Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Zurich American Insurance Company (“Defendant”) insured St. Joe Minerals Corporation (“St. Joe”) and its sole shareholder Fluor Corporation (“Plaintiff”) from 1981 to 1985. St. Joe operated a lead smelting plant in Herculaneum, Missouri. Residents of the town sued Fluor and St. Joe in the early 2000s, claiming that they had been injured by the plant’s release of lead and other toxins.Defendant agreed to defend the companies and paid out $9.87 million. Defendant also contributed more than $25 million to a settlement between St. Joe and the remaining plaintiffs. Plaintiff went to trial, lost in a jury trial, and then settled the claims for $300 million.Defendant filed for declaratory judgment against Plaintiff, who filed a counterclaim alleging bad faith failure to settle. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that the policy limited Defendant’s liability on a per-occurrence basis and that the $3.5 million per-occurrence limit had been exhausted by Defendant’s initial payments. The court also concluded that Defendant did not act in bad faith when it elected not to settle the claims against Plaintiff.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s policy-limits determination and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that an endorsement modified the limits of liability for comprehensive general liability, including bodily injury liability, to be on a per-claim basis. View "Fluor Corporation v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) and John Sandberg appealed a district court judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision on remand, entered after the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State by & through Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Sandberg (“Sandberg II”), 956 N.W.2d 342. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the ALJ had made conflicting and insufficient findings to support the finding that Sandberg’s claim was compensable and it was “unable to reconcile the ALJ’s decision with the statutory requirements for medical evidence supported by objective medical findings for a compensable injury in N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(10).” On remand, the ALJ made additional findings and again held Sandberg met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had sustained a compensable injury. WSI appealed to the district court and the court affirmed the ALJ’s order. On the second appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the “judgment affirming the ALJ’s revised order to the extent the order found Sandberg sustained a compensable injury; however, the Court remand[ed] the case to WSI for further proceedings on whether benefits must be awarded on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15.” On remand, WSI reversed its decision and accepted Sandberg’s claim on an aggravation basis and denied Sandberg disability benefits. Sandberg appealed to the district court, which affirmed WSI’s determination to award benefits on an aggravation basis and reversed the ALJ’s affirmance of WSI’s denial of disability benefits concluding WSI exceeded the scope of remand provided in Sandberg II. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding WSI exceeded the scope of the remand and in reversing the ALJ's order affirming WSI's denial of disability benefits. The Court affirmed the district court affirmance of the ALJ’s order awarding benefits on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15. The Court reinstated the ALJ’s order affirming WSI’s denial of disability benefits. View "Sandberg v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from a district court order approving a class-action settlement that purports to provide injunctive relief and up to $8 million in monetary relief to a class of individuals (the “Class”) who purchased one or more “brain performance supplements” manufactured and sold by Defendants Reckitt Benckiser LLC and RB Health (US) LLC (together, “RB”) under the brand name “Neuriva.” Five Plaintiffs (together, the “Named Plaintiffs”) who had previously purchased Neuriva brought a putative class action, alleging that RB used false and misleading statements to give consumers the impression that Neuriva and its “active ingredients” had been clinically tested and proven to improve brain function. The parties promptly agreed to a global settlement (the “Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) that sought to resolve the claims of all Plaintiffs and absent Class members. The current appeal involves one unnamed Class member, an attorney and frequent class-action objector, who objected in district court and subsequently appealed the district court’s approval order.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court concluded that the Named Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims for injunctive relief. The court explained that Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must establish that they are likely to suffer an injury that is “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural or hypothetical.” But none of the Named Plaintiffs allege that they plan to purchase any of the Neuriva Products again. The district court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to award injunctive relief to the Named Plaintiffs or absent Class members, and its approval of the Settlement Agreement was an abuse of discretion. View "David Williams, et al v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thousands of Peruvian citizens, alleged injury from Doe Run’s lead-mining and smelting complex in La Oroya, Peru. Doe Run, based in St. Louis, Missouri, has operated the complex since 1997. The Renco Group owns Doe Run. Plaintiffs sued in Missouri state court, and Defendants removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Defendants submitted a report to the district court about allegedly fraudulent conduct by two former “plaintiff recruiters” in Peru. Defendants sought certain discovery in this case. Plaintiffs opposed these efforts and filed for a protective order to bar the defendants from obtaining discovery from the non-trial-pool Plaintiff. Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a protective order to prohibit Defendants’ Peruvian counsel from participating in witness interviews in the Peruvian criminal investigation, claiming that it would be impermissible ex parte communication. Defendants appealed the grant of Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a protective order. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But they moved to withdraw their motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw their motion to dismiss as moot. The court reasoned that though the order is not appealable merely by virtue of its effect on a foreign criminal investigation, it may nevertheless be appealable if it has the practical effect of an injunction and has serious, irreparable consequences. The court concluded that the order does not have that effect. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated that it has serious, irreparable consequences. View "Chris Collins v. Doe Run Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

