Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In a class-action lawsuit against former manufacturers of white lead pigments, the plaintiffs sought to recover the costs of blood-lead screening, which their children underwent as required by the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act (410 ILCS 45/1). The complaint excluded any claim for physical injury. The class was certified in 2008 as the parents or guardians of children who, in 1995-2008, were between six months and six years old and lived in zip codes identified by the Illinois Department of Public Health as ‘high risk’ areas and had a blood test for lead toxicity. The circuit court granted the defendants summary judgment on a civil conspiracy count, noting that the named plaintiffs had not established any economic loss because third parties, Medicaid and private insurance, had paid for the tests. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that parents are liable for the expenses of their children and that the collateral source rule applied.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Plaintiffs who do not suffer any economic loss cannot maintain a tort action that is based on a claim that alleges solely an economic injury and no physical injury or property damage. The plaintiffs were required to establish actual economic loss as an essential element of their claim of intentional misrepresentation, underlying the civil conspiracy count. The Family Expense Act cannot be extended to create a liability or expense where one never arose, to allow a parent to sue where there was no underlying personal injury claim filed on behalf of the child. As a substantive rule of damages, the collateral source rule bars a defendant from reducing a plaintiff’s compensatory award by the amount the plaintiff received from the collateral source; it is unrelated to whether a plaintiff has an actionable injury. View "Lewis v. Lead Industries Association" on Justia Law

New Jersey Transit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) sought to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee, David Mercogliano, who sustained injuries in a work-related motor vehicle accident. It sued the individuals allegedly at fault in the accident, defendants Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that authorized employers and workers’ compensation carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees to assert subrogation claims. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether that subrogation action was barred by the Auto Insurance Cost Recovery Act (AICRA). The trial court granted defendants’ motion, ruling that New Jersey Transit could not assert a claim based on economic loss. It noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k) defined economic loss for purposes of AICRA to mean “uncompensated loss of income or property, or other uncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to, medical expenses.” In the trial court’s view, because New Jersey Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid benefits for all of Mercogliano’s medical expenses and lost income, he had no “uncompensated loss of income or property,” and thus sustained no economic loss for purposes of AICRA. The trial court relied on Continental Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 288 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 1996), and policy considerations in reaching its decision. The Appellate Division reversed that judgment, agreeing with New Jersey Transit that its subrogation action arose entirely from “economic loss comprised of medical expenses and wage loss, not noneconomic loss.” However, it rejected the trial court’s view that an employer’s or workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogation claim based on benefits paid for economic loss contravened AICRA’s legislative intent. Finding no error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Mariah Charles was born prematurely in October 2014 at Lafayette General Medical Center (LGMC) and hospitalized there until transferred to Women’s and Children’s Hospital of Lafayette (W&C). She was released in April 2015 release. Dr. Geeta Dalal, a pediatric cardiologist with clinical privileges at both hospitals, contributed to Mariah’s care during and after Mariah’s hospitalization. While Mariah remained at LGMC, Dr. Dalal ordered and interpreted eight echocardiograms that, according to the petition, revealed abnormal findings that could cause pulmonary artery hypertension. The petition alleged Dr. Dalal took no action other than ordering additional echocardiograms. After Mariah’s transfer to W&C, Dr. Dalal interpreted three more echocardiograms, again noted abnormalities, and allegedly failed to properly diagnose or treat Mariah. On May 8, Mariah was admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit at W&C and examined by another pediatric cardiologist who diagnosed pulmonary artery hypertension. Mariah was transferred by helicopter to Children’s Hospital of New Orleans where medical staff confirmed the diagnosis and performed a heart catheterization procedure. Mariah’s mother, Megan Thomas (Thomas), initiated Medical Review Panel proceedings with the Patient’s Compensation Fund against Dr. Dalal and the hospital defendants, alleging medical malpractice and seeking damages for their alleged failure to properly diagnose and treat Mariah. In addition to the Medical Review Panel proceedings, Thomas filed suit against the hospitals: The Regional Health System of Acadiana, LLC, Women’s & Children’s Hospital, Inc., HCA Holdings, Inc. W&C, and LGMC. The issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review centered on allegations of negligent credentialing against Dr. Dalal, and whether those allegations fell within the scope of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, or alternatively, sounded in general negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial court's judgment sustaining the hospital defendants' exceptions of prematurity. View "Thomas v. Regional Health System of Acadiana, LLC." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted summary judgment to plaintiff St. Charles Gaming Company d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino Lake Charles ("Grand Palais"), holding the casino was a :vessel" for the purposes of general maritime law. The decision contradicted Benoit v. St. Charles Gaming Company, LLC, 233 So. 3d 615, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 104 (2018), which held the Grand Palais was not a vessel. Plaintiff Don Caldwell worked for Grand Palais Riverboat, LLC, and was injured when the gangway attached to the riverboat malfunctioned and collapsed. Plaintiff petitioned for damages, alleging the Grand Palais was a vessel under general maritime law, and that he was a seaman under the Jones Act at the time of the accident. After a de novo review of the record, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the Grand Palais was a not vessel under general maritime law. Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff’s suit. View "Caldwell v. St. Charles Gaming Company" on Justia Law

