Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Trina Cunningham, an employee of the Baltimore Department of Public Works, was responsible for monitoring water flow at the Patapsco Wastewater Treatment Plant. On June 3, 2019, while inspecting the plant's Grit Facility, Cunningham fell through a metal, grated catwalk that collapsed under her feet, causing her to drown in the wastewater chamber below. Her estate and family members filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the City of Baltimore, various city officials, and several crane servicing companies, alleging negligence and other claims related to her death.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted motions to dismiss filed by most of the defendants, including Freeland Hoist & Crane, Inc., but did not address the claims against Crane 1 Services, Inc., and Overhead Crane Service, Inc., who had not filed motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed the entire complaint, despite the unresolved claims against these two defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court's order was not a final decision because it did not resolve all claims against all parties. The appellate court noted that the district court failed to address the claims against Crane 1 Services and Overhead Crane Services, and thus, the order was not appealable. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court to adjudicate the remaining claims. View "Estate of Cunningham v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling the larger boy away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The case was tried in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. After a 15-day trial, the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times and concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The jury found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the trial court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, finding no error in the trial court’s decisions. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also found no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness and the refusal to give several special jury instructions requested by the plaintiff. The appellate court concluded that the standard instructions given were sufficient and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s rulings. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist. et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Marilyn Kubichek and Dorothy Baldwin were injured on October 11, 2019, when they were struck by a Segway operated by Eduardo Samonte during a guided tour run by Unlimited Biking Washington, D.C., LLC. They filed two complaints on December 30, 2022, alleging negligence by Samonte and failure to train and supervise by Unlimited Biking. The complaints were filed after the three-year statute of limitations for negligence had expired.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia consolidated the two cases and granted Samonte's motion to dismiss, concluding that the COVID-19 emergency orders did not toll the statute of limitations for the appellants' claims. The court determined that the tolling orders only applied to deadlines that fell within the tolling period or arose from claims that accrued during the tolling period. Since the Segway accident occurred before the tolling period began and the statutory deadline was after the tolling period expired, the court ruled that the limitations period was not tolled.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant and should not be raised sua sponte by the court. However, in this case, the trial court did not act entirely sua sponte because Samonte had asserted the limitations defense, and the appellants had the opportunity to litigate the issue. The Court of Appeals also confirmed that the Superior Court's tolling orders during the COVID-19 pandemic did not toll the limitations period for the appellants' negligence claims, as the orders only applied to deadlines that expired during the emergency period, which was not the case here. The dismissal of the complaints was affirmed. View "Kubichek v. Unlimited Biking Washington, DC, LLC" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Dylann Roof shot and killed nine people at Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, including M.P.'s father, Reverend Clementa Pinckney. M.P., a minor, filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) and its subsidiaries, alleging that Facebook's algorithm recommended harmful content that radicalized Roof, leading to the murders. M.P. asserted claims of strict products liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, as well as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed M.P.'s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred her state law tort claims. The court also found that M.P. failed to plausibly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that M.P.'s state law tort claims were barred by Section 230 because they sought to hold Facebook liable as a publisher of third-party content. The court also determined that M.P. failed to plausibly allege proximate causation under South Carolina law, as her complaint did not provide sufficient factual foundation linking Roof's Facebook use to his crimes. Additionally, the court found that M.P. forfeited her challenge to the dismissal of her Section 1985 claim by not adequately addressing it in her appellate brief. The court also concluded that any potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting Facebook's motion to dismiss. View "M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc." on Justia Law

Gregory Cohane filed a lawsuit against The Home Missioners of America, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, and Al Behm, alleging child sexual abuse by Behm and negligence by the other defendants. Cohane claimed that Behm, a clergyman employed by Glenmary and supervised by the Diocese, groomed and sexually abused him over several years, starting when he was nine years old. Behm's abuse continued even after he was transferred to different locations due to other allegations of misconduct. Cohane's lawsuit was filed in 2021, invoking the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allows previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse to be brought within a specific two-year window.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County dismissed Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese, ruling that the revival provision only applied to direct abusers, not to institutions that enabled the abuse. Cohane appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the plain language of the revival provision was broad enough to include claims against both direct abusers and enablers.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which revives any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under N.C.G.S. § 1-52, applies to claims against both direct abusers and those who enabled the abuse. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute did not distinguish between different types of defendants and that traditional tort principles allow for recovery from both direct tortfeasors and those who contributed to the harm. Thus, Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese were revived under the SAFE Child Act. View "Cohane v. The Home Missioners of America" on Justia Law

