Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Dr. Mark Geier, David Geier, and Anne Geier (collectively, Respondents) filed a complaint against the Maryland Board of Physicians and related individuals (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that Petitioners invaded their privacy by publicizing their private medical information in a cease and desist order that was issued during disciplinary proceedings. During discovery, the circuit court entered three separate orders challenged by Petitioners. The Court of Appeals (1) granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss as it related to the orders denying Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration of a default order on liability for a series of discovery failures and for a protective order from Respondents’ sixth motion to compel documents, holding that the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction of Petitioners’ appeal regarding these interlocutory orders; and (2) reversed and vacated the order granting Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions against Petitioner regarding the disclosure audiotapes of Petitioner’s disclosures, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the motion for sanctions. Remanded. View "Maryland Board of Physicians v. Geier" on Justia Law

Geralyn Gallagher appealed when her lawsuit against the Best Western Cottontree Inn (the Hotel) and Snake River Peterson Properties LLC (Snake River) was dismissed. The district court held that the amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the original filing and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Snake River’s failure to file a certificate of assumed business name. Gallagher argued that the amended complaint should relate back to the date that she filed the original complaint. Gallagher argued that because complaints can be amended at any time, and because the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, the amended complaint related back to that time. The district court found that because Gallagher was amending her complaint to name a new defendant, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) applied. Snake River did not have notice of the suit within the statute of limitations, the district court held that the amended complaint could not relate back. The Supreme Court concluded the district court’s conclusion was correct. Gallagher also argued the statute of limitations should have been tolled because Snake River failed to file a certificate of assumed business name with the Secretary of State. The district court found that because Gallagher’s only search was of the Secretary of State’s database, Gallagher did not exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the proper party. The district court therefore declined to toll the statute of limitations. Although the Supreme Court found that the district court correctly dismissed Gallagher’s personal injury action due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Court remanded this case in order to give the district court the opportunity to entertain a motion to amend the complaint to assert a cause of action against Snake River under Idaho Code section 53-509(2). View "Gallagher v. Best Wester Cottontree" on Justia Law

Eke Wokocha sued Sharp Memorial Hospital alleging that the Hospital’s negligence caused his quadriplegia. The jury found that the Hospital was negligent but that this negligence did not cause Wokocha’s quadriplegia. Wokocha subsequently died, and Wokocha’s widow, Berthe Kabran, was substituted as plaintiff. Kabran moved for a new trial on the basis of evidence obtained from an autopsy that purportedly called into question the jury’s causation determination. Kabran did not timely pay the necessary filing fee in submitting expert affidavits explaining the significance of this new evidence. The Hospital, however, did not object to the timeliness of the affidavits. Consequently, the trial court granted Kabran’s motion for a new trial. The Hospital appealed, arguing that because the affidavits were not timely filed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rely on them in hearing the motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Hospital did not object to the timeliness of the affidavits in the trial court, it may not raise this issue for the first time on appeal. View "Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC; Graceland Management Company, Inc.; Lafayette LTC, Inc.; and Yalobusha General Hospital and Nursing Home (collectively, Graceland) in a case brought by Shirley Adams for injuries her mother allegedly sustained while in the defendants’ care. As the basis for granting summary judgment, the circuit court determined that Adams was judicially estopped from bringing her suit because Adams had failed to disclose the suit in her prior bankruptcy proceedings. Adams appealed, and the Court of Appeals, in a plurality opinion, reversed the circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to proceed with a trial on the merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and held that the Court of Appeals misapplied the applicable standard of review and the law of judicial estoppel in the instant case. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Adams v. Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC" on Justia Law

Parker and her sister, Schiavon, checked into adjoining rooms at the Four Seasons. In each, a sliding glass door separated the shower area from the vanity area. As Parker exited the shower area by opening that door, it exploded, raining shards of glass onto her naked body and causing her injuries. Schiavon summoned help. Gartin, a hotel engineer, arrived, immediately looked at the overhead track and said: “Looks like the stopper moved again!” He explained that a “bunch” of newly installed glass doors had exploded because the track stoppers were not working properly, allowing the door-handles to crash into walls and cause the glass to explode. Gartin said the room was on a “do not sell” list; “You might want to check yours.” Schiavon checked and determined that the door in her room had the same defect. Parker uncovered evidence suggesting that the door in her room had previously shattered and had been replaced. An email between third party contractors revealed that several rooms had similar issues. The hotel conceded negligence. The court blocked Parker from raising the issue of punitive damages before the jury, finding her evidence insufficient as a matter of law. Parker recovered $20,000 in compensatory damages, reduced to $12,000 after set-off. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Four Seasons may have thought it repaired the problem. Parker’s room could have been pulled from service for another reason. These are issues for a fact-finder. Parker has the right to present her punitive damages claim to the jury. View "Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd." on Justia Law

