Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law

A constable, Deborah Martinez-Garibay, was fatally shot while attempting to serve a writ of restitution to a tenant who had threatened a resident with a gun. The tenant also killed Angela Fox, who was accompanying Garibay, and another individual before taking his own life. Angela's surviving spouse, William Fox, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Garibay's spouse, Pima County, and the Arizona Constable Ethics, Standards and Training Board, alleging negligence and gross negligence on Garibay's part.The Superior Court of Pima County denied Garibay's spouse's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and owed no duty to Angela. The Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that Garibay was judicially immune from liability as her actions did not constitute "misconduct" under A.R.S. § 11-449.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to determine whether the common law doctrine of judicial immunity shields constables from liability under A.R.S. § 11-449. The court held that § 11-449 limits, rather than abrogates, judicial immunity. It concluded that a constable who engages in "misconduct" in the service or execution of a writ is subject to liability. The court defined "misconduct" as an intentional violation of an applicable rule, standard, or norm, rather than mere negligence or gross negligence.The court found that Fox's complaint did not allege that Garibay engaged in "misconduct" as defined by the statute, but rather that she was negligent or grossly negligent. Therefore, the court concluded that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and reversed the lower court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GARIBAY v FOX" on Justia Law

Catherine Kuo was killed while volunteering at a food distribution event organized by the Dublin Unified School District (DUSD). Her family and estate sued DUSD for negligence and premises liability, alleging failure to implement and communicate safety protocols. DUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that Labor Code section 3364.5, which deems school volunteers as employees entitled to workers' compensation benefits, barred the plaintiffs' claims.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, granted DUSD’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that section 3364.5 applied, providing that workers' compensation was the sole remedy for any injury, including death, sustained by volunteers while performing their duties. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history supported this interpretation, and thus, it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the term "any injury" in section 3364.5 unambiguously includes fatal injuries. The court also determined that DUSD’s resolution, which declared volunteers entitled to workers' compensation benefits, satisfied the statutory requirement, even though it did not explicitly use the word "deemed." The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute did not apply because DUSD did not treat its volunteers as employees in practice, noting that the statute did not require such conduct.The appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DUSD, affirming that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claims. View "Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Karrie and Howard Gurwood filed a lawsuit against GCA Services Group, Inc. after Karrie slipped and fell on a freshly waxed floor at her workplace, resulting in serious injuries. The Gurwoods claimed negligence on the part of GCA and sought damages, including punitive damages. At trial, the court granted GCA's motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages, and the jury found both Karrie and GCA each fifty percent at fault. The jury awarded Karrie the exact amount of her past medical expenses but found in favor of GCA on Howard's loss of consortium claim.The Gurwoods appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict on punitive damages and raised five other issues. The Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict on punitive damages, finding it dispositive of the appeal, and remanded for a new trial. GCA then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the directed verdict on punitive damages but modified the remand instructions. The Supreme Court held that requiring a retrial on all issues would be contrary to law and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the other five grounds raised by the Gurwoods. The Supreme Court clarified that if the Court of Appeals finds no error on the other grounds, the case should proceed to a new trial on punitive damages only, unless GCA requests a new trial on all issues under subsection 15-32-520(A) of the South Carolina Code. View "Gurwood v. GCA Services Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Philip Sanders filed a petition in the District Court for Creek County, alleging that Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC caused the wrongful death of his wife, Brenda Jean Sanders, during her confinement in the Creek County Jail. Brenda Sanders was booked into the jail on October 17, 2016, and her health deteriorated over four weeks. She was transported to a hospital on November 20, 2016, diagnosed with severe sepsis and other conditions, and died the next day.The District Court granted Turn Key's motion to dismiss Sanders' petition, citing immunity under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, and allowed Sanders thirty days to amend his petition. Sanders did not amend and appealed the dismissal. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court's order, but Turn Key filed a petition for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Sanders' appeal was premature as it challenged an interlocutory order, and appellate jurisdiction was absent. The Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and withdrew it from publication. The Court recast Sanders' petition in error as an application to assume original jurisdiction and a petition for prohibition. The Court concluded that the Governmental Tort Claims Act makes licensed medical professionals "employees" of the state when under contract with city, county, or state entities and providing medical care to inmates or detainees. The Court assumed original jurisdiction and denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Sanders v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC" on Justia Law

