Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint against four employees of the Santa Rosa County Jail, alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to his attack at the jail by two inmates. Petitioner also raised federal law claims against the jail employees. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Petitioner’s state law claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations period in Fla. Stat. 95.11(5)(g) and that Petitioner’s federal law claims were governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and exhaustion of administrative remedies was mandatory. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the one-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g) did not apply in this case, but rather, the four-year statute of limitations in Fla. Stat. 768.28(14) governed; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s federal law claims, as the burden fell on the jail employees to demonstrate that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Green v. Cottrell" on Justia Law

After Tony Havner was injured in a motorcycle accident involving an overhead communications cable, Havner and his wife, Tina Havner, filed a negligence action against Northeast Arkansas Electric Cooperative (NAEC) and other defendants. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of NAEC. Havner subsequently filed a motion for entry of judgment and an Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate with the circuit court. The court entered a judgment and a Rule 54(b) certificate, which was stamped as ‘presented’ and ‘recorded.’ The case was then submitted to the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order, concluding that because the judgment and 54(b) certificate was recorded but never filed, it was not entered as required by court rules. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion, holding that, in light of In re Administrative Order No. 2(b)(2), the circuit court’s summary-judgment order was a final, appealable order. Remanded. View "Havner v. Northeast Arkansas Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

Insured Kourtni Martin suffered serious injuries from an automobile collision in Oklahoma City with Nicholas Gray. At the time of the collision, Insured had UM coverage with Goodville Mutual Casualty Company. The policy was purchased by her parents while they lived in Kansas. She was, however, a listed/rated driver in the policy. Before the collision, Martin's parents notified the Kansas agent that she was moving to Oklahoma to live with her grandmother and that her vehicle would be garaged in Oklahoma. After the collision, the claim was reported to the agent in Kansas who then transmitted the claim to Insurer which was located principally in Pennsylvania. The claim was adjusted out of Pennsylvania. Martin was unable to locate Gray. Her attempts to serve Gray, or his insurer, in Oklahoma and Texas failed. Martin filed this lawsuit against Gray alleging negligence (later adding breach of contract and bad faith against her Insurer). After service by publication, Gray answered asserting a general denial. Martin sought compensation from the Insurer pursuant to her UM policy and negotiations began between Insured and Insurer regarding medical bills and projected future medical bills substantially in excess of $100,000. Insurer offered $27,000 for medical expenses under the "Kansas No Fault Benefits" and $10,000 in UM coverage. The trial court, after reviewing the policy at issue here, applied Kansas law to this case and dismissed Martin's bad faith claim against the Insurer (with prejudice). After review, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in applying Kansas law, finding that the actions by Insurer related to the bad-faith claim appear to have occurred primarily in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania: (1) any injury from the alleged bad faith occurred in Oklahoma where Insured is located; (2) the alleged conduct causing injury from bad faith occurred in Oklahoma or Pennsylvania, where the claim was handled; (3) the domicile of Insurer and Insured are Pennsylvania and Oklahoma, respectively, and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties occurred had yet to be determined. However, because the trial court did not apply the "most significant relationship test," there was no evaluation of these factors according to their relative importance. Despite the parties' voluntary settlement of this case, the Supreme Court nevertheless remanded this case for the trial court to make findings with respect to the "most significant relationship test," and then to dismiss. View "Martin v. Gray" on Justia Law

Harris Management and JJR Associates filed a complaint against Paul Coulombe and two LLCs under his control (collectively, Defendants), alleging seven causes of action arising from allegations that Coulombe had misrepresented his commitment to hire Harris Management to manage a golf course, which Coulombe was preparing to purchase, in an effort to obtain nearby property from JJR Associates at a discount and to prevent Harris from purchasing the golf club. During discovery, the court entered an order providing that Coulombe must permit Harris to discover the communications among Coulombe, his counsel, and a third party, concluding that those communications were either not subject to the attorney-client privilege or were discoverable because the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except with respect to one communication that the Court concluded the trial court must consider further on remand, holding that, with the exception of those pages, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the release of specific communications between Coulombe and his attorneys. View "Harris Management, Inc. v. Coulombe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant M. Strasner sued out-of-state defendants Brightpoint, Inc., Brightpoint North America, LP, Touchstone Wireless Repair and Logistics, LP, and Touchstone Acquisition, LLC (collectively, Defendants) for injuries she suffered when a Touchstone employee allegedly uploaded a private photograph of Strasner to her Facebook page from a mobile telephone she had returned to T-Mobile. The court granted Defendants' motion to quash service of the summons and amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Strasner appealed, contending she made a sufficient showing of Defendants' contacts with California, both directly and through their California parent corporation, to subject them to personal jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit to this appeal concerned two automobile accidents that occurred on Interstate 55 North in Grenada County on the evening of Thursday, May 24, 2012. The first accident involved David Williams and Brian Spurlock: Williams was traveling in a tractor-trailer leased to RWI Transportation, LLC. The left side of the trailer contacted the right side of a Ford Ranger pickup driven by Spurlock. Spurlock's truck overturned. Williams pulled the trailer over to the shoulder of the highway on an offramp to Exit 206. The second accident involved George Ready, II, and a UPS tractor-trailer driven by Shannon Carroll. The Ready accident occurred nearly three quarters (3/4) of a mile south of the Williams accident. Approximately 730 feet north of the ramp to the Exit 206 overpass, Ready collided with the rear of a of the UPS tractor-trailer driven by Carroll. The UPS tractor-trailer was stopped in the right hand northbound travel lane where it had been forced to stop as a result of backed-up traffic from the Williams accident. Ready filed suit against RWI and Williams, alleging claims of negligence and negligent entrustment. RWI and Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ready’s injury was not a foreseeable consequence of Williams’s accident, thus Ready could not establish that he was owed a duty by RWI and Williams. RWI and Williams were granted summary judgment. Ready appealed, but finding no error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ready v. RWI Transportation, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner was the victim of an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites hotel. Petitioner filed a negligence action against Hilton Hotels and related companies (collectively, Respondents). Following one mistrial, the parties commenced a second trial. Ultimately, the jury found that Petitioner sustained a total of $1.7 million in damages, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied the motion. The Fifth District affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s pretrial offers of settlement to Respondents did not satisfy the requirements of Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the plain language of both section 768.79 and Rule 1.442 indicated that Petitioner was entitled to attorneys’ fees because he submitted sufficient offers to settle his claims against Respondents and obtained satisfactory judgments in his favor. View "Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp." on Justia Law