SE Property Holdings, LLC (“SEPH”) obtained a deficiency judgment against Neverve LLC (“Neverve”) after Neverve defaulted on loans secured by a mortgage on its property. Following this judgment, Neverve received the proceeds from an unrelated settlement. But Neverve transferred those proceeds to attorneys representing Neverve’s principal in payment of attorney’s fees relating to the principal’s personal bankruptcy proceedings. SEPH then sued Neverve based on Neverve’s allegedly fraudulent transfer of those settlement proceeds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve, finding that the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act’s (“FUFTA”) “catch-all” provision did not allow for (1) an award of money damages against the transferor, (2) punitive damages, or (3) attorney’s fees. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim, as Neverve no longer possessed the settlement proceeds at issue.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the narrow interpretation of FUFTA in Freeman v. First Union National Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004), the court believes the Florida Supreme Court would determine that FUFTA’s catch-all provision does not allow for an award of money damages against the transferor, an award of punitive damages, or an award of attorney’s fees. Thus, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s FUFTA claims. And the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Neverve LLC" on Justia Law

Bird Rides, Inc. (Bird) launched its electric motorized scooter rental business in the City of Los Angeles (the City) by deploying hundreds of Bird scooters onto the City’s streets and sidewalks. Plaintiff and her daughter were on a City sidewalk just after twilight. The sidewalk was crowded with holiday shoppers, and Plaintiff did not see the back wheel of a Bird scooter sticking out from behind a trash can. She tripped on the scooter, fell, and sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs sued Bird and the City for negligence and other related claims. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, concluding neither Bird nor the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court’s judgment is correct as to the City, but the trial court erred when it dismissed the claims against Bird. Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the City are premised on the public entity’s discretionary authority to enforce the permit, the City is immune from liability under the Government Claims Act. In contrast, regardless of the permit’s terms, Bird may be held liable for breaching its general duty under section 1714 to use “ordinary care or skill in the management of [its] property.” The court explained that having deployed its dockless scooters onto public streets, Bird’s general duty encompasses an obligation, among other things, to use ordinary care to locate and move a Bird scooter when the scooter poses an unreasonable risk of danger to others. The court concluded that Plaintiff is authorized to assert a private action for public nuisance against the company. View "Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc." on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Following a vehicular accident, Martin Peteet entered into a release and settlement agreement with the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer. Peteet did not seek a waiver of subrogation or consent from his own automobile insurer, Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), prior to executing the release and settlement agreement. After the release and settlement agreement was executed, Peteet filed a complaint against Farm Bureau, seeking damages under the uninsured motorist (UM) provision in his auto policy with Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the complaint, and the county court denied the motion. Farm Bureau sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. After a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. View "Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Peteet" on Justia Law

After (Decedent) died, two of his three adult children brought a pro se diversity action in the District of Minnesota against Defendant, Decedent’s second wife. They asserted multiple claims arising from Defendant’s alleged use of her power as Decedent’s attorney-in-fact to close two Certificates of Deposit and keep funds that Decedent intended would benefit his children. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of diversity jurisdiction because Decedent’s third child, like Defendant, is a resident of California and is an indispensable, non-diverse party. Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs’ incomplete assignment did not establish diversity jurisdiction. The district court determined it has diversity subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the FAC claims with prejudice because they fail to state a claim and Plaintiffs are not real parties in interest. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the district court properly granted Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion because Plaintiffs’ FAC failed to state plausible claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and civil theft. Therefore, the court wrote it need not separately consider the district court’s alternative ruling that Plaintiffs are not “real parties in interest” under Rule 17(a). Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the claims asserted in the FAC. The court explained it does not agree that additional claims regarding Defendant’s use of the CD proceeds after she was done acting as Attorney-in-Fact would necessarily have been futile. But without a proposed amended complaint to consider, the district court did not abuse its discretion by assuming they would be. View "Eric Sorenson v. Joanne Sorenson" on Justia Law

On May 27, 2016, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Sgt. George Taylor, a police officer employed by the Chickasaw Police Department, discovered an automobile on the shoulder of the on-ramp to an interstate highway. Carlos Lens Fernandez ("Lens") was passed out inside the automobile, and the automobile's engine was running. After he failed to complete various field sobriety tests, Lens acknowledged that he was intoxicated. Sgt. Taylor arrested Lens for driving under the influence and, with assistance from Officer Gregory Musgrove, transported Lens to the Chickasaw City Jail. At the jail, Lens did not advise Sgt. Taylor or any other person that he had any medical issues or that he needed medical attention. According to both Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Phillip Burson, Lens appeared to be intoxicated, and nothing about their encounter with Lens indicated to them that Lens needed medical attention. At approximated 8 a.m., jailers checked on Lens, but he was not responding to oral commands. Officer Robert Wenzinger stated that when he checked Lens, he could not find a pulse and noticed that Lens was cool to the touch on his arm and neck. Emergency medical services were dispatched; by 8:50 a.m., attempts to resuscitate Lens were unsuccessful, and Lens was pronounced dead at 9:14 a.m. Lens's autopsy report listed the cause of death as "hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease." Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of Lens' estate, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in two separate actions in favor of the City of Chickasaw, and the varios officers and jail officials who checked on Lens when he was arrested and detained. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in either case, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Murey v. City of Chickasaw, et al." on Justia Law