Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The parents of nine minor children, individually and as guardians of the children, appealed a district court judgment determining the statutory damage cap for tort claims against a political subdivision was constitutional. In January 2015, a collision occurred between a Larimore Public School District bus and a BNSF Railway train. At the time, there were thirteen School District students riding home from school on the bus. One child died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident and the other children suffered serious injuries. The accident resulted in the potential for multiple damage claims in excess of the School District's aggregate statutory cap on liability under the codification of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2) in effect at the time of the accident, which limited the liability of political subdivisions "to a total of two hundred fifty thousand dollars per person and five hundred thousand dollars for injury to three or more persons during any single occurrence regardless of the number of political subdivisions, or employees of such political subdivisions, which are involved in that occurrence." The School District and its government self-insurance pool, the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, brought this interpleader action and deposited five hundred thousand dollars with the district court to satisfy the damage cap for claims arising from the accident under the applicable language of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2). The parents and guardians for some of the children answered and counterclaimed, asserting the damage cap was unconstitutional. The parents argued the damage cap violated the open court, jury trial, equal protection, and special law provisions of the state constitution. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the damage cap did not violate those constitutional provisions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Larimore Public School District No. 44 v. Aamodt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Avondale and others in state court, alleging that defendants exposed their sister, Mary Jane Wilde, to asbestos and caused her to die of mesothelioma. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case back to state court after removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1442. The court held that, under controlling precedent, Avondale must show a causal connection between the federal officer’s direction and the conduct challenged by plaintiffs. Because Avondale has failed to make this showing of a causal nexus, the district court properly remanded the case back to state court. View "Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Avondale and others in state court, alleging that defendants exposed their sister, Mary Jane Wilde, to asbestos and caused her to die of mesothelioma. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case back to state court after removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1442. The court held that, under controlling precedent, Avondale must show a causal connection between the federal officer’s direction and the conduct challenged by plaintiffs. Because Avondale has failed to make this showing of a causal nexus, the district court properly remanded the case back to state court. View "Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc." on Justia Law

Larry Curry appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Gable Miller, Jr., and Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners") on the ground of failure to prosecute. In 2014, Curry was injured when the vehicle in which he was driving was struck from the rear by a vehicle being driven by Miller. Curry retained attorney Russell Johnson to represent him in the matter. Johnson, on Curry's behalf, filed a personal-injury action against Miller. Johnson’s claim against Auto Owners sought uninsured/underinsured-motorist benefits. In 2017, the trial court set the case for a bench trial. At some point Curry's relationship with Johnson began to deteriorate, and Curry terminated Johnson's employment. On April 3, 2017, the trial court granted Johnson's motion to withdraw. On the same day, Johnson filed with the trial court a lien for attorney fees and expenses. Johnson stated in the lien that, during his representation of Curry, Miller had made an offer to settle Curry's claims for $17,000; that Curry had accepted the offer to settle but had refused to sign the necessary releases; and that Johnson had filed the personal-injury action on Curry's behalf to prevent Curry's claims from being barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court entered an order stating that the status conference had been held on April 11, 2017; that defense counsel had attended the conference; that Curry failed to appear at the conference; and that Curry was to notify the court within 30 days of his intention either to proceed pro se or to retain counsel. The order further stated that failure to comply with the order could result in sanctions, including dismissal of the lawsuit. On the same day, the trial court rescheduled the bench trial. On May 19, 2017, Miller and Auto Owners moved to dismiss Curry's claims for failure to prosecute, asserting that Curry had not attended the April 11, 2017, status conference and had not complied with the trial court's subsequent orders. The trial court deferred ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss for one week to give Curry ample opportunity to respond. Curry failed to respond, and the trial court entered an order dismissing, with prejudice, Curry's lawsuit against the defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed this outcome, finding Curry simply offered the trial court no plausible explanation as to why, out of all the documents mailed to him at his address, he would have received only one of those documents: defense counsel's motion to dismiss the action for want of prosecution. The trial court had before it sufficient evidence to reject Curry's assertion that he did know that a lawsuit had been filed on his behalf. Accordingly, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in concluding that Curry's failure to prosecute his lawsuit was "willful" for purposes of Rule a 41(b) involuntary dismissal. View "Curry v. Miller" on Justia Law

Bettye Logan sustained a compensable leg injury while employed at Klaussner Furniture Corporation d/b/a Bruce Furniture Industries (“Klaussner”). An Administrative Judge (“AJ”), and the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”), found that Logan had suffered a sixty-percent loss of industrial use to her left lower extremity, which entitled her to 105 weeks of compensation set at $331.06 for her “scheduled-member” injury under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-17(c)(2). Logan appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Commission and the AJ had applied the incorrect part of Section 71-3-17 and that either subsection (a) or subsection (c)(25) of the statute, and not subsection (c)(2), applied. Klaussner and the American Casualty Company, the carrier, petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for review. The Court determined the Commission and the AJ properly awarded Logan permanent-partial disability benefits under Section 71-3-17(c)(2). Accordingly, it reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the holding of the AJ and Commission. View "Logan v. Klaussner Furniture Corp." on Justia Law

