Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina dealt with the issue of whether a statute of limitations barred a defendant's counterclaim for negligence because it was filed one day after the three-year limitations period had expired. The court ruled that the counterclaim should be considered as having been filed on the same date that the plaintiff commenced his lawsuit, thus making it timely.The case originated from a two-automobile accident that occurred on 19 December 2015. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant over injuries he allegedly sustained in the accident on 19 December 2018. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff for his own injuries on 20 December 2018, arguing that the plaintiff's own negligence caused the accident. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, asserting that the counterclaim should be dismissed under N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) because it was filed outside the statute’s three-year limit for personal injury claims.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that his counterclaim filed on 20 December 2018 should be deemed to relate back to the filing of the original complaint by the plaintiff on 19 December 2018, and thus should be considered timely filed within the three-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reasoning that for purposes of the statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), the filing of a compulsory counterclaim relates back to the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the court held that N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) did not bar the defendant’s compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Upchurch v. Harp Builders, Inc" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, two interlocutory appeals were consolidated, both arising from the same wrongful-death lawsuit. Beverly Butts, on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of John Albert Hemphill, Sr., alleged that four years prior to Hemphill's death, Dr. Reese Lindsey failed to remove part of a bladder catheter, leading to recurring infections and ultimately Hemphill's death. Additionally, she claimed that the staff at Greenwood Leflore Hospital, where Lindsey treated Hemphill, provided substandard care.Regarding Lindsey, the court found that he had not been lawfully served with process. Despite multiple summons, Butts failed to comply with the Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which outlines the requirements for serving process. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lindsey, leading the Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's decision and render judgment dismissing Lindsey from the lawsuit.Concerning the Hospital, the court found that Butts had failed to provide the necessary medical expert testimony to support her medical negligence claim against the Hospital. Despite her argument that the Hospital's summary judgment motion was preemptive as no scheduling order had been set, the court noted that a defendant can file for summary judgment at any time. Given Butts's failure to present necessary expert testimony, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the Hospital. View "Lindsey v. Butts" on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The case involves Michael Goguen, an engineer and businessman, who was the subject of two civil suits alleging sexual and criminal misconduct. The New York Post published an article detailing these lawsuits, which Goguen claimed was defamatory. Goguen filed a defamation lawsuit against New York Post's parent company, NYP Holdings, and others. In response, NYP Holdings argued that their article was protected by New York’s fair report privilege, a law that protects media from defamation suits if they are reporting on official proceedings.However, the District Court in Montana, where Goguen resides, applied Montana law and denied NYP Holdings' motion to dismiss, finding that whether the article was privileged was a question of fact for the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana determined that under Montana's choice of law rules, New York law should be applied to determine the fair report privilege. The Court found that all the contested statements in the article fairly and accurately reported the lawsuits against Goguen and were thus protected by New York's fair report privilege. Therefore, the Court held that NYP Holdings was entitled to dismissal of Goguen’s complaint.The Court also upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss Goguen's defamation claim against former police chief Bill Dial, ruling that Dial's statements in the article were protected opinions and not actionable. View "Goguen v. NYP Holdings" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed a lower court decision that granted Dr. Gregory S. Tierney's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by Janice M. Dodds for insufficient service of process. Dodds initially filed the suit against Dr. Tierney and Benefis Health System in 2013, alleging medical malpractice related to a knee replacement surgery. She failed to serve the defendants in time. Dr. Tierney later filed for bankruptcy, which invoked an automatic stay, halting the lawsuit. After his bankruptcy discharge, Dodds attempted to serve Dr. Tierney but failed to do so within the required 30-day timeframe following the discharge.Dodds further sought to join Dr. Tierney's malpractice insurance company as the real party in interest, but the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Dodds had not proven Dr. Tierney's liability, thus the insurer had no duty to indemnify him. The court also rejected Dodds' argument that Dr. Tierney lacked standing after his Chapter 7 discharge. The court held that Dr. Tierney maintained a personal stake in demonstrating he was not liable for medical malpractice and that his insurer would only have a duty to indemnify him once Dodds proved her malpractice claims. View "Dodds v. Tierney" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

