Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a personal injury action brought by Earlene McBride against Carnival Corporation. McBride fell out of her wheelchair while being assisted by a Carnival crewmember, Fritz Charles, during disembarkation from a Carnival cruise ship. McBride claimed that she suffered severe injuries due to the fall and sued Carnival for negligence.The case was initially heard in the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court allowed the deposition testimony of Charles to be presented to the jury over McBride's objection. The jury awarded McBride economic damages for past medical expenses related to the fall but did not award her any damages for past pain and suffering. McBride appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in allowing Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury and that the jury's verdict was inadequate because it did not award her past pain and suffering damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury. The court found that McBride had waived her objection to the use of the deposition by not raising it at the appropriate time during the trial. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of McBride's motion for a new trial on the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. The court found that the jury's verdict was inadequate as a matter of law because there was uncontradicted evidence that McBride suffered at least some pain in the immediate aftermath of the wheelchair incident. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. View "McBride v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice claim filed by Darrin P. Miller against Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp. and several medical professionals. The claim arose from the death of Miller's wife, Meredith, who died after a car accident when an endotracheal tube was incorrectly placed in her esophagus instead of her trachea. Miller alleged that the medical providers breached the standard of care by incorrectly performing the intubation and failing to identify and correct the error.The defendants sought dismissal of the case on two grounds: the expert's certificate of merit was not signed under oath as required by Iowa Code section 147.140, and the expert, an anesthesiologist, was not qualified to testify against the defendant surgeons or respiratory therapist. The district court denied the defendants' motions, ruling that the expert's unsworn but signed letter substantially complied with the affidavit requirement and that the expert's qualifications satisfied section 147.139.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the expert's signed but unsworn report did not substantially comply with section 147.140's affidavit requirement, and this violation was not cured by the expert's sworn declaration served over three months after the statutory deadline. The court did not reach the question of whether the expert anesthesiologist was qualified under section 147.139 to testify against these defendants. The case was remanded for dismissal of the medical malpractice claims with prejudice. View "Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp." on Justia Law

This case involves a lawsuit filed by Cornelius Williams against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM), a supplier of asbestos-cement pipe. Williams alleged that he developed mesothelioma due to secondary exposure to asbestos from his brother Nathan's work with asbestos-cement pipe over a period of more than 20 years. Williams and Nathan did not live together, but had regular close contact during Nathan's employment. The jury found JMM liable under theories of design defect and failure to warn, concluding that the pipe sold by JMM was a substantial factor in increasing Williams' risk of developing cancer. JMM appealed the decision.The trial court dismissed Williams' negligence claim, but not the strict liability claim. The jury found in favor of Williams on his remaining strict liability claim, awarding him significant damages. JMM moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and, in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of a previous case, Kesner v. Superior Court, to preclude only the negligence cause of action. The motion was denied. JMM also appealed from the judgment and order denying its motion for JNOV.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected JMM's arguments that (1) judgment must be entered in its favor because, under Kesner, strict liability does not apply to Williams; (2) the judgment must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence; or (3) a new trial is necessary because the trial court abused its discretion on certain evidentiary rulings. View "Williams v. J-M Manufacturing Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a wrongful death suit filed by Catherine Evans, the mother of Tommy Wiley's children, against Abubaker, Inc., the owner of a convenience store where Wiley was shot and killed. The incident occurred in the store's parking lot during a verbal altercation between Wiley and Cedric Daniels. Wiley struck Daniels in the face, and Daniels retaliated by shooting and killing Wiley. Evans alleged that the store owner had a duty to provide heightened security measures due to the store's location in a high crime area and its history of criminal activity. She claimed that Abubaker's failure to implement such measures made it liable for Wiley's death.The district court denied Abubaker's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the shooting was not foreseeable and that Wiley was not an innocent bystander but was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the shooting. The court found that there were questions of fact regarding the foreseeability of the crime and whether Abubaker had a duty to provide additional security. The appellate court upheld the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Wiley was not acting as a store patron but was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the incident. Therefore, Abubaker had no duty to protect Wiley from the consequences of his own actions. The court held that Abubaker should have been granted summary judgment as it had no duty to protect Wiley under the circumstances of the case. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "EVANS VS. ABUBAKER, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Shirley Ann Carpin, who sued Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation and Clifton Associates on behalf of her mother's estate for negligence and wrongful death. She alleged that the defendants caused the asbestos exposure that led to her mother's mesothelioma and subsequent death. Her mother, Shirley Hilster, was exposed to asbestos through her husband, who worked as a pipefitter and regularly came home with asbestos-contaminated clothes. Hilster's husband worked for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., where Clifton Associates had installed asbestos. Hilster was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in July 2020 and died three months later.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the twenty-year statute of repose under 12 V.S.A. § 518(a), finding the “last occurrence” to which her mother’s mesothelioma was attributed fell outside the repose period. Carpin appealed, arguing that her claims are not barred by § 518(a)’s repose period and, in the alternative, that § 518(a) violates the Vermont Constitution.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court determined that the “last occurrence” to which Hilster’s mesothelioma was attributed was her last known exposure to asbestos in 1995. The court further concluded that the statute was constitutional. The court rejected Carpin's argument that the “last occurrence” was the cellular changes that resulted in her 2020 mesothelioma diagnosis. The court also rejected Carpin's constitutional challenge, finding that the statute of repose did not arbitrarily disadvantage any part of the community and was a valid legislative prerogative. View "Carpin v. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas was asked to consider whether Texas Rules of Evidence 509(e)(4) and 510(d)(5) apply to a discovery request for a minor plaintiff’s psychological treatment records. The minor, E.B., was seeking damages for mental anguish she suffered from witnessing her younger brother's death in an ATV accident. The ATV was sold by Richardson Motorsports, who requested all of E.B.’s psychological treatment records from her clinical psychologist and pediatrician. The court had to decide whether E.B.’s mental or emotional condition was part of her negligence claim for mental anguish damages or Richardson’s defense that post-accident causes contributed to E.B.’s anguish, thus making her psychological records discoverable under the privilege exceptions.The trial court denied E.B.’s motions to quash the discovery request and ordered that all of E.B.’s requested psychological records be produced to Richardson. E.B. and her mother then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, which conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate its orders denying their motions to quash and requiring disclosure of the records. The court of appeals held that the records are privileged and the exceptions do not apply because E.B.’s pleadings make no more than a routine claim of mental anguish.The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that E.B.’s mental or emotional condition is part of her claim because she is relying on expert testimony about that condition to prove her mental anguish damages, and it is also part of Richardson’s defense that those damages have alternative causes. Thus, discovery of E.B.’s mental health care treatment records relevant to the claim or defense is not foreclosed by privilege. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the court of appeals to withdraw its mandamus order preventing discovery. The court also noted that discovery of some records may be permitted on privilege-waiver grounds and further trial court proceedings are necessary to determine which parts of the records are not privileged under each rule. View "IN RE RICHARDSON MOTORSPORTS, LTD." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, the owner of Margaritaville Resort Lake Conroe, and a guest, Mendez, who claimed to have sustained severe bodily injuries after stepping into a deep hole on the property. Mendez sued Lakeside for premises liability and negligence, seeking monetary relief between $200,000 and $1,000,000, along with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, court costs, and expenses. Lakeside failed to timely answer the lawsuit due to an alleged failure by its registered agent for service of process to send a physical copy of the service and misdirect an electronic copy. Mendez then moved for a default judgment, which was granted by the district court.The district court signed a "Final Default Judgment" proposed by Mendez's counsel, which awarded Mendez damages exceeding the $1 million upper limit stated in her original petition. The judgment concluded with the language: "This Judgment finally disposes of all claims and all parties, and is not appealable." Lakeside, unaware of the suit, did not respond before or after the judgment was signed. After the time for a restricted appeal had run, Mendez requested an abstract of judgment and began execution. Lakeside, upon learning of the suit and resulting judgment, filed an answer containing a general denial, a motion to rescind abstract of judgment, and a combined motion to set aside the default judgment and for a new trial. The district court denied Lakeside’s motions, concluding that the judgment was final and that its plenary power had therefore expired.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the default judgment was not final despite being labeled as a "Final Default Judgment." The court reasoned that the judgment's assertion of non-appealability did not just prevent it from unequivocally expressing an intent to finally dispose of the case—it expressly and affirmatively undermined or contradicted any such intent. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the challenged orders that were predicated on that court’s conclusion that its prior judgment is final. View "IN RE LAKESIDE RESORT JV, LLC" on Justia Law

