Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Randy Severance appealed the dismissal of his personal injury claim against Dr. Brenden Howe. The district court dismissed the case because Severance did not submit an affidavit containing an expert opinion to support a prima facie case of professional negligence as required by N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46. The North Dakota Supreme Court held Severance pleaded a cognizable claim for the intentional tort of battery and that N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 did not apply to intentional torts. Accordingly, the Court reversed the dismissal judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Severance v. Howe" on Justia Law

This case stems from a car accident that claimed the lives of four young women. The women’s estates sued the driver who rear-ended their car, for negligence. And the estates sued the driver’s employer, Discount Rock & Sand, Inc., for negligently entrusting the company’s truck to the driver and for vicarious liability for Blanco’s negligent driving. The district court ordered the dismissal of the claim against the driver. The remaining claims against Discount Rock went to trial, and the jury found the company liable and awarded nearly $12 million in damages to the estates. Discount Rock appealed the judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that although the stipulation did not comply with rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the district court’s order dismissing the claim against the driver satisfied rule 41(a)(2)—which allows a district court to dismiss an action by court order at a plaintiff’s request. And on the merits, the court concluded that: (1) Discount Rock was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligent entrustment claim; (2) any error in instructing the jury on the rear-end-collision presumption was harmless; and (3) there was no reversible error in publishing the demonstrative aid. The court explained that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Discount Rock negligently entrusted the driver with the modified truck. And even though the district court erred in instructing the jury on Florida’s rebuttable presumption that a rear-ending driver was negligent, that error wasn’t “to the prejudice of” Discount Rock because Discount Rock failed to produce evidence rebutting the presumption. View "Ricardo Sanchez, et al. v. Discount Rock & Sand, Inc." on Justia Law

After consuming excessive amounts of alcohol, Christina Demirelli left a restaurant in the Fashion Island shopping center (Fashion Island) and walked through a nearby parking structure while engaging in “displays of nonsensical horseplay.” She found herself on an upper story of the parking structure where she seated herself on a 43-inch tall perimeter wall, lost her balance, and fell backward out of the structure to the ground several stories below. Demirelli sued The Irvine Company, which owned the parking structure, for premises liability, alleging the parking structure had a physical defect or dangerous condition. The Irvine Company filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. The Irvine Company filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause. The Court thereafter granted The Irvine Company’s petition. In her opposition, Demirelli conceded the parking structure did not have a physical defect or dangerous condition. In the stead of her original theory, Demirelli asserted a new theory of liability: The Irvine Company assumed a duty to her by hiring a security company charged with detecting and stopping horseplay according to the Fashion Island Code of Conduct. She argued The Irvine Company was liable for the security company’s negligence in enforcing that code. The Court of Appeal found The Irvine Company’s retention of security services did not increase any risk to Demirelli and she did not rely on that undertaking to her detriment. Therefore, The Irvine Company did not owe a duty to Demirelli and summary judgment should have been granted. View "The Irvine Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Before Plaintiffs’ cases were distributed to the district court, these cases were part of MDL 2179, the multi-district litigation proceeding before United States District Court Judge Carl J. Barbier in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Barbier established what is known as the “B3 Bundle” within the overall litigation. The B3 Bundle included claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil and/or other chemicals used during the response to the disaster. 85 B3 cases were assigned to District Judge Barry Ashe. Before his confirmation, Judge Ashe he was a longtime partner at the Stone Pigman law firm. A little more than two weeks after Judge Ashe began granting summary judgments following the exclusion of Dr. Cook, Street’s counsel moved to disqualify Judge Ashe in the five cases in which he had excluded Dr. Cook and in other cases where Daubert and summary judgment motions were still pending. Plaintiffs argued that Judge Ashe should have disqualified himself and, in the alternative, that he should have extended the case-management deadlines.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. If Judge Ashe erred when he failed to recuse in these cases, that error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the arguments on this appeal support, potential conflicts of interest must be taken seriously by every member of the judiciary. The litigants and the public need to be confident in the impartiality of those who will decide legal disputes. View "Lundy v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeal properly found no abuse of discretion in a jury’s award of approximately $10 million in general damages to plaintiff Henry Pete who developed mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos. Intertwined with this issue was the fundamental question of the manner by which appellate courts were to review damage awards for excessiveness; necessarily, the same rules would apply in determining whether an award was too low. Louisiana jurisprudence had a long-standing general principle that, in reviewing a general damage award, the “initial inquiry . . . is whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages.” Thereafter, and only when a determination has been made that the “trier of fact has abused its ‘much discretion,’” will a court “resort to prior awards . . . and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.” Such determinations are not subject to mathematical exactitude or scientific precision. The Court held that an appellate court must consider relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of fact’s award is an abuse of discretion. Applying this principle to this case, the Court found the jury abused its discretion in awarding $9,800,00.00 in general damages. "The evidence presented at trial does not support an award that far exceeds the highest reasonable awards in cases involving similar injuries. Accordingly, based on the evidence adduced at trial, we find $5,000,000.00 to be the highest amount that could reasonably be awarded." View "Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co, LLC et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Oris Latour was injured after he tripped and fell at Steamboat Bill’s restaurant (“Steamboat”) in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Latour alleged he tripped on a concrete ledge that ran perpendicular to the end of a row of dining tables. Contending the ledge was disguised and dangerous, he filed a negligence suit against the restaurant owner. