Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (DCCMG) and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting five causes of action: negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, was exposed to HIV patient’s blood during a procedure due to Dr. Panguluri’s actions. The complaint did not allege that Glenn contracted HIV but claimed harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The Maniagos did not request oral argument and did not appear for the hearing. Subsequently, they voluntarily dismissed their entire action with prejudice to expedite an appeal of the adverse rulings.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs’ request without a final judicial determination of their claims. The court emphasized that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff is a ministerial act and not appealable. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent negligence by other doctors led to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and a survival claim.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center's motion to strike portions of Ng's complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct, even when based on the same incident of medical malpractice. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The court granted Ng's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its previous order and issue a new order denying the Medical Center's motion to strike. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Todd Weiland filed a personal injury lawsuit against Patrick Bumann for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident while Bumann was on duty as a South Dakota Highway Patrol trooper. The circuit court denied Weiland’s motion for partial summary judgment on negligence, contributory negligence, causation, and failure to mitigate damages, leading to a jury trial. The court also denied Bumann’s request to apply a recklessness standard instead of ordinary negligence. At trial, the court excluded the Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Department accident report, certain SDHP investigation materials, and representations by Bumann’s insurance adjuster. The jury found Bumann negligent but also found Weiland contributorily negligent, awarding Weiland $18,661.50 in damages.Weiland appealed, challenging the circuit court’s rulings. The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found Weiland’s challenge to the denial of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on negligence moot since the jury found Bumann negligent. The court upheld the denial of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on contributory negligence and failure to mitigate damages, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.The court also upheld the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no prejudice from the exclusion of the accident report and SDHP investigation materials, as the jury heard similar testimony. The exclusion of the insurance adjuster’s testimony was also upheld due to lack of an offer of proof. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the jury instruction on liability insurance and precluding a per diem argument for non-economic damages, as the evidence did not support such an argument.The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, making it unnecessary to address issues raised by Bumann’s notice of review. View "Weiland V. Bumann" on Justia Law

In 2019, the New York legislature passed the Child Victims Act (CVA), allowing previously time-barred tort claims based on sex offenses against children to be brought within a specific period. The CVA stipulated that such claims could be filed between August 14, 2019, and August 14, 2021. The plaintiff, alleging sexual misconduct by a teacher in 2009 and 2010, filed a negligence action against the defendant school district on April 26, 2019, before the CVA's filing window opened. The teacher had pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree in 2013.The defendant removed the case to federal court and asserted a statute of limitations defense. After extensive litigation, the defendant moved for summary judgment on September 3, 2021, arguing that the plaintiff's action was premature. The District Court granted the motion, noting that the plaintiff conceded the premature filing but argued for equitable estoppel, which the court rejected.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the CVA's six-month waiting period constituted a statute of limitations. The Second Circuit concluded that the CVA revived claims immediately upon its effective date and imposed a two-year filing window. However, it was unclear if the start date was a statute of limitations, leading the court to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals determined that the six-month waiting period is neither a statute of limitations nor a condition precedent. The court explained that statutes of limitations bar claims asserted too late, not too early, and the CVA's waiting period was intended to allow the court system to prepare for the influx of cases. The court's response to the certified question clarified that the waiting period does not create a statute of limitations or condition precedent, impacting the Second Circuit's handling of the appeal. View "Jones v Cattaraugus-Little Val. Cent. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling one of the boys away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train its teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a 15-day trial, during which the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times. The jury concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent and found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness on the grounds that the expert was not qualified to opine on classroom management and discipline. Additionally, the court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the plaintiff’s requested special jury instructions, as the standard instructions on negligence were deemed sufficient. The judgment and the order denying the plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and a new trial were affirmed. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

James Wilson III used earplugs manufactured by Hearos, LLC at a shooting range and subsequently suffered significant hearing loss. He filed a lawsuit against Hearos in state court, alleging various tort claims. Protective Industrial Products, Inc. (PIP), a non-party, removed the case to federal court. The district court noted the unusual removal by a non-party but proceeded as neither Wilson nor Hearos objected to the court's jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Wilson's claims as time-barred under Georgia law.The district court for the Southern District of Georgia found that Wilson filed his complaint three days before the statute of limitations expired but did not serve Hearos until 117 days after the limitations period ended. The court concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate the required diligence in serving Hearos, leading to the dismissal of his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that removal by a non-party is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and must be objected to within 30 days under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Since Wilson did not object within this period, he waived his right to challenge the removal. The court also affirmed that Georgia's service-and-diligence rule, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), applied to determine if Wilson's claims were time-barred. The court concluded that Wilson did not act with the required diligence to serve Hearos, affirming the district court's dismissal of his claims. View "Wilson v. Hearos, LLC" on Justia Law

