Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After slipping and falling in the crosswalk of a Safeway parking lot, which was wet due to rain, Paige sued Safeway for negligence and premises liability. She asserted that Safeway failed to exercise due care in the manner it restriped the crosswalk several weeks before her fall by not adopting measures that would have made the crosswalk more slip-resistant. The jury returned a verdict for Safeway.On appeal, Paige argued the trial court erroneously prohibited her from cross-examining Safeway’s liability expert about standards promulgated by the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) with respect to safe walking surfaces. Paige contends that Evidence Code Section 721(b)(3) makes clear that an adverse expert may be cross-examined about a publication established as reliable authority, such as the ASTM standards, regardless of the expert’s consideration or reliance on the publication in forming his opinions. The court of appeal affirmed. While the trial court erroneously prohibited Paige from using the ASTM standard during her cross-examination of Safeway’s expert based on the expert’s lack of consideration or reliance on it, the error was harmless. View "Paige v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal disputed the sequence for applying the provisions when calculating compensation for injured employees; another provision applied a cost-of-living ratio only to out-of-state recipients. Richard Roberge injured his shoulder in May 2014 while working for ASRC Construction Holding Company; he continued working with accommodations until the job ended in November. Roberge then returned to his Idaho residence. ASRC paid him $834.85 weekly in temporary total disability compensation through mid-August 2015, calculated by adjusting the maximum weekly compensation rate by the prevailing cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) percentage for his residence. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded We conclude the Act required first applying the cost-of-living ratio and then applying the maximum rate. View "Roberge v. ASRC Construction Holding Company, et al." on Justia Law

Yulanda Haddan appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Norfolk Southern Corporation (collectively referred to as "Norfolk Southern"). She also sought review of a circuit court order striking certain deposition testimony. Haddan was injured when a pickup truck in which she was riding collided with a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad crossing. In its summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that Haddan could not recover against Norfolk Southern because, it determined, the driver of the truck failed to stop, look, and listen before entering the crossing and that failure was the sole proximate cause of Haddan's injury. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order striking the testimony, but reversed summary judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. "Haddan presented substantial evidence ... from which a reasonable person could conclude that Norfolk Southern contributed to cause the collision resulting in Haddan's injuries, calling into question whether Cox's contributory negligence rose to the level of a superseding, intervening cause and creating a jury question as to whether Cox's conduct was that of a concurrent tortfeasor. The evidence of Norfolk Southern's failure to install lights and a gate at the crossing further raises doubt as to whether Cox's failure to stop, look, and listen was truly unforeseeable. Haddan has raised enough of a factual issue to preclude the entry of a summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. Ultimately, 'the jury must decide whose actions are the proximate cause of the injury, or whether both [parties'] actions concurred and combined to proximately cause the injury.'" View "Haddan v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Treasure Andrews sued the Metropolitan Transit System, San Diego Transit Corporation, and Janalee St. Clair (collectively, MTS) after she was injured on an MTS bus driven by St. Clair. MTS moved for summary judgment on the ground that Andrews’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because Andrews filed suit more than six months after MTS mailed a notice of rejection of Andrews’s claim for damages. Andrews opposed, arguing among other things that MTS’s notice of rejection was defective because it did not include the full warning required by statute, and the two-year statute of limitations therefore applied. The trial court found that Andrews’s complaint was untimely, granted the motion, and entered judgment against Andrews. On appeal, Andrews again contended the notice of rejection was defective. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: the notice did not comply with the statute and was therefore insufficient to trigger the six-month statute of limitations in Government Code section 945.6 (a)(1). Instead, Andrews had two years from the accrual of her cause of action to file suit. Thus, the Court determined the trial court erred by finding that the six-month limitations period applied, and reversed judgment on that basis. View "Andrews v. Metropolitan Transit System" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court finding that Electric Boat Corp. had failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) for federal officer removal, holding that Electric Boat established the statutory requirements for removal.During the late-1960s, Michael Moore was allegedly exposed to asbestos during construction of a submarine, the USS Francis Scott Key, where he worked as an electronics officer. Moore and his wife (collectively, Moore), brought suit against Electric Board and others, alleging several state claims. Electric Boat removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442. Moore filed a motion to remand to state court, which the district court granted after finding that Electric Boat had failed to satisfy the requirements for federal officer removal under section 1442(a)(1). The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the district court interpreted section 1442(a)(1) in a manner inconsistent with the 2011 congressional amendment to the statute; and (2) Electric Boat satisfied the standard for federal officer removal under section 1442(a)(1). View "Moore v. Electric Boat Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner California Correctional Peace Officers Association Benefit Trust Fund (CCPOA) paid money pursuant to its disability policy to real party in interest David Martin Jr., a CCPOA member, after he filed a workers’ compensation claim for injuries sustained while working as a correctional officer. CCPOA subsequently filed a lien against the prospective workers’ compensation award for the sum it paid. It was represented in the workers’ compensation proceedings by petitioner Dan Escamilla, a non-attorney appearing pursuant to Labor Code section 5700. After Martin’s attorney petitioned for costs and sanctions against CCPOA and Escamilla for alleged misbehavior during proceedings on Martin’s claim, CCPOA withdrew the lien. Escamilla then failed to appear at four subsequent hearings on the petition for costs and sanctions. While respondent Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) ultimately affirmed the denial of costs and sanctions, it affirmed an award of $3,280 in attorney fees against CCPOA and Escamilla for the failure to appear at the four hearings. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of review, claiming: (1) the failure to notify them that a hearing held subsequent to the COVID-19 pandemic was to be held telephonically was a deprivation of due process; (2) failure to appear following the withdrawal of the lien was not sanctionable bad faith; and (3) attorney fees were not permitted for an attorney expending time litigating on his or her own behalf. The Court of Appeal found there was adequate notice of the one hearing in question, withdrawal of the lien did not deprive WCAB of jurisdiction to determine the petition for costs and sanctions, and the contention regarding attorney fees for work on behalf of the attorney was not properly before the Court, as it was determined by WCAB in a previous proceeding. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Cal. Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Prior to her death, Eyvon Ambrose (decedent) had become entirely dependent upon others for her basic care needs. Defendants Oroville Hospital d/b/a Golden Valley Home Health and Oroville Hospital, agreed to provide decedent in-home nursing services for wound care for a pressure injury to her left ischium or buttock. Defendants provided such in-home wound care on six occasions in July 2015 and four additional occasions in October 2015. According to real parties in interest (plaintiffs), decedent’s wound worsened, she sustained additional wounds, she was hospitalized, and she ultimately died from her wound and complications. Plaintiffs filed the underlying actions against defendants alleging a number of causes of action. Defendant’s writ petition and arguments related solely to plaintiff’s cause of action to recover under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act for defendants’ alleged neglect which, they asserted, was committed with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Therefore, plaintiffs asserted entitlement to enhanced remedies under the Elder Abuse Act. They sought no other relief in their petition. Defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, asserting they did not have a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, a prerequisite for recovery for neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. They further asserted that a reasonable jury could not find them guilty of forms of abuse or neglect rising to the level of recklessness. The trial court denied defendants’ motion. To the Court of Appeal, Defendants sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of their motion for summary adjudication and to grant the motion. The Court concluded that, in opposition to defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to summary adjudication on plaintiffs’ Elder Abuse Cause of action based on the absence of a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. The Court therefore issued the requested writ. View "Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

