Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellant, as personal representative of the estate of Decedent, filed a second amended complaint alleging Decedent suffered deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while in custody at the Alleghany County, Maryland Detention Center (“ACDC”), which led to his death. Appellant asserted claims against various individuals (the “Individual Medical Defendants”) and against the company contracted to provide medical care services to inmates at ACDC, Wellpath, LLC, (collectively “Appellees”). The district court dismissed Appellant’s second amended complaint.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs. The court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that Appellant failed to plead actual knowledge when she alleged that none of the Individual Medical Defendants “thought it necessary to take Decedent to the hospital.” In so holding, the district court failed to consider the context of the allegation and disregarded the obvious sarcasm in the full allegation. Appellant actually alleged that none of the Individual Medical Defendants “thought it necessary to take Decedent to the hospital despite an obvious ongoing medical emergency.” Further, the court held that Appellant sufficiently alleged that the Individual Medical Defendants’ treatment and/or attempts at treatment were not “adequate to address Decedent’s serious medical needs,” that Decedent’s deterioration was persistent and obvious, and that the factual allegations allege more than mere disagreements regarding Decedent’s medical care. As such, Appellant has plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation. View "Shelly Stevens v. Dawn Holler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), of their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims. The district court held that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants Global Tel*Link Corp. (“GTL”); Securus Technologies, LLC; and 3Cinteractive Corp. (“3Ci”) proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and held that Plaintiffs have pleaded facts that satisfy RICO’s proximate-causation requirement, as explained in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). The court explained that RICO proximate causation is lacking when (1) there is a “more direct victim” from whom (or intervening factor from which) the plaintiff’s injuries derive, or (2) the alleged RICO predicate violation is “too distinct” or logically unrelated from the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiffs’ complaint suffers from neither deficiency. As Plaintiffs point out, the governments’ injuries could be cured if Defendants paid higher site commissions—even if Plaintiffs paid the same inflated price. So Plaintiffs’ injuries aren’t derivative of those suffered by the governments. Rather, Plaintiffs and the governments are both direct victims. View "Ashley Albert v. Global TelLink Corp." on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence and not intentional wrongdoing, and it denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district was under the duty to preserve the video when it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). The Court of Appeal concluded the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f) did not shield a party from sanctions for the spoliation of electronic evidence if the evidence was altered or destroyed when the party was under a duty to preserve the evidence. The Court found the record supported the trial court’s ruling that the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, the safe-harbor provision did not apply. The Court granted the real parties’ petition in part and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the form of sanctions imposed were warranted. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Walmart in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, Missouri. Plaintiff alleged Walmart engaged in misleading and deceptive marketing practices by selling cough suppressants with dextromethorphan hydrobromide (“DXM”) and a “non-drowsy” label. Walmart removed the case to the Eastern District of Missouri, and Plaintiff moved to have the case remanded to state court. The district court remanded, finding Walmart had not met the Class Action Fairness Act’s jurisdictional requirement of showing the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Walmart has shown the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.  The court concluded that Walmart’s declaration was sufficient to support a finding that sales exceeded $5 million. The total amount of sales can be a measure of the amount in controversy. The court explained that the declaration was sufficient, particularly when it is very plausible that a company the size of Walmart would have sold more than $5 million in cough suppressants in the state of Missouri over a period of five years. View "Nicholas Brunts v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for driving while intoxicated. She sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and related state laws. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, Plaintiff contests the summary judgment for the Section 1983 claims of false arrest and excessive force along with the state law claims of false arrest, excessive force, negligence, and vicarious liability.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated. The court explained that the following facts are confirmed: (1) A witness reported to the police that Plaintiff was driving in a dangerous manner;(2) there is video footage of Plaintiff’s car swerving out of the lane and recorded audio of the officers noting the swerve, and (3) The officers could not conclusively determine that she had not taken drugs. Those facts alone are sufficient to give rise to probable cause that Plaintiff was driving while intoxicated. Further, the court found that the officer’s limited use of force (in such a short time frame) to restrain Plaintiff and place her in handcuffs as a response to Plaintiff’s perceived resistance does not amount to excessive force.   Moreover, the court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated, and accordingly, there was no false arrest. Finally, because Plaintiff’s underlying state law claims were properly dismissed, there is no basis for her vicarious liability claim against the municipal Defendants. View "Scott v. City of Mandeville, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a diversity suit against his former stepfather, Defendant, alleging that Defendant owed him a fiduciary duty to disclose the existence of certain Settlement Funds arising from the wrongful death of Plaintiff’s biological father. The Eleventh Circuit previously certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding breach of fiduciary duty for failure to disclose a claim.