Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In a case brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Michael and Melissa Sullivan sued Werner Company and Lowe's Companies, Inc. over a mobile scaffold that collapsed and caused serious injury to Michael Sullivan. The Sullivans claimed the scaffold was defectively designed because it was possible for a user to inadvertently rotate the deck pins off the platform during normal use.Before trial, the Sullivans filed a motion to preclude Werner and Lowe’s from admitting into evidence any industry or government standards, which the trial court granted. The jury ultimately found Werner and Lowe’s liable for the design defect and awarded the Sullivans $2.5 million in damages.Werner and Lowe's appealed, arguing that they should have been allowed to present evidence that the mobile scaffold complied with industry and governmental safety standards. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that such compliance evidence remained inadmissible in products liability cases.The court applied the risk-utility test, which asserts that a product is in a defective condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions. The court concluded that evidence of a product’s compliance with governmental regulations or industry standards is inadmissible in design defect cases to show a product is not defective under the risk-utility theory because such evidence goes to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in making its design choice, not to whether the product was defectively designed. View "Sullivan v. Werner Co." on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Iowa, the plaintiff, Renee Hummel, brought a medical malpractice suit against the defendants, Adam B. Smith, Adam Smith, M.D., P.C., and Tri-State Specialists, L.L.P. The defendants requested an interlocutory review of a lower court order that denied their motion to strike and for summary judgment. The issue at the heart of the defendants' motion was that the expert who signed the plaintiff's certificate of merit did not have an active license to practice medicine.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case. The court determined that an expert who signs a plaintiff's certificate of merit in a medical malpractice case must have an active license to practice medicine. Therefore, the lower court erred in denying the defendants' motion to strike and for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff's certificate of merit was signed by an expert without an active medical license. View "Hummel v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Iowa, the appellants, the estate and family of Deanna Dee Fahrmann, had filed a wrongful-death action against ABCM Corporation and two of its employees, alleging nursing home malpractice. The appellants failed to serve a certificate of merit affidavit, required under Iowa Code section 147.140, signed by a qualified expert within sixty days of the defendants’ response to the claim. Instead, they served initial disclosures, signed only by their counsel, that named their expert within the statutory sixty-day deadline. After the deadline, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for noncompliance, and the appellants served a certificate signed by their expert and argued that they substantially complied with the statute. The district court dismissed the case based on the mandatory language of the statute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the case. The court held that the plaintiffs' initial disclosure, signed only by their counsel, did not comply with or substantially comply with the certificate of merit requirement under section 147.140 of the Iowa Code. The law unambiguously required the plaintiffs to timely serve a certificate of merit affidavit signed under oath by a qualified expert stating the expert’s familiarity with the applicable standard of care and its breach by the defendants unless the parties extend the deadline by agreement or the plaintiffs show good cause to move for an extension within the sixty-day deadline. The plaintiffs' untimely service of a certificate signed by their expert did not constitute substantial compliance with the statute. Therefore, dismissal was mandatory under the plain language of the statute. View "The Estate of Deanna Dee Fahrmann v. ABCM Corporation" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, the plaintiffs were the children of Robert Crum Jr., who was killed when the concrete truck he was driving overturned due to a tire failure. The tire was a 10-year-old Hankook AH10 tire, and the plaintiffs sued the companies that allegedly designed, manufactured, and distributed the tire, Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire & Technology Co., Ltd. ("Hankook"). The plaintiffs alleged that the tire was defective and caused the accident. They sought to depose Hankook's designated corporate representative, Won Yong Choi, and claimed that he provided evasive answers or did not answer at all. They also alleged that Hankook's attorney consistently interrupted the deposition, objected to questions, and instructed Choi not to answer. As a result, the plaintiffs moved the trial court to impose sanctions against Hankook.The trial court granted the motion and imposed sanctions that included prohibiting Hankook from having any corporate representative give testimony at trial that went beyond Choi's deposition testimony, barring Hankook from disputing at trial that the failed tire was defective, and striking 10 of Hankook's affirmative defenses. The trial court also ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence of the attorneys' fees and costs they had incurred in preparing for and taking Choi's deposition. After they did so, the trial court entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $66,550 in attorneys' fees.Hankook petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to direct the trial court to vacate the sanctions order and the fee order. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were not authorized by Rule 37(d) because Choi did not fail to appear for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to vacate both its initial order sanctioning Hankook and its later order imposing a monetary sanction. View "Ex parte Hankook Tire America Corporation PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice lawsuit, Kimberly Taylor claimed that Dr. Keith Brill breached the accepted standard of medical care by causing damage during her surgery. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the lower court had made several errors during the trial. Firstly, the lower court should not have allowed any evidence or argument regarding Taylor's informed consent or assumption of risk, as Taylor's consent was uncontested and such information was irrelevant to determining whether Dr. Brill had conformed to the accepted standard of care. Secondly, the lower court should not have prohibited Taylor from presenting non-expert evidence to show that the costs of her medical damages were reasonable. The Supreme Court also found that the lower court should not have allowed evidence of insurance write-downs, as these did not create any payable benefit to Taylor. Finally, the lower court was wrong to limit the scope of Taylor's closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida heard a case involving an appeal by James Seadler against Marina Bay Resort Condominium Association, Inc. following an injury Seadler sustained when a pool chair at the resort collapsed. The case revolved around the jury selection process during the initial trial and specifically, the denial by the trial court of Seadler’s request to dismiss a potential juror (Juror 16) for cause. Seadler argued that this decision by the trial court led to an unfair trial as he was forced to use his peremptory challenges to exclude Juror 16, leaving him without a challenge to exclude another juror (Juror 22), who he found objectionable. The First District Court of Appeal rejected Seadler's claim that an error by the trial court in denying his cause challenge to a potential juror automatically entitled him to a new trial. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the First District Court that the harmless error standard applies in such cases, rather than automatic entitlement to a new trial. However, the Supreme Court found that Marina Bay did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error by the trial court did not contribute to the verdict. The court concluded that Seadler was entitled to a new trial and quashed the decision of the First District Court. View "Seadler v. Marina Bay Resort Condominium Association, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed a district court's decision in a case involving a plaintiff, John Breuer, who sued the State of Montana for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The accident was caused by a student-employee of the University of Montana. Breuer claimed that the accident resulted in a shoulder injury that caused him significant pain and suffering, and loss of established course of life. The State admitted liability for the accident, but disputed that the accident was the sole cause of Breuer's claimed disabilities and pain. The district court excluded evidence of Breuer's pre-accident back injury and related disabilities as alternate cause evidence. The Supreme Court held that this was an error and that the district court's exclusion of this evidence materially prejudiced the State's right to a fair trial. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Breuer v. State" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Dorothy Warren passed away after Dr. Nirandr Inthachak allegedly misinterpreted her CT scan. Angela Wilson, Warren’s daughter, filed a lawsuit against Dr. Inthachak. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Inthachak on two grounds. First, Wilson failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence required under OCGA § 51-1-29.5 for healthcare liability claims arising from emergency medical care. Second, Wilson couldn’t prove that the outcome would have been different if Dr. Inthachak had correctly interpreted the CT scan.Wilson appealed, and all 14 judges of the Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. However, they were evenly divided on why summary judgment was incorrect under OCGA § 51-1-29.5. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the equal division, invoking the Court's equal-division jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Court of Appeals was not equally divided on the disposition of the judgment that was appealed. The Court of Appeals had unanimously agreed that the grant of summary judgment could not stand, and their disagreement was only regarding the reasons for why one of the two grounds was faulty. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that such a disagreement did not invoke its equal-division jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court returned the case to the Court of Appeals. View "WILSON v. INTHACHAK" on Justia Law

In this case, Arlene James filed a premises liability lawsuit against Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC, after she tripped on a parking bumper in a parking lot owned by Brixmor and sustained injuries. The parking bumper was not in its usual location but was instead laid out to separate the parking space from a motorcycle parking area. After the incident, Brixmor painted the parking bumper yellow. The trial court denied Brixmor's motion for summary judgment due to disputed facts about whether the structure James tripped on was a hazard and whether she had previously encountered it. The trial court also granted James's motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, barring Brixmor from arguing that the parking bumper was not a potential hazard. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment but vacated the order imposing spoliation sanctions, remanding the matter to the trial court to apply the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Brixmor's petition for a writ of certiorari but chose to address a different issue: the Court of Appeals' determination that Brixmor failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in considering the subsequent remedial measures rule in its analysis of the spoliation issue. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that once the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court applied the incorrect standard on spoliation, consideration of the remedial measure rule was unnecessary and thus dicta. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated Division 3 of the opinion to the extent that it purports to make a legal determination on the subsequent remedial measures rule and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BRIXMOR NEW CHASTAIN CORNERS SC, LLC v. JAMES" on Justia Law

A minor, Freedom Morris, sought emergency treatment for appendicitis at Vidant Medical Center and was operated on by Dr. David Rodeberg. Despite complaining of severe pain after the surgery, Morris was discharged. He returned to the hospital a day later with a fever and sharp abdominal pain. A second surgery performed by a different doctor revealed that not all of the appendix had been removed during the first operation. This had caused a ruptured appendix and infection in Morris' body. Morris underwent a third surgery to drain a pelvic abscess.More than five years after the first surgery, Morris filed a lawsuit against Dr. Rodeberg and Vidant Medical Center alleging medical malpractice and medical negligence. The defendants responded with motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the lawsuit was filed outside the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims of persons who are over ten years old but under eighteen years old when their claims accrue. The trial court denied the defendants' motions, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the three-year statute of limitations barred Morris' medical malpractice claims. The Court reasoned that while the North Carolina General Assembly has recognized that individuals under certain disabilities, including being a minor, are unable to appreciate the nature of potential legal claims and take appropriate action, subsection 1-17(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes eliminates the tolling of the medical malpractice claims of minors, except in certain situations. None of those exceptions applied to Morris' case, so his claim was subject to the standard three-year statute of limitations and was therefore time-barred. The Court did not address Morris' argument that the application of the three-year statute of limitations violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because it did not have jurisdiction to review that issue. View "Morris v. Rodeberg" on Justia Law