Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

While riding a bicycle, Plaintiff ran into an open car door being operated by a recruiter for the U.S. Marines. Plaintiff brought a claim for negligence against the United States, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the United States liable but concluded Plaintiff was also negligent and, therefore, partially liable.On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the evidence of Plaintiff's negligence was "dubious," and, even if Plaintiff was negligent, the district court failed to make the findings necessary to any holding that the plaintiff’s negligent conduct sufficiently caused the collision so as to make Plaintiff 40% responsible for the damages. View "Dooley v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a post-judgment order awarding Respondent attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.4.1 Appellant argued that the trial court erred by not reducing the fee award in accordance with the percentage of Respondent’s comparative fault, that the court abused its discretion by awarding fees that were not supported by sufficient documentation, that the hourly rate awarded for a first-year attorney was unreasonable, and that the court applied an excessive multiplier to the lodestar amount.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court was not required to reduce Respondent’s attorney fee award in accordance with his comparative fault. Further, the court held that Appellant failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. The court explained that the record indicates the trial court considered Respondent’s comparative fault. Further, the fee award was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the court wrote that the use of a blended $450 hourly rate for Respondent’s counsel was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court noted that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a 2.0 multiplier. View "Isom v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tina and David Glynn, parents of decedent Nicholas Glynn (Nicholas), appealed the grant of summary judgment against them and in favor of defendants Orange Circle Lounge Inc., Lounge Group, Inc., and Mario Marovic, owners and operators of the District Lounge, a bar. Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the physical and temporal distance between defendants’ bar (at which a fight took place between Nicholas and some assailants) and the subsequent fight a block away and nearly an hour later that resulted in Nicholas’s death. "In the absence of ongoing or imminent criminal conduct, we cannot find defendants owed a duty to Nicholas to protect him from the assailants during the final altercation. Once Nicholas, J.D., and the assailants left defendants’ bar peaceably and in separate directions, the bar’s duty ended." The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. View "Glynn v. Orange Circle Lounge Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a defense verdict in a case alleging law enforcement officers and the City of North Charleston violated the civil rights of Jane Doe, a vulnerable adult. During its deliberations, the jury submitted several questions, the last of which was ambiguous. The trial court answered the question without requesting clarification from the jury and denied Doe's request to charge the jury on nominal damages for a third time. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the trial court erred in not requesting clarification, but ultimately concluded the error was harmless. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals in result. View "Estate of Jane Doe 202 v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal of the circuit court's orders, the latter of which denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment, in this action alleging that Petitioners acted negligently in their handling of an incident where S.D. was inappropriately touched by a fellow student in the hallway of a high school, holding that the orders appealed from did not present an appealable ruling.In their notice of appeal, Petitioners asserted that the individual defendants were entitled to dismissal pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-12A-5(b)(2) because the order at issue found that the individual defendants did not act maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Petitioners further contend that the board of education was immune from liability pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-12A-5(a)(4). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the orders presented in this appeal were interlocutory, did not fall within the collateral order doctrine, and did not otherwise present an appealable ruling. View "Kanawha County Board of Education v. S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Steven Bird, an independent contractor hired to install a new checkout lane at Defendant Pruett's Food store, was injured after falling off a ladder Defendant had supplied to aid Plaintiff in completing the work. Plaintiff initiated a negligence action, seeking damages from his injuries and lost wages. Plaintiff presented his case at trial, after which Defendant demurred to Plaintiff's evidence. The trial court sustained the demurrer. Plaintiff appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant owed him a duty of care. View "Bird v. Pruett's Food, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter was a trial court’s order denying immunity to Defendant New Century Hospice, Inc. and its subsidiaries, Defendants Legacy Hospice, LLC, d/b/a New Century Hospice of Denver, LLC, and Legacy Hospice of Colorado Springs, LLC (collectively, “New Century”). New Century argued it was entitled to immunity under four different statutes. Tana Edwards filed suit against New Century (her former employer) and Kathleen Johnson, the Director of Operations for New Century Castle Rock (collectively, “Defendants”). As part of her employment with New Century, Edwards provided in-home care to an elderly patient. In December 2019, Johnson began to suspect that Edwards was diverting pain medications from the patient. Defendants reported the suspected drug diversion to the Castle Rock Police Department and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”). Defendants also lodged a complaint against Edwards’s nursing license with the Colorado Board of Nursing (“the Board”). After investigations, no criminal charges were filed and no formal disciplinary actions were taken against Edwards. Edwards subsequently brought this action against Defendants, alleging claims for negligent supervision and negligent hiring against New Century, as well as claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against New Century and Johnson. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to Edwards’s claims for negligent hiring, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that the claims were either time-barred or could not be proven. Three of the statutes New Century cited for its immunity claim, 12-20-402(1), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Professions Act”), 12-255-123(2), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Nurse Practice Act”), and 18-6.5-108(3), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Mandatory Reporter statute”), only authorized immunity for a “person.” Relying on the plain meaning of “person,” the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to immunity under these three statutes because it was a corporation, not a person. The fourth statute, 18-8-115, C.R.S. (2022) (“the Duty to Report statute”), explicitly entitled corporations to immunity, but only if certain conditions were met. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of immunity under this statute because it did not carry its burden of demonstrating that all such conditions were met. View "In re Edwards v. New Century Hospice" on Justia Law

