Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound) appealed a trial court’s order granting plaintiff Linda Gee’s motion to set aside dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Gee had been injured while a passenger on a Greyhound bus. She alleged the driver was going too fast, which caused the bus to hit two other vehicles and then crash into a tree. Gee also sued the bus driver’s estate and several others relating to the accident. On appeal, Greyhound argued that the trial court erred in granting relief under section 473, subdivision (b), contending that: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal under section 473, subdivision (b), because Gee failed to comply with the requirements of section 1008; and (2) Gee failed to provide a sufficient showing to justify relief under section 473, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial court’s judgment, and affirmed. View "Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Jamie Fast sought medical care because of difficulty conceiving and menstrual bleeding, which had been heavier and more prolonged than normal. Upon first consulting with Dr. Adam Smith, she noted on her medical history forms that her grandmother had diabetes and her parents had high cholesterol. In late March 2008, Dr. Smith confirmed Jamie was pregnant. Jamie bled for the first few months of pregnancy-visiting the emergency room at least once for bleeding. Jamie phoned Dr. Smith's office multiple times to inquire about her bleeding. Each time, Jamie went to Dr. Smith for an examination or she had an ultrasound at the hospital. After each checkup or ultrasound, Dr. Smith assured Jamie that everything was fine or normal. Neither Dr. Smith nor his nursing staff ever raised concerns about blood sugar, diabetes, high blood pressure, or weight loss during Jamie's pregnancy. At an August 2008 appointment, Dr. Gregory Schroff covered for Dr. Smith. Dr. Schroff discovered Jamie's blood glucose concentration was over six times the upper limit of normal. A second test confirmed the high result was not a fluke. Dr. Schroff admitted Jamie to the hospital for management of diabetes and pregnancy that same day. At the hospital, Dr. Schroff ordered intermittent fetal monitoring. The monitor detected fetal distress several times, indicating decelerations of the fetal heart rate. The nursing staff's response was to turn off the monitor, rather than to substitute a different monitor or to expedite delivery of the unborn child. Dr. Schroff failed to review fetal monitor strips. Nurses were unable to detect a fetal heartbeat; Jamie delivered a stillborn baby. She was diagnosed as an insulin-dependent type 2 diabetic since the stillbirth. The medical negligence statute of limitations (MNSOL) required filing a claim for medical negligence within three years of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence was or should have been discovered, whichever is later. The MNSOL may be tolled for one year upon the making of a good-faith request for mediation. The general torts catchall statute of limitations was also three years, but with no associated tolling provision. statute of limitations. Dr. Smith, joined by the other defendants, moved for summary judgment, because the Fasts’ wrongful death claim was barred by the general torts catchall statute of limitations and violation of a tort claim statute. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. The Fasts appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)) applied. View "Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

Karisa and Roger Frith appealed the dismissal of their complaint against the Park District of the City of Fargo and the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund. The Friths sued the Park District and Fund seeking monetary damages for injuries Karisa allegedly sustained while rollerblading in a Fargo park on July 7, 2012. The Friths alleged Karisa tripped on soft patching material used to fill a crack in the park pathway. The Friths argued the district court erred in dismissing their complaint because it applied the wrong statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in its use of the appropriate statute of limitations to dismiss the case. View "Frith v. Park District of the City of Fargo" on Justia Law

In 2013, fourteen plaintiffs, including ten from West Virginia and four from New York, filed products liability and negligence claims agist Pfizer, Inc. regarding their use of the medication, Lipitor, a drug manufactured by Pfizer. An amended complaint was later filed adding twenty-six plaintiffs from Texas. Ultimately, the circuit court granted Pfizer’s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens and dismissed the non-West Virginia plaintiffs from the underlying civil action. Plaintiffs sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order granting Pfizer’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court acted within its authority in granting the motion to dismiss. View "State ex rel. Almond v. Honorable Rudolph Murensky" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint against four employees of the Santa Rosa County Jail, alleging negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to his attack at the jail by two inmates. Petitioner also raised federal law claims against the jail employees. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Petitioner’s state law claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations period in Fla. Stat. 95.11(5)(g) and that Petitioner’s federal law claims were governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and exhaustion of administrative remedies was mandatory. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the one-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g) did not apply in this case, but rather, the four-year statute of limitations in Fla. Stat. 768.28(14) governed; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s federal law claims, as the burden fell on the jail employees to demonstrate that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Green v. Cottrell" on Justia Law

After Tony Havner was injured in a motorcycle accident involving an overhead communications cable, Havner and his wife, Tina Havner, filed a negligence action against Northeast Arkansas Electric Cooperative (NAEC) and other defendants. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of NAEC. Havner subsequently filed a motion for entry of judgment and an Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate with the circuit court. The court entered a judgment and a Rule 54(b) certificate, which was stamped as ‘presented’ and ‘recorded.’ The case was then submitted to the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order, concluding that because the judgment and 54(b) certificate was recorded but never filed, it was not entered as required by court rules. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion, holding that, in light of In re Administrative Order No. 2(b)(2), the circuit court’s summary-judgment order was a final, appealable order. Remanded. View "Havner v. Northeast Arkansas Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

