Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Kierra Dates filed a lawsuit against the City of Atlanta after her minor son was injured by a falling tree branch on City property. Dates sent an initial ante litem notice to the City within the required time frame, claiming a nonspecific amount of loss. Over a year later, she sent a supplemental notice claiming a loss of $1,000,000. The trial court dismissed her complaint for failing to comply with the municipal ante litem notice statute, and Dates appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Dates's first notice was not specific enough and that her second notice was untimely. The court also ruled that the tolling provision for actions brought by minors did not apply to municipal ante litem notices.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether the minor tolling provision applies to the municipal ante litem notice statute. The Court concluded that the tolling provision does not apply. The Court reasoned that the municipal ante litem notice statute is a condition precedent to bringing a lawsuit, not a statute of limitations, and therefore is not subject to tolling under the minor tolling provision. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that Dates's supplemental notice was untimely and not tolled by the minor tolling provision. View "DATES v. CITY OF ATLANTA" on Justia Law

In April 2022, six-year-old Emory Sayre was killed by her school bus in Parker County, Texas. The bus was manufactured by Blue Bird Body Company and sold by Rush Truck Centers of Texas to Brock Independent School District. Emory's parents, Sean and Tori Sayre, filed a lawsuit in Dallas County against Rush Truck and Blue Bird, asserting various claims including strict liability and negligence. They argued that venue was proper in Dallas County due to several activities related to the bus sale occurring there.The trial court denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue to Parker or Comal County. Rush Truck and Blue Bird filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Dallas County.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and focused on whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory appeal. The Court held that Section 15.003(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits interlocutory appeals only in cases where a plaintiff’s independent claim to venue is at issue. Since the Sayres asserted identical claims based on identical facts with identical venue grounds, the trial court did not need to determine whether each plaintiff independently established proper venue. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in taking jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. v. Sayre" on Justia Law

Julie Sprafka underwent knee replacement surgery in August 2016 using the ATTUNE knee replacement system designed by DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Four years later, she required revision surgery due to the debonding of the tibial baseplate. Sprafka filed a lawsuit against DePuy, claiming strict liability, negligent products liability, and breach of warranties. She later withdrew the warranty claims and proceeded with the products liability claims, alleging defective design and failure to warn.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case. DePuy moved to exclude the opinions of Sprafka’s design defect expert, Dr. Mari S. Truman, and for summary judgment. The district court granted DePuy’s motions, excluding Dr. Truman’s opinions for failing to meet the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert standards. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of DePuy, as Sprafka could not prove her design defect claim without expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Dr. Truman’s opinions were unreliable and speculative. The appellate court noted that Dr. Truman’s opinions were not based on independent research and lacked scientific scrutiny. The court also found that Sprafka did not preserve the argument that Dr. Kristoffer Breien’s expert opinion alone could support her design defect claim. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment, as Sprafka failed to provide sufficient expert testimony to support her claims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Sprafka v. Medical Device Bus. Services" on Justia Law

Karen Orr tripped on a soft drink display at a Dollar General store in Ackerman, Mississippi, and subsequently fell. After Orr's death, Sandie Keister, on behalf of Orr's estate, sued Dolgencorp for premises-liability negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. During discovery, Dolgencorp failed to produce security camera footage, data from the store’s daily planner, and safety-check data. The district court found that Dolgencorp lost or could not access this evidence. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and Keister also filed a motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment for Dolgencorp on all claims and denied Keister’s motions for summary judgment and sanctions. Keister appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Dolgencorp on her premises liability claim and in denying her motion for sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed the decision. The court held that Keister failed to provide evidence that Dolgencorp breached its duty to warn Orr of the dangerous condition. Keister's arguments, including the mode-of-operation theory and the duration of the dangerous condition, were insufficient to establish Dolgencorp's liability. The court also affirmed the denial of Keister’s motion for sanctions, finding no evidence that Dolgencorp intended to deprive her of the missing evidence and noting that the request for a jury instruction became moot after summary judgment was granted.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Keister v. Dolgencorp" on Justia Law

