconcile the ALJ’s decision with the statutory requirements for medical evidence supported by objective medical findings for a compensable injury in N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(10).” On remand, the ALJ made additional findings and again held Sandberg met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had sustained a compensable injury. WSI appealed to the district court and the court affirmed the ALJ’s order. On the second appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the “judgment affirming the ALJ’s revised order to the extent the order found Sandberg sustained a compensable injury; however, the Court remand[ed] the case to WSI for further proceedings on whether benefits must be awarded on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15.” On remand, WSI reversed its decision and accepted Sandberg’s claim on an aggravation basis and denied Sandberg disability benefits. Sandberg appealed to the district court, which affirmed WSI’s determination to award benefits on an aggravation basis and reversed the ALJ’s affirmance of WSI’s denial of disability benefits concluding WSI exceeded the scope of remand provided in Sandberg II. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding WSI exceeded the scope of the remand and in reversing the ALJ's order affirming WSI's denial of disability benefits. The Court affirmed the district court affirmance of the ALJ’s order awarding benefits on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15. The Court reinstated the ALJ’s order affirming WSI’s denial of disability benefits. View "Sandberg v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from a district court order approving a class-action settlement that purports to provide injunctive relief and up to $8 million in monetary relief to a class of individuals (the “Class”) who purchased one or more “brain performance supplements” manufactured and sold by Defendants Reckitt Benckiser LLC and RB Health (US) LLC (together, “RB”) under the brand name “Neuriva.” Five Plaintiffs (together, the “Named Plaintiffs”) who had previously purchased Neuriva brought a putative class action, alleging that RB used false and misleading statements to give consumers the impression that Neuriva and its “active ingredients” had been clinically tested and proven to improve brain function. The parties promptly agreed to a global settlement (the “Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) that sought to resolve the claims of all Plaintiffs and absent Class members. The current appeal involves one unnamed Class member, an attorney and frequent class-action objector, who objected in district court and subsequently appealed the district court’s approval order.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court concluded that the Named Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims for injunctive relief. The court explained that Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must establish that they are likely to suffer an injury that is “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural or hypothetical.” But none of the Named Plaintiffs allege that they plan to purchase any of the Neuriva Products again. The district court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to award injunctive relief to the Named Plaintiffs or absent Class members, and its approval of the Settlement Agreement was an abuse of discretion. View "David Williams, et al v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thousands of Peruvian citizens, alleged injury from Doe Run’s lead-mining and smelting complex in La Oroya, Peru. Doe Run, based in St. Louis, Missouri, has operated the complex since 1997. The Renco Group owns Doe Run. Plaintiffs sued in Missouri state court, and Defendants removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Defendants submitted a report to the district court about allegedly fraudulent conduct by two former “plaintiff recruiters” in Peru. Defendants sought certain discovery in this case. Plaintiffs opposed these efforts and filed for a protective order to bar the defendants from obtaining discovery from the non-trial-pool Plaintiff. Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a protective order to prohibit Defendants’ Peruvian counsel from participating in witness interviews in the Peruvian criminal investigation, claiming that it would be impermissible ex parte communication. Defendants appealed the grant of Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a protective order. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But they moved to withdraw their motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw their motion to dismiss as moot. The court reasoned that though the order is not appealable merely by virtue of its effect on a foreign criminal investigation, it may nevertheless be appealable if it has the practical effect of an injunction and has serious, irreparable consequences. The court concluded that the order does not have that effect. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated that it has serious, irreparable consequences. View "Chris Collins v. Doe Run Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

SE Property Holdings, LLC (“SEPH”) obtained a deficiency judgment against Neverve LLC (“Neverve”) after Neverve defaulted on loans secured by a mortgage on its property. Following this judgment, Neverve received the proceeds from an unrelated settlement. But Neverve transferred those proceeds to attorneys representing Neverve’s principal in payment of attorney’s fees relating to the principal’s personal bankruptcy proceedings. SEPH then sued Neverve based on Neverve’s allegedly fraudulent transfer of those settlement proceeds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve, finding that the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act’s (“FUFTA”) “catch-all” provision did not allow for (1) an award of money damages against the transferor, (2) punitive damages, or (3) attorney’s fees. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim, as Neverve no longer possessed the settlement proceeds at issue.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the narrow interpretation of FUFTA in Freeman v. First Union National Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004), the court believes the Florida Supreme Court would determine that FUFTA’s catch-all provision does not allow for an award of money damages against the transferor, an award of punitive damages, or an award of attorney’s fees. Thus, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s FUFTA claims. And the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Neverve LLC" on Justia Law