Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves three plaintiffs, Parker Wideman, Riley Draper, and William and Jessica Douglass, who were severely burned while cleaning a plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The plant, owned by Innovative Fibers LLC and Stein Fibers Ltd, converted recycled plastics into polyester fibers. The plaintiffs were employees of a third-party contractor, Advanced Environmental Options, hired to clean the plant. During the cleaning process, a fire broke out, causing severe injuries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the plant owners for negligence under state common law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to federal court by the defendants. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs were "statutory employees" covered by South Carolina's Workers' Compensation Law. This law prohibits statutory employees from suing in tort in state courts and instead requires them to submit their claims to South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Commission. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that while state law can define the substantive rights asserted in federal diversity jurisdiction, it cannot strip federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over any category of claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the dispute satisfied all the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. View "Wideman v. Innovative Fibers LLC" on Justia Law

James Corley, as the representative of his deceased son's beneficiaries, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Wyoming Rents, LLC. His son had died in a work-related accident while operating a manlift rented from Wyoming Rents. Corley's counsel missed several deadlines to file an amended complaint, continued to pursue claims against another party that the district court had dismissed, and attempted to engage in discovery without a properly filed amended complaint. Consequently, the district court granted Wyoming Rents' motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. Corley appealed, arguing that a lesser sanction was more appropriate.The district court had previously dismissed Wyoming Machinery Company (WMC) from the case due to lack of claims against it and granted Corley leave to file a second amended complaint. However, Corley failed to meet the deadline for filing the revised complaint and included WMC in the complaint's caption despite the court's dismissal. The court granted Corley another chance to file an amended complaint, but he again missed the deadline. Wyoming Rents then filed a motion to dismiss the case based on Corley's failure to file any pleading by the court's deadline.The Supreme Court of Wyoming found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. The court noted that Corley's counsel demonstrated a complete lack of diligence throughout the case, which prejudiced Wyoming Rents by forcing it to incur substantial attorney’s fees and hindered the court's ability to move forward in resolving the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. View "Corley v. Wyoming Rents, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Timothy Morales, who was injured when he was hit by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal within the Weatherford Distribution Facility in Williston. Morales filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against Weatherford U.S., L.P., Junewal, and Junewal's employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc. He also claimed that Weatherford was negligent for failing to install proper lighting, road signs, or sidewalks near the road.The District Court of Williams County dismissed Morales's claims against Wilhoit with prejudice after the parties did not oppose Wilhoit’s motion for summary judgment. Later, Weatherford moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Morales because he was aware of the obvious danger posed by vehicles on the roadway. The district court granted Weatherford’s motion, and Morales appealed.Meanwhile, Junewal notified the court that she and Morales had reached a settlement. However, no concluding documents were filed. The district court then entered an order for judgment under its order granting Weatherford summary judgment. Morales appealed again, but the Supreme Court of North Dakota dismissed his appeal because claims against Junewal remained pending in the district court.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the court concluded that the district court misapplied the law when it treated Morales’s request as a Rule 60(b) motion and held it “no longer has jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying Morales's request and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to enter a single final judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities within twenty days from the filing of the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S., L.P." on Justia Law

