Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Laura Milus, on behalf of herself and her minor son, D.L.J., filed a wrongful death action against Sun Valley Company after her husband died from colliding with snowmaking equipment while skiing at Sun Valley Ski Resort. Milus claimed that Sun Valley breached its duties under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) and (6) by not properly marking the equipment and failing to post a notice about snowmaking operations.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley, concluding that the company met its duty under section 6-1103(2) by placing yellow padding on the equipment and had no duty under section 6-1103(6) because the equipment was not actively discharging snow. The court did not address Sun Valley's argument that Milus' claims were barred by section 6-1106, which states that skiers assume the risk of injury from plainly visible or marked snowmaking equipment.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that ski area operators are held to an ordinarily prudent person standard of care when performing duties under the Ski Area Liability Act. The court found that Milus failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Sun Valley met this standard with the yellow padding. However, the court also held that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether Sun Valley posted the required notice under section 6-1103(6).Despite this, the court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Milus' claims were barred by section 6-1106 because Mr. Milus assumed the risk of injury from the plainly marked snowmaking equipment. The court denied Sun Valley's request for attorney fees on appeal, as both parties prevailed on some arguments. View "Milus v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kathleen Keaten and her daughter Delaney Keaten, lived in a Section 8 housing complex managed by the defendants, Terra Management Group, LLC, and Littleton Main Street LLC. They complained about physical ailments due to suspected methamphetamine fumes from the apartment below. The defendants evicted the tenant in the lower unit but failed to preserve evidence from the apartment. The Keatens later filed a lawsuit under the Colorado Premises Liability Act, alleging permanent injuries from the fumes.The Arapahoe County District Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Keatens, awarding significant damages. The court found that the chemical fumes from the lower unit caused the Keatens' injuries, relying on expert testimony and meth residue levels. The court also drew an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to preserve evidence from the lower unit.The defendants appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants should have known about their potential liability and upheld the adverse inference sanction. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for certiorari review.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a duty to preserve evidence arises when a party knows or should know that litigation is pending or reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that any error in the trial court's adverse inference sanction was harmless because the causation finding was based on independent evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Terra Mgmt. Grp. v. Keaten" on Justia Law

Bettie Leverette was shopping at a Walmart store in Conyers, Georgia, when two Walmart employees moving a 2,000-pound box on a pallet jack backed into her. Leverette initially reported no significant injury but later went to the hospital with head pain, blurred vision, and nausea. She was diagnosed with a mild traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome. Leverette sued Walmart, claiming her symptoms were caused by the employees' negligence. At trial, Leverette's family and expert witnesses testified about her injuries and the projected costs of her future care, estimated between $2 million and $3.5 million. Walmart argued that Leverette's symptoms were due to pre-existing conditions and presented expert testimony to support this.The trial court gave a jury instruction on nominal damages at Walmart's request. Walmart suggested in closing arguments that nominal damages could be as low as $10 or as high as $500 but should not be $3 million. Leverette's counsel argued for over $5 million in damages. The jury awarded Leverette $1 million in nominal damages, leaving other damage categories blank. Walmart moved for a new trial, arguing the award was excessive, but the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on precedent that nominal damages have no maximum limit.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine if the $1 million award exceeded the limits on nominal damages under Georgia law. The court concluded that nominal damages, as adopted from English common law, are intended to be a trivial sum, important for the fact of the award but not meaningful in amount. The court overruled the Court of Appeals' precedent allowing large nominal damages and vacated the judgment. The case was remanded for the lower courts to resolve case-specific issues, including whether the error was invited by Walmart and the appropriate remedy. View "WALMART STORES EAST, LP v. LEVERETTE" on Justia Law

Robert Carbone, a Connecticut resident, sued two Swiss organizations and several individuals from California, Illinois, and Switzerland for defamation and other tortious conduct. Carbone, a member of the two Swiss organizations, claimed that the defendants used websites to publish defamatory statements about him and facilitate his removal from the organizations. He filed the lawsuit in Ohio, arguing that the defamatory statements passed through servers located in Ohio, which hosted the organizations' websites.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Carbone's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Carbone failed to establish that the defendants had sufficient contacts with Ohio to justify the court's jurisdiction over them. The defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as the servers' location in Ohio was chosen by third parties, not the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as their only connection to the state was the location of the servers, which was a decision made by third parties. The court also found that Carbone's claims did not arise from the defendants' activities in Ohio, as the allegedly defamatory statements were not directed at Ohio or its residents. Therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Ohio would not comply with the Due Process Clause. View "Carbone v. Kaal" on Justia Law

