Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Following the death of their twenty-five-year-old son Cory Bisher (“Cory”), Brenton and Carla Bisher filed suit, without representation by counsel, against eleven defendants comprising both named individuals and corporate entities alleging their medical malpractice resulting in Cory’s death. Each parent brought their own wrongful death claims, and Carla filed a survival action on behalf of Cory’s estate (“Estate”). Following protracted proceedings, the trial court struck the amended complaint with prejudice because of defects in the Certificates of Merit mandated by Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 in professional liability suits against licensed professionals. On appeal, the Superior Court sua sponte determined that the Bishers committed two errors that jointly deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims: Carla’s unauthorized practice of law and the lack of verification of the complaint. The panel concluded that it too lacked jurisdiction and quashed the appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the unauthorized practice of law in the trial court, nor the lack of verification identified by the Superior Court, implicated subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus could not be raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court also disagreed with the panel’s alternative holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint because of the defects in the Certificates of Merit. Because the unauthorized practice of law issue will be ripe for further litigation on remand, the Supreme Court concluded that pleadings unlawfully filed by non-attorneys were not void ab initio. "Instead, after notice to the offending party and opportunity to cure, the pleadings are voidable in the discretion of the court in which the unauthorized practice of law took place." View "Estate of Bisher v. Lehigh Vly Health Net." on Justia Law

In late 2015, decedent Cody Albert (“Cody”) and his childhood friend, Zachary Ross (“Zachary”) struggled with substance abuse issues. At that time, Zachary’s mother, April Kravchenko, was suffering from multiple myeloma for which her doctors prescribed her several opiate pain medications, which she filled at a small, independent pharmacy in Scranton called Sheeley’s Drug Store. Kravchenko and her sister Debra Leggieri worried Zachary would try to pick up (and use) Kravchenko’s pain medication from Sheeley’s while Kravchenko was in the hospital. To prevent this, Leggieri called Sheeley’s and placed a restriction on who could pick up Kravchenko’s prescriptions. Zachary called Sheeley’s one day pretending to be his mother, and asked about refilling her OxyContin prescription. Donato Iannielli, owner-pharmacist Lori Hart’s father, and the prior owner of Sheeley’s, was the pharmacist on-duty at the time, and told “Kravchenko” that her OxyContin prescription could not be filled yet, but that she had a prescription for fentanyl patches ready to be picked up. “Kravchenko” told Iannielli that she wanted to send her son to pick up the patches, but stated that he did not have a driver’s license or other form of identification. Iannielli told the caller that this would not be a problem, since he personally knew and would recognize Zachary. Cody then drove Zachary to Sheeley’s, where Zachary picked up Kravchenko’s medication even though, according to Zachary, the pharmacy receipt explicitly stated, “[d]o not give to son.” On the drive back to Zachary’s house, Cody at some point consumed fentanyl from one of the patches, smoked marijuana, and then fell asleep on the once inside the house. Later that night, Zachary tried to wake Cody up, but he was unresponsive. Cody was later pronounced dead at a hospital. Zachary eventually pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and multiple drug offenses in connection with Cody’s overdose. The question in this appeal was whether claims brought against the pharmacy on behalf of the decedent who overdosed on illegally obtained prescription drugs was barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the in pari delicto doctrine, judgment was affirmed. View "Albert v. Sheeley's Drug Store, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Vincent Lorino worked as an equipment operator for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Employer”) when he slipped on the running board of the truck he used for work and fell backwards, injuring his lower back and left hip. Employer accepted liability for a low back sprain/tear and a left hip sprain/tear pursuant to two medical-only notices of compensation payable (“NCP”). In February 2017, Employer referred Appellant for an independent medical examination (“IME”). The IME examiner determined Appellant had fully recovered from his injuries, that any pain Appellant experienced was the result of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that Appellant required no further treatment. As a result, Employer filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s treatment. Appellant retained counsel for the hearing on Employer’s termination petition. At the hearing, Appellant testified he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Shivani Dua, who administered epidural steroid injections to alleviate the pain in his back and left hip. Appellant explained that while the steroid injections would alleviate his pain for a few months, the pain would slowly return, at which point he would need to return for additional injections. Appellant indicated he received his most recent injection approximately two to three weeks before the IME. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant requested, in addition to continued medical benefits, attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440 of the Workers' Compensation Act, asserting that, because he received only medical benefits, he was unable to retain the services of an attorney based on a traditional contingent fee arrangement, and instead was required to enter into an hourly-rate fee agreement. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s construction of Section 440 of the Act as precluding an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant when an employer established a reasonable basis for seeking a termination of benefits. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 440 was contrary to the statute’s express language, and, therefore, reversed in part and remanded. View "Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA)" on Justia Law

