Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Mann attacked his coworker, Baylay, a British citizen. The men, members of an Etihad Airways (incorporated in Abu Dhabi) flight crew, were at a Chicago hotel on a layover. Baylay sued Etihad, Mann, and the hotel’s corporate entities. The district court dismissed Baylay’s claims against Etihad, stating that they should be heard by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, and later dismissed Baylay’s remaining claims, reasoning that it had no original jurisdiction over the claims and declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act imposes liability on the foreign state “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. 1606. If the foreign state is not immune from suit, “plaintiffs may bring state law claims that they could have brought if the defendant were a private individual.” Baylay failed to show that his injuries would not be compensated under Illinois law. After Etihad’s dismissal, Baylay’s remaining claims included state-law claims against Mann and the hotel’s corporate entities. The corporate entities’ third-party contribution claims are entirely dependent on the resolution of the underlying state-law negligence claim against them. Baylay’s state-law claims substantially predominate; the district court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion in light of 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). View "Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stacy Gaasch, as personal representative for the Estate of Troy Gaasch, filed suit against St. Paul File and Marine Insurance Company, alleging the insurance company failed to timely provide reasonable and necessary medical treatment as ordered by the Workers' Compensation Court. Troy required multiple surgeries over several years due to his work-related injury. Troy was hospitalized due to his work-related injury. He allegedly became malnourished with accompanying weight loss and different physicians recommended a nutritional consult. A nurse case manager recommended monthly a nutritional consult. Troy died during his hospitalization approximately six months after the initial recommendation for a nutritional consult. Prior to his work-related injury, Troy underwent a gastric bypass surgery and allegedly suffered from a malabsorption syndrome secondary to this surgery. A disagreement arose between insurer and Troy concerning whether the insurer was required to pay for a nutritional consult. Insurer claimed Troy's nutritional problems were created prior to his work-related injury and his nutritional state in the hospital was not due to the work-related injury. The company moved for summary judgment which was granted. Plaintiff appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held: (1) Plaintiff's district court action alleging breach of contract also included a request for damages resulting from the death of the workers' compensation claimant; (2) the district court action was based upon alleged delay by a workers' compensation insurer in providing medical care as previously awarded by the Worker's Compensation Court; and (3) the district court action against the workers' compensation insurer was precluded by an exclusive remedy provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. “Plaintiff attempts to go around this procedure we classified as a ‘jurisdictional requirement’ . . .by characterizing the claim as a breach of contract and an action for damages resulting from an alleged wrongful death. The clear public policy expressed in the amended version of Art. 23 sec. 7 requires available workers' compensation remedies for any type of wrongful death claim to be pursued in the Workers' Compensation Court when required by the workers' compensation statutes.” View "Gaasch v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Spring Creek Coal Company (Spring Creek) petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a decision by the Department of Labor (DOL) awarding survivors’ benefits to Susan McLean under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. sections 901-944. The DOL concluded that Bradford McLean became disabled and died from his exposure to coal dust during the course of his employment at Spring Creek’s surface coal mine. The BLBA adopts several presumptions that apply for purposes of determining whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and whether the death of a miner was due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1)-(5). One of those presumptions, the fifteen-year presumption, is central to the outcome in this case. The ALJ, after concluding that Mr. McLean was entitled to the statutory/regulatory presumption of pneumoconiosis, in turn analyzed the medical evidence to determine whether Spring Creek had rebutted that presumption. The Tenth Circuit determined the ALJ’s findings and decision in this case were case-specific and confined to the specific flaws in the testimony of Spring Creek’s medical experts, thus concluding Spring Creek did not rebut the presumption. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the proffered medical opinions, and that there was no need to remand this case for further proceedings. Spring Creek’s petition for review was denied. View "Spring Creek Coal Company v. McLean" on Justia Law

International Creative Management Partners, LLC, d/b/a ICM Partners ("ICM"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying ICM's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Jordan Pardue, a minor, and Terrie Pardue, individually and as Jordan's mother and next friend (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Pardues"), on the basis that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over it and to issue an order granting its motion. ICM is a talent agency, and its clients perform at various venues across the globe. Jordan attended a concert by an ICM client, Cannibal Corpse, at Soul Kitchen Hall in Alabama. The Pardues state in their response to ICM's petition that, during the concert, "the crowd became violent and Jordan ... was thrown to the ground, suffering a spinal cord injury." The Pardues alleged in their complaint that it was, or should have been, foreseeable "that patrons attending Cannibal Corpse concerts exhibit violent behavior, including ... forming 'mosh pits' and/or dancing, running[,] jumping or otherwise physically contacting other patrons during the concert." The Pardues state that Jordan's total medical bills for treating the injuries Jordan incurred at the concert exceed $1.2 million. After review, the Supreme Court determined that other than arranging the booking of Cannibal Corpse, ICM had no involvement with the actual performance by Cannibal Corpse at Soul Kitchen Music Hall where Jordan incurred the injuries that were the basis of this action. For this reason alone it appears that ICM had no activity in Alabama giving rise to the episode-in-suit. “Moreover, assuming that ICM did engage in activity in Alabama, it does not appear that ICM's activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit.” The Court concluded the exercise of jurisdiction over ICM did not comport with fair play and substantial justice, and that ICM demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying ICM's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to enter an order dismissing ICM from the underlying action. View "Ex parte International Creative Management Partners, LLC, d/b/a ICM Partners." on Justia Law

