Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tanner Altizer suffered serious injuries when he ran into a suspended cable fence while riding his off-road motorcycle on an unpaved area in an unoccupied area of the desert. The owner of the property, respondent Coachella Valley Conservation Commission (the Commission), placed the cable fence around its property to stop illegal dumping and off-road vehicles in order to protect the sensitive habitat. Altizer sued the Commission, alleging that the cable fence created a dangerous condition on public property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission, and Altizer appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Commission was entitled to hazardous recreational activity immunity under Government Code section 831.71 and affirmed. View "Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Com." on Justia Law

Pretrial detainee Wilson complained to Philadelphia Federal Detention Center medical staff about a lump on his testicle in November 2017. They allegedly stated that such a lump was probably cancerous. Wilson subsequently complained that his condition worsened but received no further treatment. Wilson was transferred to Bureau of Prisons custody, where a urologist determined in February 2018 that the lump was cancerous. Wilson's right testicle was surgically removed. Wilson believed that if his cancer had been addressed earlier, treatment would not have involved chemotherapy and surgery.Wilson alleged medical negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court granted extensions for Wilson (pro se) to act on Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3, which requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to certify either that they have expert support for their claims or will proceed without an expert. Wilson explained that he wanted an expert but conceded the impossibility of obtaining one during the pandemic prison lockdowns. He stated that his medical records would demonstrate that his injury “was not inevitable" and specifically identified documents as discoverable material to substantiate his allegations, The court granted the government summary judgment stating that, while a factfinder could find without expert testimony that the delay in treatment was unreasonable, the issue of whether the delay caused the need to remove Wilson’s testicle required expert testimony.The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the FTCA does not incorporate Rule 1042.3. Wilson did not otherwise have an adequate opportunity to seek out an expert or conduct discovery due to his unique position as a pro se inmate during the pandemic. View "Wilson v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a fatal collision between a tractor-trailer driven by Lloy White and a car driven by Kristie Miller. The issue it presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether the well-established test governing the admissibility of expert testimony applied with equal force to investigating law enforcement officers. To this, the Court held that when an investigating law enforcement officer provides expert testimony, the officer is subject to the same inquiry as all witnesses who offer expert opinion testimony and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a full, three-prong analysis under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and its progeny. View "Miller, et al. v. Golden Peanut Company, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a diversity action in the District of Nebraska against Defendant, seeking damages for losses allegedly caused by an auto accident in 2015. Defendant’s Answer admitted that her negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. After protracted discovery disputes over expert witness disclosures, the district court excluded all of Plaintiff’s numerous treating physician witnesses for failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the summary judgment record supports the district court’s conclusion that the treating physician’s letter “demonstrates that his causation opinion was not formed during his treatment of Plaintiff.” Therefore, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in determining that the physician was a prospective expert witness subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and excluding his testimony for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with that Rule. View "J.T. Johnson, Jr. v. Jenna Friesen" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Transportation hired Joe McGee Construction Company, Inc., for a road construction and bridge replacement project. The Department designed the temporary traffic control plan for the project, which provided for the placement of temporary traffic signs. McGee Construction then subcontracted with Riverside Traffic Systems, Inc. for the placement of the signs leading up to and around the site. Hattie Brown drove down the closed portion of Highway 245 and collided with a stationary crane, resulting in her death. Responding Mississippi Highway Patrol Trooper Jonathan Ragan’s report stated Brown’s vehicle “collided with the barricade on the southbound lane and traveled approximately 200 yards colliding head on with a crane parked on a bridge.” His report also noted that “[t]here was adequate warning signage of the road being closed with barricades across both lanes” and that “[t]he southbound side barricade was destroyed.” Dianne Brown-Bowens, Hattie Brown’s daughter, filed a wrongful death suit against McGee Construction, and later amended the complaint to include the Department and Riverside as defendants, asserting claims of negligence and strict liability, and sought to recover punitive damages. McGee Construction moved for summary judgment, asserting it “provided legally sufficient notice to motorists, including [Hattie] Brown, that the section of Highway 245 South where the accident occurred was closed and that McGee Construction therefore, breached no duty owed to [Hattie] Brown” and that it was not negligent because none of its actions proximately caused the accident. The trial court entered an order granting Riverside’s motion for summary judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Department’s and McGee Construction’s motions for summary judgment, ruling that the Department’s and McGee Construction’s summary judgment motions were denied as to Brown-Bowens’s negligence claim but granted as to her claims for strict liability and for punitive damages. On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, defendants argued the trial court erred by denying their motions for summary judgment because Brown-Bowens failed to present evidence that either party, by act or omission, contributed to the death of Hattie Brown. The Court agreed with this and reversed the trial court. View "Joe McGee Construction Company, Inc. v. Brown-Bowens" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jackie and Debra Aycock sued the University of Mississippi Medical Center for medical negligence, alleging injuries Jackie suffered occurred as a result of the hospital’s negligence. The medical center sought summary judgment seeking dismissal of the negligence action based on the Aycocks’ failure to serve its chief executive officer with their notice of claim as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2019). The hospital argued that the Aycocks’ failure to serve proper notice resulted in the running of the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(3)(a) (Rev. 2019). The circuit court denied summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The hospital appealed. but the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of UMMC's motion for summary judgment. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Aycock" on Justia Law

