Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while stepping from a dock to a boat. He sued his employer—a yacht club in Long Beach—under federal admiralty law. The trial court sustained the club’s final demurrer to the second amended complaint. The court ruled there was no admiralty jurisdiction.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the court’s ruling without deciding about admiralty jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress in 1984 specified employees covered by state workers’ compensation law working at a “club” are covered by state workers’ compensation law and not federal law if they are eligible for state workers’ compensation. The court wrote that Plaintiff concedes the yacht club is a “club.” Federal law thus makes California state workers’ compensation law paramount, which means Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation. The court wrote that a core part of the state workers’ compensation bargain is that injured workers get speedy and predictable relief irrespective of fault. In return, workers are barred from suing their employers in tort. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s tort suit against his employer. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

Holly Rich brought a legal malpractice action against her attorneys, Hepworth Holzer, LLP, and E. Craig Daue and Daue Buxbaum, PLLC (“Daue Buxbaum”) (collectively, “Respondents”), regarding their legal representation of Rich in an underlying medical malpractice action against Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (“EIRMC”), Dr. John Lassetter (a cardiologist), and Dr. Charles Phillips (an intensivist) (collectively, “EIRMC providers”). In that action, Rich's claims against the EIRMC providers failed because they were filed after the statute of limitations expired. Rich alleged in this action that those claims were not filed on time because of Respondents’ legal malpractice. Both sides filed substantive motions for summary judgment and the district court found that Rich could not prevail because she had “not disclosed any expert [medical] testimony which complies with the requirements of Idaho law for admissibility.” The district court concluded that, lacking evidence to “set out a prima facie case of medical malpractice,” in the underlying case, Rich’s claim against Respondents for legal malpractice failed. Rich appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Rich v. Hepworth Holzer" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff’s home sustained water damage in a hailstorm, he asked his insurer Allstate to cover the loss; consequently, Steamatic was hired to perform water abatement and mold remediation services. Plaintiff claimed that the mold was not remediated properly and that he developed a severe and permanent lung condition as a result. New Mexico does not permit a civil plaintiff to recover duplicate compensatory damages for the same injuries. The collateral source rule presents an exception to the prohibition of double recovery, permitting a plaintiff to recover the same damages from both a defendant and a collateral source. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the payor of the prejudgment settlement of a claim qualifies as a collateral source and that the payment does not reduce the same damages the plaintiff may recover from an adjudicated wrongdoer. The issue this case presented for review centered on whether a payment in postjudgment settlement of a claim by an adjudicated wrongdoer qualified as a collateral source. The Court clarified that the collateral source rule had no application to a postjudgment payment made by an adjudicated wrongdoer. Here, the Court held that the payment, which Plaintiff received in a postjudgment settlement with Allstate satisfied a portion of Plaintiff’s damages and extinguished Plaintiff’s right to recover the same damages from Steamatic. The Court explained that the share of damages fully satisfied by Allstate must offset the damages Plaintiff may recover from Steamatic. View "Gonzagowski v. Steamatic of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In a previous action between these parties, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether the exclusive-remedies provision in the workers’ compensation act precluded an injured employee from pursuing recovery from an uninsured motorist policy. After the Court held that the exclusive-remedies provision did not apply, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier sought a declaratory judgment that they were permitted to assert a lien against any recovery the employee might obtain for injuries already compensated under the workers’ compensation act. The employee and the uninsured motorist insurer contended that any such lien was barred by statute, relying on the Court’s decision in Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 74 A.3d 609 (Del. 2013). The superior court followed that binding precedent as it was required to do and dismissed the declaratory judgment claim. After review however, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded Simendinger was decided in error. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and held that the workers’ compensation act expressly allowed the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier to assert a subrogation lien against benefits paid to the employee under the employer’s uninsured motorist policy. View "Horizon Services, Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Herrgott, was driving a four-seat Polaris all-terrain vehicle at night down a gravel road when he “overcorrected” trying to avoid a pothole. The ATV overturned, and Joseph MacNabb, a passenger, was severely injured. Since MacNabb was a state employee in the course and scope of his employment, he received workers’ compensation benefits from the Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers’ Compensation Trust. The Trust later initiated this litigation in an attempt to recover more than $300,000 in benefits paid for MacNabb’s injury. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment to Herrgott because the Trust’s Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) representative could not articulate a legal theory entitling it to recover. The Mississippi Supreme Court found there was sufficient evidence of Herrgott’s negligence for the case to go to trial, and the deposition testimony of a lay witness should not have bound the Trust as to which legal theories it could pursue. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers' Compensation Trust v. Herrgott" on Justia Law