Fire-Dex, a manufacturer of personal protective equipment for firefighters, faced lawsuits from firefighters and their spouses alleging exposure to carcinogens from Fire-Dex's products. These lawsuits were consolidated in multidistrict litigation in South Carolina. Fire-Dex had general commercial liability insurance policies with Admiral Insurance Company and requested Admiral to defend and indemnify it against the lawsuits. Admiral refused, leading to a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Ohio, where the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially had diversity jurisdiction over Admiral's declaratory judgment action but chose to abstain from exercising it, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Subsequently, Fire-Dex filed a lawsuit in Ohio state court seeking a declaration that Admiral must defend and indemnify it, along with compensatory and punitive damages for breach of contract and bad faith. Admiral removed the case to federal court and filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment. Fire-Dex moved to remand the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to remand the declaratory claims and stay the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in abstaining from the declaratory claims under Thibodaux abstention, as the case did not involve unsettled questions of state law intimately involved with state sovereignty. The court also found that abstaining from the declaratory claims was an abuse of discretion because the declaratory and damages claims were closely intertwined, and no traditional abstention doctrine applied to the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fire-Dex, LLC v. Admiral Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Cockrum developed mesothelioma after working for Alcoa Inc. for several decades, where he was exposed to asbestos without adequate protective measures. Alcoa was aware of the dangers of asbestos and the potential for long-term health issues, but did not provide sufficient warnings or protections. Cockrum was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2022 and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against Howmet Aerospace, Inc., the corporate successor to Alcoa, claiming deliberate intent to injure by exposing him to asbestos.The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Howmet, concluding that Cockrum could not meet the deliberate injury exception under Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), which requires actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, citing the precedent set in Walston v. Boeing Co., which held that employees could not sue for latent diseases like mesothelioma because they could not meet the required level of certainty.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and overruled the Walston decision, recognizing it as incorrect and harmful. The court held that in cases of latent diseases, virtual certainty is sufficient to prove an employer’s actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur. This new standard does not alter the general requirement for immediate and visible injuries but is limited to latent disease cases. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine summary judgment under the virtual certainty standard. View "Cockrum v. C.H. Murphy/Clark-Ullman, Inc." on Justia Law

Giorgio Webster sued Dr. Jeffrey Osguthorpe and Summit Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, PC, for dental malpractice related to a biopsy. On December 8, 2020, a mandatory case evaluation resulted in an award for Webster, which he accepted, but the defendants rejected. The case proceeded to trial after multiple settlement conferences and facilitations. The jury awarded Webster $68,000 in past economic damages and $2.682 million in noneconomic damages, which was later adjusted to $565,000 due to statutory caps. Webster sought costs, statutory interest, and attorney fees as case-evaluation sanctions under the former MCR 2.403(O), which allowed such sanctions before its amendment on January 1, 2022.The Macomb Circuit Court granted Webster's request for sanctions, applying the former rule, and the parties agreed on reasonable attorney fees. The trial court entered an amended judgment reflecting these fees, statutory interest, and costs. The defendants appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the sanctions award, stating that the trial court should not have applied the former rule since the verdict was substantially higher than the case-evaluation award, causing no injustice to Webster.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court had the discretion to apply the former MCR 2.403(O) under MCR 1.102, which allows a court to apply former rules if applying the current rules would work an injustice. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as Webster had relied on the former rule when making strategic decisions, and all relevant actions occurred before the rule change. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed in part, and the trial court's award of case-evaluation sanctions was reinstated. View "Webster v. Osguthorpe" on Justia Law

An egg farm owned by Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. experienced a collapse of its poultry cage system in 2020, resulting in significant damage and the death of a farm worker. Rembrandt had contracted with Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA in 2006 to design and manufacture the cage system, which included a provision for Tecno to supervise its installation. The installation was completed in 2007. Rembrandt sued Tecno in 2021, alleging strict products liability, breach of implied warranties, and negligence. The district court allowed the negligence claim to proceed to trial, where a jury found that Tecno did not breach its duty to supervise the installation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa granted summary judgment for Tecno on the strict products liability and breach of implied warranties claims. At trial, the jury heard conflicting expert testimony regarding the cause of the collapse. Rembrandt's expert attributed the collapse to missing screws and misplaced bolts, while Tecno's experts blamed improper manure disposal by Rembrandt. The jury ultimately sided with Tecno, and the district court entered judgment in favor of Tecno.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Rembrandt argued that the district court erred in denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law and in excluding a screenshot of Tecno's website. The appellate court held that Rembrandt failed to preserve its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by not renewing its motion under Rule 50(b) after the jury verdict. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the website screenshot, as it was not relevant to the 2006 contract. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA" on Justia Law

John P. Middleton filed a defamation lawsuit against Roy Lee, The Hollywood Reporter LLC, and Gary Baum in the Southern District of Florida. The case stemmed from a professional and personal fallout between Middleton and Lee, which began and ended in California. Middleton had sued Lee in California for millions of dollars, and during the ongoing legal battle, Middleton relocated to Florida. In June 2020, The Hollywood Reporter published an article by Baum that detailed the feud and contained allegedly false statements about Middleton. Middleton claimed these statements were defamatory and filed the lawsuit in June 2022.The district court dismissed Middleton's action, applying California's one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims, which rendered the claims time-barred. The court concluded that Florida's borrowing statute and choice-of-law rules required the application of California law due to the significant relationship factors. The court also denied Middleton's motion to amend the complaint, deeming it futile as the proposed amendments did not alter the determination that California's statute of limitations applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that California had the most significant relationship to the defamation claims, considering factors such as the place where the injury and conduct causing the injury occurred, the domicile and residence of the parties, and where the relationship between the parties was centered. Consequently, California's one-year statute of limitations applied, and Middleton's claims were time-barred. The court upheld the dismissal of the action and the denial of the motion to amend the complaint. View "Middleton v. The Hollywood Reporter LLC" on Justia Law