On the evening of May 21, 2014, Denise Garrison went to Target in Anderson, South Carolina with her eight-year-old daughter. Before entering the store, however, Denise retrieved her coupon book from her car, placed it on the hood, and proceeded to examine it. Looking up from the book, her daughter appeared with what looked like a hypodermic needle in her hand. Denise instinctively swatted the syringe out of her daughter's hand. However, in the swatting process, the syringe punctured the palm of her hand. Denise informed Target's store manager, who apologized for what happened. Denise believed the manager assured her that her medical bills would be paid, testifying that the manager said "bring us the bill." Despite Denise's belief that Target would cover her medical costs, Target refused to do so. The case proceeded to a jury trial, in which Target was found negligent, and awarded Denise $100,000 in compensatory damages and $4.51 million in punitive damages. The jury also awarded Clint $3,500 for lost wages and $5,000 for loss of consortium. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in: (1) affirming the trial court's denial of Target's motion for JNOV as to liability based on a theory of constructive notice; (2) holding the statutory cap on punitive damages was an affirmative defense; (3) instructing the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of punitive damages; and (4) refusing to award interest on punitive damages under Rule 68, SCRCP. The Supreme Court determined the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Target had constructive notice of the syringe in its parking lot and failed to discover and remove it in the exercise of due care. In addition, Court held the statutory cap on punitive damages pursuant was not required to be pled by the defendant as an affirmative defense in order to apply. The court of appeals properly instructed the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of the Garrisons' punitive damages award. Lastly, the Supreme Court held Denise was entitled to eight percent interest on the entirety of her damages award, including punitive damages, pursuant to Rule 68, SCRCP. View "Garrison v. Target Corporation" on Justia Law

An explosion at the Omega Protein Plant in Moss Point, Mississippi killed one man and seriously injured several others. Multiple lawsuits were filed against Omega in federal district court. Colony Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court seeking a declaration that it did not cover bodily injuries arising out of the Moss Point facility explosion. Evanston Insurance Company intervened also seeking a declaration of no coverage for the same injuries: Evanston provided a $5 million excess liability policy, which provided coverage after Colony’s $1 million policy was exhausted. Because Colony settled one of the underlying personal injury cases for $1 million (the limits under its policy), Omega sought excess coverage from Evanston for the injuries that occurred at its plant. A special master was appointed, and the trial court granted Evanston’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the pollution exclusion in the insurance contract barred coverage. Omega appealed that grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that a pollution exclusion in the insurance contract was ambiguous, and should have been construed in favor of the insured, allowing coverage. Further, the Court found the question of whether coverage was triggered was governed by the language of the contract, and that Evanston failed to prove there could be no coverage under the excess liability policy. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law

After Lauren Bridges’ daughter S.B. was born severely disabled, Bridges sued the many healthcare providers involved in S.B.’s birth. When Bridges’s attorneys failed to timely oppose the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted summary judgment and then final judgment in favor of all defendants. Bridges then moved for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). The superior court found that Bridges' attorneys’ neglect was inexcusable, precluding relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but nonetheless granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to avoid injustice. The Alaska Supreme Court found the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding the neglect of Bridges’s counsel inexcusable and denying relief under Rule 60(b)(1). But the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). "An attorney’s neglect, whether excusable or inexcusable, cannot be grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) unless the attorney abandons the client. Because that is not what the record shows, we reverse the superior court’s ruling and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants." View "Chena Obstetrics and Gynecology, et al. v. Bridges" on Justia Law