Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Susan Miller, who sued Michaels Stores, Inc. for negligence after she slipped and fell in one of their stores in Slidell, Louisiana, during a rainstorm. Miller claimed that she had entered the store via a propped-open exit door, where no warning signs or mats were present, and subsequently slipped on a clear substance. She argued that a store employee had admitted to the presence of a warning sign and mat at the other door, indicating that the store was aware of the wet conditions but had failed to adequately warn customers.Earlier, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana had granted summary judgment in favor of Michaels. The store had argued that Miller lacked evidence proving that they had notice of any hazards where she slipped. The district court ruled that none of the evidence showed that Michaels was aware of a hazard in the area where Miller fell, and hence granted summary judgement for Michaels.Upon review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Miller's evidence was insufficient to show that Michaels had actual or constructive notice of the specific hazard that caused her fall. Furthermore, it ruled that the statements made by the Michaels employee were irrelevant to the issue of notice and were therefore inadmissible. Lastly, the court found no evidence that Michaels had spoiled any evidence, as alleged by Miller. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Michaels Stores. View "Miller v. Michaels Stores" on Justia Law

Patricia Hanger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Allison L. Raines and Emergency Physicians of Tidewater, PLC, alleging that they negligently failed to treat her low blood sodium, leading to a seizure and a subsequent fall that resulted in a traumatic brain injury. The defendants argued that the fall could have been caused by other means. A jury sided with Hanger and awarded her $1.6 million, a decision that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals had to decide whether the trial court erred in refusing a jury instruction supporting the defendants' theory of the case. The Court of Appeals held that this question was waived. The defendants argued that they did not waive their right to appeal this question and that they were entitled to the issuance of their proffered jury instruction.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, concluding that the defendants did not waive their argument. The Supreme Court found that the defendants had preserved their objection to the trial court's refusal to issue the jury instruction and had adequately briefed the matter before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's failure to issue the jury instruction was reversible error and that the Court of Appeals also erred in declining to rule on the matter. The case was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to enter a mandate to the trial court consistent with the opinion. View "Emergency Physicians of Tidewater v. Hanger" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Zhen Feng Lin, a food delivery driver who was severely injured in a car accident, and his employer's insurance company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. After the accident, Lin received a settlement from the at-fault driver's insurance company, and workers' compensation benefits from his employer's insurance carrier, Hartford Fire Insurance Company. Lin later sought additional recovery under his employer's underinsured motorist policy with Hartford Accident.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Lin and Hartford Accident had not entered into a "settlement agreement" as defined by the insurance policy. As a result, the court ruled that the policy limits should be reduced by the amount Lin received in workers' compensation benefits. The court also agreed with the district court that Lin should be credited for the amount he paid to settle the workers' compensation lien.Additionally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lin's counterclaims for bad faith and breach of contract. The court found no plausible claim supporting the argument that Hartford Accident unreasonably delayed settling Lin's claim. Lin's request for statutory penalties for Hartford Accident's purported delay in handling his claim was also denied.Finally, the court denied both parties' motions for sanctions. Lin's appeal was deemed frivolous in part, but the court exercised its discretion not to impose sanctions. View "Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Lin" on Justia Law

An automobile accident in Idaho resulted in Emily Fairbanks receiving severe injuries while a passenger in a vehicle driven by Holly Galbraith. Fairbanks filed two lawsuits: one against the Idaho Transportation Department claiming negligent maintenance of a guardrail, and another against Galbraith in Wyoming for negligence. Galbraith sought to dismiss the Wyoming suit, citing that the statute of limitations had elapsed. The district court denied the motion. Later, Galbraith was granted summary judgment based on collateral estoppel, preventing relitigation of negligence and damages issues established in the Idaho case.Both parties appealed. Galbraith claimed the lower court had erred in its conclusion about the statute of limitations, while Fairbanks disputed the application of collateral estoppel and the application of Idaho's statutory cap on non-economic damages. The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that the statute of limitations had run before Fairbanks filed her complaint, reversing the district court's ruling on the issue. The court did not address the merits of the collateral estoppel appeal. The court found that under Idaho law, Fairbanks' lawsuit was time-barred as she made no effort to locate Galbraith during the time Galbraith was out of state, thus the statute of limitations was not tolled. View "Galbraith v. Fairbanks" on Justia Law