International Creative Management Partners, LLC, d/b/a ICM Partners ("ICM"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying ICM's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Jordan Pardue, a minor, and Terrie Pardue, individually and as Jordan's mother and next friend (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Pardues"), on the basis that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over it and to issue an order granting its motion. ICM is a talent agency, and its clients perform at various venues across the globe. Jordan attended a concert by an ICM client, Cannibal Corpse, at Soul Kitchen Hall in Alabama. The Pardues state in their response to ICM's petition that, during the concert, "the crowd became violent and Jordan ... was thrown to the ground, suffering a spinal cord injury." The Pardues alleged in their complaint that it was, or should have been, foreseeable "that patrons attending Cannibal Corpse concerts exhibit violent behavior, including ... forming 'mosh pits' and/or dancing, running[,] jumping or otherwise physically contacting other patrons during the concert." The Pardues state that Jordan's total medical bills for treating the injuries Jordan incurred at the concert exceed $1.2 million. After review, the Supreme Court determined that other than arranging the booking of Cannibal Corpse, ICM had no involvement with the actual performance by Cannibal Corpse at Soul Kitchen Music Hall where Jordan incurred the injuries that were the basis of this action. For this reason alone it appears that ICM had no activity in Alabama giving rise to the episode-in-suit. “Moreover, assuming that ICM did engage in activity in Alabama, it does not appear that ICM's activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit.” The Court concluded the exercise of jurisdiction over ICM did not comport with fair play and substantial justice, and that ICM demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying ICM's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to enter an order dismissing ICM from the underlying action. View "Ex parte International Creative Management Partners, LLC, d/b/a ICM Partners." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the trial court's order awarding costs to plaintiffs in a wrongful death case under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the joint offer to settle both wrongful death claims was valid. The court held that the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs costs under section 998. In this case, defendants did not anticipate that either wrongful death claim, standing alone, would exceed the settlement offer. The court explained that this was precisely the situation in which an additional cost award under section 998 was appropriate and in furtherance of the goal of encouraging parties to accept reasonable settlement offers. View "Gonzalez v. Lew" on Justia Law

A woman checked into a hotel room in the early evening. She did not answer her husband’s calls for several hours. He suspected that she may have been injured. The husband called the hotel and a maintenance worker checked the room. The worker reported that no one was there. Hours later, the husband went to the hotel room and found his wife lying on the floor. She had suffered a brain aneurism. The couple sued the hotel and the maintenance worker’s employer (a staffing agency) for negligence. The agency filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no legal duty to the married couple. The trial court granted the motion and the couple appealed. Ordinarily, a person has no legal duty to come to the aid of another; however, if that person does, and does so without exercising reasonable care, the person coming to the aid of the other may be responsible for any damages caused under a “negligent undertaking” theory of liability. The Court of Appeal could not say as a matter of law that the maintenance worker owed no legal duty; there were triable issues of material fact such that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment and reverse. View "O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review centered on the proper statutory interpretation of the Recreational Property Act, OCGA 51-3-20 et seq. (RPA), which shields from potential liability landowners who “either directly or indirectly invite[] or permit[] without charge any person to use the[ir] property for recreational purposes.” Willie and Kristy Harris, along with their six-year-old daughter, Riley, attended a youth football game in 2012 at the Garden City Stadium, a facility owned and maintained by the City of Garden City. Willie and Kristy each paid the required $2 admission fee for spectators over the age of six. However, because Riley was only six years old, the Harrises were not required to pay an entrance fee for her, and Riley was admitted to the event free of charge. At one point during the game, while Riley was walking across the bleachers to return to her seat after visiting the concession stand, she slipped and fell between the bench seats and suffered serious injuries after falling to the ground nearly thirty feet below. The Harrises sued the City to recover for Riley’s injuries, and the City moved for summary judgment, relying on the immunity provided by the RPA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a landowner would not be shielded from potential liability by the RPA where that landowner charged a fee to some people who used the landowner’s property for recreational purposes, but did not charge any fee to the injured party who used the property for such purposes. The Court determined that because the plain language of the RPA shielded a landowner from potential liability under the circumstances presented here, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. View "Mayor & Alderman of Garden City v. Harris" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review centered on the proper statutory interpretation of the Recreational Property Act, OCGA 51-3-20 et seq. (RPA), which shields from potential liability landowners who “either directly or indirectly invite[] or permit[] without charge any person to use the[ir] property for recreational purposes.” Willie and Kristy Harris, along with their six-year-old daughter, Riley, attended a youth football game in 2012 at the Garden City Stadium, a facility owned and maintained by the City of Garden City. Willie and Kristy each paid the required $2 admission fee for spectators over the age of six. However, because Riley was only six years old, the Harrises were not required to pay an entrance fee for her, and Riley was admitted to the event free of charge. At one point during the game, while Riley was walking across the bleachers to return to her seat after visiting the concession stand, she slipped and fell between the bench seats and suffered serious injuries after falling to the ground nearly thirty feet below. The Harrises sued the City to recover for Riley’s injuries, and the City moved for summary judgment, relying on the immunity provided by the RPA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a landowner would not be shielded from potential liability by the RPA where that landowner charged a fee to some people who used the landowner’s property for recreational purposes, but did not charge any fee to the injured party who used the property for such purposes. The Court determined that because the plain language of the RPA shielded a landowner from potential liability under the circumstances presented here, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. View "Mayor & Alderman of Garden City v. Harris" on Justia Law

High school student Antoine Williams tragically died after engaging in horseplay with another student while his teacher was out of their classroom. Antoine’s parents, appellants Jena Barnett and Marc Williams filed a complaint against Appellee Phyllis Caldwell, the teacher. They alleged that Caldwell was liable in her individual capacity for Antoine’s wrongful death because she had been negligent in supervising his classroom. The trial court granted Caldwell’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that she was entitled to official immunity because her acts were the product of discretionary decisions concerning the supervision of students. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that student supervision was not unalterably discretionary in all respects, but here, because the school’s policy was not so definite as to render Caldwell’s actions ministerial, therefore, she was entitled to official immunity. View "Barnett v. Caldwell" on Justia Law