Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Hardwick alleged that his bloodstream contains trace quantities of five chemicals (PFAS)—which are part of a family of thousands of chemicals used in medical devices, automotive interiors, waterproof clothing, food packaging, firefighting foam, non-stick cookware, ski and car waxes, batteries, semiconductors, aviation and aerospace construction, paints and varnishes, and building materials. Hardwick, who was exposed to firefighting foam, does not know what companies manufactured the particular chemicals in his bloodstream; nor does he know whether those chemicals might someday make him sick. Of the thousands of companies that have manufactured PFAS since the 1950s, Hardwick sued 10 defendants and sought to represent a class comprising nearly every person “residing in the United States.” The district court certified a class comprising every person residing in Ohio with trace amounts of certain PFAS in their blood.The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. Even at the pleadings stage, the factual allegations, taken as true, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” The element of traceability requires a showing that the plaintiff’s “injury was likely caused by the defendant.” The district court treated the defendants as a collective, but “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Even if Hardwick met the actual-injury requirement he must tie his injury to each defendant.” Hardwick’s conclusory allegations do not support a plausible inference that any of the defendants bear responsibility for the PFAS in Hardwick’s blood. View "Hardwick v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the underlying tort action for failure to timely effect service of process, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for enlargement of time to serve and dismissing the action.Appellants sued Respondent for personal injuries following a car collision. Because Appellants failed to serve the summons and complaint on Respondent within 120 days the district court issued an order to show cause, and the summons and complaint were served. Respondent moved to quash the service of process and to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time to serve process and granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time and properly dismissed the case under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). View "Sabater v. Razmy" on Justia Law

Cosmo DiNardo (“DiNardo”) suffered from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder, and, as a result, exhibited psychosis, grandiose speech, suicidal ideation, as well as homicidal ideation and violent behavior. He confessed to killing four individuals, and pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree murder. He subsequently filed a complaint against his treating psychiatrist and health care providers, claiming that his criminal conduct was the result of his psychiatrist’s grossly negligent treatment, and sought compensatory damages, indemnification for judgments levied against him by his victims’ families, and counsel fees. In an appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration was whether the “no felony conviction recovery” rule precluded DiNardo’s cause of action. Because the Court found the rule barred the medical malpractice claims at issue in this appeal, it affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "DiNardo v. Kohler, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, a Pennsylvania trial court transferred venue based on a determination the corporate defendant did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia County because only 0.005% of the company’s total national revenue was derived from that county. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion in transferring venue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to evaluate the Superior Court’s determination, and affirmed: venue was proper in Philadelphia County. View "Hangey, et al. v. Husqvarna, et al." on Justia Law

Above All Termite & Pest Control ("Above All") employed Henry Keim as a salaried pest-control technician and provided him with an employer authorized vehicle for work use. Above All’s policy limited the quantity of supplies technicians could keep in their authorized vehicles overnight. When technicians needed to replenish supplies, Above All authorized them to drive their vehicles to Above All’s shop instead of driving directly to a worksite, to retrieve whatever they required, and then to go from the shop to the scheduled sites. On the morning of the accident, Keim clocked in, received his schedule, and concluded that his vehicle lacked sufficient supplies. On his way to the shop for supplies, Keim sustained injuries in a car accident. The Judge of Compensation dismissed Keim’s claim petition with prejudice, concluding that Keim was merely commuting to work when he sustained injuries. The Appellate Division applied the “authorized vehicle rule” and reversed the dismissal order. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court, finding Keim was “in the course of employment” under the “authorized vehicle rule” at the time of the accident because Above All authorized a vehicle for him to operate and his operation of that identified vehicle was for business expressly authorized by Above All. View "Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control" on Justia Law

