Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, the owner of Margaritaville Resort Lake Conroe, and a guest, Mendez, who claimed to have sustained severe bodily injuries after stepping into a deep hole on the property. Mendez sued Lakeside for premises liability and negligence, seeking monetary relief between $200,000 and $1,000,000, along with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, court costs, and expenses. Lakeside failed to timely answer the lawsuit due to an alleged failure by its registered agent for service of process to send a physical copy of the service and misdirect an electronic copy. Mendez then moved for a default judgment, which was granted by the district court.The district court signed a "Final Default Judgment" proposed by Mendez's counsel, which awarded Mendez damages exceeding the $1 million upper limit stated in her original petition. The judgment concluded with the language: "This Judgment finally disposes of all claims and all parties, and is not appealable." Lakeside, unaware of the suit, did not respond before or after the judgment was signed. After the time for a restricted appeal had run, Mendez requested an abstract of judgment and began execution. Lakeside, upon learning of the suit and resulting judgment, filed an answer containing a general denial, a motion to rescind abstract of judgment, and a combined motion to set aside the default judgment and for a new trial. The district court denied Lakeside’s motions, concluding that the judgment was final and that its plenary power had therefore expired.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the default judgment was not final despite being labeled as a "Final Default Judgment." The court reasoned that the judgment's assertion of non-appealability did not just prevent it from unequivocally expressing an intent to finally dispose of the case—it expressly and affirmatively undermined or contradicted any such intent. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the challenged orders that were predicated on that court’s conclusion that its prior judgment is final. View "IN RE LAKESIDE RESORT JV, LLC" on Justia Law

Christine John and Christopher Lewis were injured in a rear-end collision involving a tractor-trailer driven by Roberto Alonzo. In the subsequent personal-injury lawsuit, Alonzo and his employer, New Prime, Inc., admitted liability for Alonzo’s negligence, leaving damages as the only issue at trial. The jury awarded $12 million to John and $450,000 to Lewis for physical pain and mental anguish. Alonzo and New Prime sought a new trial, arguing that the plaintiffs’ counsel had inflamed the jury with an unprovoked accusation of race and gender bias. The trial court rejected this motion, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower courts' decisions, finding that the plaintiffs’ counsel had indeed crossed the line with an uninvited accusation of discriminatory animus. The court noted that while it is not inherently improper to question potential jurors about bias, the plaintiffs’ counsel had gone further by accusing the defense of seeking a lower damages amount because John is a black woman. The court found this argument to be inflammatory, uninvited, and unprovoked, and it concluded that it was so prejudicial that its harmfulness was incurable. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Alonzo v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Six patients filed medical malpractice actions against the estate and practice of a deceased physician, alleging that the physician breached the standard of care. The patients submitted various materials to medical review panels, including a wrongful death complaint filed by the physician's wife in a separate malpractice action. The defendants petitioned the trial court to redact the wife's complaint and any mention of its contents from the patients' submissions. The trial court granted the petition.The case was appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision. The patients then petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that trial courts do not have the authority to act as gatekeeper of the evidence a party submits to a medical review panel. The court also held that the third-party complaint in this case is evidence, and therefore, the trial court lacked the authority to order the patients to redact their submissions. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Bojko v. Anonymous Physician" on Justia Law

