Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In February 2016, Kevin Frost kidnapped his estranged wife, Sherri Frost, during a contentious divorce. He lured her into a situation where he could seize her, forced her into his vehicle, and held her for several hours in a barn owned by a family associate. During captivity, Kevin made Sherri severely intoxicated and later delivered her to the emergency room before turning himself in. Kevin pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping and served a prison sentence. Sherri subsequently filed a civil suit against Kevin, Frost Ranching Corporation (the Ranch), and other parties, seeking damages for injuries and emotional distress resulting from the kidnapping. She alleged that Kevin acted, at least in part, to prevent her from obtaining an interest in the Ranch during the divorce.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, dismissed claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment to Frost Limited Partnership. The court denied summary judgment to the Ranch on vicarious liability, allowing that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, Sherri presented evidence of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages. The jury found Kevin liable for several torts but awarded only $20,000 in damages, which matched the lower end of medical expenses and did not account for pain and suffering. The District Court granted Sherri’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s award unsupported by substantial evidence, as it disregarded uncontradicted, credible evidence of pain and suffering. The court also granted the Ranch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the Ranch could not ratify Kevin’s conduct absent acceptance of any benefit from the kidnapping.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed both rulings. It held that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence and that a new trial on damages was warranted. The court also held that, under Montana law, ratification requires acceptance of a benefit, which was absent here, so the Ranch could not be held liable for Kevin’s actions. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions.The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages.After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment.The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

In 2019, a well-known advice columnist publicly accused a sitting U.S. president of sexually assaulting her in a department store in 1996. The president, while in office, responded with public statements denying the allegations, asserting he did not know the accuser, and claiming she fabricated the story for personal and political gain. The accuser then filed a defamation lawsuit in New York state court, alleging that these statements were false and damaged her reputation. The case was removed to federal court after the Department of Justice certified that the president acted within the scope of his office, but the DOJ later withdrew this certification. During the litigation, the accuser also brought a separate lawsuit under a new state law allowing survivors of sexual assault to sue regardless of the statute of limitations, which resulted in a jury finding that the president had sexually abused and defamed her after leaving office.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial summary judgment for the accuser in the original defamation case, relying on issue preclusion from the verdict in the later case. The trial was limited to damages, and the jury awarded the accuser $83.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The president moved for a new trial or remittitur, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to presidential immunity, that the damages were excessive, and that the jury instructions were erroneous. The district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the president had waived any claim to absolute presidential immunity by failing to timely assert it, and that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump v. United States did not alter this conclusion. The court also found no error in the district court’s application of issue preclusion, evidentiary rulings, or jury instructions, and concluded that the damages awarded were reasonable and not excessive. The judgment in favor of the accuser was affirmed in full. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

An employee suffered a severe hand injury, including the amputation of a finger, while operating a table saw without a safety guard at work. After receiving some worker’s compensation benefits, the employee filed a civil tort action against the employer, alleging that the employer’s requirement to use the saw without a guard constituted “willful or unprovoked physical aggression,” which, under Idaho law, would allow a lawsuit outside the worker’s compensation system. The employer did not respond to the lawsuit, and the employee obtained a default judgment for damages.Several months later, the employer moved to set aside the default judgment, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the employee’s worker’s compensation claim had been filed first. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District agreed, stayed enforcement of the default judgment, and directed the parties to seek a determination from the Idaho Industrial Commission on whether the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception applied. The Commission concluded that the exception did not apply, and the district court then set aside the default judgment and dismissed the civil action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the district court erred by deferring to the Commission on the applicability of the statutory exception and by setting aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court clarified that district courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies, even if a worker’s compensation claim was filed first, unless the Commission has already decided the issue. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, vacated the Commission’s findings, and remanded with instructions to reenter the default judgment in favor of the employee. View "Tyler v. Masterpiece Floors, Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2022, Garry Douglas Seaman shot and killed James Preston Freeman and seriously wounded Heidi Gabert, following the end of his romantic relationship with Gabert, with whom he shares a minor child. Seaman was criminally charged, and Gabert and Dawn Freeman, James’s spouse, filed a civil suit for damages. To prevent Seaman from transferring or selling assets during the litigation, Gabert and Freeman successfully sought a receivership over all of Seaman’s property. After negotiations, the parties reached a settlement memorialized in a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which included $10 million judgments for Gabert and Freeman, liquidation of Seaman’s assets, and a homestead exemption for Seaman.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, approved the creation of a designated settlement fund (DSF) to facilitate asset liquidation. Initially, the court’s DSF Order required the Liquidation Receiver to reserve funds from asset sales to pay Seaman’s capital gains taxes, interpreting the MOU’s tax payment provision as unambiguous. Gabert and Freeman moved to amend this order under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the court erred in its interpretation and that the parties did not intend to reserve funds for Seaman’s capital gains taxes. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court agreed, finding the MOU ambiguous and, based on extrinsic evidence, concluded the parties did not intend to reserve such funds. The court amended its order, striking the provision requiring reservation for capital gains taxes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in amending the DSF Order. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, correctly found the MOU ambiguous, and its factual finding regarding the parties’ intent was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s amended order. View "Gabert v. Seaman" on Justia Law

