Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Clint Walters appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in favor of Montgomery Police Department ("MPD") patrol officer Jessica De'Andrea and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company ("Progressive"). Walters was driving his motorcycle when he came to a complete stop at a red light. De'Andrea was traveling in her MPD police vehicle when she came to a stop directly behind Walters's motorcycle at the intersection of the Eastern Boulevard and Monticello Drive. De'Andrea testified in her deposition that she had completed her patrol shift and that she was on her way to the MPD South Central Headquarters on the Eastern Boulevard to end her shift. When the light turned green, De'Andrea saw that other vehicles were moving. She wasn't sure if Walters' brake light was intact; the officer assumed Walters was moving and proceeded to go, hitting Walters from behind. Walters alleged he suffered multiple injuries as a result of the accident, and filed an action against De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Walters asserted claims of negligence and wantonness against De'Andrea in her individual capacity; he asserted claims for uninsured-motorist benefits against Progressive and State Farm. State Farm moved for summary judgment, attesting Walters did not have any insurance policies with State Farm in force at the time of the accident. De'Andrea moved for summary judgment, arguing she was entitled to state-agent immunity; Progressive and State Farm also moved for summary judgment, arguing that if De'Andrea was entitled to be dismissed, they too should be dismissed because Walters would not be "legally entitled to recover damages" from De'Andrea. The circuit court entered summary judgments in favor of De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm. The summary-judgment order did not detail the circuit court's reasons for its decision. Walters filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the circuit court alter, amend, or vacate its summary-judgment order. The postjudgment motion was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding De'Andrea failed to demonstrate that Walters's claims arose from a function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity. Therefore, the summary judgment in De'Andrea's favor was due to be reversed. Because Progressive's summary-judgment motion was predicated solely on the ground that Walters would not be "legally entitled to recover" uninsured-motorist benefits if De'Andrea was entitled to State-agent immunity, the summary judgment in its favor was also reversed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walters v. De'Andrea" on Justia Law

Christian Dailey, a minor, suffered a catastrophic personal injury at a day-care facility run by Resurrection of Life, Inc., d/b/a Perfect Place Christian Academy ("Resurrection of Life"). Christian's parents, Mark and Valerie Dailey, sued Resurrection of Life and its employee Latoya Mitchell Dawkins (hereinafter "the day-care defendants") on his behalf and, following a jury trial, obtained a sizable compensatory-damages award. The day-care defendants did not challenge the size of that award, but they did challenge the trial court’s refusal to grant them a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. Because the day-care defendants were not entitled to a new trial, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Resurrection of Life, Inc. v. Dailey" on Justia Law

Following an automobile accident in Lee County, Alabama between Dionne Drisker and Sean Michael Allen, Drisker sued Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc. ("Bonehead"), and FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. ("FedEx"), in Macon County, where Drisker resided. The defendants sought a writ of mandamus directing the Macon Circuit Court to transfer this case to the Lee Circuit Court under the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Because the defendants demonstrated that the connection between this case and Macon County was weak and that the connection between this case and Lee County was strong, the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying the defendants' motion to transfer the case to Lee County. The Alabama Supreme Court therefore directed the trial court to transfer this case to Lee County. View "Ex parte Sean Allen, One Bonehead Trucking, Inc., & FedEx Ground Package System, Inc." on Justia Law

In November 2007, Marten performed surgery on Doe’s face and neck. In June 2008, Doe sent Marten a letter stating she was considering suing him and demanded that he preserve her documents, files, and photos. In November, Doe’s attorney served Marten with a written demand for arbitration pursuant to a Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement. In January 2009 Marten’s counsel responded, identifying an arbitrator, without questioning the origin of the agreement or disputing that Marten had signed it. The applicable one-year statute of limitations ran in March 2009. (Code Civ. Proc.340.5) In May 2009, Merten subpoenaed and obtained the records of Dr. Daniel, whom Doe earlier consulted. Located within Daniel’s records was a signed arbitration agreement. Nearly three years later, Marten’s counsel first confronted Doe with the arbitration agreement and refused to continue with the arbitration.Doe sued for medical malpractice and medical battery. The court overruled dismissal motions, finding triable issues as to whether equitable tolling or equitable estoppel disallowed the statute of limitations defense. The court imposed sanctions after hearing evidence that Marten destroyed electronically stored information. After the close of evidence, the trial court dismissed the medical battery claim. On the malpractice claim, the jury awarded over $6.3 million in damages. The court then found the malpractice claim time-barred. The court of appeal reversed in part. The medical malpractice claim was not time-barred because Merten’s conduct actually and reasonably induced Doe to refrain from filing a timely action. View "Doe v. Marten" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Juan Morales-Hurtado filed a vehicular negligence claim against defendant Abel Reinoso. The Supreme Court shared the Appellate Division's view that the cumulative effect of multiple errors deprived plaintiff of a fair trial and of a verdict based on the merits of the parties’ claims, and that he was entitled to a new trial. The Court took the opportunity to comment on the Appellate Division’s reversal of the trial court’s decision to exclude the opinion of Dianne Simmons-Grab, a certified life care planner. Simmons-Grab was not a physician or other health care provider, and was in the Court's estimation, "clearly unqualified to opine on plaintiff’s prognosis or to identify any medication, surgery, therapy, or other care necessary to treat his injuries over his lifetime." The trial court found that Simmons-Grab’s opinion was based on unreliable sources of information and excluded her testimony. As the court observed, she relied on medical records and questionnaires that she “prepared in detail . . . and submitted to the doctors for their markings and then sign off.” Although the questionnaires were “purportedly filled out . . . by the medical providers,” the court noted that “[t]he responses . . . by the medical providers were not certified,” and there was no indication that each physician had offered an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty within his area of expertise. The Supreme Court held that in appropriate circumstances, an expert witness could rely on the opinion of another expert in a relevant field. "That principle, however, does not obviate the need to demonstrate that the treating physician on whom the life care expert relies actually holds the opinion attributed to him or her, which can be accomplished by means of a report by the treating physician, his or her trial testimony, or other competent evidence. . . . In the event that plaintiff seeks to present the expert testimony of Simmons-Grab on remand -- and defendant challenges the reliability of that opinion -- the trial court should conduct a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(c), and determine the question of admissibility in accordance with the standards prescribed by N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703." View "Morales-Hurtado v. Reinoso" on Justia Law