The circuit court entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Wayne Fagerstrom, individually and as the administrator of the estate of Sylvia Fagerstrom, deceased. The defendants were Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("MIMC") and Gulf Health Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Thomas Hospital. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying their renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, in which they asserted that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence demonstrating that the proximate cause of Sylvia's death was sepsis resulting from an infected pressure ulcer allegedly caused by the defendants' breaches of the standard of care. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed with defendants and reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Fagerstrom" on Justia Law

K&C Logistics, LLC, brought suit in Madison County, Mississippi Circuit Court against Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., and Daniel Cooper as the result of a vehicle accident that occurred in Nogales, Arizona. The trial court determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Old Dominion. K&C Logistics appealed, asking the Mississippi Supreme Court to find that courts in Mississippi had jurisdiction over Old Dominion. The Court was further requested to interpret the Mississippi Business Corporation Act to hold that Old Dominion, a foreign corporation registered to do business in Mississippi, consented to general personal jurisdiction when it registered to do business in the state. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K&C Logistics, LLC v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are people who claim to suffer from chronic Lyme disease. A person contracts Lyme disease from ticks carrying the bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi. In 2006, IDSA published The Clinical Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Lyme Disease, Human Granulocytic Anaplasmosis, and Babesiosis: Clinical Practice Guidelines by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (“the Guidelines”). The Guidelines extensively discuss how to diagnose and treat Lyme disease. Throughout, they express doubt about the causes, frequency, and even the existence of chronic Lyme disease. Moreover, the Guidelines do not recommend long-term antibiotic therapy for persons with persistent Lyme symptoms who have already received recommended treatments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs took issue with IDSA’s positions that (1) “there is no convincing biological evidence for the existence of symptomatic chronic B. burgdorferi infection among patients after receipt of recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease,” and (2) “antibiotic therapy has not proven to be useful and is not recommended for patients with chronic (>6 months) subjective symptoms after recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease.” On their face, however, these statements are medical opinions. In this context (a scientific debate over treatment options for persistent Lyme symptoms), to say that evidence is not “convincing” or that some treatment is “not recommended” is plainly to express a medical opinion. Just because Plaintiffs disagree with those opinions does not mean that IDSA is somehow liable because their doctors or insurance providers found the opinions persuasive. View "Torrey v. Infectious Diseases Socty" on Justia Law

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff Sean Stetson and Defendant Edmonds were part of a low-speed, sideswipe vehicle accident. Although no one reported injuries on the scene, two weeks after the accident, Plaintiff sought medical treatment for injuries he claimed he sustained in the accident. With this visit, Plaintiff filed his now "plainly evident" campaign to fabricate a claim for damages. When a party to litigation seeks to intentionally deceive the court and its adversary, a district court may issue reasonable sanctions and require the deceitful party to pay attorney fees. Finding plaintiff did just that, and the district court sanctioned him with reasonable attorney fees and dismissal of his non-economic claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sanctions. View "Stenson v. Edmonds, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff took her neighbor’s dog for a walk around Dolphin’s apartment complex. Plaintiff observed that it was raining that day with thunderstorms. Before crossing, Plaintiff observed that the concrete on the North Side Gate driveway was wet, and rainwater formed a current that was running down the driveway. Plaintiff proceeded to cross, and the rainwater current knocked her down. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her right shoulder, left knee, and face. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dolphin, alleging general negligence and premises liability. Dolphin filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because the running rainwater was open and obvious, Dolphin had no duty to warn. The trial court granted Dolphin’s motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims because the rainwater current on the driveway was open and obvious. Further, the court wrote that even assuming Plaintiff did not forfeit the necessity exception to the open and obvious rule, she still cannot prevail on the merits. The court wrote that Plaintiff was in a better position to avoid the obvious danger of walking across a current of water that formed as a result of a rainstorm that began that same day. Plaintiff could have chosen to use a different entrance. The burden imposed on Dolphin to constantly monitor weather conditions and immediately install warning signals is outweighed by Plaintiff’s ability to avoid a condition she should have observed as obviously dangerous. View "Nicoletti v. Kest" on Justia Law