Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Michael Boren applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to have an unimproved airstrip on his property recognized as a designated county airstrip. Gary Gadwa, Sarah Michael, and other concerned citizens opposed Boren’s application, but it was ultimately approved. Following the approval, Boren sued Gadwa, Michael, and others for defamation, defamation per se, conspiracy to commit defamation, and declaratory relief, alleging they made false statements about the airstrip and his use of it. Boren filed an amended complaint, and Gadwa and Michael moved to dismiss the claims, arguing their statements were protected by litigation privilege and constitutionally protected petitioning activity.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Boren’s claims, agreeing with Gadwa’s and Michael’s arguments. The court also denied Boren’s motion to file a second amended complaint, concluding it would be futile. Boren appealed the district court’s decisions.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Boren’s civil conspiracy claim and declaratory judgment claim. However, it reversed the dismissal of most of Boren’s defamation claims, finding that the applicability of the absolute and qualified litigation privileges was not evident on the face of the complaint. The court also held that neither the First Amendment nor the Idaho Constitution provides absolute protection for defamatory statements made in the course of protected petitioning activity. The court reversed the district court’s decision denying Boren’s motion to amend his complaint, as the amendment would not be futile. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand and did not award attorney fees to any party. View "Boren v. Gadwa" on Justia Law

Steven Chase appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The claim arose from a failed real estate transaction between Steven’s mother, Audrey Chase, and Streamline Builders, LLC, owned by Richard Swoboda, for the construction of a home. Steven was involved in the transaction, assisting his mother by communicating with Swoboda and realtors, and inspecting the home. The sale did not close due to disagreements over holdback amounts for uncompleted items. Following the failed closing, Streamline and Swoboda sued Steven for tortious interference.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Kootenai County. At the close of Streamline and Swoboda’s evidence, Steven moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence of wrongful interference. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found in favor of Streamline and Swoboda, awarding $20,000 in damages. Steven appealed, contending the district court erred in denying his motion because he acted as his mother’s agent and could not be liable for tortious interference.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Steven failed to preserve his agency argument for appeal, as he did not present it to the district court in support of his motion for a directed verdict. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, noting that Steven’s argument on appeal differed from his argument at trial, where he focused on the lack of improper motive rather than his agency status. The court also awarded attorney fees on appeal to Streamline and Swoboda, finding Steven’s appeal unreasonable and without foundation. View "Streamline Builders, LLC v. Chase" on Justia Law

Following heavy snowfall in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the roofs of several chicken houses at ten poultry farms collapsed. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which insured the farms, sued Rogers Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the roof trusses used in the chicken houses, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranties. Rogers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Norfolk’s claims were barred by the Arkansas statute of repose.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agreed with Rogers and dismissed the complaint. Norfolk appealed the dismissal, arguing that the statute of repose did not apply to Rogers because the roof trusses were standardized goods, not custom-designed for the farms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Norfolk’s favor. The court found that Norfolk’s complaint plausibly supported an inference that the roof trusses were standardized goods, which would not be covered by the Arkansas statute of repose. The court emphasized that at this early stage, the complaint should not be dismissed if it allows for a reasonable inference of liability.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the facts and legal arguments could be further developed as the case progresses. View "Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers Manufacturing Corporation" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, the decedent's son and Administrator of her estate, filed a negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death lawsuit in the Supreme Court, New York County, against Dewitt Rehabilitation and Nursing Center and other defendants. The decedent was a resident at Dewitt in February and March 2019. Dewitt moved to transfer the venue to Nassau County based on a forum selection clause in two electronically signed admission agreements. Dewitt supported its motion with the agreements and an affidavit from its director of admissions, Francesca Trimarchi. The plaintiff contested the authenticity of the agreements, claiming the signatures were forged and provided an exemplar of the decedent's handwritten signature for comparison.The Supreme Court granted Dewitt's motion, finding that Dewitt met its initial burden to show the forum selection clause was applicable and enforceable, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the alleged forgery. The case was ordered to be transferred to Supreme Court, Nassau County. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Dewitt failed to adequately authenticate the admission agreements as Trimarchi did not witness the signing, and thus the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The dissent argued that the burden should be on the plaintiff to prove the clause should not be enforced.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's decision, reinstating the Supreme Court's order. The court held that Dewitt met its burden of establishing the authenticity of the agreements through circumstantial evidence, including Trimarchi's affidavit and the agreements themselves. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the authenticity of the signatures. The court also clarified that CPLR 4539(b) was inapplicable as the documents were originally created in electronic form. The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp." on Justia Law

An Illinois attorney, employed by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) from 2000 to 2020, filed a defamation lawsuit against Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC, and Tim Novak. The lawsuit stemmed from articles published in February and October 2020, which alleged that the attorney pressured PTAB staff to reduce property taxes on Trump Tower due to political motivations. The articles claimed the attorney was under investigation for these actions, which the attorney contended were false and damaging to his reputation.The Cook County Circuit Court denied the defendants' first motion to dismiss, finding that the attorney had adequately pled the falsity of the statements and special damages. The court also found that the fair report privilege and actual malice were questions of fact. The court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count but allowed the defamation and false light claims to proceed.Defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under the Illinois Citizen Participation Act. The circuit court denied this motion, finding the defendants failed to show the lawsuit was solely based on their protected political speech activities and that the attorney's claims were meritless and retaliatory.The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, applying the Sandholm v. Kuecker test. The appellate court found that the defendants did not meet their burden to show the articles were published in furtherance of their rights to participate in government and that the attorney's lawsuit was solely based on these rights.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that the articles did not constitute acts in furtherance of government participation and thus were not protected under the Citizen Participation Act. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Glorioso v. Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