In 2021, Lyra Jean Spencer filed a personal injury lawsuit against Franklin Hills Health-Spokane LLC. To serve the summons, her attorney hired a process server who, after learning that the registered agent was unavailable, served the documents to the company's human resources manager, Sheri Flavel. Franklin Hills filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that service on Flavel was improper as she was not authorized to accept service under RCW 4.28.080(9). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Spencer had not met her initial burden to show that service was proper.Spencer appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that Spencer had made a prima facie showing that service to Flavel was proper and the trial court erred in dismissing the case without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if Flavel was a “managing agent” or “office assistant” under RCW 4.28.080(9).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted Franklin Hills’s petition for review. The court concluded that the service statute is to be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of accomplishing service of process and notice to the defendant. The court held that a person may be a managing agent if they are in charge of a single department of the corporation’s business, even if their discretion is controlled somewhat by a superior, provided that they have substantial managerial responsibilities and authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court found that Flavel, as the human resources manager, met the definition of a managing agent under the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the lawsuit to proceed to discovery and trial. View "Spencer v. Franklin Hills Health-Spokane, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jennifer Ripple, who married Richard Counter after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease allegedly caused by asbestos exposure from the 1950s to the 1990s. Counter filed a personal injury complaint against multiple defendants, claiming negligence and strict liability. After Counter's death, Ripple, as the personal representative of Counter's estate, amended the complaint to wrongful death claims under the Florida Wrongful Death Act. The estate sought damages for Ripple under section 768.21(2) of the Act, which allows a surviving spouse to recover for loss of companionship and mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ripple could not recover damages under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his alleged asbestos exposure. The court based its decision on Florida's common law rule that a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury to assert a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of Counter's adult children, concluding that Ripple was Counter's surviving spouse, thus barring the children from recovery under section 768.21(3) of the Act.The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Ripple's claim but reversed the decision regarding the adult children's claim. The district court held that Ripple could not recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his injury.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court rejected the argument that the common law "marriage before injury" rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). Consequently, the court approved the holding in Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, where the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). The court concluded that Jennifer Ripple can recover as a surviving spouse under section 768.21(2). View "Ripple v. CBS Corporation" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over personal jurisdiction. Worth Harris Carter Jr., a Virginia resident, sought treatment for a rash from Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center and Wake Forest University Health Sciences in North Carolina. Despite numerous in-person visits and follow-up communications via phone calls, text messages, and an online patient portal, Mr. Carter's condition worsened, and he was eventually diagnosed with skin cancer. After his death, Katherine Louise Carter, executor of Mr. Carter's estate, filed a lawsuit against Wake Forest in Virginia, alleging medical malpractice.The Circuit Court for the City of Martinsville dismissed the case, ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Wake Forest. The court found that Wake Forest's communications with the Carters in Virginia were responses to inquiries initiated by the Carters and did not constitute purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities within Virginia. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed this decision, emphasizing that the actual treatment occurred in North Carolina and that Wake Forest did not maintain a presence or solicit business in Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that Wake Forest's contacts with Virginia were incidental to in-person treatment and were directed to the patient in need, rather than the forum state itself. The court found that Wake Forest's responses to the Carters' communications did not constitute purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in Virginia. The court also noted that the communications between Ms. Carter and Wake Forest were more aptly characterized as isolated or attenuated and were insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction. View "Carter v. Wake Forest" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Hannah Tanner against Texas State University. Tanner was injured on October 4, 2014, when she was thrown from a golf cart on the University campus. She filed a lawsuit against the University, the Texas State University System, and Dakota Scott, a University employee who was driving the golf cart, on September 29, 2016, just before the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions was set to expire. However, Tanner did not serve the University until May 20, 2020, several years after the statute of limitations had run.The University argued that Tanner's lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because she did not serve the University until after the statute of limitations had expired. The University contended that timely service of process is a statutory prerequisite to a suit against a governmental entity, and Tanner did not satisfy this prerequisite. The district court granted the University's plea to the jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that untimely service does not pose a jurisdictional issue that a plea to the jurisdiction can resolve.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The court held that the statute of limitations, including the requirement of timely service, is jurisdictional in suits against governmental entities. Therefore, the University's plea to the jurisdiction was a proper vehicle to address Tanner's alleged failure to exercise diligence in serving the University. However, the court declined to determine whether the district court properly granted the plea. Instead, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to determine whether Tanner's service on Scott excuses her from the duty to serve the University. View "TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY v. TANNER" on Justia Law

The case involves three plaintiffs, Parker Wideman, Riley Draper, and William and Jessica Douglass, who were severely burned while cleaning a plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The plant, owned by Innovative Fibers LLC and Stein Fibers Ltd, converted recycled plastics into polyester fibers. The plaintiffs were employees of a third-party contractor, Advanced Environmental Options, hired to clean the plant. During the cleaning process, a fire broke out, causing severe injuries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the plant owners for negligence under state common law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to federal court by the defendants. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs were "statutory employees" covered by South Carolina's Workers' Compensation Law. This law prohibits statutory employees from suing in tort in state courts and instead requires them to submit their claims to South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Commission. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that while state law can define the substantive rights asserted in federal diversity jurisdiction, it cannot strip federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over any category of claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the dispute satisfied all the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. View "Wideman v. Innovative Fibers LLC" on Justia Law

James Corley, as the representative of his deceased son's beneficiaries, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Wyoming Rents, LLC. His son had died in a work-related accident while operating a manlift rented from Wyoming Rents. Corley's counsel missed several deadlines to file an amended complaint, continued to pursue claims against another party that the district court had dismissed, and attempted to engage in discovery without a properly filed amended complaint. Consequently, the district court granted Wyoming Rents' motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. Corley appealed, arguing that a lesser sanction was more appropriate.The district court had previously dismissed Wyoming Machinery Company (WMC) from the case due to lack of claims against it and granted Corley leave to file a second amended complaint. However, Corley failed to meet the deadline for filing the revised complaint and included WMC in the complaint's caption despite the court's dismissal. The court granted Corley another chance to file an amended complaint, but he again missed the deadline. Wyoming Rents then filed a motion to dismiss the case based on Corley's failure to file any pleading by the court's deadline.The Supreme Court of Wyoming found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. The court noted that Corley's counsel demonstrated a complete lack of diligence throughout the case, which prejudiced Wyoming Rents by forcing it to incur substantial attorney’s fees and hindered the court's ability to move forward in resolving the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. View "Corley v. Wyoming Rents, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Timothy Morales, who was injured when he was hit by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal within the Weatherford Distribution Facility in Williston. Morales filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against Weatherford U.S., L.P., Junewal, and Junewal's employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc. He also claimed that Weatherford was negligent for failing to install proper lighting, road signs, or sidewalks near the road.The District Court of Williams County dismissed Morales's claims against Wilhoit with prejudice after the parties did not oppose Wilhoit’s motion for summary judgment. Later, Weatherford moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Morales because he was aware of the obvious danger posed by vehicles on the roadway. The district court granted Weatherford’s motion, and Morales appealed.Meanwhile, Junewal notified the court that she and Morales had reached a settlement. However, no concluding documents were filed. The district court then entered an order for judgment under its order granting Weatherford summary judgment. Morales appealed again, but the Supreme Court of North Dakota dismissed his appeal because claims against Junewal remained pending in the district court.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the court concluded that the district court misapplied the law when it treated Morales’s request as a Rule 60(b) motion and held it “no longer has jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying Morales's request and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to enter a single final judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities within twenty days from the filing of the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S., L.P." on Justia Law