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Latour, finding Steamboat 80 percent at fault and awarding Latour damages totaling $675,053. On appeal, the court found the district court committed reversible error related to two pretrial evidentiary rulings which affected the outcome of the case. The court of appeal conducted a de novo review of the entire record and found Latour met his burden of proving negligence. The appellate court then assessed Steamboat with 85 percent of the fault and Latour with 15 percent fault. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine: (1) whether the court of appeal erred in finding Latour met his burden of proving Steamboat was negligent pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.6; and (2) whether, after finding prejudicial error, the court of appeal erred in increasing Steamboat’s percentage of fault on de novo review, although Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the Supreme Court found Latour met his burden of proof under La. R.S. 9:2800.6. The Court also found consistent with statutory law and secondarily, jurisprudence, Steamboat could not be assessed with a greater percentage of fault than the 80 percent assigned by the jury. Because Latour did not appeal or answer the appeal, the 20 percent of fault allocated to him cannot be reduced. Therefore, on de novo review, the Supreme Court allocated fault at 80 percent to Steamboat and 20 percent to Latour. View "Latour v. Steamboats, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Breanne Martin alleged she was injured when a large metal gate fell on her while she was on a residential rental property located in Alpine, California. Martin initially filed claims for negligence and premises liability against the owners of the property. But upon learning that the owners had previously filed a bankruptcy petition, Martin amended her complaint to add the court-appointed bankruptcy trustee, Leslie Gladstone, as a defendant. Gladstone demurred to Martin’s complaint, asserting that application of federal statutory and common law demonstrated that Martin could not state a cause of action against her. The trial court rejected Gladstone’s argument regarding application of the "Barton" doctrine, but accepted her argument regarding the abandonment of the property at issue; the court sustained Gladstone’s demurrer on this ground and entered judgment in favor of Gladstone. On appeal, Martin contended the trial court erred in concluding that Gladstone’s abandonment of the relevant property after the accident prevented Gladstone from being held liable for Martin’s injuries. Martin further argued the trial court correctly determined it could not conclude as a matter of law that the Barton doctrine applied to divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over Martin’s claims. The Court of Appeal agreed with Martin’s appellate contentions and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Martin v. Gladstone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s son spent several months at a medium-security facility in St. Louis called “the Workhouse.” None of the guards saw Plaintiff’s son receive or take fentanyl, the drug that killed him. Inmates tried to help by rubbing ice on him once he lost consciousness. Upon arriving a few minutes later, three Officers radioed for medical assistance. In the meantime, rather than try to resuscitate Plaintiff’s son themselves, they stood by and watched as two inmates tried to help him. When trained medical personnel finally arrived four minutes later, it was too late: they were unable to revive Plaintiff’s son, who died from an overdose. Surveillance footage captured some, but not all, of these events. Plaintiff’s mother sued the City of St. Louis, the three responding officers, and two supervisors for their deliberate indifference. The district court denied summary judgment to the responding officers.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court misstated the burden and relied on allegations from an unverified complaint to deny summary judgment. The court wrote that the district court erred in how it dealt with the gaps in the video footage. Instead of relying on other evidence to fill in the missing details, the findings mirrored what the plaintiff’s unverified complaint said. The court wrote that unsworn allegations are no substitute for evidence at summary judgment. The court explained that the district court tilted the scales too far in the Plaintiff’s favor by raising the summary-judgment burden on the officers and allowing unsworn allegations to rebut evidence. View "Janice Washington v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction in this case in which three law firms petitioned the Court to order a judge to dismiss them from the underlying lawsuit, holding that the law firms demonstrated a "clear and indisputable right to the relief requested and a lack of other means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or to obtain he requested action."Plaintiffs sued certain cigarette manufacturers and retailers, bringing product liability, fraud, and conspiracy claims. Plaintiff also sued three law firms that counseled the tobacco companies, alleging two counts of conspiracy. The law firms each filed motions to dismiss under Haw. R. Civ. P. (HRCP) Rule 12(b)(2), claiming that Hawai'i courts lacked general and specific jurisdiction over them. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss without making minimum contacts findings or undertaking any due process analysis. The law firms subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition and, alternatively, for a writ of mandamus ordering dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction and granted the law firms' writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court clearly exercised jurisdiction beyond its authority, and there were no other means for the law firms to adequately address the alleged wrong or to obtain dismissal. View "Dickinson v. Kim" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were allegedly injured from a collision with an Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) Trooper. Less than three weeks after the accident, plaintiffs' lawyer sent the OHP a letter asking it to preserve any evidence relating to the incident, and to request some additional information. OHP forwarded the letter to the Oklahoma Office of Management & Enterprise Services (OMES) and OMES unilaterally determined that the request letter was the statutory notice of a governmental tort claim, triggering the time limits within the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (the Act). Plaintiffs' lawyer disagreed. Less than one year after the accident, the lawyer sent a notice of governmental tort claim to OMES. Five months later, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the OHP, seeking recovery for their injuries. OHP filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the letter requesting the preservation of evidence was notice of a governmental tort claim triggering time limits which had already expired by the time plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the cause. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted review to determine whether plaintiffs' letter requesting the preservation of evidence constituted the required statutory notice of a governmental tort claim. The Court held that it did not. View "Ullman v. Oklahoma Highway Patrol" on Justia Law