Carl and Roberta Culp filed a lawsuit alleging federal and state law claims against various defendants, including Fort Wayne and Allen County police officers. The claims included excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, criminal mischief, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The incident in question occurred on August 20, 2018, when Carl Culp, a double amputee, expressed suicidal intentions during a psychiatric appointment, leading to police intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, leaving only Carl Culp’s § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims against Officers Woods and Schulien for trial. A jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims except for Roberta Culp’s state law battery claim against Officer Woods, awarding her nominal damages of $1. The Culps appealed the summary judgment decision, and Woods and Schulien cross-appealed the denial of costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants, as the defendants’ brief complied with the local rules. The court also found that the Culps failed to present evidence of discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, without deciding, that these laws applied to law enforcement actions but concluded that the evidence did not support the Culps' claims.Regarding the cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to deny costs to both parties, recognizing the mixed outcome of the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Culp v. Caudill" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action brought by the Estate of Jared Shaffer, through Daniel Shaffer as administrator, against Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc. Jared Shaffer, a developmentally disabled adult, died on April 18, 2017, from a sudden pulmonary embolism caused by metastatic testicular cancer. The estate claimed that the defendant, responsible for overseeing Jared's Medicaid waiver funds and coordinating his care, was negligent in its duties, leading to Jared's death.Initially, the estate sued Heartbeet Lifesharing, Dr. Peter Sher, and the defendant in federal court, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a settlement with Dr. Sher’s medical practice. The estate then filed the wrongful-death action in the civil division against the defendant and Heartbeet. Before the trial, the estate settled with Heartbeet, leaving the case to be tried solely against the defendant. The defendant asserted a comparative negligence defense, implicating Daniel Shaffer, Jared's father and co-guardian, in Jared's death.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the estate appealed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. The estate argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence, providing misleading jury instructions, and sustaining objections to certain questions posed to the defendant’s corporate representative. The estate also contended that the jury deliberated too quickly and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported its claim of negligence.The Vermont Supreme Court found that while the trial court erred in conflating the identity of the plaintiff with Daniel Shaffer, the estate was not prejudiced because the jury never reached the question of comparative negligence, having found no negligence on the defendant's part. The court also upheld the trial court's evidentiary rulings and found no error in the jury's deliberation process. The jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Shaffer v. Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Cesar Posada sued Osvanis Lozada and his employer, TELS, Inc., after a collision between their tractor-trailers. Posada claimed negligence and negligence per se against Lozada and sought to hold TELS vicariously liable. Lozada's tire unexpectedly lost air, causing his truck to jackknife and block the highway, leading to Posada crashing into it. Lozada and TELS filed no-evidence motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.The trial court in El Paso County granted the no-evidence motions for summary judgment filed by Lozada and TELS, dismissing Posada's claims. Posada's motions for a new trial were denied. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a reasonable jury could find that Lozada breached his duty of care and that his actions were the proximate cause of the collision. The court of appeals also reversed the summary judgment in favor of TELS, as their liability was predicated on Lozada's liability.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Posada failed to produce summary-judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lozada breached his duty of care. The court noted that the evidence showed Lozada was driving under the speed limit when his tire rapidly lost air, causing the accident. There was no evidence Lozada acted negligently in response to the tire failure. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, dismissing Posada's claims against Lozada and TELS with prejudice. View "Lozada v. Posada" on Justia Law

Lauren Scottoline gave birth to J.S.S. at Christiana Care Hospital on July 28, 2015. After birth, J.S.S. could not breathe on his own, had low blood-oxygen levels, and suffered seizures. He was diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (HIE) and stayed in the newborn intensive care unit for three weeks. J.S.S. showed developmental delays and was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in 2018, confirmed in 2021. Lauren and Stephen Scottoline filed a lawsuit against Christiana Care Health System, Inc. and Women First, LLC, claiming negligence during J.S.S.’s birth caused his condition.The Superior Court of Delaware excluded the expert causation opinion of Dr. Daniel Adler, a pediatric neurologist, who claimed that HIE caused J.S.S.’s ASD. The court found Dr. Adler’s opinion unreliable and inadmissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702, as it lacked a scientific basis and did not employ a reliable methodology. The court granted the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude Dr. Adler’s testimony and subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants due to the lack of admissible causation testimony.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings. The court held that Dr. Adler’s causation opinion was inadmissible because it was not supported by scientific literature or a reliable differential etiology. The court also found that Dr. Adler’s third report did not materially differ from his previous reports and failed to provide a reliable basis for his causation opinion. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Adler’s testimony and denying an evidentiary hearing. The court also upheld the exclusion of Jody Masterson’s derivative opinion and found no error in the Superior Court’s handling of procedural motions. View "Scottoline v. Women First LLC" on Justia Law

Rose, while 24 weeks pregnant with M.W., was traveling by Greyhound bus from Washington State to Las Vegas. During the journey, she boarded a bus in Redding, California, where another passenger, Asaandi Coleman, opened fire, injuring Rose. Rose was treated in California and later transferred to Las Vegas, where she suffered complications leading to an emergency C-section for M.W. M.W. has required constant medical care since birth. M.W.'s father filed a negligence lawsuit against Greyhound, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, retaining, supervising, and equipping.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Greyhound, applying the Calder effects test, which is used for intentional torts. The court found that Greyhound did not purposefully direct its conduct toward Nevada, the cause of action did not arise from Greyhound's contacts with Nevada, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in applying the Calder effects test, as it only applies to intentional torts, and the claims against Greyhound were based on negligence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that even under the correct test for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Greyhound's contacts with Nevada were not sufficiently related to the negligence claims, which arose from events in California. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order dismissing the action. View "WHITLEY VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC." on Justia Law