An underage user of the Grindr application, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging that the app facilitated his sexual exploitation by adult men. Doe claimed that Grindr's design and operation allowed him to be matched with adults despite being a minor, leading to his rape by four men, three of whom were later convicted. Doe's lawsuit included state law claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a federal claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Doe's claims, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provided Grindr with immunity from liability for the state law claims. The court also found that Doe failed to state a plausible claim under the TVPRA, as he did not sufficiently allege that Grindr knowingly participated in or benefitted from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 barred Doe's state law claims because they implicated Grindr's role as a publisher of third-party content. The court also agreed that Doe failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim, as he did not allege that Grindr had actual knowledge of or actively participated in sex trafficking. Consequently, Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Doe's claims in their entirety. View "DOE V. GRINDR INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former foster child, filed a lawsuit under the Child Victims Act against Cayuga County and other unnamed defendants, alleging negligence. The plaintiff claimed that the County placed her in a foster home where she suffered severe sexual and physical abuse from her foster parent over several years. She argued that the County had a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting, retaining, and supervising her foster placement and breached this duty by failing to ensure her safety.The Supreme Court denied the County's motion to dismiss the complaint, recognizing that the plaintiff was asserting a common-law negligence claim rather than a statutory claim. The court distinguished this case from previous cases by noting that the plaintiff was in the County's custody. However, the Appellate Division reversed the decision, granting the County's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the County owed her a special duty under the three recognized categories of the special duty doctrine.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court of Appeals held that municipalities owe a duty of care to children placed in foster homes because they have assumed custody of those children. The court determined that the special duty doctrine did not apply in this case, as the County had a common-law duty to safeguard the plaintiff from foreseeable risks of harm due to its custodial relationship. The court emphasized that this duty arises from the government's assumption of custody, which limits the child's avenues for self-protection. The Court of Appeals concluded that the County's motion to dismiss should be denied, and the case should proceed. View "Weisbrod-Moore v Cayuga County" on Justia Law

Dr. Armin Oskouei, owner of two medical facilities, filed a defamation lawsuit against defense attorney Zachary Matthews. Oskouei alleged that Matthews made defamatory statements suggesting that Oskouei performed illegal surgeries. Matthews moved to strike the lawsuit under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, which allows for the dismissal of claims that infringe on free speech when there is no probability of the plaintiff prevailing. The trial court denied Matthews’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Oskouei could not establish a probability of prevailing because he had not shown that Matthews acted with actual malice.The trial court found that Matthews’s statements arose from protected activity but concluded that Oskouei had a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. The court noted that a reasonable jury could infer that Matthews did not have a good faith basis for his statements. The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Matthews’s statements were conditionally privileged and that Oskouei had not shown actual malice, as required to defeat the privilege.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to address whether a plaintiff must show actual malice to defeat a conditional privilege defense. The court concluded that the actual malice standard does not apply in such cases. Instead, under OCGA § 51-5-9, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used the privilege as a pretext for private malice, meaning the statement was made with ill will or intent to injure. The court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court also overruled several other cases that had incorrectly applied the actual malice standard to conditional privilege defenses under Georgia law. View "OSKOUEI v. MATTHEWS" on Justia Law

In 2019, Colby James Bray died while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC). His parents, Jeffrey and Michelle Bray, acting as personal representatives of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit in federal court one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired. They later voluntarily dismissed the federal case and refiled in state court nearly three years after Colby's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The Brays appealed, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-234 and 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations. The district court had concluded that section 5-234 did not toll the time for filing the state complaint and that section 1367(d) did not apply to IDJC due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the defendants.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's ruling that section 5-234 did not toll the statute of limitations. It also agreed that the claims against Meacham and the Individual Defendants were time-barred under section 1367(d) because the Brays did not file within 30 days after the federal court dismissed those claims. However, the court found that section 1367(d) did toll the time for filing the complaint against IDJC, but IDJC was immune from the claims under Idaho Code section 6-904B(5). The court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the respondents. View "Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections" on Justia Law