Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Lynda Danhoff and her husband, Daniel Danhoff, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Daniel K. Fahim, M.D., and others, alleging that Fahim and Kenneth P. D’Andrea, D.O., had committed malpractice by perforating Lynda’s sigmoid colon during a surgical procedure. Following the procedure, Lynda experienced complications, including pain, fever, and elevated body temperature and blood pressure. A CT scan revealed that there was “free air and free material” outside Lynda’s colon, and Lynda had to have another surgical procedure to correct this issue. Lynda had four more surgeries to correct the perforation, which led to permanent medical conditions.The defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the standard of care or causation. The trial court found that the affidavit of merit submitted by plaintiffs’ expert was not sufficiently reliable to admit his testimony because the expert had failed to cite any published medical literature or other authority to support his opinion that defendants had breached the standard of care. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and submitted another affidavit from their expert. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the opinions of plaintiffs’ expert still were not supported by reliable principles and methods or by the relevant community of experts. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Michigan Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by inadequately assessing the reliability of a standard-of-care expert witness without appropriately analyzing the proposed testimony under MRE 702 or the reliability factors of MCL 600.2955. The court emphasized that neither MRE 702 nor MCL 600.2955 requires a trial court to exclude the testimony of a plaintiff’s expert on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to support their expert’s claims with published literature. The court concluded that the lower courts erred by focusing so strictly on plaintiffs’ inability to support their expert’s opinions with published literature such that it was inadmissible under MRE 702. The case was reversed and remanded. View "Danhoff v. Fahim" on Justia Law

The case involves a defamation claim brought by Bill Charles, a real estate professional and president of the homeowners' association of the Durham Farms community in Hendersonville, Tennessee, against Donna McQueen, a resident of the same community. McQueen had posted a critical review of Charles on Google, accusing him of using misleading tactics to deceive home buyers. Charles filed a defamation and false light claim against McQueen, who sought dismissal of the claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, arguing that Charles could not establish a prima facie case for his claims because he could not prove actual malice.The trial court agreed with McQueen and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, agreeing that Charles had to prove actual malice for his false light claim but holding that Charles was not a public figure and therefore did not need to prove actual malice for his defamation claim.The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that Charles is a limited-purpose public figure given his voluntary and prominent role in a controversy concerning changes to the Durham Farms development plan. The court further held that Charles failed to establish a prima facie case of actual malice. The court also rejected Charles’s argument that McQueen waived her request for appellate attorney’s fees by failing to list it as an issue in her Court of Appeals brief. The court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and affirmed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Charles v. McQueen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Gail M. McCormick, filed a personal injury lawsuit against Narragansett Improvement Company, Inc. (NICO) for injuries she sustained in a motorcycle accident on May 29, 2010. McCormick alleged that she lost control of her motorcycle due to unguarded manhole covers on a road in Cranston, Rhode Island, which NICO was contracted to repair. NICO failed to respond to the lawsuit, and a default judgment was entered against them on November 18, 2011. However, NICO later sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that they had not begun repairs on the road until after the accident occurred.The Superior Court granted NICO's motion to vacate the default judgment. The case proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in March 2022, which resulted in a verdict in favor of NICO. McCormick subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial justice.McCormick appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the Superior Court erred in vacating the default judgment and in denying her motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court had abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment without requiring NICO to provide evidence explaining their failure to respond to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for a hearing on the assessment of damages. View "McCormick v. Narragansett Improvement Company, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a medical negligence claim brought by John Armour, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Judith Armour, against David Bader, M.D., Neil Brandon, M.D., and South County Hospital Healthcare System d.b.a. South County Cardiology. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants negligently failed to provide adequate follow-up and treatment to Judith Armour following a stress test, which ultimately led to her death from a heart attack the next day. The stress test results were "markedly abnormal" and indicated potential significant coronary artery disease, but Mrs. Armour was sent home after the staff determined she was medically stable.The case was tried in the Washington County Superior Court. The jury heard testimony from various witnesses, including the nurses, the defendant-doctors, Mrs. Armour’s family, and expert testimony from both sides regarding the applicable standard of care and causation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all counts. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict was against the fair preponderance of the evidence and that the trial justice erred in several respects. The trial justice denied the motion, concluding that the overwhelming weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in refusing to issue a jury instruction based on a previous court decision, erred in permitting defendants’ standard-of-care expert to utilize the referring doctor’s records, and erred in limiting cross-examination of that expert regarding a particular study. The Supreme Court found that the trial justice's refusal to issue the requested jury instruction was prejudicial and constituted reversible error. The court also found that it was an error to allow the expert to use the referring physician’s records to support his opinions as defendants did not have access to this information when determining if Mrs. Armour was stable. Lastly, the court concluded it was an abuse of discretion to limit cross-examination on a point that went to the heart of the most important standard-of-care issue in the case. The judgment of the Superior Court was vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Armour v. Bader" on Justia Law