In June 2015, Jordan Morsette was driving on the wrong side of the road when his vehicle collided head-on with another vehicle driven by Shayna Monson. Monson suffered serious bodily injuries, while two passengers in her vehicle, Taylor Goven and Abby Renschler, died at the scene. Morsette admitted liability for the collision, and a jury trial was held to determine the amount of compensatory damages. The jury awarded the plaintiffs a total of $242 million in noneconomic compensatory damages and $895 million in punitive damages.Morsette appealed the verdict, and the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded the case, holding that the lower court erred in admitting evidence of Morsette’s intoxication when liability was admitted, and in allowing a claim for punitive damages. On remand, the district court held another jury trial, which resulted in a verdict awarding a total of $175 million in noneconomic damages. Morsette again appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs improperly referred to alcohol at the trial on remand, that the damages award was excessive, and that the jury improperly speculated as to the damages.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morsette a new trial based on the limited references to alcohol during the trial on remand. However, the court concluded that the district court did abuse its discretion by not providing an explanation of the evidence supporting the jury’s award of noneconomic damages, and by concluding the damages award was not excessive. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and the order denying Morsette’s motion for new trial, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Zander v. Morsette" on Justia Law

The case involves three plaintiffs, Xingjian Sun, Xing Zhao, and Ao Wang, who sued their professor, Gary Gang Xu, for various allegations. Sun and Zhao, former students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, accused Xu of sexual and emotional abuse. Wang, a professor at Wesleyan University, posted online that Xu had a history of sexually assaulting students. In response, Xu allegedly posted negative comments about Wang and sent a letter to his employer. Xu counterclaimed, asserting a defamation claim against Sun and claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all three plaintiffs.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, where a jury found in favor of Xu on all issues and awarded him damages against Sun and Wang. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding Xu’s intentional infliction of emotional distress counterclaims. They also contended that the district court erred in denying their motion for a new trial, based on the court’s decision to admit evidence that Sun had a relationship with another professor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment in favor of Xu on his counterclaim against Wang, finding that no reasonable jury could find Wang's conduct extreme and outrageous under Illinois law. However, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Xu on his counterclaim against Sun, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that Sun's conduct met the requirements for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. View "Sun v. Xu" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Beverly Ferraro, slipped and fell at a Burger King restaurant in Butler County, Pennsylvania, and filed a negligence lawsuit against the restaurant's operators. Ferraro filed her complaint within the two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. However, she encountered difficulties in serving the complaint to the defendants, Patterson-Erie Corporation D/B/A Burger King and Burger King Corporation, due to issues with the Sheriff's service and the COVID-19 pandemic. Ferraro eventually served the complaint through a private process server and later reinstated the complaint and served it through the Sheriff, but this occurred after the original statute of limitations period had elapsed.The defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations because Ferraro did not make a good faith effort to serve them in a timely manner. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the Superior Court affirmed this decision. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the lower courts' conclusions conflicted with previous court rulings on the issue of timely service of process.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the order of the Superior Court. The court held that Ferraro failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she made a good faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on the defendants. Therefore, the defendants' informal receipt of actual notice was irrelevant. The court emphasized that plaintiffs cannot opt out of the rules to give notice of the commencement of a lawsuit by informal means. If attempts at service of process are optional for giving such notice, then no plaintiff would be required to rely on the service of process rules to impart notice. View "Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie" on Justia Law

Nicholas and Julie Kuhar filed a product liability claim against Thompson Manufacturing, a Utah company, seeking compensation for injuries Nicholas sustained when his safety harness failed while he was cleaning rain gutters in New Jersey. This was not the first lawsuit the Kuhars had brought regarding this incident. They had previously sued Thompson and other defendants in New Jersey federal court, alleging that the harness was defective. That suit was unsuccessful, with Thompson being dismissed from the case due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. The Kuhars then refiled their claims against Thompson in Utah.In the New Jersey case, the Kuhars' expert witness was excluded, and the remaining defendants were granted summary judgment. Thompson then moved in the Utah case to preclude the Kuhars from litigating the issue of whether the harness was defective. The district court agreed with Thompson and dismissed the Kuhars' claims. However, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the issue litigated and decided in New Jersey was not identical to the issue Thompson sought to preclude in Utah.