Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Above All Termite & Pest Control ("Above All") employed Henry Keim as a salaried pest-control technician and provided him with an employer authorized vehicle for work use. Above All’s policy limited the quantity of supplies technicians could keep in their authorized vehicles overnight. When technicians needed to replenish supplies, Above All authorized them to drive their vehicles to Above All’s shop instead of driving directly to a worksite, to retrieve whatever they required, and then to go from the shop to the scheduled sites. On the morning of the accident, Keim clocked in, received his schedule, and concluded that his vehicle lacked sufficient supplies. On his way to the shop for supplies, Keim sustained injuries in a car accident. The Judge of Compensation dismissed Keim’s claim petition with prejudice, concluding that Keim was merely commuting to work when he sustained injuries. The Appellate Division applied the “authorized vehicle rule” and reversed the dismissal order. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court, finding Keim was “in the course of employment” under the “authorized vehicle rule” at the time of the accident because Above All authorized a vehicle for him to operate and his operation of that identified vehicle was for business expressly authorized by Above All. View "Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control" on Justia Law

The circuit court entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Wayne Fagerstrom, individually and as the administrator of the estate of Sylvia Fagerstrom, deceased. The defendants were Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("MIMC") and Gulf Health Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Thomas Hospital. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying their renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, in which they asserted that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence demonstrating that the proximate cause of Sylvia's death was sepsis resulting from an infected pressure ulcer allegedly caused by the defendants' breaches of the standard of care. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed with defendants and reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Fagerstrom" on Justia Law

K&C Logistics, LLC, brought suit in Madison County, Mississippi Circuit Court against Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., and Daniel Cooper as the result of a vehicle accident that occurred in Nogales, Arizona. The trial court determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Old Dominion. K&C Logistics appealed, asking the Mississippi Supreme Court to find that courts in Mississippi had jurisdiction over Old Dominion. The Court was further requested to interpret the Mississippi Business Corporation Act to hold that Old Dominion, a foreign corporation registered to do business in Mississippi, consented to general personal jurisdiction when it registered to do business in the state. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K&C Logistics, LLC v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are people who claim to suffer from chronic Lyme disease. A person contracts Lyme disease from ticks carrying the bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi. In 2006, IDSA published The Clinical Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Lyme Disease, Human Granulocytic Anaplasmosis, and Babesiosis: Clinical Practice Guidelines by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (“the Guidelines”). The Guidelines extensively discuss how to diagnose and treat Lyme disease. Throughout, they express doubt about the causes, frequency, and even the existence of chronic Lyme disease. Moreover, the Guidelines do not recommend long-term antibiotic therapy for persons with persistent Lyme symptoms who have already received recommended treatments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs took issue with IDSA’s positions that (1) “there is no convincing biological evidence for the existence of symptomatic chronic B. burgdorferi infection among patients after receipt of recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease,” and (2) “antibiotic therapy has not proven to be useful and is not recommended for patients with chronic (>6 months) subjective symptoms after recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease.” On their face, however, these statements are medical opinions. In this context (a scientific debate over treatment options for persistent Lyme symptoms), to say that evidence is not “convincing” or that some treatment is “not recommended” is plainly to express a medical opinion. Just because Plaintiffs disagree with those opinions does not mean that IDSA is somehow liable because their doctors or insurance providers found the opinions persuasive. View "Torrey v. Infectious Diseases Socty" on Justia Law