Dorothy Hampton was released from the Medical Center of Southeast Texas after an abdominal hernia surgery. Later that night, she fell at home, becoming confused and disoriented, and was readmitted to the hospital. She filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Leonard Thome, alleging that she was released prematurely from the hospital which led to her fall and subsequent mental and physical injuries. Hampton's lawyer sent a pre-suit notice to Dr. Thome along with a medical authorization form as required under Texas law before filing a suit. The form listed only two providers and omitted future health care providers.Hampton filed her suit outside the usual two-year statute of limitations but within the 75-day tolling period provided by the law. Dr. Thome argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the limitations period as the medical authorization form served by Hampton was deficient, and hence the 75-day tolling period was not applicable. The trial court rejected this argument, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.The Supreme Court of Texas held that an imperfect medical authorization form is still a medical authorization form, which is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 75 days. The court emphasized that the limitations period should be established with clarity at the outset. Any defects or omissions in the medical authorization form that came to light during the litigation could have been adequately addressed by the statutory remedy of abatement, additional discovery, or even sanctions. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HAMPTON v. THOME" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the plaintiffs, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, sued TNA NA Manufacturing, Inc. and Food Design, Inc., claiming negligence and product liability for a listeria outbreak that resulted from using the defendants' food processing equipment. The outbreak cost the plaintiffs around $20 million. The trial court and Court of Appeals upheld that the plaintiffs had waived any action in tort through their purchase contract with the defendants, as the contract contained a waiver of tort liability. The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, disagreed.The court ruled that, under Oregon law, a contract will not be construed to provide immunity from consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. The court found that the language in the contract between the plaintiffs and defendants did not meet this standard. The court held that to waive tort liability, contract language must be clear and explicit, stating that the waiver will not be deduced from inference or implication. The text of the contract must unambiguously show that the parties intended to disclaim actions outside of contract, i.e., actions in tort.Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The court confirmed that, while no magic words are required for a waiver of tort liability to be effective, the use of terms such as "negligence" or "tort" may be helpful in demonstrating an explicit intent to waive such liability. View "Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was tasked with reviewing a case involving the interpretation of the state's comparative fault statute and its application to tort actions involving the "dram-shop exception." The case originated from a tragic accident in which an intoxicated 18-year-old, Jacquelyn Faircloth, was hit by a speeding truck driven by an intoxicated 20-year-old, Devon Dwyer. Faircloth's guardianship sued two bars, asserting that they had "willfully and unlawfully" served alcohol to Dwyer and Faircloth, leading to their intoxication and the subsequent accident.The central legal question in this case was whether the action permitted under the dram-shop exception, section 768.125, which allows liability when alcohol is "willfully and unlawfully" provided to an underage patron causing intoxication and injury, is a "negligence action" for the purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81.The court agreed with the district court’s finding that the action permitted by the underage drinker exception in section 768.125 is indeed a negligence action for purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81. The court reasoned that while the dram-shop exception requires a finding of willful misconduct, this does not alter the basic relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury inherent in a negligence claim. The court clarified that willfulness in this context pertains to the defendant’s knowledge of the purchaser's underage status, not an intentional infliction of harm.The court did not, however, rule on the district court's conclusions about how fault should be allocated among the bars and underage patrons involved in the case, considering those issues outside the scope of the certified question. View "Faircloth v. Main Street Entertainment, Inc., etc." on Justia Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs Terri and Louis LoBianco appealed a district court's summary judgment in favor of Bonefish Grill, LLC. Terri LoBianco had slipped and fallen at a Bonefish Grill restaurant in Skokie, Illinois, dislocating her hip and requiring four surgeries. She claimed she slipped on a pool of liquid that the restaurant had negligently failed to clean. Louis LoBianco claimed loss of consortium due to his wife's injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Bonefish Grill, concluding that Terri LoBianco failed to identify the proximate cause of her fall and injury.The appellate court, however, held a different view. After a careful review of the facts and applying Illinois tort law, the court concluded that Terri LoBianco had consistently identified a liquid as the cause of her fall and had done so with certainty. This, coupled with supporting testimony from third parties, was enough to create a disputed issue of fact. The court found that this was not mere speculation but was based on Terri's sensory perception and consistent testimony.As a result, the appellate court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Terri's negligence claim and Louis's loss of consortium claim. The case was remanded for trial, as the court held that there was sufficient evidence to create a jury issue about whether liquid on Bonefish Grill’s floor caused Terri to slip and injure herself. View "LoBianco v. Bonefish Grill, LLC" on Justia Law