A family leased a home within military housing at the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California. Shortly after moving in, they experienced persistent water intrusion and mold contamination, which they alleged damaged their property and affected their health. The family reported these issues to the property manager and the public-private entity responsible for the housing, but claimed that remediation efforts were inadequate and that their concerns were dismissed. After further testing confirmed hazardous mold, the family vacated the property and brought state law claims, including negligence and breach of contract, against the property manager, the public-private housing entity, and a mold remediation company.The defendants removed the case from California state court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal officer, and federal agency jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and, after further proceedings, found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on all asserted grounds. Specifically, the court determined there was no evidence that the United States had accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the property, that the defendants failed to show a causal nexus between their actions and federal direction, and that the public-private entity was not a federal agency. The district court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the remand order under an exception allowing appellate review when federal officer removal is asserted. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly found no federal enclave jurisdiction because there was no evidence of federal acceptance of exclusive jurisdiction over the property. The court also held that the defendants did not meet the requirements for federal officer or agency jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s remand to state court. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

A teacher at a public charter school in Utah was terminated after a series of events involving a student and the student's parent. The teacher, a former Air Force veteran, reprimanded the student for disruptive behavior, leading the student to quit the team and report the incident to his father. The parent, dissatisfied with the teacher's conduct, began raising concerns about the teacher's alleged inappropriate behavior, including claims of physical and verbal abuse, to school administrators and at a school board meeting. The parent also communicated these concerns to the school superintendent and, according to the teacher, made a report to local police. Investigations by both the police and the Division of Child and Family Services found no evidence of abuse, and the teacher was ultimately terminated without a stated reason.The teacher filed suit in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), abuse of process, and tortious interference with economic relations. The parent moved for early dismissal under Utah’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), arguing the statute protected his speech and actions. The district court denied the motion, finding UPEPA inapplicable and concluding that the teacher had stated prima facie cases for all claims.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred in finding UPEPA did not apply, as the parent’s statements concerned a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court also found that the teacher failed to state prima facie cases for IIED and abuse of process, requiring dismissal of those claims. The court vacated the denial of the special motion as to defamation and tortious interference, remanding for further consideration of whether the teacher could establish a prima facie case, particularly regarding privilege. The court ordered costs and fees related to the motion be awarded as provided by UPEPA. View "Mackey v. Krause" on Justia Law

In 2021, a plaintiff filed a complaint against a public school district, alleging that she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a teacher while attending middle and high school. The complaint asserted that the teacher’s abusive conduct was widely known within the school and that the district either knew or should have known about the abuse but failed to act, allowing the teacher to remain employed. The plaintiff brought claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, relying on statutory provisions that exempt certain childhood sexual assault claims from the usual requirement to present a claim to the public entity before filing suit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after the school district moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district argued that the plaintiff’s claims were only possible due to Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218), which retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual assault claims against public entities. The district contended that AB 218 violated the gift clause of the California Constitution by imposing liability for past acts where no enforceable claim previously existed. The trial court agreed, finding that AB 218 retroactively created liability and constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that AB 218 does not violate the gift clause because it did not create new substantive liability; rather, it removed a procedural barrier to enforcing pre-existing liability for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with directions to deny the school district’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "O.B. v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law