In June 2020, a fire broke out at a warehouse in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Richard Dolsen, a professional firefighter, responded to the scene. While navigating through the smoke-filled, dark warehouse, Dolsen fell through an unguarded opening above a basement stairwell, sustaining injuries to his neck and right arm. The warehouse was owned by Sweet Real Estate – City Center, LLC, and leased to VeoRide, Inc., which stored electric scooters and other equipment on the premises. Dolsen sued both companies, alleging negligence in failing to fix the wall opening and in failing to warn the fire department of the hazard.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of VeoRide and Sweet, holding that Dolsen's claims were barred under the firefighter's rule, which limits a firefighter's ability to recover damages for injuries sustained while responding to a fire. Dolsen appealed the ruling only as to VeoRide, and the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the firefighter's rule did not bar Dolsen's claim against VeoRide.The Indiana Supreme Court granted VeoRide's petition to transfer the case. The court clarified that the firefighter's rule and the first-responder's rule are two separate doctrines. The firefighter's rule applies only to firefighters and prescribes the duty owed for a premises-liability claim arising when a firefighter enters premises to extinguish a fire. The first-responder's rule limits the duty owed to all first responders during an emergency.In this case, the court held that the first-responder's rule did not bar Dolsen's claim as he did not allege that the negligence that caused his injuries also caused the fire. As for the firefighter's rule, the court found that disputed factual issues remained on whether VeoRide breached its duty to Dolsen. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for VeoRide and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dolsen v. Veoride, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice and hospital negligence claim filed by Jami Lynn Golden against Floyd Healthcare Management, Inc. Golden visited Floyd Emergency Care Center in July 2016, complaining of abdominal pain, fever, chills, and nausea. Despite a computer-generated sepsis alert, Golden was discharged with instructions to follow up in two to three days. Her condition worsened, and she was later admitted to Redmond Regional Medical Center Intensive Care Unit in septic shock. As a result, Golden suffered necrosis that required the amputation of parts of her fingers and toes.Floyd Healthcare Management moved to dismiss Golden's claim, arguing that the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose had expired. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the repose statute was tolled by the "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the repose statute was not tolled by the emergency order.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the emergency order did indeed toll the repose statute, and that there was no impediment in the federal or Georgia Constitutions for the statute of repose to be tolled. The court concluded that Golden's claims were not time-barred, and that the application of the emergency order to toll the repose statute did not violate Floyd Healthcare Management's due process rights. View "GOLDEN v. FLOYD HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC." on Justia Law

This case involves a vehicular collision that occurred in a construction zone on Interstate 10 in LaPlace, Louisiana. The plaintiff, Frank Cushenberry, was driving a commercial vehicle when he collided with a truck owned by Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC. The truck was partially in the right lane of the highway while backing up to move traffic cones. The collision resulted in significant injuries to Mr. Cushenberry, including a traumatic brain injury.The case was initially heard in a lower court, where the jury found Barber Brothers 100% at fault for the accident and awarded substantial damages to Mr. Cushenberry, his wife, and their two minor children. Barber Brothers appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault.The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the trial court did err in its jury instructions, but that this error was not reversible. The court also found that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault for the accident. The court determined that Barber Brothers was 80% at fault and Mr. Cushenberry was 20% at fault.The court also found that the jury abused its discretion in awarding general damages of $10,750,000.00 to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $2,500,000.00 to his spouse, Robin Cushenberry, and $1,500,000.00 to each of their minor children. The court reduced these awards to $5,000,000.00 in general damages to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $400,000.00 to Mrs. Cushenberry and $100,000.00 to each child.As amended, the trial court judgment was affirmed. View "BARBER BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, LLC VS. CAPITOL CITY PRODUCE COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

Joel Phillip McNinch, Jr., a dementia patient with other serious health issues, was admitted to Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC in June 2019. He was later admitted to Merit Health Rankin due to combative behaviors related to his dementia. He developed a decubitus ulcer and was admitted to St. Dominic Hospital, where he died the next day. His widow, Cheryl McNinch, requested her husband's medical records from Brandon Nursing and Merit Health soon after his death and received them in mid-December 2019. She filed a complaint in January 2022, alleging negligence, medical malpractice, gross negligence, and reckless disregard, claiming that substandard care had accelerated her husband's health deterioration and led to his death.The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Mrs. McNinch argued that the discovery rule operated to toll the statute of limitations until she received the medical records. The trial court converted the defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion without holding a hearing.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Supreme Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mrs. McNinch had knowledge of negligent conduct through personal observation or other means prior to or at the time of Mr. McNinch’s death. The court found that the discovery rule could operate to toll the statute of limitations when the medical records are necessary to discover the negligence. The court concluded that Mrs. McNinch exercised reasonable diligence in requesting the medical records promptly, and therefore, the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McNINCH v. BRANDON NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER" on Justia Law

The case involves Somsak Limprasert, a patient diagnosed with COVID-19 and acute hypoxic respiratory failure, who was transferred to PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas, LLC, for rehabilitation and treatment. While at PAM, Limprasert, who was bedridden and unable to stand without support, was assisted by PAM's workers to rise from his bed. However, they unexpectedly let go of him while he was in a standing position, causing him to fall and suffer injuries. Limprasert filed a complaint against PAM, asserting claims for negligence and abuse of the vulnerable, and alternatively, under Nevada’s medical malpractice statutes. However, he failed to attach a supporting declaration from a medical expert to his complaint.The district court found that Limprasert’s claims were of professional negligence, requiring a supporting declaration from a medical expert. As Limprasert filed his complaint without the supporting declaration and the erratum was not filed at the same time as the complaint, the district court granted PAM’s motion to dismiss. Limprasert appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, finding that the district court erred by dismissing Limprasert’s complaint. PAM petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for judicial review.The Supreme Court of Nevada determined that Limprasert’s claims were of professional negligence, requiring an affidavit under Nevada law. However, the court concluded that Limprasert’s expert declaration complied with the law, and the district court therefore erred by dismissing his complaint for noncompliance. The court reversed the dismissal of Limprasert’s professional negligence claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law