Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was the victim of an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites hotel. Petitioner filed a negligence action against Hilton Hotels and related companies (collectively, Respondents). Following one mistrial, the parties commenced a second trial. Ultimately, the jury found that Petitioner sustained a total of $1.7 million in damages, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied the motion. The Fifth District affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s pretrial offers of settlement to Respondents did not satisfy the requirements of Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the plain language of both section 768.79 and Rule 1.442 indicated that Petitioner was entitled to attorneys’ fees because he submitted sufficient offers to settle his claims against Respondents and obtained satisfactory judgments in his favor. View "Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp." on Justia Law

Harvey Wainio’s primary care physician referred him to podiatrist Dr. Richard M. Allen, because of a bunion on his right foot. In Wainio's first meeting with Dr. Allen, the doctor recommended surgery. Wainio agreed to have the surgery, and he again met with Dr. Allen at his office for a preoperative visit. Dr. Allen performed the surgery at Syringa Surgical Center, LLC (“the Surgical Center”). Three days later, Wainio began having symptoms that caused him to seek emergency medical treatment. Due to insufficient blood flow to his right foot and an infection, his foot became necrotic, requiring amputation of the foot. The Surgical Center moved for summary judgment which was granted, with the trial court finding that at the time of the alleged negligence, Dr. Allen was not acting in the capacity of an agent of the Surgical Center or as a member of its medical staff. Wainio appealed, arguing dismissing the Surgical Center was made in error. But finding none, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Center" on Justia Law

David and Jayme Samples (“the Samples”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Ray Hanson and Bingham Memorial Hospital in a medical malpractice action. Mr. Samples was admitted to Bingham Memorial Hospital (“BMH”) in Blackfoot with abdominal pain and was found to have acute cholecystitis. Dr. Hanson performed a laparoscopic cholecystectomy on Mr. Samples. Dr. Birkenhagen was a practicing surgeon at PMC in 2009 when Dr. Hanson performed the laparoscopic cholecystectomy on Mr. Samples. Dr. Birkenhagen was a member of the American College of Surgeons and board certified at the time. At PMC, Dr. Birkenhagen re-opened the surgical site and discovered sepsis. Dr. Birkenhagen removed significant amounts of pus and later operated in order to repair a hole in the colon, which had allowed stool to leak out of the incision at the surgical site. The sepsis had caused Mr. Samples’ respiratory distress. Samples filed suit against BMH and Dr. Hanson for medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment after it determined that the Samples failed to establish the necessary foundation under Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 to admit testimony from the Samples’ only medical expert. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "This is not a complicated standard of care. It merely calls for basic post-operative care to ensure that the patient does not suffer infection or complications. It is not a standard of care that requires detailed specialization, intricate treatments, expensive equipment, or detailed knowledge of drug interactions. One would hope that any surgeon, regardless of whether operating in the backwoods or a metropolitan hospital, would monitor the patient post-operatively to ensure a decent recovery without infection or complications. That didn’t happen with Mr. Samples, as outlined by Dr. Birkenhagen." View "Samples v. Hanson" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff’s utility terrain vehicle (UTV) overturned the roof of the UTV failed and caused Plaintiff injuries. Plaintiff sued Chesterfield Valley Sports, Inc. (Defendant). Prior to trial, Plaintiff designated Herbert Newbold as an expert witness. Plaintiff then rescinded Newbold’s expert witness designation without disclosing Newbold’s expert analysis or conclusions. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to amend the scheduling order to permit Newbold’s deposition. Plaintiff objected, asserting that Newbold’s opinions and conclusions were protected from discovery by the work product doctrine. The trial court sustained Defendant’s motion, concluding that Plaintiff had waived the protections afforded by the work product doctrine by designating Newbold as an expert witness. Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it made permanent, holding (1) designating an expert witness does not, standing alone, irrevocably waive the protections afforded by the work product doctrine; and (2) in this case, there was no disclosing event that waived the work product privilege. View "State ex rel. Malashock v. Honorable Michael T. Jamison" on Justia Law