This matter arose from Whitney Engler's use of a medical device, the "Polar Care 500," manufactured by Breg, Inc. (Breg) and prescribed by David Chao, M.D. Engler suffered injuries as a result of her use of the Polar Care 500, and she brought various tort claims against Chao, his medical group Oasis MSO, Inc. (Oasis), and Breg, among others. At trial, the jury considered Engler's claims for medical malpractice, design defect (under theories of negligence and strict liability), failure to warn (also under theories of negligence and strict liability), breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional concealment. With a few exceptions, the jury generally found in favor of Engler, and against the defendants, on these claims. The jury awarded $68,270.38 in economic compensatory damages and $5,127,950 in noneconomic compensatory damages to Engler. It allocated responsibility for Engler's harm: 50 percent to Chao, 10 percent to Oasis, and 40 percent to Breg. The jury made findings of malice, oppression, or fraud as to each defendant on at least one claim. In the punitive damages phase of trial, the jury awarded $500,000 against Chao and $7 million against Breg. The jury declined to award any punitive damages against Oasis. Breg, Chao, Oasis, and Virginia Bigler-Engler, as administrator of Engler's estate, appealed, raising numerous challenges to the judgment. In the published portions of its opinion, the Court of Appeal considered: (1) whether Engler's counsel committed prejudicial misconduct during trial; (2) whether the jury's awards of noneconomic compensatory damages and punitive damages were excessive; (3) whether the evidence supported the jury's verdict against Breg for intentional concealment in the absence of a transactional relationship between Breg and Engler (or her parents); (4) whether Oasis fell within the medical provider exception to the doctrine of strict products liability; (5) whether Breg was entitled to an instruction on the learned intermediary doctrine; (6) whether the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) and Proposition 51 applied to the jury's verdict; and (7) whether Engler's pretrial settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 complied with the statute. In the unpublished portions of the opinion, the Court considered additional challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's jury instructions, and the trial court's evidentiary rulings. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in part, concluding the jury's verdict as to several claims was not supported by the evidence, including Engler's intentional concealment claim against Breg and her strict products liability claim against Oasis. In light of this reversal of Engler's intentional concealment claim against Breg, the jury's punitive damages award against Breg had to be reversed too. Furthermore, the Court concluded the jury's award of noneconomic compensatory damages and the jury's award of punitive damages as to Chao were indeed excessive. Those awards were reversed and remanded for a new trial unless Bigler-Engler accepted reductions in those awards to $1,300,000 and $150,000 respectively. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc." on Justia Law

Adam Hilyer appealed a circuit court order denying his request to set aside a default judgment entered against him in a suit brought by Betti Fortier, mother and next friend of minor M.M. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway on Kennedy Avenue. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. The circuit court entered its default judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Hilyer's Rule 55(c) motion to set aside the default judgment. The Court found questions of fact remained about service of the complaint, and miscommunications between insurers, adjusters investigators and lawyers, were not a result of Hilyer's "own culpable conduct." The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law

Petitioners VEL, LLC ("VEL"); Montgomery Drug Co., Inc. ("MDCI"); Robert Stafford; and Erica Greene sought mandamus relief. William Kilgore sought to fill his prescription for ropinirole, a drug used to treat the symptoms of Parkinson's disease, at the Adams Drugs pharmacy in Montgomery. Instead of filling Kilgore's prescription with ropinirole as prescribed, the employees working at the pharmacy filled Kilgore's prescription with risperidone. After having taken risperidone instead of ropinirole for several days, Kilgore began experiencing negative health consequences and sought medical assistance at the emergency room of Baptist Medical Center South. At the time Kilgore's prescription was improperly filled at the Adams Drugs pharmacy, VEL and MDCI each owned and operated at least one Adams Drugs pharmacy in Montgomery. Kilgore and Patricia Kilgore Kyser, as guardian and conservator of Kilgore (collectively, "plaintiffs"), filed the original complaint in the action against "VEL, LLC, d.b.a. Adams Drugs, and/or Adams Drugs Good Neighbor Pharmacy," and several fictitiously named defendants, seeking damages for Kilgore's injuries that plaintiffs alleged were caused by defendants' alleged negligence and wantonness. A month after the statute of limitations expired, VEL moved to dismiss, asserting that it "has no relation or connection with any of the claims stated against it in [the plaintiffs'] complaint." Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to list parties that were previously listed fictitiously. Several months after VEL's motion to dismiss, MDCI moved to dismiss, arguing the statute of limitations had expired, plaintiffs were suing the wrong entity, and that the amended complaint did not relate back to the original. VEL renewed its motion to dismiss, also arguing plaintiffs sued the wrong entity. The trial court ultimately denied the motions, and petitioners filed this mandamus action. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition insofar as they requested a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying MDCI's summary-judgment motion and to enter an order granting MDCI's summary-judgment motion. The Court denied insofar as they requested the circuit court vacate its order denying VEL's, Stafford's, and Greene's summary-judgment motions and to enter an order granting those motions. View "Ex parte VEL, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Michael Adams died after striking Susan Fallini’s cow while driving on a portion of highway designated as open range. Adams’ estate sued Fallini for negligence. The district court entered a final judgment against Fallini for $1,294,041. Thereafter, Fallini brought a motion pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b), contending that the district court should set aside the judgment because the Estate’s counsel committed a fraud upon the court. The district court granted the motion. Fallini then filed a motion for entry of final argument, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. 568.360 provided a complete defense to the Estate’s claims. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The Estate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this court had jurisdiction to consider challenges to the district court’s Rule 60(b) order in this appeal; (2) the district court did not err in addressing the merits of Fallini’s the Rule 60(b) motion; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting relief based on fraud upon the court. View "Estate of Adams v. Fallini" on Justia Law

Petitioner’s son was hit by a car while attempting to cross an intersection. Petitioner timely served notices of claim on the State, town, and county. Five months after the statutory period for serving a notice of claim had expired, Petitioner served a notice of claim on the School District, alleging that the School District’s sign at the corner of the intersection where Petitioner’s son was struck obstructed the view of pedestrians and drivers and created a dangerous and hazardous condition. Petitioner simultaneously filed an order to show cause for leave to serve a late notice of claim, arguing that he had a reasonable excuse for the late notice. Supreme Court determined that Petitioner should not be permitted to serve the late notice of claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the lower courts abused their discretion as a matter of law when, in the absence of any record evidence to support such determination, the courts determined that the School District would be substantially prejudiced in its defense by a late notice of claim; and (2) the lower court improperly placed the burden of proving substantial prejudice solely on Petitioner. View "Newcomb v. Middle Country Central School District" on Justia Law