Teresa Vermilyea and her daughter, Julie Vermilyea Kasby, filed suit against Singing River Health System, Jennifer Thomas-Taylor, M.D.; Alva Britt, R.N.; Benjamin Hudson, M.D.; and Emergency Room Group, Ltd., pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act for the wrongful death of Randy Vermilyea, the husband of Teresa Vermilyea and father of Julie Vermilyea Kasby (collectively, “Vermilyea”). Vermilyea alleged that Randy had been admitted to the Singing River Hospital following a suicide attempt and that the defendants had breached the standard of care by failing to assess his mental condition properly and prematurely discharging him, proximately causing his suicide minutes after his discharge. Julie Vermilyea Kasby, who had witnessed her father’s suicide, asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted appellants' interlocutory appeal. Finding that Vermilyea did state viable legal claims based upon Randy Vermilyea’s death, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Singing River Health System v. Vermilyea" on Justia Law

Stacy Triplett filed three lawsuits against her former employer, Southern Hens, all stemming from an incident in which Triplett, while working, witnessed the gruesome death of a coworker. This incident caused Triplett mental anguish leading to an award of workers’ compensation benefits. After Triplett allegedly incurred some trouble in collecting her award of workers’ compensation benefits, she sued Southern Hens and Southern Hens’s carrier, Liberty Mutual. Triplett’s first lawsuit against Southern Hens, for failure to pay, ultimately was dismissed. Triplett then filed a second lawsuit against Southern Hens for failure to report; Triplett failed to serve Southern Hens within 120 days, as required under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). With no official court action on her second suit, and admittedly knowing that she could not show good cause for failure to serve in the second suit, Triplett filed a third suit against Southern Hens , like the second, was for failure to report. Aware of the second suit, the circuit court dismissed Triplett’s third suit as an impermissible duplicative suit. Triplett appealed. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Triplett v. Southern Hens, Inc." on Justia Law

Stacy Triplett filed three lawsuits against her former employer, Southern Hens, all stemming from an incident in which Triplett, while working, witnessed the gruesome death of a coworker. This incident caused Triplett mental anguish leading to an award of workers’ compensation benefits. After Triplett allegedly incurred some trouble in collecting her award of workers’ compensation benefits, she sued Southern Hens and Southern Hens’s carrier, Liberty Mutual. Triplett’s first lawsuit against Southern Hens, for failure to pay, ultimately was dismissed. Triplett then filed a second lawsuit against Southern Hens for failure to report; Triplett failed to serve Southern Hens within 120 days, as required under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). With no official court action on her second suit, and admittedly knowing that she could not show good cause for failure to serve in the second suit, Triplett filed a third suit against Southern Hens , like the second, was for failure to report. Aware of the second suit, the circuit court dismissed Triplett’s third suit as an impermissible duplicative suit. Triplett appealed. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Triplett v. Southern Hens, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Bryan Harrell was driving his pickup truck at more than 50 miles per hour when he rear-ended the 1999 Jeep in which four-year-old Remington Walden was a rear-seat passenger, with his aunt behind the wheel. The impact left Harrell and Remington’s aunt unhurt, but fractured Remington’s femur. The impact also caused the Jeep’s rear-mounted gas tank to rupture and catch fire. Remington burned to death trying to escape; he lived for up to a minute as he burned, and witnesses heard him screaming. Remington’s parents (“Appellees”) sued both Chrysler and Harrell for wrongful death. At trial, in March and April of 2015, Appellees challenged the Jeep’s vehicle design, arguing that Chrysler should not have used a rear-mounted fuel tank. When questioning Chrysler Chief Operating Officer Mark Chernoby at trial, Appellees’ counsel asked about the CEO’s salary, bonus, and benefits; Marchionne himself was never questioned about his income and benefits. The trial court overruled Chrysler’s repeated relevance and wealth-of-a-party objections to this line of questioning. Appellees’ counsel referenced Marchionne’s compensation testimony again in closing, arguing, “what [Chrysler’s counsel] said Remi’s life was worth, Marchionne made 43 times as much in one year.” The jury determined that Chrysler acted with a reckless or wanton disregard for human life and failed to warn of the hazard that killed Remington. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeal discussed admission of CEO compensation, holding “evidence of a witness’s relationship to a party is always admissible” and that the CEO’s compensation “made the existence of [the CEO’s] bias in favor of Chrysler more probable.” The Georgia Supreme Court held not that compensation evidence is always admissible to show the bias of an employee witness, or that it is never admissible, but that such evidence is subject to the Rule 403 analysis weighing the evidence’s unfair prejudice against its probative value. Because Chrysler did not raise a Rule 403 objection to the compensation evidence at issue in this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the question not under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard, but as a question of plain error. The Court concluded that under the particular circumstances of this case, it could not say that the prejudicial effect of the evidence so far outweighed its probative value that its admission was clear and obvious reversible error. Accordingly, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the rationale of the Court of Appeals, it ultimately affirmed its judgment. View "Chrysler Group, LLC v. Walden" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals in the preceding case, Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. Koch, 793 SE2d 564 (2016), properly articulated the legal standard for when a plaintiff’s duty to preserve evidence begins and properly applied that standard to the facts of this case. Like a defendant’s duty, a plaintiff’s duty to preserve relevant evidence in her control arises when that party actually anticipates or reasonably should anticipate litigation. Because the Court of Appeals appropriately identified and applied this standard, as did the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Koch" on Justia Law