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff Sean Stetson and Defendant Edmonds were part of a low-speed, sideswipe vehicle accident. Although no one reported injuries on the scene, two weeks after the accident, Plaintiff sought medical treatment for injuries he claimed he sustained in the accident. With this visit, Plaintiff filed his now "plainly evident" campaign to fabricate a claim for damages. When a party to litigation seeks to intentionally deceive the court and its adversary, a district court may issue reasonable sanctions and require the deceitful party to pay attorney fees. Finding plaintiff did just that, and the district court sanctioned him with reasonable attorney fees and dismissal of his non-economic claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sanctions. View "Stenson v. Edmonds, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff took her neighbor’s dog for a walk around Dolphin’s apartment complex. Plaintiff observed that it was raining that day with thunderstorms. Before crossing, Plaintiff observed that the concrete on the North Side Gate driveway was wet, and rainwater formed a current that was running down the driveway. Plaintiff proceeded to cross, and the rainwater current knocked her down. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her right shoulder, left knee, and face. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dolphin, alleging general negligence and premises liability. Dolphin filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because the running rainwater was open and obvious, Dolphin had no duty to warn. The trial court granted Dolphin’s motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims because the rainwater current on the driveway was open and obvious. Further, the court wrote that even assuming Plaintiff did not forfeit the necessity exception to the open and obvious rule, she still cannot prevail on the merits. The court wrote that Plaintiff was in a better position to avoid the obvious danger of walking across a current of water that formed as a result of a rainstorm that began that same day. Plaintiff could have chosen to use a different entrance. The burden imposed on Dolphin to constantly monitor weather conditions and immediately install warning signals is outweighed by Plaintiff’s ability to avoid a condition she should have observed as obviously dangerous. View "Nicoletti v. Kest" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Octavi Perez appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Roman’s Restaurant, LLC, d/b/a Roman’s Night Club, on claims for damages under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act. In July 2019, 18-year-old Edgar Perez had been a patron of the nightclub and was killed when the vehicle he was driving left the roadway and hit a tree. An autopsy indicated Edgar was intoxicated at the time of his death. Plaintiff filed suit against Roman’s alleging it served alcoholic beverages to a minor, and Edgar’s subsequent intoxication precipitated Edgar’s death. Roman’s moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant part that: (1) Plainitff lacked standing to sue on Edgar’s behalf because Plaintiff was neither Edgar’s parent nor stood in loco parentis; and (2) Plaintiff could not maintain an action under the Dram Shop Act because plaintiff had not been “injured in person, property or means of support.” The court record reflected Plaintiff was Edgar’s uncle, and Edgar contributed to the household expenses in the apartment he shared with Plaintiff and his father, Rigoberto Perez. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in Roman’s favor and affirmed. View "Perez v. Roman's Restaurant, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In April 2015, federal agent Quinn shot and killed Kellom while trying to arrest him. Kellom’s estate sued Quinn under the Federal Tort Claims Act with a “Bivens” excessive-force claim. The government replaced Quinn as the defendant in the tort claims. The estate then filed an unsuccessful claim with Quinn’s employer, DHS. The FTCA requires plaintiffs to seek relief “first” from the federal agency within two years: the government notified the estate that it needed to bring a new lawsuit for its FTCA claims. Instead, in May 2018, the estate amended its complaint, asserting the same claims. The district court treated the FTCA exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the FTCA claims. The Bivens claim proceeded. A jury ruled in Quinn’s favor. Meanwhile, Kellom’s family members brought FTCA claims by joining the estate’s amended complaint, which was filed in May 2018. The family had not sought relief from DHS, so the district court dismissed those claims. In October 2018, the family filed a claim with DHS. DHS denied the claim. Rather than rejoin the estate’s lawsuit, the family filed a new one. The district court dismissed the family’s claims as untimely.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The government did not waive or forfeit its exhaustion defense in the estate’s case by failing to oppose a motion to amend. The estate did not cure its failure to exhaust by filing an amended complaint. The family’s claims were untimely. View "Kellom v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured in an auto accident and brought product liability claims against the vehicle’s manufacturer. In the course of litigation, the manufacturer moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ two liability experts, moved for a new trial and a judgment as a matter of law, and objected to the denial of a jury instruction regarding the presumption of nonliability (“the presumption”). Ultimately, the manufacturer was found liable and ordered to pay nearly $5 million in damages.On appeal, the manufacturer argued the district court erred in denying the motions and rejecting the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs’ experts based their opinions on reliable methodologies and provided relevant, helpful testimony. View "Kim v. American Honda Motor" on Justia Law

Alicia Sampson ("Alicia"), as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Joshua Sampson ("Josh"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HeartWise Health Systems Corporation; HeartWise Clinic, LLC (collectively referred to as "HeartWise"); Isaac Health & Prevention Partners, LLC ("Isaac Health"); William Nixon, M.D.; and Jeffrey Saylor, M.D., in a wrongful-death action. At its HeartWise clinic, Isaac Health administered a battery of up to 31 physical tests that were intended "to assist in the detection of early evidence of vascular and cardiac abnormalities." In 2015, 29-year-old Josh visited the Isaac Health clinic. Months earlier, Josh's father died at age of 56 from "right ventricular dysplasia," which was a "congenital heart defect." Lowell's death led the Sampson family to seek heart evaluations to determine whether they had inherited the heart defect. Josh underwent the full battery of testing provided at the Isaac Health clinic; Josh's data from the left ventricular echocardiogram was within the "normal" range. Josh's mother, who also received the testing, stated that the nurse practitioner did not tell Josh in any way that he "needed to have any further diagnostic work-up or testing relative to his heart." On October 5, 2015, Josh collapsed at home while working on a construction project. He was taken to the Emergency Room, but died that day. The Sampson family procured a private autopsy; the report concluded that Josh died due to an arrhythmia secondary to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a congenital heart condition. Alicia thereafter filed suit against the clinic, HearWise and the doctors, alleging fraud and negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Isaac Health and Drs. Nixon and Saylor with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against them because those allegations were never properly presented to the circuit court for adjudication. The Court also reversed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against HeartWise because Alicia presented substantial evidence of Josh's reasonable reliance upon HeartWise's representations about its program. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Isaac Health with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against Isaac Health because Alicia failed to present substantial evidence that Josh's course of conduct would have changed if he had not seen HeartWise materials in the Isaac Health clinic's waiting room. The Court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against HeartWise for multiple reasons. View "Sampson v. HeartWise Health Systems Corporation, et al." on Justia Law