Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

K&C Logistics, LLC, brought suit in Madison County, Mississippi Circuit Court against Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., and Daniel Cooper as the result of a vehicle accident that occurred in Nogales, Arizona. The trial court determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Old Dominion. K&C Logistics appealed, asking the Mississippi Supreme Court to find that courts in Mississippi had jurisdiction over Old Dominion. The Court was further requested to interpret the Mississippi Business Corporation Act to hold that Old Dominion, a foreign corporation registered to do business in Mississippi, consented to general personal jurisdiction when it registered to do business in the state. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K&C Logistics, LLC v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are people who claim to suffer from chronic Lyme disease. A person contracts Lyme disease from ticks carrying the bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi. In 2006, IDSA published The Clinical Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Lyme Disease, Human Granulocytic Anaplasmosis, and Babesiosis: Clinical Practice Guidelines by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (“the Guidelines”). The Guidelines extensively discuss how to diagnose and treat Lyme disease. Throughout, they express doubt about the causes, frequency, and even the existence of chronic Lyme disease. Moreover, the Guidelines do not recommend long-term antibiotic therapy for persons with persistent Lyme symptoms who have already received recommended treatments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs took issue with IDSA’s positions that (1) “there is no convincing biological evidence for the existence of symptomatic chronic B. burgdorferi infection among patients after receipt of recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease,” and (2) “antibiotic therapy has not proven to be useful and is not recommended for patients with chronic (>6 months) subjective symptoms after recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease.” On their face, however, these statements are medical opinions. In this context (a scientific debate over treatment options for persistent Lyme symptoms), to say that evidence is not “convincing” or that some treatment is “not recommended” is plainly to express a medical opinion. Just because Plaintiffs disagree with those opinions does not mean that IDSA is somehow liable because their doctors or insurance providers found the opinions persuasive. View "Torrey v. Infectious Diseases Socty" on Justia Law

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff Sean Stetson and Defendant Edmonds were part of a low-speed, sideswipe vehicle accident. Although no one reported injuries on the scene, two weeks after the accident, Plaintiff sought medical treatment for injuries he claimed he sustained in the accident. With this visit, Plaintiff filed his now "plainly evident" campaign to fabricate a claim for damages. When a party to litigation seeks to intentionally deceive the court and its adversary, a district court may issue reasonable sanctions and require the deceitful party to pay attorney fees. Finding plaintiff did just that, and the district court sanctioned him with reasonable attorney fees and dismissal of his non-economic claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sanctions. View "Stenson v. Edmonds, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff took her neighbor’s dog for a walk around Dolphin’s apartment complex. Plaintiff observed that it was raining that day with thunderstorms. Before crossing, Plaintiff observed that the concrete on the North Side Gate driveway was wet, and rainwater formed a current that was running down the driveway. Plaintiff proceeded to cross, and the rainwater current knocked her down. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her right shoulder, left knee, and face. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dolphin, alleging general negligence and premises liability. Dolphin filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because the running rainwater was open and obvious, Dolphin had no duty to warn. The trial court granted Dolphin’s motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims because the rainwater current on the driveway was open and obvious. Further, the court wrote that even assuming Plaintiff did not forfeit the necessity exception to the open and obvious rule, she still cannot prevail on the merits. The court wrote that Plaintiff was in a better position to avoid the obvious danger of walking across a current of water that formed as a result of a rainstorm that began that same day. Plaintiff could have chosen to use a different entrance. The burden imposed on Dolphin to constantly monitor weather conditions and immediately install warning signals is outweighed by Plaintiff’s ability to avoid a condition she should have observed as obviously dangerous. View "Nicoletti v. Kest" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Octavi Perez appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Roman’s Restaurant, LLC, d/b/a Roman’s Night Club, on claims for damages under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act. In July 2019, 18-year-old Edgar Perez had been a patron of the nightclub and was killed when the vehicle he was driving left the roadway and hit a tree. An autopsy indicated Edgar was intoxicated at the time of his death. Plaintiff filed suit against Roman’s alleging it served alcoholic beverages to a minor, and Edgar’s subsequent intoxication precipitated Edgar’s death. Roman’s moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant part that: (1) Plainitff lacked standing to sue on Edgar’s behalf because Plaintiff was neither Edgar’s parent nor stood in loco parentis; and (2) Plaintiff could not maintain an action under the Dram Shop Act because plaintiff had not been “injured in person, property or means of support.” The court record reflected Plaintiff was Edgar’s uncle, and Edgar contributed to the household expenses in the apartment he shared with Plaintiff and his father, Rigoberto Perez. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in Roman’s favor and affirmed. View "Perez v. Roman's Restaurant, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In April 2015, federal agent Quinn shot and killed Kellom while trying to arrest him. Kellom’s estate sued Quinn under the Federal Tort Claims Act with a “Bivens” excessive-force claim. The government replaced Quinn as the defendant in the tort claims. The estate then filed an unsuccessful claim with Quinn’s employer, DHS. The FTCA requires plaintiffs to seek relief “first” from the federal agency within two years: the government notified the estate that it needed to bring a new lawsuit for its FTCA claims. Instead, in May 2018, the estate amended its complaint, asserting the same claims. The district court treated the FTCA exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the FTCA claims. The Bivens claim proceeded. A jury ruled in Quinn’s favor. Meanwhile, Kellom’s family members brought FTCA claims by joining the estate’s amended complaint, which was filed in May 2018. The family had not sought relief from DHS, so the district court dismissed those claims. In October 2018, the family filed a claim with DHS. DHS denied the claim. Rather than rejoin the estate’s lawsuit, the family filed a new one. The district court dismissed the family’s claims as untimely.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The government did not waive or forfeit its exhaustion defense in the estate’s case by failing to oppose a motion to amend. The estate did not cure its failure to exhaust by filing an amended complaint. The family’s claims were untimely. View "Kellom v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured in an auto accident and brought product liability claims against the vehicle’s manufacturer. In the course of litigation, the manufacturer moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ two liability experts, moved for a new trial and a judgment as a matter of law, and objected to the denial of a jury instruction regarding the presumption of nonliability (“the presumption”). Ultimately, the manufacturer was found liable and ordered to pay nearly $5 million in damages.On appeal, the manufacturer argued the district court erred in denying the motions and rejecting the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs’ experts based their opinions on reliable methodologies and provided relevant, helpful testimony. View "Kim v. American Honda Motor" on Justia Law

