Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Gary and Lori Steagald sued David, Cheryl, and Joshua Eason, alleging that the Easons failed to keep Joshua’s dog properly restrained, and asserting that the Easons, therefore, were liable for injuries that Lori sustained when the dog attacked her as she was visiting the Eason home.The Easons filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the Steagalds had no evidence that the Easons had reason to know the dog to be vicious or dangerous and, therefore, in need of restraint. The trial court granted that motion, the Steagalds appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that whether the Easons had knowledge that the dog had a propensity to bite another without provocation was a question for the jury, and summary judgment was the inappropriate resolution of this case. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Steagald v. Eason" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this wrongful-death action appealed a trial court judgment dismissing her complaint as untimely. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in: (1) denying her motion to amend the complaint to include a certificate of merit; (2) declining to treat the motion to amend as a petition to extend the statute of limitations; and (3) dismissing a claim for personal injuries incurred during the decedent’s lifetime. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McClellan v. Haddock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries while working for Union Pacific Railroad Company “as a spiker machine operator near Minidoka, Idaho.” Union Pacific’s decision to reduce “the spiker machine’s customary three-[person] crew to a two-[person] crew” placed greater physical demands on plaintiff, causing or contributing to the injuries he suffered. As a result of Union Pacific’s alleged negligent maintenance of the spiker machine and its decision to reduce the number of persons operating that machine, plaintiff suffered economic and noneconomic damages totaling approximately $615,000. The question this case presented was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted Oregon to exercise general jurisdiction over an interstate railroad for claims unrelated to the railroad’s activities in Oregon. The trial court ruled that it could exercise general jurisdiction over the railroad and denied the railroad’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence action for lack of personal jurisdiction. After the railroad petitioned for a writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court issued an alternative writ to the trial court, which adhered to its initial ruling. After review, the Supreme Court held that due process did not permit Oregon courts to exercise general jurisdiction over the railroad. View "Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working for BNSF Railway Company in Pasco, Washington, where she was repairing a locomotive engine. While she was reaching up to remove an engine part, the “portable stair supplied by [BNSF] rolled or kicked out from under [p]laintiff,” causing her to sustain substantial injuries. The question that this case presented was whether, by appointing a registered agent in Oregon, defendant (a foreign corporation) impliedly consented to have Oregon courts adjudicate any and all claims against it regardless of whether those claims have any connection to defendant’s activities in the state. Defendant moved to dismiss this action because the trial court lacked general jurisdiction over it. When the court denied the motion, defendant petitioned for an alternative writ of mandamus. The Oregon Supreme Court issued the writ, and held as a matter of state law, that the legislature did not intend that appointing a registered agent pursuant to ORS 60.731(1) would constitute consent to the jurisdiction of the Oregon courts. View "Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

After Enrique Myles’s death, his mother, Vivian Myles. filed this wrongful-death suit. Later, the parties became aware Enrique was survived by a minor child, LJW. Rather than dismissing the case for lack of standing, as requested by the defendant, the circuit judge allowed LJW to be substituted as the plaintiff. This interlocutory appeal of that decision followed, raising two related questions: (1) when a decedent is survived by his child, does the decedent’s mother have standing to file a wrongful-death action; and (2) if not, must the circuit judge dismiss the complaint, or may the circuit judge remedy the lack of standing by substituting the child as plaintiff? The Supreme Court found that Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute specifically granted the decedent’s mother standing to file the wrongful-death suit, even where a surviving child exists. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "TRK, LLC v. Myles" on Justia Law

In 1989, Marcus Moore slipped and fell in a grocery store owned by the defendant, Roberts Company, Inc. (“RCI”). Moore was three years old at the time, and he allegedly struck his head when he fell. After he reached the age of majority, Moore filed suit against RCI, claiming that RCI was negligent in allowing the floor to be slick. Moore also alleged that the fall had caused “marked and significant traumatic and permanent injuries to his brain,” leaving him with “permanent and profound deficits” in several areas. The jury returned a verdict in the defendant’s favor, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with that verdict. Moore filed a post-trial motion arguing, among other things, that one of the jurors was a convicted felon and therefore, statutorily disqualified. The trial judge agreed and granted Moore a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for an interlocutory appeal, and reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial. View "Roberts Company, Inc. v. Moore" on Justia Law

Russel Parker, an Indiana resident, brought a personal injury action against Norfolk Southern Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, alleging cumulative trauma sustained during his years of employment with Norfolk in Indiana. Norfolk moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction alleging that Missouri had no personal jurisdiction. The trial court overruled the motion without stating the grounds for its ruling. Norfolk sought a writ of prohibition directing the trial court to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which it subsequently made permanent, holding that Missouri did not have specific or general personal jurisdiction over Norfolk in the underlying personal injury action. View "State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Hon. Colleen Dolan" on Justia Law

Haniff was employed as a delivery truck driver when he was injured in a motor vehicle accident while unloading packages from his parked truck on the Stanford campus. According to Haniff, an automobile owned by Kim and parked by Hohman, a Stanford University employee, rolled down a hill and struck Haniff. As a result of the accident, Haniff sustained multiple fractures of his right femur and pelvis and underwent surgery. He has not returned to work and filed a personal injury complaint naming Hohman, Kim, and Stanford University as defendants. During the course of discovery, defendants successfully sought an order compelling Haniff to undergo a vocational rehabilitation examination by their vocational expert. Haniff challenged the order by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the court of appeal, arguing that a defense vocational rehabilitation examination is not one of the six methods of civil discovery expressly authorized by Code Civ. Proc., 2016.010. The court of appeal agreed and vacated the order. Whether a defense vocational rehabilitation examination should be an available discovery method as a matter of fundamental fairness where the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for wage loss and loss of earning capacity is better addressed to the Legislature. View "Haniff v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee J.B. was injured when certified registered nurse anesthetist (“CRNA”) Paul Serdula sexually assaulted her in a surgical suite in the dental practice of defendant-appellant Goldstein, Garber and Salama, LLC (GGS). Serdula was hired by GGS as an independent contractor through anesthesia staffing agency Certified Anesthesia Providers; in accordance with its standard practice, that agency conducted an independent credentialing process on Serdula prior to placing him in any medical or dental facilities. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that a third party’s sexual molestation of J.B. was an act foreseeable by GGS, whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of GGS’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence per se, and whether GGS waived any objection to the jury verdict’s apportionment of fault. Finding that appellate court misinterpreted OCGA 43-11-21.1, GGS’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. View "Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B." on Justia Law

Homeowners obtained loans from Bank for the construction of a new home and entered into an agreement with Contractor to complete the new home construction. When Homeowners defaulted on payments owed to Contractor and on both loans, the house was sold at foreclosure, and Homeowners filed for bankruptcy. Contractor filed a fourth amended complaint against Homeowners, who were later dismissed as parties, and Bank. Following a trial the court granted summary judgment for Bank on Contractor’s claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court reversed. After remand, Contractor filed a fifth amended complaint, which differed from the fourth amended complaint in several respects. The district court determined that the election of remedies doctrine and judicial estoppel required a dismissal of Contractor’s claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Contractor’s claims were consistently premised on the existence of a contract, and therefore, no election was required; and (2) Contractor’s claims were based on different facts and obligations, and therefore, both could be pursued. View "deNourie & Yost Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law