Former Spokane police officer Jeffery Thurman was the subject of a June 13, 2019 article in the Spokesman-Review, owned by Cowles Co., which alleged he was fired for racial slurs, sexual harassment, and talk of killing black people. On June 14, 2021, Thurman filed a defamation lawsuit against Cowles Co. Shortly after, on July 25, 2021, the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) took effect. Thurman amended his complaint on December 3, 2021, adding new factual allegations and a claim under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).The trial court partially granted Cowles' special motion for expedited relief under the UPEPA, dismissing Thurman’s CPA claim but denying the motion to dismiss the defamation claim, reasoning that the defamation claim was part of the original complaint. Cowles appealed the denial of expedited relief for the defamation claim, and Thurman cross-appealed the dismissal of his CPA claim.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the UPEPA applied to both Thurman’s defamation and CPA claims. The majority reasoned that the defamation claim was "asserted" on a continuing basis on the UPEPA’s effective date. The dissent argued that the defamation claim was not "asserted" on or after July 25, 2021, and thus the UPEPA did not apply.The Washington Supreme Court held that Thurman’s amended defamation claim relates back to the original complaint filed on June 14, 2021, and is not subject to the UPEPA. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, deciding the case on statutory grounds and declining to address the constitutional arguments. View "Thurman v. Cowles Co." on Justia Law

Robert E. Dupuis and twelve other plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, seeking damages for sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by the Bishop’s clergy when the plaintiffs were minor children. Their claims were previously barred by the statute of limitations. The Bishop moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 14 M.R.S. § 752-C(3) (2022), which purports to revive the plaintiffs’ claims, deprives the Bishop of a constitutionally protected vested right.The Business and Consumer Docket (McKeon, J.) denied the Bishop’s motions but reported its orders to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c). The court accepted the report to determine whether the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) is constitutional.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) contravenes centuries of precedent and multiple provisions of the Maine Declaration of Rights, as well as the Constitution’s provisions regarding separation of powers. The court concluded that once a statute of limitations has expired for a claim, a right to be free of that claim has vested, and the claim cannot be revived. Therefore, section 752-C(3) is unconstitutional as applied to expired claims. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured during a nightclub shooting at a rap concert featuring performers from rival gangs. They sued the nightclub's owner and operators for negligence per se and strict liability on an ultrahazardous activity theory, claiming inadequate event planning and security. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the defendants on the negligence per se claim and judgment on the pleadings for the ultrahazardous activity claim, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact for both claims.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially reviewed the case. The court granted summary adjudication on the negligence per se claim, finding that the conditional use permit was not designed to prevent the type of injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. Additionally, the court treated the motion regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted it without leave to amend, concluding that hosting a rap concert, even with performers from rival gangs, was not an ultrahazardous activity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the conditional use permit constituted a statute, ordinance, or regulation under the negligence per se doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the permit was not designed to prevent the specific type of harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim, the court concluded that hosting a rap concert, even with rival gang members, did not constitute an ultrahazardous activity as the risks could be mitigated with proper planning and security measures. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Carmichael v. Cafe Sevilla of Riverside, Inc." on Justia Law

A motorist struck and injured a pedestrian during rush hour. The motorist claimed the pedestrian stepped out from behind a large truck, obstructing her view. Witnesses and investigating officers corroborated the motorist's account, finding no evidence of speeding, reckless driving, or distraction. The pedestrian sued the motorist and her insurer for negligence, and the motorist raised a contributory-negligence defense.The Hamilton Superior Court initially granted the pedestrian's motion to compel the motorist to produce her iPhone for inspection, limited to the hour surrounding the accident. However, the court reversed its decision upon reconsideration, citing significant privacy concerns and lack of evidence suggesting the motorist was using her phone at the time. The court also granted a motion in limine to exclude any discussion of the phone inspection at trial. A jury found the pedestrian 90% at fault, barring recovery under Indiana's contributory-fault standard. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the burden of the proposed phone inspection outweighed its likely benefit given the motorist's privacy concerns.The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the pedestrian's discovery request lacked necessary evidentiary support and was overly broad. The court emphasized that privacy concerns are not a per se bar to discovery but must be balanced against the need for information. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel, as the pedestrian failed to show that the benefit of inspecting the motorist's phone outweighed her privacy interests. View "Jennings v. Smiley" on Justia Law

Clover Boykin filed a lawsuit against Greenwood Leflore Hospital (GLH) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that GLH intentionally withheld her medical records, preventing her from filing a medical malpractice suit. Boykin claimed that GLH's actions violated her constitutional right of access to the courts. GLH responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law, the employee was immune from suit, GLH was never served, and the suit was time-barred.The Leflore County Circuit Court denied GLH's motion to dismiss and granted Boykin additional time to serve GLH. GLH then sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted. Boykin did not file a brief in response to the appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi accepted Boykin's failure to file a brief as a confession of error and found that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law. The court held that HIPAA does not provide a private right of action and that Boykin could not use § 1983 to enforce a federal statute that does not give her an individual right. The court reversed the trial judge's denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of GLH. View "Greenwood Leflore Hospital v. Boykin" on Justia Law