Christine John and Christopher Lewis were injured in a rear-end collision involving a tractor-trailer driven by Roberto Alonzo. In the subsequent personal-injury lawsuit, Alonzo and his employer, New Prime, Inc., admitted liability for Alonzo’s negligence, leaving damages as the only issue at trial. The jury awarded $12 million to John and $450,000 to Lewis for physical pain and mental anguish. Alonzo and New Prime sought a new trial, arguing that the plaintiffs’ counsel had inflamed the jury with an unprovoked accusation of race and gender bias. The trial court rejected this motion, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower courts' decisions, finding that the plaintiffs’ counsel had indeed crossed the line with an uninvited accusation of discriminatory animus. The court noted that while it is not inherently improper to question potential jurors about bias, the plaintiffs’ counsel had gone further by accusing the defense of seeking a lower damages amount because John is a black woman. The court found this argument to be inflammatory, uninvited, and unprovoked, and it concluded that it was so prejudicial that its harmfulness was incurable. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Alonzo v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Six patients filed medical malpractice actions against the estate and practice of a deceased physician, alleging that the physician breached the standard of care. The patients submitted various materials to medical review panels, including a wrongful death complaint filed by the physician's wife in a separate malpractice action. The defendants petitioned the trial court to redact the wife's complaint and any mention of its contents from the patients' submissions. The trial court granted the petition.The case was appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision. The patients then petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that trial courts do not have the authority to act as gatekeeper of the evidence a party submits to a medical review panel. The court also held that the third-party complaint in this case is evidence, and therefore, the trial court lacked the authority to order the patients to redact their submissions. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Bojko v. Anonymous Physician" on Justia Law

In 2021, Lyra Jean Spencer filed a personal injury lawsuit against Franklin Hills Health-Spokane LLC. To serve the summons, her attorney hired a process server who, after learning that the registered agent was unavailable, served the documents to the company's human resources manager, Sheri Flavel. Franklin Hills filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that service on Flavel was improper as she was not authorized to accept service under RCW 4.28.080(9). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Spencer had not met her initial burden to show that service was proper.Spencer appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that Spencer had made a prima facie showing that service to Flavel was proper and the trial court erred in dismissing the case without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if Flavel was a “managing agent” or “office assistant” under RCW 4.28.080(9).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted Franklin Hills’s petition for review. The court concluded that the service statute is to be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of accomplishing service of process and notice to the defendant. The court held that a person may be a managing agent if they are in charge of a single department of the corporation’s business, even if their discretion is controlled somewhat by a superior, provided that they have substantial managerial responsibilities and authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court found that Flavel, as the human resources manager, met the definition of a managing agent under the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the lawsuit to proceed to discovery and trial. View "Spencer v. Franklin Hills Health-Spokane, LLC" on Justia Law