Iselda Moreno, wife of Rudy Robles, received liposuction, buttock augmentation, and abdominoplasty surgery performed by Dr. Patricia Yugueros of Artisan Plastic Surgery, LLC on June 24, 2009. Moreno went to the ER experiencing abdominal pains. Five days after the surgery, she died. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the appellate court was correct in holding that deposition testimony of an organizational representative taken under OCGA 9-11-30(b)(6) could be admitted into evidence at trial under OCGA 9-11-32(a)(2), without regard to the rules of evidence governing admissibility of expert testimony. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Yugueros v. Robles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tamar and Ari Ginsberg, now New Jersey residents, lived in New York during Tamar's pregnancy and at the time of the birth of their daughter, Abigail. Abigail tragically died from Tay-Sachs disease, a genetically inherited, incurable neurological disorder, at the age of three. Plaintiffs sued a New York laboratory owned and operated by defendant Quest Diagnostics Incorporated (Quest), a New Jersey-based medical testing company, alleging failure to provide correct blood test results when Ari sought to determine whether he was a Tay-Sachs carrier. Quest, in turn, asserted a third-party claim against Mount Sinai Medical Center, Inc., a New York hospital, which allegedly tested Ari's blood sample in New York pursuant to its contract with Quest. Plaintiffs also sued several New Jersey-domiciled defendants whom they alleged to have provided plaintiff Tamar with negligent advice and treatment in New Jersey. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal was whether the choice-of-law principles set forth in 146, 145, and 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) should have been applied uniformly to all defendants in a given case, or whether courts should undertake a defendant-by-defendant choice-of-law analysis when the defendants are domiciled in different states. Although the appellate panel agreed that New Jersey and New York law diverged in material respects, it concluded that New York constituted the place of injury because it was the state of plaintiffs' domicile during Tamar's pregnancy, the state in which prenatal testing would have been conducted and the pregnancy would likely have been terminated, and the state in which Abigail was born. The panel then considered the contacts set forth in Restatement 145 and the principles stated in Restatement 6 to determine whether New Jersey had a more significant relationship to the parties and the issues than New York. The panel rejected the trial court's assumption that the law of a single state must govern all of the issues in this lawsuit and instead undertook separate choice-of-law analyses for the New Jersey and New York defendants. The panel found that the presumption in favor of New York law was overcome with regard to the New Jersey defendants, but not with regard to Quest and Mount Sinai. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Mercer admitted that he negligently collided with plaintiff Lillie Moore's car. The impact had major consequences for her health and lifestyle, and suffered chronic pain. At issue in this appeal was a question of the reasonable value of medical services provided to Moore, who at the time of her injury, was uninsured. Defendant insisted that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden to prove she actually incurred liability for the full amount of the doctor and hospital charges. "If there was a failure, it was defendant’s failure to challenge plaintiff’s evidence at trial." The Court of Appeals reversed a sanctions order made in this case against the defense, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Moore v. Mercer" on Justia Law

While a resident at Cleveland Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, (“Cleveland”), Annie Mae Gully fell and broke her hip. Following complications from a surgical procedure to repair her hip, Gully died six days later. Subsequently, suit was filed against Cleveland, alleging claims of negligence and gross negligence. Following a verdict in the Estate's favor, Cleveland moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the jury had been allowed to hear undisclosed opinions from an expert and improper closing argument from counsel for the Estate. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with this contention, reversed the trial court, and remanded for a new trial. View "Cleveland Nursing and Rehabilitation, LLC v. Estate of Annie Mae Gully" on Justia Law

Manuel Nava was injured while a patient at Saddleback Memorial Medical Center (Saddleback). His injury occurred while he was being transported in the hospital on a gurney. Nava filed suit against Saddleback, and an ambulance service, Herren Enterprises, Inc. (Herren). The complaint was filed more than one year, but less than two years, after his injury. Both Saddleback and Herren filed motions for summary judgment, contending that the complaint was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, which imposed a one-year statute of limitations when an injury was caused by the professional negligence of a health care provider. The trial court granted the motions. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court held that section 340.5 applied when negligence occurs in the use or maintenance of medical equipment or premises while medical care is being provided to the plaintiff. Applying the Supreme Court's holding to this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that Nava’s claims were barred by section 340.5’s statute of limitations. "The transfer of Nava in the hospital on a gurney was integrally related to Nava’s medical treatment or diagnosis, and, therefore, the injury occurred in the rendering of professional services." The Court, therefore, affirmed. View "Nava v. Saddleback Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

Wagner, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, took both brand‐name and generic hormone therapy drugs as prescribed by her gynecologist to treat her post‐menopausal endometrial hyperplasia. After taking the drugs, Wagner developed breast cancer. Wagner sued multiple pharmaceutical companies that designed, manufactured, promoted and distributed the drugs she took, asserting Wisconsin state law tort claims, all based upon allegations that the defendants sold dangerous products and failed to adequately warn of their risks. Defendants moved for Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings, arguing that federal law preempted Wagner’s claims. In response, Wagner asserted, for the first time, that the defendants delayed updating their generic brand labels to match the updated, stricter labels on the brand‐name drug. The district judge granted the motion, finding that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. 301, preempted the state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: Wagner’s complaint lacked the requisite factual allegations to support a failure to update theory and federal law preempts her Wisconsin state‐law claims. View "Wagner v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc." on Justia Law