Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Tristin Fahrnow was injured when a hot-oil truck operated by an employee of E-5 Oilfield Services struck him on an icy Montana highway. Fahrnow had been inspecting his own vehicle after a prior collision at the intersection, and was standing in the roadway when the E-5 truck lost control and hit him. Fahrnow sued E-5 for negligence under a theory of vicarious liability, alleging that the E-5 driver failed to operate the truck safely given the hazardous conditions. E-5 asserted that Fahrnow’s own actions, including parking in the traffic lane and failing to display warning devices, constituted comparative negligence.The Seventh Judicial District Court of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of E-5, finding that Fahrnow was solely responsible for his injuries as a matter of law. The District Court also denied Fahrnow’s motions for sanctions against E-5 for alleged spoliation of evidence (loss of truck data and employment records) and denied his motion to compel E-5 to answer an interrogatory comparing the parties’ medical experts’ qualifications, granting E-5’s cross-motion for a protective order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that the record presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the comparative negligence of both drivers, making summary judgment inappropriate. The Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to E-5 and remanded for trial. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Fahrnow’s motions for default judgment as a sanction for spoliation and its denial of the motion to compel further expert discovery, finding no abuse of discretion in those rulings. View "Fahrnow v. E-5 Oil Services" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought medical care for severe headaches and related symptoms from various providers in Oklahoma and Missouri, including Freeman Health System (FHS) and Dr. Gulshan Uppal in Joplin, Missouri. After multiple visits and treatments, she was ultimately diagnosed with serious neurological conditions and suffered lasting health consequences. She alleged that several healthcare providers, including FHS and Dr. Uppal, negligently diagnosed, treated, and discharged her.She filed suit in the District Court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, naming multiple defendants. FHS and Dr. Uppal moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing their actions and contacts were insufficient for Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, finding it lacked both general and specific personal jurisdiction over these defendants, primarily because the relevant treatment occurred in Missouri and the claims did not arise from FHS’s Oklahoma contacts. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the district court erred by only considering whether the suit “arose out of” the defendants’ contacts with Oklahoma, and not whether it “related to” those contacts, as required by the two-pronged standard for specific personal jurisdiction clarified in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 8th Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff met her burden regarding FHS’s contacts with Oklahoma, warranting further proceedings to determine if her claims “relate to” those contacts. However, the plaintiff failed to show sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction over Dr. Uppal. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s opinion, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Uppal, reversed the dismissal of FHS, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barfell v. Freeman Health System" on Justia Law

After tripping and falling on a raised portion of sidewalk in front of a residence, the plaintiff sued the owners of the adjacent properties and the City for negligence and premises liability. The claim against one property owner, Goode, was based on the theory that a tree in the parkway in front of her house had roots extending under the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell, potentially causing the damage. The City maintained and inspected the tree and sidewalk, but the plaintiff alleged Goode’s ownership of the tree contributed to the dangerous condition.The Ventura County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goode, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding her liability. The plaintiff did not oppose Goode’s motion for summary judgment, but the City did file an opposition and attempted to file a cross-complaint against Goode. The trial court declined to consider the City’s opposition, ruling that the City lacked standing because it had not filed a cross-complaint, and rejected the cross-complaint on procedural grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that a codefendant with an adverse interest has standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment, regardless of whether a cross-complaint has been filed. The court further found that the City’s cross-complaint was properly filed and should not have been rejected. However, after reviewing the evidence de novo, the appellate court concluded that Goode could not be held liable as a matter of law because she did not own, control, or maintain the sidewalk or tree in a manner that created the dangerous condition. The judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Goode was affirmed. View "Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks" on Justia Law

A flight attendant on a Delta Air Lines flight observed a 13-year-old passenger crying during turbulence and believed the man accompanying her was behaving inappropriately. Concluding that the man was sexually assaulting and trafficking the child, the attendant reported her concerns to the flight captain, who relayed the information to a station manager. The manager contacted local police, who detained and questioned the man, Nicholas Cupp, and his daughter upon landing. After investigation, police determined Cupp was the child’s father and released him without charges. Cupp later filed suit, alleging the report was false and reckless, and claimed significant emotional distress and harm to his relationship with his daughter.The case was initially filed in the Circuit Court of Newport News, Virginia, but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 for good-faith reports of suspected child abuse. The district court granted the motion, finding the immunity statute applicable even though the report was made to law enforcement rather than directly to social services, and concluded that Cupp had not sufficiently alleged bad faith or malicious intent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether a nonmandatory reporter who makes a good-faith complaint of suspected child abuse to law enforcement, rather than directly to social services, is entitled to immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. Finding no controlling Virginia precedent, the Fourth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Virginia, as its answer will determine whether the district court’s dismissal should be affirmed or reversed. View "Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