Kenneth Kraemer and Kraemer Farms, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this qui tam action under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), against United Dairies, other dairy farms, and their partners and agents (“Defendants”) alleging that they knowingly filed false crop insurance claims. Plaintiffs’ FCA Complaint alleged that Defendants (1) fraudulently obtained crop insurance payments by falsely reporting a silage-use-only variety of corn as grain and using that false statement to obtain the payments, and (2) were unjustly enriched by receiving the payments. The district court held that Defendants submitted materially false claims but denied Plaintiffs FCA relief because they failed to prove that Defendants knowingly defrauded the United States. However, the court found that certain Defendants had been unjustly enriched and awarded damages to the United States. The United States then filed a post-trial motion urging the district court to vacate or amend its judgment because Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek common law unjust enrichment relief on behalf of the United States. The district court granted the motion and vacated its judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ FCA claims must be affirmed even if Plaintiffs are correct that the district court erred in ruling that any violations were not knowing. The court wrote that because it concludes that Defendants in submitting Acreage Reporting Forms supporting their crop insurance applications did not submit materially false claims for crop insurance payments, Plaintiffs contention -the district court applied the wrong legal standard in denying FCA relief on other grounds is of no moment. View "United States ex rel. Kenneth Kraemer v. United Dairies, L.L.P." on Justia Law

Decedent was hit by a pickup truck in a crosswalk at a major intersection. After the accident, the decedent, who was on a 15-minute work break, walked back to the Whole Foods Market (the store) where he worked. There, store employees gave him an ice pack, a form to fill out relating to his injury, and a ride home. He died several hours later. The decedent is survived by his wife and three children (Plaintiffs), who filed this wrongful death action against several parties, including Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc. (Mrs. Gooch’s), the parent company of the store and the decedent’s employer. Mrs. Gooch’s demurred to the operative first amended complaint because an administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board had found the decedent’s injury and death to be employment-related and, therefore within the scope of workers’ compensation. The trial court sustained the demurrer.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. Plaintiffs first argued that Mrs. Gooch’s, through its employees, acted in a dual capacity following the accident. The court explained that Plaintiffs cite no case holding that a negligent undertaking theory is viable in the circumstances of the case. Plaintiffs also argued that the fraudulent concealment exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies. The court explained that the complaint does not allege that the decedent was unaware of his injury. Moreover, according to the operative complaint, Mrs. Gooch’s was unaware of the decedent’s injury until he advised his supervisors that he had been in an accident. View "Jimenez v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Malcolm Penney left a wedding which was held at The Springs Event Venue and proceeded to drive the wrong way down a highway. He crashed head-on into a vehicle driven by Marissa Murrow, killing her. Murrows' parents sued The Springs. They did not allege that The Springs over-served Penney. Rather, they alleged The Springs had a duty to prevent Penney from leaving, and to enforce their policies which prohibited outside alcohol from being brought onto the premises. The trial court determined that the event venue had no duty to prevent harm to third-parties such as the deceased, and it granted summary judgment to The Springs. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Oklahoma law did not recognize a duty on the part of a private event venue extending to third parties killed by a voluntarily intoxicated adult who attended, but was not "over-served" by the event venue. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the parents' Motion to Vacate/Modify. View "Murrow v. Penney" on Justia Law