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals. It concluded that the elements of issue preclusion were satisfied. The court clarified that to determine the issue-preclusive effect of the New Jersey federal court’s judgment in this case, the substantive law of New Jersey applies. Under that law, the court concluded that the issue Thompson sought to preclude the Kuhars from litigating—whether the harness was defective—was actually litigated and decided on the merits in the New Jersey court’s summary judgment order. Therefore, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Kuhar v. Thompson Manufacturing" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a patient, Tommy Harris, who contracted bacterial sepsis due to repeated infections from his dialysis treatment at a clinic in Belleville, Illinois. Harris filed a malpractice lawsuit against the operators of the clinic and later included a claim against Durham Enterprises, Inc., the janitorial company responsible for cleaning the facility. The case primarily concerns Durham’s insurance coverage. Durham submitted the lawsuit to Ohio Security Insurance Company, its insurer, which denied coverage based on the insurance policy’s exclusion for injuries caused by fungi or bacteria. Harris and Durham then negotiated an agreement in which Durham promised not to mount a defense and Harris promised to seek recovery only from the insurer. The state trial judge granted a motion to sever Harris's claim against Durham and set it for a bench trial. The judge held a short, uncontested bench trial and entered judgment against Durham for more than $2 million.Ohio Security was not a party to the state court proceedings and the insurance policy was not in the record. However, the consent judgment includes findings on insurance issues, notably, that the insurer breached its duty to defend and is estopped from asserting any policy defenses. After the judgment became final, Harris filed an amended complaint purporting to add Ohio Security as a defendant. Ohio Security removed the action to federal court and sought a declaration of its coverage obligations. The district court held that the bacteria exclusion precludes coverage.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Harris and Durham jointly appealed, challenging the no-coverage ruling but also raising a belated challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The court found the jurisdictional argument meritless, as the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not block federal jurisdiction over claims by nonparties to state-court judgments. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that the policy’s bacteria exclusion precludes coverage for this loss. View "Mitchell v. Durham Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a fatal collision that occurred in May 2016 when Lyle Lima, who was legally blind, drove his truck into a horse-drawn hay trailer on a highway, resulting in the death of one passenger and injuries to others. In April 2015, a doctor at Dakota Eye Institute had declared Lima legally blind and instructed him not to drive. In April 2016, another doctor from the same institute, Dr. Briana Bohn, examined Lima and advised him not to drive at night and only minimally during the day, specifically avoiding highways. The plaintiffs, injured parties and their representatives, claimed that Dr. Bohn was liable for medical malpractice as Lima's eyesight was still below the minimum vision standards required to operate a vehicle in North Dakota.The plaintiffs initially filed a suit against the defendants, which was dismissed by the district court. However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded the decision. On remand, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case showing a breach of duty and that Dr. Bohn did not proximately cause Lima’s economic injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find Dr. Bohn proximately caused Lyle Lima’s injury.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Dr. Bohn had clearly instructed Lima not to drive on highways, and the accident had occurred on a highway. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to present competent admissible evidence to raise an issue of fact, and thus, the district court had correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Cichos v. Dakota Eye Institute, P.C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between neighbors in a six-unit condominium building. Robert Dubac, the plaintiff, and Sandra Itkoff and Jonathan Diamond, the defendants, were owners of units in the same building. The defendants made several statements about Dubac, accusing him of various wrongdoings, including discrimination, self-dealing, acting in bad faith, racism, and harassment of their daughter. These statements were made through emails and oral communications to other residents of the building, the homeowners association, and an insurance carrier.The case was initially heard in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Dubac sued Itkoff and Diamond for defamation, infliction of emotional distress, interference with economic advantage, and civil harassment. In response, the defendants filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, arguing that their statements were made in connection with a public issue. The trial court denied most of the motion, ruling that the majority of the statements did not meet the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, which required a showing that the statements were connected to a public issue.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight. The defendants appealed the trial court's refusal to strike the majority of Dubac's suit. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the dispute did not involve a public issue or an issue of public interest. The court reasoned that the dispute was essentially a private feud between neighbors and did not contribute to public discussion of public issues. The court also noted that the audience for the defendants' statements was small and confined to the building's residents and associated parties, further indicating that the matter was not of public interest. View "Dubac v. Itkoff" on Justia Law