A catastrophic multi-vehicle collision occurred in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, involving a motorcoach bus, FedEx and UPS tractor-trailers, and other vehicles. The crash resulted in five deaths and numerous injuries, requiring a large emergency response and extensive investigation. Plaintiffs, who resided in various locations across the country and abroad, filed civil lawsuits in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against several corporate defendants, all of which conduct business nationwide. The defendants sought to transfer the cases to Westmoreland County, arguing that the majority of witnesses, including first responders and investigators, were located there and would face significant hardship if required to travel over 200 miles to Philadelphia for trial.The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendants’ petitions to transfer venue, finding that the burden on witnesses was substantial and that the doctrine of forum non conveniens warranted transfer. The court noted that the defendants had identified numerous witnesses whose testimony would be material and who would be significantly inconvenienced by the distance. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that the defendants failed to show that the identified witnesses were “key witnesses” whose testimony was “critical” to the defense, and that the affidavits did not sufficiently detail the necessity of their testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the Superior Court’s imposition of a “key witness” requirement was inconsistent with Pennsylvania precedent. The Supreme Court clarified that a petitioner seeking transfer for forum non conveniens must identify the burdened witnesses and provide a general statement of their expected testimony, but need not show that their testimony is “critical” or “necessary” to the defense. The trial court’s decision to transfer the cases to Westmoreland County was found to be a proper exercise of discretion. View "Tranter v. Z&D Tour, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns an automobile accident that occurred in rural Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, on January 3, 2024. James Godwin, a resident of Dallas County and employee of Talton Communications, Inc., was driving a company vehicle when he was rear-ended by Desi Bernard Peoples, a resident of Fayette County. Godwin subsequently filed suit in the Dallas Circuit Court against Peoples, his employer Talton, and Penn National Security Insurance Company, which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Godwin’s claims included negligence and wantonness, a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits, and a workers’ compensation claim against Talton. Godwin received all medical treatment for his injuries in Dallas County, where he and his wife reside and work.After the complaint was filed, Penn National moved to sever the workers’ compensation claim and to transfer the remaining claims to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, arguing that transfer was warranted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice under Alabama’s forum non conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1. The Dallas Circuit Court denied the motion to sever but ordered the workers’ compensation claim to be tried separately. The court also denied the motion to transfer, finding insufficient evidence that Tuscaloosa County was a significantly more convenient forum or that Dallas County had only a weak connection to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed Penn National’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel transfer. The Court denied the petition, holding that Penn National failed to meet its burden of showing that Tuscaloosa County was significantly more convenient or that Dallas County’s connection to the case was weak. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is entitled to deference when both venues are proper and that the evidence presented did not justify overriding that choice. View "Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In February 2016, Kevin Frost kidnapped his estranged wife, Sherri Frost, during a contentious divorce. He lured her into a situation where he could seize her, forced her into his vehicle, and held her for several hours in a barn owned by a family associate. During captivity, Kevin made Sherri severely intoxicated and later delivered her to the emergency room before turning himself in. Kevin pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping and served a prison sentence. Sherri subsequently filed a civil suit against Kevin, Frost Ranching Corporation (the Ranch), and other parties, seeking damages for injuries and emotional distress resulting from the kidnapping. She alleged that Kevin acted, at least in part, to prevent her from obtaining an interest in the Ranch during the divorce.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, dismissed claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment to Frost Limited Partnership. The court denied summary judgment to the Ranch on vicarious liability, allowing that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, Sherri presented evidence of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages. The jury found Kevin liable for several torts but awarded only $20,000 in damages, which matched the lower end of medical expenses and did not account for pain and suffering. The District Court granted Sherri’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s award unsupported by substantial evidence, as it disregarded uncontradicted, credible evidence of pain and suffering. The court also granted the Ranch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the Ranch could not ratify Kevin’s conduct absent acceptance of any benefit from the kidnapping.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed both rulings. It held that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence and that a new trial on damages was warranted. The court also held that, under Montana law, ratification requires acceptance of a benefit, which was absent here, so the Ranch could not be held liable for Kevin’s actions. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions.The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages.After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment.The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

In 2019, a well-known advice columnist publicly accused a sitting U.S. president of sexually assaulting her in a department store in 1996. The president, while in office, responded with public statements denying the allegations, asserting he did not know the accuser, and claiming she fabricated the story for personal and political gain. The accuser then filed a defamation lawsuit in New York state court, alleging that these statements were false and damaged her reputation. The case was removed to federal court after the Department of Justice certified that the president acted within the scope of his office, but the DOJ later withdrew this certification. During the litigation, the accuser also brought a separate lawsuit under a new state law allowing survivors of sexual assault to sue regardless of the statute of limitations, which resulted in a jury finding that the president had sexually abused and defamed her after leaving office.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial summary judgment for the accuser in the original defamation case, relying on issue preclusion from the verdict in the later case. The trial was limited to damages, and the jury awarded the accuser $83.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The president moved for a new trial or remittitur, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to presidential immunity, that the damages were excessive, and that the jury instructions were erroneous. The district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the president had waived any claim to absolute presidential immunity by failing to timely assert it, and that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump v. United States did not alter this conclusion. The court also found no error in the district court’s application of issue preclusion, evidentiary rulings, or jury instructions, and concluded that the damages awarded were reasonable and not excessive. The judgment in favor of the accuser was affirmed in full. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law