In 2016, Craig Steltz filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. William Meyers, Vincera Core Institute, and Vincera Institute (collectively Appellants). While rehabilitating from surgery, Steltz, a professional football player, felt a pop in his right leg. This led him to return to Dr. Meyers, after team physicians received results from a MRI. At a follow-up appointment, Dr. Meyers also performed an MRI on Steltz, discussed the MRI with Dr. Adam Zoga, a musculoskeletal radiologist, and concluded Steltz had scar tissue breakup, a normal postoperative finding, and not a new injury. However, Dr. Paul Read, a second musculoskeletal radiologist, also independently reviewed the second MRI, and issued a report concluding there was a complete tear of the adductor tendon. Based on these conflicting interpretations of the MRI, Steltz alleged Dr. Meyers was negligent in failing to diagnose and disclose the existence of the tear as reported by Dr. Read. Appellants’ counsel’s first line of questioning to Dr. Zoga on direct examination at trial, asked Dr. Zoga's estimation of how many musculoskeletal radiologists there were in the US, and commented, in his question, that "plaintiff couldn’t find one of them to come into this courtroom to support Dr. Read, did you know that?" Steltz's counsel requested a curative instruction, and moved for a mistrial. The trial court gave the jury a curative instruction and denied the mistrial. Appellants' counsel, in closing, referred back to that line of questioning, asserting Steltz “didn’t bring anybody in to dispute [Dr. Crain and Dr. Zoga] because they can’t.” Steltz’s counsel did not object to any of these statements. Instead, in rebuttal, Steltz’s counsel reiterated that Dr. Read was a board-certified radiologist with a focus in musculoskeletal radiology. The jury returned a verdict for Appellants. Steltz filed a post-trial motion asserting the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because the effect of Appellants’ counsel’s question to Dr. Zoga was so prejudicial that no jury instruction could adequately cure the prejudice. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on a single, unanswered question proposed to an expert witness, and that decision alone could not later serve as the basis for granting a new trial. View "Steltz v. Meyers M.D., et al." on Justia Law

In a March 6, 2015, vehicular collision at a Minooka truck terminal, Armstead, a semi-truck driver with Pennsylvania-based Manfredi Mushroom, was allegedly struck and injured by the semi-truck operated by Roberts, employed by NFI. Armstead filed a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim against Manfredi Mushroom, which led to the execution of a “Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation” settling the claim. Armstead then filed a negligence suit against NFI in Illinois. The circuit court determined that the Agreement included a judicial admission that prohibited Armstead from claiming injuries other than a right knee strain. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated and remanded for dismissal. The circuit court’s order limiting Armstead’s injury allegations resolved an issue that was ancillary to the negligence claims. Permitting an appeal from that order would promote precisely the type of piecemeal appeals Rule 304(a) was designed to discourage. After the circuit court’s improper Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of its order, Armstead dismissed his action in the circuit court, where jurisdiction remained due to the improper Rule 304(a) finding. He failed to refile the action within one year or within the statute of limitations period, so his action remains dismissed. View "Armstead v. National Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, Alexander Rudnicki suffered serious injuries when OB-GYN Peter Bianco, D.O., negligently performed an operative vaginal delivery using a vacuum extractor to assist in the delivery. Alexander suffered injuries to his brain as a result of the trauma to his scalp and skull caused by the vacuum extraction. Alexander required ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy; he was intellectually disabled and enrolled in special education at school; and he was not likely to be able to live independently in the future. In 2014, Alexander’s parents, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, in both their individual capacities and as parents, filed a complaint against Dr. Bianco and the hospital where Alexander was born, alleging, among other things, professional negligence by Dr. Bianco. Dr. Bianco moved to dismiss, asserting that Alexander’s parents did not bring their individual claims against him within the applicable statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the parents' individual claims, and the case proceeded to trial with Alexander as the sole plaintiff. A jury ultimately found Dr. Bianco had acted negligently and awarded Alexander damages, including, among other things, sums for past and future medical expenses until Alexander reached the age of twenty-two. Dr. Bianco filed a post-trial motion to reduce this verdict, arguing that under Colorado common law, only Alexander’s parents could recover Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses and, therefore, the court was required to deduct from the verdict the medical expenses incurred prior to Alexander’s eighteenth birthday. The district court ultimately agreed with Dr. Bianco and vacated the entirety of the jury’s award for past medical expenses, as well as sixty percent of the award for future medical expenses, concluding that the claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to Alexander’s parents, but their claim for such expenses had been dismissed as time-barred. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether to adhere to a common law rule under which only a minor plaintiff’s parents may recover tort damages for medical expenses incurred by their unemancipated minor child. The Supreme Court concluded the traditional rationales for the common law rule no longer applied, and that "the realities of today’s health care economy compel us to abandon that rule. Accordingly, we conclude that in cases involving an unemancipated minor child, either the child or their parents may recover the child’s pre-majority medical expenses, but double recovery is not permitted." View "Rudnicki v. Bianco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cindy Planchard, filed suit against defendant, the New Hotel Monteleone, LLC. Plaintiff alleged that as she crossed the lobby of defendant’s hotel, she slipped on a foreign substance on the marble floor and fell, sustaining an injury. After discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on a surveillance video of the accident. The video showed a hotel employee dry mopping the lobby area at 8:36 p.m., approximately three minutes before plaintiff’s accident. Two “wet floor” signs are in place in the area. At 8:37 p.m., approximately one minute before plaintiff’s fall, two more “wet floor” signs were added to the area, and an employee continued to dry mop the area. Plaintiff was then seen to fall at 8:38 p.m. Defendant also submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony. In her deposition, plaintiff acknowledged seeing the signs. Plaintiff also testified she “had to walk around” the signs because there “was no other path to the front door.” As a result, plaintiff stated she “walked to the side of the signs to get to the front door.” Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Relying on her deposition testimony, plaintiff did not dispute that she saw the signs, but asserted that she thought they were “chalkboard” and did not read them. Plaintiff introduced pictures of the signs showing they did not have the traditional bright orange or yellow appearance, but were made of wood and brass. The district court denied the hotel's motion, concluding there were questions of fact concerning the “reasonableness on the part of the defendant” based on the visibility of the signs. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that the undisputed evidence established plaintiff saw the warning signs in the area prior to her fall. "Any failure of plaintiff to read these signs was a product of her own inattentiveness and not a result of the defendant’s failure to take reasonable precautions." View "Blanchard v. New Hotel Monteleone, LLC." on Justia Law