A Monongalia County deputy sheriff responded to a domestic dispute involving John D. Stewart, Jr., who suffered from mental illness. The deputy, after advising against backup, pursued Mr. Stewart, who allegedly threatened with a knife. The deputy shot Mr. Stewart, fatally wounding him. Amanda F. Stewart, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, filed a wrongful death action against the Monongalia County Commission and the deputy, alleging excessive force and negligence.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed claims against the Commission for direct liability but allowed claims for vicarious liability and against the deputy to proceed. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, stating it was premature.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim against the Commission, finding the Commission is not immune from vicarious liability for the deputy’s negligence. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the deputy, as the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to suggest the deputy acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.However, the court reversed the lower court’s decision regarding punitive damages. It held that the Tort Claims Act prohibits punitive damages against the Commission and the deputy, as the deputy was sued in his official capacity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Monongalia County Commission A/K/A Monongalia County Sheriff's Department and John Doe Deputy v. Amanda F. Stewart, Individually and/or as Administrator of the Estate of John D. Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

A baby, S.K., was injured during labor and delivery, allegedly due to the negligence of the delivering doctor, Dr. Goodman, who used a Mityvac obstetrical vacuum delivery system. The plaintiff, S.K.'s conservator, claimed that the use of the vacuum caused brain damage to S.K. and sought damages from Dr. Goodman’s employer, Obstetric & Gynecologic Associates of Iowa City and Coralville, P.C. (the clinic).A jury in the Iowa District Court for Johnson County found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. The clinic appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting a package insert from the vacuum, which contained hearsay statements about when the vacuum should not be used and potential harms from its use. The clinic contended that the insert's admission violated Iowa’s hearsay rule and prejudiced the trial's outcome.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the clinic. The court found that the package insert contained hearsay and did not fit within any recognized exceptions, including the residual exception and the market reports exception. The court noted that the insert's admission was prejudicial, as it directly addressed a central dispute in the case and was emphasized in the plaintiff's closing argument. The court concluded that the erroneous admission of the insert deprived the clinic of a fair trial.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also addressed a procedural issue raised by the clinic regarding the plaintiff's certificate of merit affidavit, ultimately denying the clinic's motion to reverse on those grounds. View "S.K. v. Obstetric & Gynecologic Associates of Iowa City and Coralville, P.C." on Justia Law

In March 2020, Eva Osborne sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct including discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wage violations. Osborne, who worked as Slap’s executive assistant, claimed Slap required her to perform personal tasks without proper compensation. In response, Slap filed a cross-complaint against Osborne in August 2022, alleging libel, slander, and other claims based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that Osborne’s statements were protected activity made in anticipation of litigation and were privileged under Civil Code section 47. The court found that Slap could not show his claims had minimal merit because the statements were privileged and he failed to demonstrate malice.The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Osborne’s statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims. The court found that Osborne’s HR letter was sent in good faith contemplation of litigation, supported by her retention of counsel and subsequent legal actions. The court did not need to address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding conditional privilege and malice, as the litigation privilege alone was sufficient to affirm the trial court’s ruling. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, co-personal representatives of the estate of Sara Schleider, filed a lawsuit in Florida state court against GVDB Operations, LLC, and JSMGV Management Company, LLC. They alleged that the defendants failed to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at their assisted living facility, resulting in Sara Schleider contracting the virus and subsequently dying. The plaintiffs asserted state-law claims for survival and wrongful death under Florida Statute § 429.28, alleging negligence and, alternatively, willful misconduct or gross negligence.The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction on three grounds: acting under a federal officer, complete preemption by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, and an embedded federal question concerning the PREP Act. The district court concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court, finding that the defendants' arguments did not establish federal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the remand, holding that the defendants did not act under a federal officer, as their compliance with federal guidelines did not equate to acting under federal authority. The court also determined that the PREP Act did not completely preempt the plaintiffs' state-law claims, as the Act's willful misconduct provision did not wholly displace state-law causes of action for negligence. Lastly, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims did not raise a substantial federal question under the Grable doctrine, as the federal issues were not necessarily raised by the plaintiffs' well-pleaded complaint. Thus, the district court's remand to state court was affirmed. View "Howard Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Yvonne Gant sued The Lynne Experience LTD (TLE) and Giant Foods, LLC (Giant) for negligence after allegedly being struck and injured by a golf cart operated by a TLE employee. Gant claimed that TLE and Giant failed to properly train and supervise their employees, leading to her injuries. TLE moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the District of Columbia’s Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) provided Gant’s exclusive remedy, thus removing the court’s jurisdiction over the matter. The Superior Court agreed, dismissing Gant’s claims against TLE with prejudice, and later granted summary judgment in favor of Giant, finding no employer-employee relationship that could support Gant’s negligence claim.The Superior Court determined that the WCA provided Gant’s exclusive remedy and that the District of Columbia Department of Employee Services (DOES) had primary jurisdiction over her claims. The court dismissed Gant’s claims against TLE with prejudice, reasoning that any claim under the WCA would be time-barred. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment for Giant, based on undisputed evidence that Giant was merely a sponsor of the event and had no role in managing or supervising the staff involved.On appeal, Gant argued that TLE failed to secure payment of compensation as required by the WCA and that she should be allowed to maintain her civil action. Alternatively, she requested a stay to present her claim to DOES. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the WCA appeared to provide Gant’s exclusive remedy but held that the Superior Court should have dismissed her claim without prejudice. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Giant, noting that Gant failed to present any arguments against it on appeal.The main holding by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was that the Superior Court should have dismissed Gant’s claim against TLE without prejudice, allowing her the opportunity to pursue her claim with DOES. The court affirmed the summary judgment for Giant, as there was no evidence to support an employer-employee relationship necessary for Gant’s negligence claim. View "Gant v. The Lynne Experience, LTD" on Justia Law