A medical malpractice lawsuit was filed by Dwan and Aaron Bray, individually and on behalf of their minor child, against Dr. Timothy J. Thress and various other medical entities. The suit, which was initially filed in state court, related to alleged negligence in Dwan Bray's prenatal care and the subsequent birth of their child. However, Thress was employed by a federally funded health center during his treatment of Bray. Under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), the lawsuit was removed to federal court and the United States was substituted as the defendant.The U.S. government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) administrative exhaustion requirement. The plaintiffs countered by moving to remand the action to state court, arguing that the FSHCAA did not apply. The district court denied both of plaintiffs’ motions, finding the FSHCAA applicable and any attempt to amend plaintiffs’ complaint futile. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ FTCA claim without prejudice and remanded plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants to state court. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to remand and its dismissal of their FTCA claim.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. It held that Thress's conduct was covered by the FSHCAA, and that the plaintiffs' attempts to amend their complaint were futile since they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the FTCA before instituting the lawsuit. View "Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Dania Mateo, filed a case against Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC and several of its employees, which included 22 counts alleging violations of Rhode Island's Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA) and Civil Rights Act (RICRA) as well as claims of sexual harassment, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, negligence, false imprisonment, defamation, and conspiracy to commit defamation. The case was pending for nearly 14 years.Mateo appealed a Superior Court decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of certain defendants. The defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the hearing justice erred in granting partial final judgment because he failed to make an express determination that there was no just reason for delay, as required by Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found the defendants’ cross-appeal meritorious. The Court ruled that the hearing justice erred in granting partial final judgment because he failed to determine whether the criteria clearly set forth in Rule 54(b) had been satisfied. The Court held that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. As a result, the Court did not reach the issues raised in the plaintiff's appeal. View "Mateo v. Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, Officer Ashton Lambert struck and killed Gregory Graham with his police cruiser while responding to a call. Graham's estate sued Lambert, the City of Fayetteville, and the Fayetteville Police Department, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.The trial court denied the City and Lambert's motions for summary judgment, arguing that governmental and public officer immunity barred the estate's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly analyzed the summary judgment order. The Court of Appeals had focused on the sufficiency of the estate's complaint, rather than the presence of a genuine factual dispute. This was incorrect, as the court should have asked whether the evidence raised a genuine factual dispute on the existence and extent of the City’s waiver of immunity.The Supreme Court also found that the estate's claim that section 20-145 waived the city's governmental immunity failed as a matter of law. The statute, which exempts police officers from speed limits when chasing or apprehending criminal absconders, does not shield officers for their gross negligence. However, the statute does not contain clear language withdrawing immunity from a discrete government body.The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to analyze whether there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether the City waived governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance. The court also clarified that section 20-145 does not waive the City’s governmental immunity for its officers’ grossly negligent driving. The Estate’s claim against the City remains intact unless otherwise waived by the purchase of liability insurance. View "Est. of Graham v. Lambert" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina dealt with the issue of whether a statute of limitations barred a defendant's counterclaim for negligence because it was filed one day after the three-year limitations period had expired. The court ruled that the counterclaim should be considered as having been filed on the same date that the plaintiff commenced his lawsuit, thus making it timely.The case originated from a two-automobile accident that occurred on 19 December 2015. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant over injuries he allegedly sustained in the accident on 19 December 2018. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff for his own injuries on 20 December 2018, arguing that the plaintiff's own negligence caused the accident. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, asserting that the counterclaim should be dismissed under N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) because it was filed outside the statute’s three-year limit for personal injury claims.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that his counterclaim filed on 20 December 2018 should be deemed to relate back to the filing of the original complaint by the plaintiff on 19 December 2018, and thus should be considered timely filed within the three-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reasoning that for purposes of the statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), the filing of a compulsory counterclaim relates back to the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the court held that N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) did not bar the defendant’s compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Upchurch v. Harp Builders, Inc" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, two interlocutory appeals were consolidated, both arising from the same wrongful-death lawsuit. Beverly Butts, on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of John Albert Hemphill, Sr., alleged that four years prior to Hemphill's death, Dr. Reese Lindsey failed to remove part of a bladder catheter, leading to recurring infections and ultimately Hemphill's death. Additionally, she claimed that the staff at Greenwood Leflore Hospital, where Lindsey treated Hemphill, provided substandard care.Regarding Lindsey, the court found that he had not been lawfully served with process. Despite multiple summons, Butts failed to comply with the Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which outlines the requirements for serving process. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lindsey, leading the Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's decision and render judgment dismissing Lindsey from the lawsuit.Concerning the Hospital, the court found that Butts had failed to provide the necessary medical expert testimony to support her medical negligence claim against the Hospital. Despite her argument that the Hospital's summary judgment motion was preemptive as no scheduling order had been set, the court noted that a defendant can file for summary judgment at any time. Given Butts's failure to present necessary expert testimony, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the Hospital. View "Lindsey v. Butts" on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law