Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Michael D. Ruble and Brenda K. Ruble, who filed a lawsuit against Rust-Oleum Corporation and other defendants. Michael Ruble alleged that he was injured due to exposure to defective, toxic chemicals at his workplace, which were manufactured by third parties. He filed a product-defect lawsuit against these manufacturers and a workers' compensation claim with his employer. The workers' compensation administrative process concluded that Ruble failed to prove he developed an injury as a result of his employment. The third-party manufacturers then moved to dismiss the product-defect lawsuit, arguing that Ruble was barred from litigating causation in court due to the workers' compensation decision. The Circuit Court of Cabell County granted the motion to dismiss.The Circuit Court of Cabell County ruled in favor of the third-party manufacturers, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court held that the workers' compensation decision precluded Ruble from litigating the causation issue in court. The court found that the workers' compensation process involved legal standards and procedural rules that were substantially different from those in a courtroom, and that process did not afford Ruble a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the third-party manufacturers' chemicals were a cause of his injury.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision. The court found that the workers' compensation administrative procedures were not an adequate substitute for juridical procedures in the circuit court. The court held that Ruble did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of causation in the prior workers' compensation administrative proceedings. The court concluded that it was error for the circuit court to have applied collateral estoppel to Ruble's claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ruble v. Rust-Oleum Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Continental Indemnity Company (Continental) and its attempt to collect a default judgment against BII, Inc. (BII) from Starr Indemnity & Liability Company (Starr), BII's insurer. Continental had paid a workers' compensation claim for an employee injured at a construction site where BII was a subcontractor. Continental then sought reimbursement from BII, which had failed to maintain its own workers' compensation insurance. When BII did not pay, Continental secured a default judgment against BII and sought to collect from Starr under Illinois garnishment procedures.The district court in the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the garnishment proceeding against Starr, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the dispute over the scope of coverage under the Starr-BII insurance policy was too distinct from the underlying suit between Continental and BII. Continental appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the garnishment proceeding introduced new factual and legal issues, making it essentially a new lawsuit. The court explained that while federal courts have ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to consider proceedings related to an underlying suit, the subject of those proceedings must still be sufficiently related to the facts and legal issues of the original action. In this case, the court found that the garnishment proceeding fell outside the scope of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. The court suggested that Continental could file a new civil action against Starr to litigate the dispute over the insurance policy's coverage. View "Continental Indemnity Company v. BII, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around an incident where an employee, Leonard Bernstein, shot his co-worker, Christopher Bayouth, at their workplace, Morgan Stanley's Oklahoma City branch. Bernstein, who was suffering from mental deficiencies, believed he was acting in self-defense due to his delusional state. After the shooting, Bayouth filed a lawsuit against Bernstein for willful and intentional acts, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bernstein passed away, and his estate was substituted as the defendant. The estate argued that Bayouth's exclusive remedy was through the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA), as he had received workers' compensation benefits.The District Court of Oklahoma County granted summary judgment in favor of Bernstein's estate, ruling that the exclusive remedy provision of the AWCA protected Bernstein regardless of whether he was acting within his course and scope of employment when the shooting occurred. The court reasoned that the focus was on whether the injured employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident, not the employee who caused the injury.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. The court held that for the exclusive remedy provision under the AWCA to apply, the employee who injures another employee must be acting within the course and scope of their employment when the incident occurs. The court found that the parties disputed whether Bernstein was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he shot Bayouth. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bayouth v. Dewberry" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the burden of proof in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The petitioners, Judith and Gary Shears, filed a lawsuit against Ethicon, Inc., and Johnson & Johnson, alleging injuries caused by Ethicon’s Tension-Free Vaginal Tape (TVT), a mesh sling used to treat stress urinary incontinence. The Shearses claimed that the TVT device was defectively designed. The case was part of a multidistrict litigation proceeding against Ethicon.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, where Ethicon argued that the plaintiffs must prove that an alternative, feasible design would have materially reduced the plaintiff’s injuries. The district court rejected this argument. However, after the publication of the West Virginia Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases (PJI) § 411, which stated that a plaintiff must prove that there was an alternative, feasible design that eliminated the risk that injured the plaintiff, the district court reconsidered its decision and agreed with Ethicon's argument. The case was then transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was asked to clarify certain elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The court held that PJI § 411 does not correctly specify a plaintiff’s burden of proof in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The court further held that a plaintiff asserting a strict liability claim for a design defect must prove that an alternative, feasible design was available to the manufacturer at the time the product in question was manufactured. Lastly, the court held that a plaintiff is required to prove that an alternative, feasible design existing at the time the subject product was made would have substantially reduced the risk of the specific injury suffered by the plaintiff. View "Shears v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, Albert Omstead contracted BPG Inspection, LLC to inspect a property he and his wife, Jessique Omstead, intended to purchase. The contract included a one-year limitation clause preventing Mr. Omstead from suing BPG Inspection or its employees more than one year after the inspection. After the inspection, the Omsteads purchased the property. Over a year later, Mr. Omstead died when a retaining wall on the property collapsed. Mrs. Omstead filed a wrongful death suit against BPG Inspection and one of its inspectors.The trial court found the one-year limitation unenforceable, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted review to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in approving the one-year limitation and whether the limitation is void as against public policy.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court found that the one-year limitation was enforceable and not void as against public policy. The court rejected Mrs. Omstead's arguments that the limitation only applied to contract claims and not claims involving bodily injury or wrongful death, that the limitation functioned as a “contractually-effectuated statute of repose,” and that the limitation impermissibly voided “professional standards of conduct.” The court concluded that the one-year limitation did not violate OCGA § 13-8-2 (b) and was not void as against public policy. View "OMSTEAD v. BPG INSPECTION, LLC" on Justia Law