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant on the failure to disclose claim and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court should only have granted Defendant summary judgment if there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the tort claim and Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing all evidence and making all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Here, a reasonable jury could find the following facts at trial:4 (1) Plaintiff and Defendant were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship such that, under Georgia law, the statute of limitations could be tolled, and a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could be supported; (2) at the time Plaintiff turned 18, at least $50,000 of the Settlement Funds remained in the Charles Schwab account; (3) Plaintiff had a right to take control of the Settlement Funds when he turned 18; (4) Defendant had a duty to disclose the existence of the Settlement Funds and turn over control of those funds to Plaintiff when he turned 18; (5) Defendant failed to do so, and (6) Plaintiff would have taken control of the funds when he turned 18. View "Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed (“Walmart”) in her “slip and fall” negligence suit under Georgia law. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in (1) analyzing her slip and fall claim under a premises liability theory instead of an active negligence theory and (2) denying her spoliation of evidence claim and related sanctions request.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to cite any binding authority under Georgia law supporting an active negligence theory in a slip and fall case. And the persuasive value of the non-binding cases she cites is limited because they have either been rejected by the Georgia courts as a basis for active negligence in the slip and fall context or are fully distinguishable. More importantly, the allegations in her complaint clearly involve a condition of the premises. Plaintiff alleged that she was shopping at Walmart when “she slipped and fell from liquid that was on the floor” and that Walmart “had a duty to inspect the Premises to discover dangerous and hazardous conditions . . . and to either eliminate such . . . conditions or to warn its invitees.” Thus, the district court did not err in analyzing her claim under the framework of traditional premises liability. View "Adriana Mendez v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP" on Justia Law

Gary and Sheila Womble, a married couple, appealed a circuit court order denying their motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking to set aside a judgment that dismissed, with prejudice, their action against Collie Moore III. In 2020, the Wombles sued Moore alleging claims of negligence, wantonness, and loss of consortium in connection with an automobile accident that had occurred March 28, 2018, in which Moore's automobile collided with the rear of the Wombles' automobile. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the Wombles did not demonstrate that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b)(1) motion; therefore, it affirmed the trial court's order denying their motion. View "Womble v. Moore" on Justia Law

Midsouth Paving, Inc. ("Midsouth"), and Christopher Nivert petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tallapoosa Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter a summary judgment in their favor in an action commenced against them by Yvonne Mason. Mason worked for PeopleReady, a temporary staffing agency, at Midsouth jobsites. PeopleReady initially provided Mason with a hard hat, sunblock, water, and a vest with "Midsouth" printed on it, and Mason kept those items in her automobile. At the job site, Midsouth employees directed and supervised Mason's job duties. Mason was working at a Midsouth job site when Nivert unintentionally drove his pilot vehicle into Mason while he was making a three-point turn. Mason's leg was severely injured, and she received multiple surgeries and remained in a hospital and then a rehabilitation facility for over a month. PeopleReady began paying workers' compensation benefits to Mason after the accident and also paid or her continued medical care. Pursuant to the labor-supply agreement, Midsouth was an insured alternate employer under PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. Mason also filed the underlying lawsuit alleging claims of negligence; wantonness; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and negligence per se. Midsouth's motion for summary judgment was denied, leading to the mandamus relief requested in this case. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert were barred by § 25-5-11, § 25-5-52, and § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of Midsouth and Nivert. View "Ex parte Midsouth Paving, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Douglas Byrne appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim against Fisk. In December 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence in Huntsville. Although Fisk's home was not on his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before, including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slip- resistant boots, as required by his employer. Byrne traversed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front porch, where her mailbox was located. According to Byrne's testimony, he was holding the handrail and being careful. However, Byrne slipped and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work in May 2019. In December 2020, Byrne commenced this action against Fisk and fictitiously named parties. Byrne alleged that there were defects in Fisk's premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on Fisk's premises; whether Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defect; whether the alleged defect proximately caused Byrne's injuries; and whether the darkness of Fisk's premises or the rainfall present there constituted open and obvious hazards. Consequently, the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Fisk. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Byrne v. Fisk" on Justia Law