Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis. Nearly four years after his diagnosis, he and his wife sued FAG Bearings, LLC, alleging the company caused his condition by improperly disposing of trichloroethylene at a facility near his childhood home in Missouri. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of FAG Bearings after concluding the suit originated in Texas under Missouri’s borrowing statute and was time-barred under Texas law.The Eight Circuit affirmed. The dispute centers on Missouri’s borrowing statute, which provides: “Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state . . . in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of [Missouri].” Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that his claim rose in Missouri. The court held that Plaintiff lived in Texas when he learned he may have a claim against the company. And, under Texas law, Plaintiff's claim was subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Thus, the district court did not error in finding Plaintiff's claim was time-barred. View "Spencer Knapp v. FAG Bearings, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were the wrongful-death beneficiaries of a man killed in an apartment fire and two other people injured in the same fire. The fire occurred at an apartment complex in Pike County, Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the apartment complex’s management company, Alpha Management Corporation, which had its principal place of business in Madison County. And they also named as a defendant the purported property owner, Community Park Apartments, Inc. (CPA). At the time the complaint was filed, the Mississippi Secretary of State’s website listed CPA as having its principal office in Hinds County. So the plaintiffs filed suit in Hinds County. The controlling issue in this interlocutory appeal is fraudulent joinder—did the plaintiffs join a defendant for the sole purpose of establishing venue in Hinds County? Alpha Management asserted that CPA did not own the apartments. And because CPA was not a proper defendant, Alpha Management moved that venue be transferred from Hinds County to Pike County or Madison County. CPA similarly filed a motion to dismiss, attaching a copy of the same warranty deed showing it had sold the apartments in 1975 and then ceased to operate as a nonprofit corporation. Hinds County Circuit Court denied both motions. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded with instructions to dismiss CPA as a defendant and transfer the case to either Madison County or Pike County. View "Alpha Management Corporation, et al. v. Harris, et al." on Justia Law

Adora Wilmore-Moody, individually and as next friend of her minor son, brought an action against Mohammed Zakir and Everest National Insurance Company, alleging that Zakir had negligently rear-ended her vehicle, and sought personal protection insurance benefits from Everest for the injuries she and her son incurred as a result of the collision. Everest did not pay the benefits but instead rescinded plaintiff’s policy on the ground that plaintiff had failed to disclose that she had a teenaged granddaughter living with her when she applied for the insurance policy. Everest then brought a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief and moved for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim against it under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was entitled to rescind plaintiff’s policy because she had made a material misrepresentation in her insurance application. The trial court granted Everest’s motion. After this ruling, Zakir also moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff was barred from recovering third-party noneconomic damages from him under the Michigan no-fault act because once Everett rescinded plaintiff’s insurance policy, she did not have the security required by statute at the time the injury occurred. The trial court granted Zakir summary judgment too. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Everest, reversed as to Zakir, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Zakir appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: an insurer’s decision to rescind a policy post-accident does not trigger the exclusion in MCL 500.3135(2)(c). "Rescission is an equitable remedy in contract, exercised at the discretion of the insurer, and does not alter the reality that, at the time the injury occurred, the injured motorist held the required security. Rescission by the insurer post-accident is not a defense that can be used by a third-party tortfeasor to avoid liability for noneconomic damages." View "Wilmore-Moody v. Zakir" on Justia Law

Appellant, as personal representative of the estate of Decedent, filed a second amended complaint alleging Decedent suffered deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while in custody at the Alleghany County, Maryland Detention Center (“ACDC”), which led to his death. Appellant asserted claims against various individuals (the “Individual Medical Defendants”) and against the company contracted to provide medical care services to inmates at ACDC, Wellpath, LLC, (collectively “Appellees”). The district court dismissed Appellant’s second amended complaint.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs. The court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that Appellant failed to plead actual knowledge when she alleged that none of the Individual Medical Defendants “thought it necessary to take Decedent to the hospital.” In so holding, the district court failed to consider the context of the allegation and disregarded the obvious sarcasm in the full allegation. Appellant actually alleged that none of the Individual Medical Defendants “thought it necessary to take Decedent to the hospital despite an obvious ongoing medical emergency.” Further, the court held that Appellant sufficiently alleged that the Individual Medical Defendants’ treatment and/or attempts at treatment were not “adequate to address Decedent’s serious medical needs,” that Decedent’s deterioration was persistent and obvious, and that the factual allegations allege more than mere disagreements regarding Decedent’s medical care. As such, Appellant has plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation. View "Shelly Stevens v. Dawn Holler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), of their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims. The district court held that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants Global Tel*Link Corp. (“GTL”); Securus Technologies, LLC; and 3Cinteractive Corp. (“3Ci”) proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and held that Plaintiffs have pleaded facts that satisfy RICO’s proximate-causation requirement, as explained in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). The court explained that RICO proximate causation is lacking when (1) there is a “more direct victim” from whom (or intervening factor from which) the plaintiff’s