Alicia Sampson ("Alicia"), as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Joshua Sampson ("Josh"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HeartWise Health Systems Corporation; HeartWise Clinic, LLC (collectively referred to as "HeartWise"); Isaac Health & Prevention Partners, LLC ("Isaac Health"); William Nixon, M.D.; and Jeffrey Saylor, M.D., in a wrongful-death action. At its HeartWise clinic, Isaac Health administered a battery of up to 31 physical tests that were intended "to assist in the detection of early evidence of vascular and cardiac abnormalities." In 2015, 29-year-old Josh visited the Isaac Health clinic. Months earlier, Josh's father died at age of 56 from "right ventricular dysplasia," which was a "congenital heart defect." Lowell's death led the Sampson family to seek heart evaluations to determine whether they had inherited the heart defect. Josh underwent the full battery of testing provided at the Isaac Health clinic; Josh's data from the left ventricular echocardiogram was within the "normal" range. Josh's mother, who also received the testing, stated that the nurse practitioner did not tell Josh in any way that he "needed to have any further diagnostic work-up or testing relative to his heart." On October 5, 2015, Josh collapsed at home while working on a construction project. He was taken to the Emergency Room, but died that day. The Sampson family procured a private autopsy; the report concluded that Josh died due to an arrhythmia secondary to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a congenital heart condition. Alicia thereafter filed suit against the clinic, HearWise and the doctors, alleging fraud and negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Isaac Health and Drs. Nixon and Saylor with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against them because those allegations were never properly presented to the circuit court for adjudication. The Court also reversed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against HeartWise because Alicia presented substantial evidence of Josh's reasonable reliance upon HeartWise's representations about its program. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Isaac Health with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against Isaac Health because Alicia failed to present substantial evidence that Josh's course of conduct would have changed if he had not seen HeartWise materials in the Isaac Health clinic's waiting room. The Court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against HeartWise for multiple reasons. View "Sampson v. HeartWise Health Systems Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Selanmin Gross appealed the grant of a new trial in a case filed by Christopher Dailey against Gross stemming from a motor-vehicle accident. Dailey alleged Gross' negligence and/or wantonness in operating his motor vehicle on August 5, 2019, had resulted in a collision with Dailey's motor vehicle and that Dailey had suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries as a result of the accident. Dailey's action was consolidated with an action commenced by Ken Houston against Gross that stemmed from the same accident. The trial court dismissed Houston's action following the filing of a joint stipulation of dismissal. Trial proceeded on Dailey's claims. The trial court entered the jury-verdict forms into the record, which showed that the foreperson had signed both verdict forms. The first form simply stated: "We the jury find for the defendant" and had the date filled in by hand above a blank line labeled "Date" and the signature of the foreperson on a second blank line labeled "Foreman." The second verdict form stated: "We the jury find for the plaintiff, Christopher D. Dailey, and assess damages of $0 dollars." That form likewise had the date filled in by hand above a blank line labeled "Date" and the signature of the foreperson on a second blank line labeled "Foreman." Dailey moved for a new trial "Due to Inconsistent Verdict." Gross opposed it, noting that the trial judge announced a verdict for defendant in open court and had polled each juror and that each juror had confirmed the verdict for defendant. He argued that "the verdict was in no way inconsistent: the verdict form for the Plaintiff awarded zero (0) dollars in damages which is perfectly consistent with a verdict for the Defendant." The trial judge granted Dailey's motion. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding the second verdict form awarding zero dollars in damages to Dailey meant that the jury reached an inconsistent verdict. "The cases relied upon by the trial court do not support that conclusion, and the evidence concerning the verdict overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the jury reached a verdict in favor of the defendant, Gross." Accordingly, the trial court's order granting a new trial is reversed, and the trial court was instructed to reinstate the verdict in favor of Gross and to enter a judgment on that verdict. View "Gross v. Dailey" on Justia Law

Carol Rogers, the administratrix of the estate of Susan Bonner, deceased, filed a wrongful-death action against (1) the Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department; (2) the Cherokee County Association of Volunteer Fire Departments, Inc.; and (3) Howard Guice, a former volunteer firefighter and emergency medical technician with the CBVFD. The incident from which this case arose happened in June 2017 when Bonner's car left the roadway and ended up submerged in a creek. Bonner ultimately died of anoxic encephalopathy, and the primary allegations in the suit was that the emergency response was negligently rendered. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Cedar Bluff and the Association. Although the trial court certified its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that certification was improper, and this appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Rogers v. Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department, et al." on Justia Law