Shane Berryhill fainted and fell out of an 18-foot deer stand while hunting five days after undergoing major heart surgery. Plaintiffs Berryhill and his wife sued his surgeon, Dr. Dale Daly, and Savannah Cardiology (collectively “defendants”), claiming Daly’s negligent prescribing caused him to faint. The trial court instructed the jury on assumption of risk, and the jury returned a defense verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the instruction should not have been given. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and found there was at least slight evidence presented at trial to warrant the instruction: Berryhill knew he had just had major surgery for serious cardiac problems, and evidence (although contradicted) existed to show that he had been instructed not to engage in strenuous activity and not to lift more than ten pounds, bend, or stoop over for at least seven days after his procedure. Even though Berryhill was not informed of the specific risk of fainting, violating such explicit medical instructions immediately after major heart surgery "poses an obvious cardiovascular risk to which competent adults cannot blind themselves," and constituted the slight evidence needed here to warrant a jury instruction. Judgment was reversed. View "Daly v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

David Turner appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. In August 2017, Turner was on duty as a paramedic and was riding in the passenger seat of an ambulance while responding to an emergency call. While traversing an intersection, the ambulance collided with a vehicle being driven by Michael Norris. Turner suffered multiple injuries, including a broken leg. In November 2017, Turner sued Norris, asserting claims of negligence and "recklessness." Norris answered the complaint, denying that he had been negligent or reckless. Because the Alabama Supreme Court Held that State Farm was discharged from its obligation to pay Turner UIM benefits based on State Farm's payment of a "Lambert" advance and Turner's repudiation of his policy with State Farm, the Court pretermitted consideration of Turner's alternative argument regarding State Farm's failure to disclose the substance of its investigation of Turner's claim for UIM benefits, and expressed no opinion concerning that issue. The Court also expressed no opinion regarding any potential liability State Farm may or may not have to Turner in tort because Turner did not assert such a claim in this action. View "Turner v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Benjamin McCormick brought this action against the State of Oregon for injuries he sustained while recreating in Lake Billy Chinook. The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was entitled to recreational immunity under ORS 105.682. In response, plaintiff contended that the state did not “directly or indirectly permit” the public to use the lake for recreational purposes. Specifically, he contended that, under both the public trust doctrine and the public use doctrine, the public already had a right to use the lake for recreational purposes and, therefore, the State did not “permit” that use. The trial court granted the State summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision. For the purposes of the recreational immunity statute, the Supreme Court held an owner could “permit” public recreational use of its land, even if it could not completely prohibit that use. More specifically, an owner could “permit” public recreational use of its land if, among other alternatives, it made that use possible by creating access to and developing the land for that use. View "McCormick v. Oregon Parks & Recreation Dept." on Justia Law

In April 2017, Jerry Mohr, a Mobile County resident and an employee of CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), was injured in an on-the-job accident while working on a crew that was repairing a section of CSX railroad track near the Chef Menteur Bridge in Louisiana. Mohr sued CSX in the Mobile Circuit Court, asserting a negligence claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of CSX. Mohr appealed that judgment, arguing there were genuine issues of material fact that could only be resolved by a jury. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mohr v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Rita Edwards, as mother of Raven Edwards, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Penny Pearson on the ground of State-agent immunity. In 2014, Raven, an eight-year-old student at Airport Road Elementary School, attempted to cross the Deatsville Highway to board a school bus being driven by Pearson, an employee of the Elmore County Board of Education. As she did so, Raven was struck by an automobile, and she ultimately died as a result of her injuries. Edwards sued for wrongful death, alleging Pearson negligently had instructed and/or invited Raven to cross the highway to board the school bus. Pearson filed an answer denying the allegations in the complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses, including, among others, State-agent immunity. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court determined Pearson demonstrated she was entitled to State-agent immunity, and Edwards failed to demonstrate that an exception to that immunity applied. Accordingly, the trial court properly entered a summary judgment in Pearson's favor. View "Edwards v. Pearson" on Justia Law