In 2015, Dr. Robert Easton performed a left total hip arthroplasty on Mrs. Cheryl Mitchell, who had dislocated her hip. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mitchell re-dislocated her hip and Dr. Easton performed a revision surgery. While Mrs. Mitchell was in the recovery room, Dr. Easton observed that she had "foot drop;" Dr. Easton performed a second surgery that same day. During the surgery, he discovered that Mrs. Mitchell’s sciatic nerve had been lacerated. Dr. Easton advised Mrs. Mitchell’s family of the situation and consulted with Dr. Rasheed Ahmad, a hand surgeon who handled nerve repairs for Dr. Easton’s medical group. Dr. Easton further advised Mrs. Mitchell that “time would tell how much, if any, function and sensory perception she would get back.” Unfortunately, Mrs. Mitchell’s foot drop never improved and she was left with sciatic nerve palsy. In 2017, Mrs. Mitchell and her husband Michael, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Easton, his employer, the Baton Rouge Orthopaedic Clinic, L.L.C., and their insurers, Physician Assurance SPC. Defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription, which the trial court granted, dismissing the action. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that, although Mrs. Mitchell continued to treat with Dr. Easton for more than a year after the alleged act of malpractice, that treatment was unrelated to the alleged act of malpractice. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no question the Mitchells, knew of the alleged act of malpractice within a day of its occurrence. "It is equally certain that suit was not filed against the treating physician, Dr. Robert Easton, within a year of the alleged malpractice. ... The sole issue, therefore, is whether prescription was suspended during this time period pursuant to the continuing treatment rule." The Court determined the record supported the lower courts' determinations that Mrs. Mitchell did not receive any specific care from Dr. Easton designed to correct or otherwise treat the injury related to the alleged act of malpractice. Even had Mrs. Mitchell received continuing treatment of her injury, the Court did not find Dr. Easton’s statements regarding her questionable prognosis to fall within the scope of the continuing treatment rule. Accordingly, under the specific circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found the continuing treatment exception of contra non valentem did not apply to suspend prescription in this case, and affirmed the judgments below. View "Mitchell v. Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, LLC et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed on a limited basis the district court's ruling that Plaintiffs suit must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that dismissal was required.Plaintiff, a New York resident, brought this suit over a for-profit Israeli corporation that ranked the performance of United States investment analysts, claiming that that company defamed her in Massachusetts by posting a low rating of her professional performance. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to adduce evidence of specific facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. View "Lin v. TipRanks, Ltd." on Justia Law

In July 2015, R.N. went boating on Lake Coeur d’Alene with his friends, C.N. and B.L. All three boys were sixteen years old at the time. The boat was owned by C.N.’s father. C.N., B.L., and R.N. obtained about 12 beers from an unknown source and consumed them while boating. Later, the boys stopped at Shooters, a restaurant and bar near the south end of the lake. Respondent Tracy Lynn allegedly provided C.N., B.L., and R.N. with an alcoholic drink known as a “Shooter sinker” (also known as a “derailer”). The boys left the restaurant and drank the derailer on the lake. At some point during the trip, R.N. jumped or fell off the boat into the water and drowned. Appellant-plaintiffs Brandi Jones (R.N.'s mother), and Dasha Drahos (R.N.'s sister) filed a complaint against Lynn, alleging she recklessly and tortiously caused R.N.’s death by providing him with alcohol before he drowned in Lake Coeur d’Alene. Lynn moved for summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss the case because the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements under Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. The district court agreed and granted Lynn’s motion for summary judgment after concluding there was no uniform body of federal maritime dram shop law that would preempt Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. Thus, the Plaintiffs had to comply with the Dram Shop Act’s notice requirements. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding that the district court correctly applied with the Idaho Dram Shop Act after concluding the Act did not conflict with any uniform federal common law, and that the district court did not err in finding Appellants' claims were barred because they did not comply with the Dram Shop Act, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Jones v. Lynn" on Justia Law