LG Chem manufactured the LG HG2 18650 lithium-ion batteries that exploded in Sullivan’s pocket and caused him severe second- and third-degree burns. Sullivan obtained the batteries from a vape store in Michigan to use for his e-cigarette device. In Sullivan’s suit, LG Chem, a South Korean company, opposed personal jurisdiction, arguing that exercising personal jurisdiction over it in Michigan would be improper under Michigan’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. Limited discovery revealed that LG sent at least two shipments of 18650 batteries directly into Michigan and had executed “two supplier agreements . . . with Michigan companies relating to 18650 batteries.” Neither party addressed whether any of the 18650 batteries that LG shipped into Michigan was ultimately one of the batteries that injured Sullivan.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. LG urged too narrow a view of personal jurisdiction. The Michigan district court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over LG because it directly shipped its 18650 batteries into the state and entered into two supplier contracts with Michigan companies for 18650 batteries. The court noted that other courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over LG when LG conducts business related to its 18650 batteries in or ships its 18650 batteries into the forum state. View "Sullivan v. LG Chem Ltd." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this case on res judicata grounds, holding that Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata.At issue in this case arising from a dispute related to a foreclosure action was whether a prior dismissal with prejudice of a complaint filed by Plaintiff in 2017 precluded the claim brought in this 2020 case. The district court concluded that because the prior dismissal had been with prejudice, it constituted a final judgment on the merits, therefore having preclusive effect. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim was barred by res judicata and that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error. View "Rivera-Rosario v. LSREF2 Island Holdings, Ltd., Inc." on Justia Law

Mercy Medical Center d/b/a CHI St. Alexius Health Williston; and David Keene, M.D. (Defendants), appealed an amended judgment awarding Michael and Kimberly Davis $1,660,000 in damages and $204,973.31 in costs and disbursements for medical malpractice relating to Michael’s kidney failure. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court awarded disbursements not authorized by N.D.C.C. § 28-26-06 and allowed other costs without explanation. The Court reversed the Davises’ award of disbursements and costs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Davis, et al. v. Mercy Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law

After slipping on a puddle of water in a Wal-Mart store, Plaintiff sued Defendant Wal-Mart Inc. and Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.   The court reversed and remanded because Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The court explained that at least two Wal-Mart employees were in the area who reasonably could have seen the puddle. Another shopper notified one Walmart employee in the area, who was bringing a wet floor sign. After the shopper returned to the area of the puddle and before Plaintiff slipped, the video surveillance shows another Wal-Mart employee walk past the puddle, looking in its direction. The shopper testified the puddle was visible, glimmering and reflecting light. Moreover, it was raining, and this area—known as “action alley”—was high-traffic, which, like in Courville, reduced the amount of time necessary to put Wal-Mart on notice. The court explained that Plaintiff has provided direct evidence that the puddle existed for “some period of time.” Under these circumstances and on summary judgment, Plaintiff has presented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the period of time the puddle existed was sufficient to place the Defendants on notice of its existence. View "Flowers v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law