A large, dead tree near a mobile home rented by Tammy and Thomas Sankey fell and damaged the Sankeys’ vehicles, killed one of their cats and traumatized the other, and caused Tammy Sankey to experience emotional distress. Proceeding pro se, the Sankeys filed a small claims action against the owner of the mobile home park where they lived and the owner and managers of their mobile home. After losing in small claims court because they failed to prove on whose land the offending tree was located, the Sankeys filed for a trial de novo in magistrate court and paid for a land survey. The Sankeys submitted both documents attached to a joint declaration from them in opposition to motions for summary judgment filed by the owners and managers, along with a declaration from the Sankeys’ neighbor setting forth the neighbor’s lay testimony that the tree was located on the lot occupied by the Sankeys. The owners and managers of the mobile home and the mobile home park filed motions to strike the declaration from the neighbor as well as portions of the Sankeys’ declaration and the attached Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit. The magistrate court granted the motions, holding that no foundation had been laid for the Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit and that they were inadmissible hearsay. The magistrate court also struck the declaration of the neighbor because her testimony about the location of the fallen tree was not based on her personal knowledge. Without admissible evidence of who owned the land where the fallen tree was located, the magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of the owners and managers. The magistrate court denied the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration. The district court, sitting in its appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Sankey v. Ivey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Holy Cross College, Inc. and Congregation of Holy Cross Moreau Province, Inc. (collectively, “Holy Cross”) in the district court. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from sexual abuse carried out by Holy Cross teacher on two separate occasions while attending summer camp at Holy Cross as a 10- or 11-year-old boy in either 1968 or 1969. Plaintiff asserted that Holy Cross is liable for the teacher’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. At the time of the alleged abuse, such an offense was subject to a one-year liberative prescriptive period. Plaintiff invoked the Revival Provision as his basis to bring a suit. The district court granted Holy Cross’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that while the appeal was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in T.S v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc., 2023 WL 4195778. The court wrote that with the benefit of the T.S. decision, the court is now certain as to how this case should be resolved under Louisiana law. As previously noted, the facts of both cases are nearly identical. Therefore, it is apparent that the district court should not have ruled on the Revival Provision’s constitutionality. Instead, it is now clear that the Revival Provision’s wording makes it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, his complaint should be dismissed for that sole reason. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider whether Plaintiff should be provided with leave to amend his complaint. View "Lousteau v. Holy Cross College" on Justia Law

After an elementary school teacher grabbed and twisted A.S.’s arm, his mother (and guardian ad litem) filed a complaint form with the Palmdale School District (District) on his behalf. They then filed a lawsuit for damages against the District, its superintendent, the assistant superintendent, the elementary school principal, and the teacher. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer to Appellant’s third amended complaint on the ground Appellant failed to file a claim with the District in compliance with Government Code section 910.2 Appellant appealed from the subsequent judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant specified several administrative actions that he wanted the District to take but did not state he was seeking monetary damages and made no attempt at all to estimate, even roughly, an amount of damages or state whether or not the claim would be a limited civil case. Accordingly, the court held that the complaint form does not substantially comply with section 910. Further, the court explained that even if it assumes that all of the elements of equitable estoppel were initially present, the law recognizes that circumstances may change and render estoppel no longer appropriate. Here, Appellant’s counsel is charged with the knowledge that Appellant needed to file a claim for damages with the District and with the knowledge of what was required for such a claim. Given that counsel possessed the relevant facts about the incident, had the original complaint form, and was actually aware of the statutory requirements for suing a governmental entity, this was ample time. View "A.S. v. Palmdale Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In June 2020, Plaintiff’s father died from COVID-19. He allegedly contracted the disease at his nursing home, NHC HealthCare-Maryland Heights, LLC. Plaintiff brought suit in Missouri state court against the nursing home, three corporate entities that own the facility, and twelve administrators and medical professionals employed by NHC HealthCare-Maryland Heights, LLC. The nursing home and the three corporate entities removed the case to federal court, but the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court. The NHC entities appealed and argued that removal was proper.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the remand order of the district court. The court explained that the PREP Act immunizes covered individuals from suit for injuries “caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure.” The Act provides no immunity where a covered person’s “willful misconduct” is the proximate cause of a person’s injuries. The statute creates an exclusive federal cause of action for claims based on willful misconduct. The court explained that the NHC entities assert that the nursing home “acted under” the direction of a federal officer because the government designated nursing homes as “critical infrastructure” during the COVID-19 pandemic and subjected these facilities to extensive regulation. However compliance with even pervasive federal regulation is not sufficient to show that a private entity acted under the direction of a federal officer. Thus, the court found that removal is not authorized under 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. View "Zane Cagle v. NHC Healthcare" on Justia Law