Kattie Boline sustained injuries from a car accident and sued JKC Trucking and driver Jerzy Syrzyna for negligence. During her jury trial, Boline violated a stipulated order in limine by mentioning insurance, which led the district court to declare a mistrial. The court found her violation intentional and sanctioned her by ordering her to pay $62,074.95 in defense attorneys’ fees and costs. The court also ruled that no new jury trial would be held until the sanction was paid. When Boline failed to pay, the district court dismissed her case with prejudice and entered judgment against her for the sanction amount.The district court of Sweetwater County initially handled the case, where Boline filed her complaint in 2018. The case experienced several delays before being set for trial in August 2022. During the trial, Boline’s mention of insurance, despite a pretrial order prohibiting such testimony, led to the mistrial. The district court then sanctioned her and conditioned a new trial on the payment of the sanction. Boline’s inability to pay the sanction led to the dismissal of her case with prejudice.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Boline and dismissing her case with prejudice. The court found that the district court properly considered Boline’s mental health condition, financial situation, and the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs. The Supreme Court also held that the district court did not violate Boline’s right to open access to the courts under the Wyoming Constitution, as the sanction and subsequent dismissal were appropriate responses to her intentional violation of the court’s order. View "Boline v. JKC Trucking" on Justia Law

Crystal Walcott Spill's estate and beneficiaries filed a wrongful death suit against several doctors, including Dr. Steven Paganessi and his medical group, alleging negligence during a surgical procedure that led to Spill's death. Spill, who had lupus, was under the care of Dr. Jenny Diep, a New York-based rheumatologist, and Dr. Jacob Markovitz, a New Jersey-based gynecologist. Before the surgery, Dr. Diep increased Spill's blood pressure medication dosage and recommended she see a nephrologist. Spill saw Dr. Holly Koncicki, a New York-based nephrologist, who conducted lab tests but did not receive the results before the surgery. Spill suffered a cardiac event during the procedure and died the same day. The lab results, available after her death, showed critically elevated creatinine and potassium levels.The trial court dismissed Dr. Diep from the case due to lack of personal jurisdiction and denied the defendants' motion to include her on the verdict form for fault allocation. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that an out-of-state individual over whom New Jersey courts lack personal jurisdiction cannot be included for fault allocation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, with modifications. The Court held that an individual outside New Jersey's jurisdiction is not a "party" under the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA) for fault allocation purposes. However, such an individual may be considered a joint tortfeasor under the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (JTCL), allowing defendants to seek contribution in a relevant jurisdiction if a judgment is rendered against them. The Court did not agree with the Appellate Division's view that the model civil jury instruction on causation mitigates any unfairness to the defendants. View "Estate of Spill v. Markovitz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who were allegedly sexually assaulted or harassed by Uber drivers, filed individual lawsuits against Uber Technologies, Inc. across various districts. They claimed Uber failed to take reasonable measures to prevent such misconduct, asserting negligence, misrepresentation, products liability, and vicarious liability. Plaintiffs argued that Uber was aware of the issue since at least 2014 but did not implement adequate safety measures, such as proper background checks, emergency notifications, and effective responses to complaints.The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) centralized these cases in the Northern District of California for coordinated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Uber opposed the centralization, arguing that their terms of use included a collective action waiver that precluded such a transfer and that the cases did not share sufficient common factual questions to warrant centralization. The JPML found that the cases did involve common factual questions and that centralization would eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve resources.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the JPML's order. The court held that Uber had not demonstrated that the JPML committed a clear error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. The court found that the JPML acted within its broad discretion in determining that the cases presented common questions of fact and that centralization would promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions. The court also rejected Uber's argument regarding the collective action waiver, stating that Section 1407 grants the JPML the authority to centralize cases regardless of private agreements to the contrary. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION" on Justia Law

Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Marlene Banwart and her husband Richard filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in 2020 against Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C., Dr. David Beck, and Dr. Thomas Getta. Marlene had undergone a lumbar laminectomy performed by Dr. Beck in July 2018, followed by severe postoperative pain and complications, including an epidural hematoma that required emergency surgery. The plaintiffs alleged negligence in the surgery and postoperative care by Dr. Beck and Dr. Getta.The Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' action as time-barred, concluding that the Iowa Supreme Court's emergency supervisory orders tolling the statute of limitations during the COVID-19 pandemic were invalid. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had substantially complied with Iowa's certificate of merit affidavit statute, despite the certificates not being signed under oath or penalty of perjury. Both parties appealed these rulings.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and bypassed the statute of limitations issue, focusing on the cross-appeal regarding the certificate of merit. The court held that the plaintiffs' certificates did not substantially comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 because they were not signed under oath or penalty of perjury. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the statute was void for vagueness and that the defendants had waived their rights by delaying their challenge. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's ruling on the certificates of merit and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Banwart v. Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C." on Justia Law