In this toxic tort action, the plaintiffs claimed they were exposed to a carcinogen emitted from a plant operated by the defendants, Terumo BCT, Inc. and Terumo BCT Sterilization Services, Inc. To support their claim, the plaintiffs' counsel provided an expert with a spreadsheet detailing where each plaintiff lived and worked and when. The defendants demanded that the plaintiffs produce not only the spreadsheet but also any communications between the plaintiffs and their counsel that contained the information used to create the spreadsheet. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that such communications were privileged and beyond the scope of disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2). The district court granted the defendants' request and ordered the plaintiffs to produce the information.The plaintiffs sought relief under C.A.R. 21, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the district court erred in both respects. The court held that the attorney-client privilege does apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Jordan v. Terumo BCT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over who should pay for the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits of Justin Childers, who was severely injured in a car accident. Initially, Childers' PIP benefits were covered by American Fellowship Mutual Insurance Company, but the company was declared insolvent in 2013. The Michigan Property and Casualty Guaranty Association (MPCGA) then assumed responsibility for Childers' PIP benefits. The MPCGA, after an investigation, concluded that Progressive Marathon Insurance Company was next in line to provide Childers' PIP benefits. However, Progressive denied Childers' claim.The trial court granted summary disposition to Progressive, ruling that while the actions were not time-barred, Progressive was not within statutory priority for Childers' benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the one-year limitations period did not apply because the MPCGA is not generally subject to the no-fault act, and the MPCGA did not bring the action under the no-fault act. Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the MPCGA’s right to proceed against Progressive came from the guaranty act, which allows the MPCGA to claim reimbursement from another insurer in the chain of designated priority insurers.The Michigan Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals. It held that the one-year limitations period in MCL 500.3145(1) applies where either an insured or the MPCGA brings an action for PIP benefits against a lower priority no-fault insurer after the higher priority insurer becomes insolvent. The court concluded that both the action brought by Childers' conservator and the MPCGA's action were time-barred. The court reversed part of the Court of Appeals' opinion, vacated the remainder, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Childers v. Progressive Marathon Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a products-liability claim brought by Jennifer Parks, individually and as the guardian of Samuel Gama, against Ford Motor Company. Gama suffered serious injuries when his 2001 Ford Explorer Sport rolled over. Parks alleged that the Explorer's design made it unstable and prone to rollovers, and that the design of its roof and restraint system increased the risk of injury in a crash. Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing that Parks’ suit is foreclosed by the statute of repose in Section 16.012(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires that a products liability action be brought within 15 years of the sale of a product.The trial court's proceedings were protracted and winding, with the court initially granting Ford’s summary-judgment motion, then vacating that order and granting Parks’ motion for new trial, then denying Ford’s renewed summary-judgment motion, then denying Ford’s motion for reconsideration of that order, before finally granting another summary-judgment motion by Ford. The evidence that Ford sold the Explorer to a dealership more than 15 years before Parks filed suit was overwhelming.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Ford did not conclusively establish the 'date of the sale' from which section 16.012(b)’s claimed protection ran. The court reasoned that Ford was required to establish the specific date on which the dealership paid Ford for the Explorer in full and that Ford has not done so.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that the timing of a sale does not turn on the date of payment, and any inconsistency in Ford’s evidence regarding the timing of the dealership’s payment to Ford for the Explorer is immaterial and not a basis for denying or reversing summary judgment. The court concluded that Ford's evidence easily meets the test of proving that the sale must have occurred outside the statutory period, and thus, Ford is entitled to summary judgment. View "FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. PARKS" on Justia Law

The case involves a civil dispute arising from an automobile collision. The plaintiff, David Audish, and the defendant, David Macias, were both found negligent in the operation of their vehicles, which resulted in a collision. The jury found that each party's negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Audish. Audish suffered damages amounting to $65,699.50, including past medical expenses, past non-economic losses, and future medical expenses. The jury assigned each party 50 percent of the responsibility for these losses.The case was initially filed in the Superior Court of San Diego County. The jury returned a special verdict finding both Audish and Macias negligent in the operation of their vehicles. The jury found that Audish had incurred past medical expenses, past non-economic losses, and would have future medical expenses, but did not award any damages for future non-economic losses. Audish moved for a partial new trial on the issue of damages, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's findings that he had no past or future lost earnings. The trial court denied the motion for a partial new trial and entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California. Audish argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he would have Medicare medical insurance at the age of 65. He also contended that the jury returned an impermissible compromise verdict and erred by failing to award him damages for future non-economic losses. The appellate court rejected these claims and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The court found no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings and concluded that the award of zero future non-economic damages was proper. The court also found that Audish had not established an impermissible compromise verdict. View "Audish v. Macias" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action initiated by Torrey Kath against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms. After the parties filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice," the district court dismissed the case. Kath then filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Agraria Insurance Company, doing business as Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), seeking an order that FUMIC had a duty to indemnify Prochnow under an insurance policy. While FUMIC's motion in the declaratory judgment action was pending, Kath and Prochnow filed a "Joint Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Prejudice" in the original case, seeking an amended judgment.The district court had previously dismissed the case with prejudice. However, Kath and Prochnow filed a motion to vacate the dismissal, which the court granted. FUMIC then filed a motion to intervene, arguing that Kath and Prochnow were seeking to impair its rights. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on FUMIC's intervention motion because the case had been dismissed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with the district court's decision. The court noted that Kath and Prochnow's motion to vacate the dismissal re-invoked the district court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, FUMIC's intervention motion initiated a special proceeding, which also invoked the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider FUMIC's motion to intervene. The case was remanded for the district court to decide on FUMIC's motion to intervene and, if necessary, to conduct additional proceedings consistent with its disposition of the motion. View "Kath v. Prochnow" on Justia Law