Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Christine and Thomas O'Holleran married in 2005. They had no children. In 2015, Christine filed for divorce and in her complaint alleged “[t]hat [Thomas] is guilty of physical and mental abuse toward [Christine], and such is sufficient that this marriage should be terminated at the fault of [Thomas].” In his response and counterclaim, Thomas requested a divorce on the grounds of habitual intemperance, extreme cruelty, and irreconcilable differences. Christine subsequently moved to amend her divorce complaint to add a tort claim for emotional and physical abuse and requested damages in excess of $10,000. In his answer to Christine’s amended complaint, Thomas asserted an affirmative defense arguing that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction to hear Christine’s tort claim. The magistrate court granted Christine’s motion to amend her complaint. The magistrate court held a bench trial on the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint, granting the divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, divided the parties’ real and personal property, and awarded Christine spousal maintenance. The decision did not address Christine’s tort claim. Thomas and Christine both filed motions to reconsider, but neither mentioned the magistrate court’s lack of findings and conclusions regarding Christine’s tort claim. Similarly, the magistrate court did not address Christine’s tort claim in its order denying reconsideration. The issue on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the magistrate court had authority to decide a tort claim by one spouse against another as an ancillary matter to a divorce proceeding. The Supreme Court determined Idaho Code sections 1-2208 and 1-2210 and I.C.A.R. 5 limited the case types that could be assigned to magistrate courts to those specified in the Seventh Judicial District’s order on local rules. That order did not give the magistrate court authority to decide civil cases seeking damages in excess of $10,000. Nor was the tort claim an ancillary matter to the divorce proceeding. Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined the magistrate court had authority to decide Christine’s tort claim. View "O'Holleran v. O'Holleran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a qui tam case on behalf of the State of California alleging Defendants and Respondents engaged in medical insurance fraud. Plaintiff asserted the alleged fraud victimized the state workers’ compensation system, including the State Compensation Insurance Fund, as well as Medi-Cal, and brought her action under the California False Claims Act (CFCA) and the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA). Plaintiff filed her qui tam complaint under seal and in camera as statutorily required. Before the matter reached trial, however, the trial court dismissed the action pursuant to the “five-year rule” set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment of dismissal, reinstated the action, and remanded it. The court held that the 962 days the action was kept under seal should have been excluded from the five-year period pursuant to Section 583.340(b). Further, the five-year period had not expired at the time the court dismissed the action. A five-year period totals 1,825 days. Adding to that period, the 962 days during which the action was under seal, the 712 days of the first stay and the 236 days of the second stay total 3,735 days. The date 3,735 days from the date Plaintiff filed her complaint (July 13, 2012) is October 3, 2022. Adding six months due to the COVID-19 emergency rule extends the period to April 3, 2023. Therefore, the trial court erred in prematurely dismissing Plaintiff’s action on February 24, 2021. View "State of Cal. ex. rel. Sills v. Gharib-Danesh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gregg Lawrence sued defendant Oregon State Fair Council for negligence, alleging that defendant had failed “to supervise and maintain its premises in a reasonably safe manner” so that guests walking on the property would not be injured. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result, the aluminum bleachers at a show that he attended with his wife and mother were wet and unsafe, causing him to fall and incur injuries. The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to exclude certain evidence. During trial, at plaintiff’s request, the trial court reconsidered its ruling, but adhered to its decision to exclude the evidence. After a verdict for defendant, plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that plaintiff had not done enough to preserve the issue of the admissibility of the challenged evidence. To this the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for a determination of that issue on its merits. View "Lawrence v. Oregon State Fair Council" on Justia Law

In 2014, plaintiffs Roberta and Kevin Haas' stopped car was struck by a car driven by defendant Mark Carter. Plaintiffs brought this negligence action against defendants, Carter's estate and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, seeking to recover economic and noneconomic damages. Carter died after plaintiffs filed suit. State Farm was Roberta Haas' insurer, whom she sued for breach of contract, alleging it failed to pay all the personal injury protection benefits that were due. At trial, one of the primary issues was whether Carter’s driving was a cause-in-fact of the injuries that plaintiffs alleged, and the issue on appeal became whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on causation. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court determined the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on causation, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter" on Justia Law

Employees at C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. jumped ship to join Traffic Tech, Inc. C.H. Robinson then sued five of those former employees and Traffic Tech, raising various state-law claims, including tortious interference with a contractual relationship. After the case was removed to federal court, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former employees and Traffic Tech. The district court also awarded attorney fees to the former employees and Traffic Tech   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, reversed the judgment in all other respects, and vacated the district court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs. The court held that Minnesota law applies to the interpretation and enforceability of Defendants’ employment contracts. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether C.H. Robinson’s claims or disputes against Peacock arose in California or elsewhere under Peacock’s employment contract. The court further remanded for the district court to substantively analyze whether all or part of the former employees’ contracts are unenforceable and, if not, whether the claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with a contractual relationship survive summary judgment. View "C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Traffic Tech, Inc." on Justia Law

Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("Mobile Infirmary") appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. ("Quest"). Quest and Mobile Infirmary entered into a Laboratory Management Agreement ("the LMA"), in which Quest agreed to manage Mobile Infirmary's onsite clinical laboratory facilities and to provide clinical testing services used by Mobile Infirmary's medical staff to diagnose and treat patients. The LMA also contained indemnity provisions. In 2015, James Ward went to Mobile Infirmary's emergency room after suffering weakness, dizziness, loss of fluids, a mild cough, and severe body aches. Ward was eventually diagnosed with diabetic ketoacidosis. When his condition did not improve, Ward was moved into the intensive-care unit, at which point his doctor ordered him to undergo glucose finger-sticks and a basic metabolic panel every four hours to help monitor his serum glucose, kidney function, acid/base status, and electrolytes. According to Mobile Infirmary, those basic metabolic panels were supposed to be performed by Quest, but they were allegedly canceled by one of Quest's employees. At some point, he suffered an "anoxic brain injury" and later died "as a result of multisystem organ failure secondary to severe sepsis and septic shock." Ingrid Mia Ward ("Mia"), Ward's wife and the personal representative of his estate, commenced a wrongful-death action against Mobile Infirmary and other defendants responsible for Ward's treatment and care. Quest was not named as a party to Mia's action. Mobile Infirmary informed Quest of the action and, as the case progressed, apprised Quest of the status of the proceedings, including its negotiations with Mia for potential settlement of the lawsuit. Mia and Mobile Infirmary ultimately settled the wrongful-death action. Before Mia's claims against Mobile Infirmary were dismissed pursuant to a joint motion of those parties, Mobile Infirmary filed a third-party complaint against Quest in which it sought contractual and equitable indemnity related to its defense and settlement of Mia's action. Quest filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted in part by dismissing Mobile Infirmary's equitable- indemnity claim. The Alabama Supreme Court found that nowhere in the LMA did the parties expressly agree or clearly provide a formula that, in the event there was a claim that arises out of partial liability or concurrent acts by both parties, indemnification will be required for a proportionate share. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tina Fleurrey appealed the dismissal of her negligence claim against defendant landlord 3378 VT Route 12 LLC. In her complaint, she alleged that landlord was responsible for the drowning death of decedent Scott Fleurrey, a fifty-four-year-old man with developmental disabilities, on the property that landlord leased to decedent’s caretakers, Upper Valley Services (UVS) and Azwala Rodriguez. The question on appeal was whether the civil division properly dismissed plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff argued the civil division erred by misunderstanding the controlling law because landlord owed decedent a duty to protect and because the civil division drew inferences favorable to landlord. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the civil division properly granted landlord’s dismissal motion because: (1) Vermont precedents required an invitee to seek redress for injuries sustained on negligently maintained property from the land possessor who invited the injured invitee to the defective property, rather than from the absentee landlord; (2) §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts were inapplicable here because those Restatement sections addressed only land possessors, and plaintiff did not allege that landlord was the possessor of the subject property; and (3) no duty could arise where, as here, a plaintiff did not allege that a legal relationship existed between a decedent and a landlord. View "Fleurrey v. Department of Aging and Independent Living, et al." on Justia Law

Jessica Tutor was driving three passengers in her automobile when she hit another vehicle head-on. Two of the passengers, Jack Sines and Devan Frazier, were injured and later sued Tutor. The case went to trial solely on Sines's and Frazier's claims of wantonness, and the jury found in their favor. The trial court then entered judgment against Tutor. She appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tutor v. Sines, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued numerous media organizations and individual journalists, alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff’s claims arise from misstatements of his criminal record: he was convicted and served one year in prison for a federal conspiracy offense, but Defendants made statements describing him as a “felon.” The sixteen Defendants moved for summary judgment in their respective cases. The district court granted summary judgment to all sixteen Defendants after concluding they did not make the statements with actual malice. At issue are two appeals: a consolidated appeal from the district court’s decisions granting summary judgment to fifteen Defendants and a separate appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Boston Globe.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the cumulative record simply does not permit a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that any Defendant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the statements it published. Some of the statements may have been the product of carelessness and substandard journalistic methods. But at the end of the day, the record does not contain evidence that the commentators and journalists responsible for the statements were anything more than confused about how to describe a person who served a year in prison for a federal offense. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence of actual malice to support his defamation or false light claims against Fox News, he cannot establish an underlying tort, and his conspiracy claims fail as a matter of law. View "Don Blankenship v. NBCUniversal, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against TrustedID, Inc. under South Carolina’s Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act (the “Act”), S.C. Code Ann. Section 37-20-180. The district court held that Plaintiff alleged an Article III injury in fact but failed to state a claim under the Act. Plaintiff agrees with the district court’s decision on standing but appeals its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court where it originated. The court conceded that it is odd that TrustedID failed to comply with the five-digit SSN cutoff, which doesn’t appear to be unique to South Carolina’s Act. But federal courts can’t entertain a case without a concrete injury in fact. The court offered no opinion about whether the alleged facts state a claim under the Act. Absent Article III jurisdiction, that’s a question for Plaintiff to take up in state court. View "Brady O'Leary v. TrustedID, Inc." on Justia Law