Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC and JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, claiming that he fell and was injured on property owned by Bakewell and leased by Chase. Plaintiff made no disclosure of expert witnesses, but in response to Bakewell’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted the declarations of two experts. Bakewell objected to the introduction of these declarations. The trial court sustained the objection because Plaintiff had failed to disclose the experts. The court then granted summary judgment for Bakewell. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the time of exchanging expert witness information has expired before a party moves for summary judgment, and a party objects to a declaration from an undisclosed expert, the admissibility of the expert’s opinion must be determined before the summary judgment motion is resolved. View "Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC" on Justia Law

Pertinent to this appeal, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) required insurers to offer insureds Underinsured Motorist coverage. Subsection 1731(c.1) of the MVFRL stated that any UIM coverage rejection form that does not “specifically comply” with Section 1731 of the MVFRL was void and that, if an insurer failed to produce a valid UIM coverage rejection form, then UIM coverage shall be equal to the policy’s bodily injury liability limits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether an insurer’s UIM coverage rejection form “specifically compl[ied]” with Section 1731 of the MVFRL if the insurer’s form was not a verbatim reproduction of the statutory rejection form found in Subsection 1731(c) of the MVFRL but, rather, differed from the statutory form in an inconsequential manner. The Court held that a UIM coverage rejection form specifically complies with Section 1731 of the MVFRL even if the form contains de minimis deviations from the statutory form. Because the Superior Court reached the proper result in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed that court’s judgment. View "Ford v. American States Ins." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Colorado had jurisdiction to award benefits for out-of-state work-related injuries and to impose a statutorily penalty on an employer under 8-41-204, C.R.S. (2016), when the employer was not a citizen of Colorado, and had no offices or operations in Colorado, only that the employer hired a Colorado citizen within the state. The Supreme Court held that on the facts presented here, Colorado lacked personal jurisdiction over the employer. View "Youngquist v. Miner" on Justia Law

One evening, plaintiff Deborah Peralta was drinking beer with a neighbor in a downtown Vancouver tavern. After an argument at the party, Peralta left on foot, became lost, and called her brother Jorge Peralta. She told him she had been drinking and asked for a ride home. After several unsuccessful efforts to meet her brother, Peralta mistook an approaching car for her brother's car. She stepped in front of the car, which was driven by a Washington State Patrol Sergeant who did not see Peralta in time to stop. The trooper struck her with his vehicle. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review was the trial court's ruling that plaintiff’s admission during pretrial discovery should have been given conclusive effect. Plaintiff admitted without qualification to being "under the influence of intoxicating liquors" at the time she was struck and injured. The Supreme Court held that her admission in this context was unambiguous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled she was bound by her admission. The jury instruction incorporating this ruling was also appropriate. As a result, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this point. The Supreme Court did not address the other evidentiary errors identified by the Court of Appeals, but instead remanded them for a determination of prejudice. View "Peralta v. Washington" on Justia Law

Richard and Jason Debrincat filed the original civil proceeding against a group of defendants. Stephen Fischer was later added as a party defendant, but the Debrincats subsequently dropped Fischer from the underlying proceeding. Fischer then brought an action against the Debrincats for malicious prosecution. The Debrincats moved for summary judgment, arguing that the litigation privilege afforded them immunity for their conduct of joining Fischer as a defendant in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment and entered a final judgment for the Debrincats. The Fourth District reversed, holding that th litigation privilege cannot be applied to bar the filing of a malicious prosecution claim. The Supreme Court approved the Fourth District’s decision, holding that the litigation privilege does not bar the filing of a claim for malicious prosecution that was based on adding a party defendant to a civil suit. View "Debrincat v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Sherri Hurst and Brenda Ray had been friends and neighbors for approximately 20 years before the incident that is the basis of the underlying action. One day in 2013, Ray telephoned Hurst and asked her to accompany her to a Wal-Mart. Ray was taking Nona Williams, her elderly aunt, to purchase Williams's medication and other merchandise that day, in preparation for Williams's move to Ohio. Williams testified that Ray asked Hurst to accompany them to the Wal-Mart because "both [Ray] and I had limited mobility, and [Ray] wanted [Hurst] to come along in case either of us needed help moving around." When they arrived at the Wal-Mart, Ray pulled her vehicle along the curb in front of the store to allow Williams to get out of the vehicle at the entrance. After Williams got out of the vehicle, Ray asked Hurst to stand with Williams on the curb while she parked the car. Hurst then began to get out of the vehicle, but, before she had completely exited the vehicle, Ray pulled the vehicle forward, causing Hurst to fall to the ground. Hurst sustained injuries when the back tire of the vehicle ran over her leg. Hurst sued Ray's estate ("the estate"), alleging negligence and seeking to recover damages for her injuries. The estate answered the complaint, raising as a defense, among other things, the Alabama Guest Statute. The estate moved for a summary judgment, arguing that Hurst's negligence claim was barred by the Guest Statute. The trial court entered an order granting the estate’s motion and denying Hurst’s cross-motion for a summary judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the Guest Statute did not apply in this matter, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hurst v. Sneed" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal of the Lincoln County Circuit court’s Order Denying the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the plaintiff’s overarching claim was framed in negligence, it factually sounded in intentional tort and was subsequently barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s Order Denying Summary Judgement and rendered a verdict in favor of the Defendant. View "Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. McCullough" on Justia Law

After a jury found CSX solely liable for injuries suffered by an employee of General Mills and awarded the employee damages, CSX filed this action for indemnification from General Mills. The district court dismissed on the ground that the contract between the parties barred indemnification for damages arising from CSX's sole negligence. In reaching this result, the district court applied a federal rule of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the relative fault of General Mills for the injury suffered by its employee. The court held, however, that federal common law adopts the state rule of collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court that exercised diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether collateral estoppel bars the complaint of CSX for indemnification. The court declined to decide the dispute regarding one element of collateral estoppel as defined by Georgia law: the earlier litigation must have been between identical parties. The court also declined to decide the alternative argument raised by CSX, whether the Sidetrack Agreement requires indemnification assuming CSX was solely at fault. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

Raven Addy-Cruz was killed in an automobile accident caused by Lyle Carman. Carman was employed by Lopez Trucking. Lopez Trucking had been hired by Werner Construction (Werner) to haul debris from a construction site. Addy-Cruz’s estate filed a wrongful death suit against Carman, the owner of Lopez Trucking (Lopez), and Werner. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Werner. The estate, Carman, and Lopez then entered a joint stipulation to dismiss without prejudice. Thereafter, the estate filed a notice of appeal from the order sustaining summary judgment in favor of Werner. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the estate’s voluntary dismissal of the cause of action without prejudice did not create a final order from which an appeal could be brought. View "Addy v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2013, a golf ball struck Miguel Leyva in the eye while he and his wife, Socorro Leyva, walked along a public path adjacent to the Bonita Golf Club. The Leyvas appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Crockett and Company, Inc., the owner and operator of the Club. The Leyvas contended Crockett was not entitled to summary judgment because the immunities designated in Government Code section 831.41 and Civil Code section 846 did not apply to their tort claims. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 831.4 barred their action, therefore affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "Leyva v. Crockett & Co." on Justia Law