Insured Kourtni Martin suffered serious injuries from an automobile collision in Oklahoma City with Nicholas Gray. At the time of the collision, Insured had UM coverage with Goodville Mutual Casualty Company. The policy was purchased by her parents while they lived in Kansas. She was, however, a listed/rated driver in the policy. Before the collision, Martin's parents notified the Kansas agent that she was moving to Oklahoma to live with her grandmother and that her vehicle would be garaged in Oklahoma. After the collision, the claim was reported to the agent in Kansas who then transmitted the claim to Insurer which was located principally in Pennsylvania. The claim was adjusted out of Pennsylvania. Martin was unable to locate Gray. Her attempts to serve Gray, or his insurer, in Oklahoma and Texas failed. Martin filed this lawsuit against Gray alleging negligence (later adding breach of contract and bad faith against her Insurer). After service by publication, Gray answered asserting a general denial. Martin sought compensation from the Insurer pursuant to her UM policy and negotiations began between Insured and Insurer regarding medical bills and projected future medical bills substantially in excess of $100,000. Insurer offered $27,000 for medical expenses under the "Kansas No Fault Benefits" and $10,000 in UM coverage. The trial court, after reviewing the policy at issue here, applied Kansas law to this case and dismissed Martin's bad faith claim against the Insurer (with prejudice). After review, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in applying Kansas law, finding that the actions by Insurer related to the bad-faith claim appear to have occurred primarily in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania: (1) any injury from the alleged bad faith occurred in Oklahoma where Insured is located; (2) the alleged conduct causing injury from bad faith occurred in Oklahoma or Pennsylvania, where the claim was handled; (3) the domicile of Insurer and Insured are Pennsylvania and Oklahoma, respectively, and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties occurred had yet to be determined. However, because the trial court did not apply the "most significant relationship test," there was no evaluation of these factors according to their relative importance. Despite the parties' voluntary settlement of this case, the Supreme Court nevertheless remanded this case for the trial court to make findings with respect to the "most significant relationship test," and then to dismiss. View "Martin v. Gray" on Justia Law

Harris Management and JJR Associates filed a complaint against Paul Coulombe and two LLCs under his control (collectively, Defendants), alleging seven causes of action arising from allegations that Coulombe had misrepresented his commitment to hire Harris Management to manage a golf course, which Coulombe was preparing to purchase, in an effort to obtain nearby property from JJR Associates at a discount and to prevent Harris from purchasing the golf club. During discovery, the court entered an order providing that Coulombe must permit Harris to discover the communications among Coulombe, his counsel, and a third party, concluding that those communications were either not subject to the attorney-client privilege or were discoverable because the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except with respect to one communication that the Court concluded the trial court must consider further on remand, holding that, with the exception of those pages, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the release of specific communications between Coulombe and his attorneys. View "Harris Management, Inc. v. Coulombe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant M. Strasner sued out-of-state defendants Brightpoint, Inc., Brightpoint North America, LP, Touchstone Wireless Repair and Logistics, LP, and Touchstone Acquisition, LLC (collectively, Defendants) for injuries she suffered when a Touchstone employee allegedly uploaded a private photograph of Strasner to her Facebook page from a mobile telephone she had returned to T-Mobile. The court granted Defendants' motion to quash service of the summons and amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Strasner appealed, contending she made a sufficient showing of Defendants' contacts with California, both directly and through their California parent corporation, to subject them to personal jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit to this appeal concerned two automobile accidents that occurred on Interstate 55 North in Grenada County on the evening of Thursday, May 24, 2012. The first accident involved David Williams and Brian Spurlock: Williams was traveling in a tractor-trailer leased to RWI Transportation, LLC. The left side of the trailer contacted the right side of a Ford Ranger pickup driven by Spurlock. Spurlock's truck overturned. Williams pulled the trailer over to the shoulder of the highway on an offramp to Exit 206. The second accident involved George Ready, II, and a UPS tractor-trailer driven by Shannon Carroll. The Ready accident occurred nearly three quarters (3/4) of a mile south of the Williams accident. Approximately 730 feet north of the ramp to the Exit 206 overpass, Ready collided with the rear of a of the UPS tractor-trailer driven by Carroll. The UPS tractor-trailer was stopped in the right hand northbound travel lane where it had been forced to stop as a result of backed-up traffic from the Williams accident. Ready filed suit against RWI and Williams, alleging claims of negligence and negligent entrustment. RWI and Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ready’s injury was not a foreseeable consequence of Williams’s accident, thus Ready could not establish that he was owed a duty by RWI and Williams. RWI and Williams were granted summary judgment. Ready appealed, but finding no error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ready v. RWI Transportation, LLC" on Justia Law