injuries derive, or (2) the alleged RICO predicate violation is “too distinct” or logically unrelated from the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiffs’ complaint suffers from neither deficiency. As Plaintiffs point out, the governments’ injuries could be cured if Defendants paid higher site commissions—even if Plaintiffs paid the same inflated price. So Plaintiffs’ injuries aren’t derivative of those suffered by the governments. Rather, Plaintiffs and the governments are both direct victims. View "Ashley Albert v. Global TelLink Corp." on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence and not intentional wrongdoing, and it denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district was under the duty to preserve the video when it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). The Court of Appeal concluded the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f) did not shield a party from sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence if the evidence was altered or destroyed when the party was under a duty to preserve the evidence. The Court found the record supported the trial court’s ruling that the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, the safe-harbor provision did not apply. The Court granted the real parties’ petition in part and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the form of sanctions imposed were warranted. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Walmart in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, Missouri. Plaintiff alleged Walmart engaged in misleading and deceptive marketing practices by selling cough suppressants with dextromethorphan hydrobromide (“DXM”) and a “non-drowsy” label. Walmart removed the case to the Eastern District of Missouri, and Plaintiff moved to have the case remanded to state court. The district court remanded, finding Walmart had not met the Class Action Fairness Act’s jurisdictional requirement of showing the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Walmart has shown the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.  The court concluded that Walmart’s declaration was sufficient to support a finding that sales exceeded $5 million. The total amount of sales can be a measure of the amount in controversy. The court explained that the declaration was sufficient, particularly when it is very plausible that a company the size of Walmart would have sold more than $5 million in cough suppressants in the state of Missouri over a period of five years. View "Nicholas Brunts v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for driving while intoxicated. She sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and related state laws. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, Plaintiff contests the summary judgment for the Section 1983 claims of false arrest and excessive force along with the state law claims of false arrest, excessive force, negligence, and vicarious liability.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated. The court explained that the following facts are confirmed: (1) A witness reported to the police that Plaintiff was driving in a dangerous manner;(2) there is video footage of Plaintiff’s car swerving out of the lane and recorded audio of the officers noting the swerve, and (3) The officers could not conclusively determine that she had not taken drugs. Those facts alone are sufficient to give rise to probable cause that Plaintiff was driving while intoxicated. Further, the court found that the officer’s limited use of force (in such a short time frame) to restrain Plaintiff and place her in handcuffs as a response to Plaintiff’s perceived resistance does not amount to excessive force.   Moreover, the court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated, and accordingly, there was no false arrest. Finally, because Plaintiff’s underlying state law claims were properly dismissed, there is no basis for her vicarious liability claim against the municipal Defendants. View "Scott v. City of Mandeville, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a diversity suit against his former stepfather, Defendant, alleging that Defendant owed him a fiduciary duty to disclose the existence of certain Settlement Funds arising from the wrongful death of Plaintiff’s biological father. The Eleventh Circuit previously certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding breach of fiduciary duty for failure to disclose a claim.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant on the failure to disclose claim and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court should only have granted Defendant summary judgment if there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the tort claim and Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing all evidence and making all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Here, a reasonable jury could find the following facts at trial:4 (1) Plaintiff and Defendant were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship such that, under Georgia law, the statute of limitations could be tolled, and a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could be supported; (2) at the time Plaintiff turned 18, at least $50,000 of the Settlement Funds remained in the Charles Schwab account; (3) Plaintiff had a right to take control of the Settlement Funds when he turned 18; (4) Defendant had a duty to disclose the existence of the Settlement Funds and turn over control of those funds to Plaintiff when he turned 18; (5) Defendant failed to do so, and (6) Plaintiff would have taken control of the funds when he turned 18. View "Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed (“Walmart”) in her “slip and fall” negligence suit under Georgia law. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in (1) analyzing her slip and fall claim under a premises liability theory instead of an active negligence theory and (2) denying her spoliation of evidence claim and related sanctions request.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to cite any binding authority under Georgia law supporting an active negligence theory in a slip and fall case. And the persuasive value of the non-binding cases she cites is limited because they have either been rejected by the Georgia courts as a basis for active negligence in the slip and fall context or are fully distinguishable. More importantly, the allegations in her complaint clearly involve a condition of the premises. Plaintiff alleged that she was shopping at Walmart when “she slipped and fell from liquid that was on the floor” and that Walmart “had a duty to inspect the Premises to discover dangerous and hazardous conditions . . . and to either eliminate such . . . conditions or to warn its invitees.” Thus, the district court did not err in analyzing her claim under the framework of traditional premises liability. View "Adriana Mendez v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP" on Justia Law