Goros, age 92, filed suit alleging that Kindred Healthcare violated the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600) by failing to timely obtain medical treatment for her after she suffered a stroke while a patient at their nursing home. After Goros’s death about two years later, her daughter substituted in as successor in interest and added a claim for wrongful death. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, predicated on the exclusion of the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert on the issue of causation.The court of appeal affirmed. The plaintiff’s expert failed to provide any basis for his opinions and stated only that “his opinion is based on his experience and documented medical literature.” The plaintiff cites no evidence contradicting the court’s finding that her expert did not have the education or experience to render an opinion about the cause or treatment of Goros’s stroke, as required by Evidence Code section 720(a). Qualifications on a related subject matter are insufficient. View "Lowery v. Kindren Healthcare Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1998, al Qaeda operatives detonated truck bombs outside the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Victims sued the Republic of Sudan under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7)), which included a bar on punitive damages for suits under any of the sovereign immunity exceptions. In 2008, Congress amended the FSIA in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). NDAA section 1083(c)(2) creates a cause of action for acts of terror that provides for punitive damages; it gave effect to existing lawsuits that had been “adversely affected” by prior law “as if” they had been originally filed under the new section 1605A(c). Section 1083(c)(3) provided a time-limited opportunity for plaintiffs to file new actions “arising out of the same act or incident” as an earlier action and claim those benefits. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include section 1605A(c) claims. The district court awarded the plaintiffs approximately $10.2 billion, including roughly $4.3 billion in punitive damages. The D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to punitive damages because Congress had included no statement in NDAA section 1083 clearly authorizing punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Even assuming that Sudan may claim the benefit of the presumption of prospective effect, Congress was as clear as it could have been when it expressly authorized punitive damages under section 1605A(c) and explicitly made that new cause of action available to remedy certain past acts of terrorism. The court of appeals must also reconsider its decision concerning the availability of punitive damages for state law claims. View "Opati v. Republic of Sudan" on Justia Law

Deborah Shannon suffered from ongoing medical problems she claimed were the result of an automobile accident. The jury that considered the claims she asserted against the other driver rejected her claims and returned a verdict in favor of the other driver. The trial court denied Shannon's motion for a new trial and she appealed, contending the jury's verdict was not sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding adequate evidence to support the verdict, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shannon v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ relief challenging the district court's denial of his motion for a protective order, holding that the district court and its judge (collectively, Respondents) did not engage in the proper process courts must use when determining the scope of discovery under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) or use the framework provided by this Court for courts to apply when determining whether a protective order should be issued for good cause under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).Joyce Sekera allegedly slipped and fell on the Venetian Casino Resort's (Petitioner) marble flooring and was seriously injured. During discovery, Sekera requested that Petitioner produce incident reports relating to slip and falls on the marble flooring for three years preceding her injury. Petitioner provided sixty-four incident reports but redacted the personal information of the injured parties. When Sekera insisted on receiving the unreacted reports the Venetian moved for a protective order. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted writ relief, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion when it did not consider proportionality under section 26(b)(1) prior to allowing discovery; and (2) should have determined whether Petitioner demonstrated good cause for a protective order under section 26(c)(1). View "Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Melanie Arace, as personal representative and successor in interest for Grace R. Miller (Miller) and trustee of the Grace R. Miller Trust dated May 8, 2002, filed a complaint against Medico Investments, LLC (Medico), a residential care facility, and others. Plaintiff alleged that Medico, or its employee Elizabeth Colon (Colon), engaged in multiple acts of elder abuse of Miller. The jury found in favor of plaintiff, who was awarded damages, attorney fees, and costs. On appeal, Medico contended: (1) the trial court erred in denying its motion to continue the trial based on the unavailability of a material witness; (2) the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs; and (3) plaintiff was not entitled to economic damages under her claim for elder abuse (neglect) since the jury declined to award noneconomic damages. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment against Medico. View "Arace v. Medico Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

In June 2018, plaintiffs-respondents Suzanne Yang and Doc Yang Medical Corporation sued defendants-appellants Tenet Healthcare Inc. doing business as John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital (the hospital), its medical staff, and individual doctors, alleging defamation and nine other causes of action. Defendants filed a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) targeting only the defamation cause of action. Dr. Yang alleged that since March 2016, defendants conspired to drive her practice out of business in various ways, including by making defamatory statements. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion contended that the statements were protected activity because they were made in connection with the hospital’s peer review process, and because they were made in furtherance of the exercise of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Defendants also contended that Dr. Yang could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing because she consented to the peer review process that the statements were purportedly in connection with, and because the statements were privileged. Applying the California Supreme Court's recent opinion in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (2019), and concluded defendants’ conduct arose from protected activity because their allegedly defamatory statements were made in connection with an issue of public interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded Dr. Yang did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. The Court therefore reversed the trial court, which denied the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law