Harvey Wainio’s primary care physician referred him to podiatrist Dr. Richard M. Allen, because of a bunion on his right foot. In Wainio's first meeting with Dr. Allen, the doctor recommended surgery. Wainio agreed to have the surgery, and he again met with Dr. Allen at his office for a preoperative visit. Dr. Allen performed the surgery at Syringa Surgical Center, LLC (“the Surgical Center”). Three days later, Wainio began having symptoms that caused him to seek emergency medical treatment. Due to insufficient blood flow to his right foot and an infection, his foot became necrotic, requiring amputation of the foot. The Surgical Center moved for summary judgment which was granted, with the trial court finding that at the time of the alleged negligence, Dr. Allen was not acting in the capacity of an agent of the Surgical Center or as a member of its medical staff. Wainio appealed, arguing dismissing the Surgical Center was made in error. But finding none, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Center" on Justia Law

David and Jayme Samples (“the Samples”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Ray Hanson and Bingham Memorial Hospital in a medical malpractice action. Mr. Samples was admitted to Bingham Memorial Hospital (“BMH”) in Blackfoot with abdominal pain and was found to have acute cholecystitis. Dr. Hanson performed a laparoscopic cholecystectomy on Mr. Samples. Dr. Birkenhagen was a practicing surgeon at PMC in 2009 when Dr. Hanson performed the laparoscopic cholecystectomy on Mr. Samples. Dr. Birkenhagen was a member of the American College of Surgeons and board certified at the time. At PMC, Dr. Birkenhagen re-opened the surgical site and discovered sepsis. Dr. Birkenhagen removed significant amounts of pus and later operated in order to repair a hole in the colon, which had allowed stool to leak out of the incision at the surgical site. The sepsis had caused Mr. Samples’ respiratory distress. Samples filed suit against BMH and Dr. Hanson for medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment after it determined that the Samples failed to establish the necessary foundation under Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 to admit testimony from the Samples’ only medical expert. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "This is not a complicated standard of care. It merely calls for basic post-operative care to ensure that the patient does not suffer infection or complications. It is not a standard of care that requires detailed specialization, intricate treatments, expensive equipment, or detailed knowledge of drug interactions. One would hope that any surgeon, regardless of whether operating in the backwoods or a metropolitan hospital, would monitor the patient post-operatively to ensure a decent recovery without infection or complications. That didn’t happen with Mr. Samples, as outlined by Dr. Birkenhagen." View "Samples v. Hanson" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff’s utility terrain vehicle (UTV) overturned the roof of the UTV failed and caused Plaintiff injuries. Plaintiff sued Chesterfield Valley Sports, Inc. (Defendant). Prior to trial, Plaintiff designated Herbert Newbold as an expert witness. Plaintiff then rescinded Newbold’s expert witness designation without disclosing Newbold’s expert analysis or conclusions. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to amend the scheduling order to permit Newbold’s deposition. Plaintiff objected, asserting that Newbold’s opinions and conclusions were protected from discovery by the work product doctrine. The trial court sustained Defendant’s motion, concluding that Plaintiff had waived the protections afforded by the work product doctrine by designating Newbold as an expert witness. Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it made permanent, holding (1) designating an expert witness does not, standing alone, irrevocably waive the protections afforded by the work product doctrine; and (2) in this case, there was no disclosing event that waived the work product privilege. View "State ex rel. Malashock v. Honorable Michael T. Jamison" on Justia Law