Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Justin Nelson filed a lawsuit against his former mother-in-law, Traci Phillips, former sister-in-law, Ashley Phillips, and other friends and family of his deceased wife, Tiffani Nelson. Justin alleged that Traci, Ashley, and the other defendants conspired to defame him by suggesting he was responsible for Tiffani’s death. None of the defendants reside in Utah, and each moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. They provided sworn statements denying the allegations, while Justin relied solely on his complaint’s allegations without submitting counter-evidence.The Fifth District Court in Washington County, Utah, denied the motions to dismiss. The court concluded that Justin had sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, would demonstrate a conspiracy to defame him, thus establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants. For Traci and Ashley, the court found that their personal contacts with Utah were sufficient to assert specific personal jurisdiction.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petitions for interlocutory review filed by Traci and Ashley as improvidently granted, as the lower court had not ruled on the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction for them. The court reversed the lower court’s denial of the motions to dismiss for the other defendants, finding that Justin failed to meet his burden of providing evidence to support his allegations once the defendants had submitted sworn statements contradicting his claims. The court emphasized that without evidence to support the allegations, the district court could not assert jurisdiction based on a conspiracy theory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Nelson v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Three customers, D.W., L.T., and J.G., filed a lawsuit against FPA Sandy Mall Associates (SMA) and Hong Guang Lin, an unlicensed massage therapist, after Lin allegedly sexually assaulted them during their massage appointments at a shopping center owned by SMA. The plaintiffs claimed premises liability and negligence, arguing that SMA, as the landlord, had a duty to ensure the safety of its invitees and to verify Lin's licensure status.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County denied SMA's motion to dismiss the claims, concluding that SMA owed a duty to the plaintiffs as invitees to keep the premises safe and to exercise reasonable care. The court also applied the five-factor analytical framework from B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, 275 P.3d 228 (Jeffs factors), to assess whether SMA had a duty to verify Lin's licensure status and found that the factors favored recognizing such a duty.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court clarified that the Jeffs framework is only applicable when a party seeks to establish a previously unrecognized duty. Since the plaintiffs invoked established duties under Utah law, the district court's application of the Jeffs factors was unnecessary. The Supreme Court struck the district court's analysis based on the Jeffs factors, including its observations on foreseeability, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its instructions. The court did not address whether SMA owed a duty to verify Lin's licensure status, as this was not the duty recognized by the district court. View "D.W. v. FPA Sandy Mall Associates" on Justia Law

Anne G. McNair experienced a perforated esophagus and infection following cervical fusion surgery performed by Dr. Joshua D. Beck at North Lincoln County Hospital District, d/b/a Star Valley Health. Dr. Beck, employed by Orthopaedics of Jackson Hole, P.C., d/b/a Teton Orthopaedics, continued to treat her post-surgery. McNair filed a complaint against Dr. Beck, Teton, and Star Valley, alleging medical malpractice, negligence, and vicarious liability. The district court dismissed her complaint, citing the statute of limitations, and denied her motion to amend the complaint, deeming it futile.The District Court of Lincoln County granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that McNair's claims were filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. The court determined that the continuous treatment rule did not apply, as McNair's injury stemmed from a single act of negligence during the surgery on December 30, 2020. Consequently, the court found that the statute of limitations began on December 31, 2020, the date McNair was discharged from the hospital, making her April 2023 filings untimely. The court also denied McNair's motion to amend her complaint, asserting that any amendment would be futile.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its application of the continuous treatment rule. The Supreme Court held that the continuous treatment rule applies when a medical provider has provided ongoing care for the same or related complaints. The court noted that McNair's complaint alleged continuous treatment by Dr. Beck and Teton into early 2021, which could extend the statute of limitations. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying McNair's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendments did not show on their face that the claims were untimely. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McNair v. Beck" on Justia Law

Christopher Hildebrant, a real-estate developer, facilitated a property sale in 2011 and expected consulting fees from both the seller and the buyer. During the transaction, Hildebrant alleged that Thomas Weidman, a trustee on the Sycamore Township Board, demanded a kickback. To avoid paying, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account and sent himself an email portraying Weidman as demanding payments. This email was forwarded to another party but remained private until 2020, when Hildebrant showed it to other township officials during a separate transaction. Weidman learned of the email in November 2020 during an investigation and received a copy in January 2021.The Warren County Court of Common Pleas granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Weidman’s defamation claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the email was first sent in 2011. The court also ruled that Weidman’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and false-light invasion of privacy were similarly time-barred as they were derivative of the defamation claim.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the publication was secretive or inherently unknowable. The court ruled that Weidman’s claims were not time-barred because he could not have known about the defamatory email until it was disclosed to him in 2020.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the discovery rule applies to libel claims when the publication is secretive or inherently unknowable. The court also held that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims like IIED and false-light invasion of privacy when they are based on the same allegations as the libel claim. The case was remanded to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Hildebrandt" on Justia Law

Jessica Wiseman and her children sued Dr. Nathan Rencher and others for the wrongful death of Eric Wiseman, alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence. Rencher, the only defendant subject to Idaho's prelitigation screening panel requirement, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Wisemans failed to comply with this requirement. He supported his motion with the panel’s advisory decision, filed under seal. The district court granted Rencher’s motion, concluding that the Wisemans did not meet the prelitigation requirement based on the advisory decision. The Wisemans also sought to disqualify the district judge, which was denied.The district court, part of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, ruled that the advisory decision could be considered to determine compliance with the prelitigation requirement. The court found the statutes ambiguous and concluded that they allowed limited review of the advisory decision. The court also ruled that the statutes controlled over conflicting Idaho Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rencher, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding the Wisemans' compliance with the prelitigation requirement.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the prelitigation screening statutes unequivocally precluded judicial review of the advisory decision for any purpose. The court emphasized that the statutes clearly stated there should be no judicial review and that parties should not be affected by the panel’s conclusions. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand, distinguishing this case from precedent and finding no appearance of bias. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal, as both prevailed in part. View "Wiseman v. Rencher" on Justia Law

Pearl Ray and Andrew Ray, Sr. sued medical providers in Illinois state court for medical malpractice, which allegedly injured Pearl and caused Andrew to suffer a loss of consortium. They settled with all but one defendant. Pearl was enrolled in a federal health benefits plan, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) was the plan’s carrier. Under the plan, BCBSA sought reimbursement from the settlement for benefits paid to Pearl. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reduce BCBSA’s reimbursement by their attorney’s fees and costs under Illinois’s common fund doctrine.The case was removed to federal court by BCBSA, arguing federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the remand motion but later reconsidered and remanded the entire case, concluding it lacked federal question jurisdiction. BCBSA appealed, asserting federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that federal question jurisdiction was not present, as federal common law did not govern the reimbursement dispute, following the precedent set by Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois v. Cruz. However, the court found that BCBSA met the requirements for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as it was acting under a federal agency (OPM) and had a colorable federal defense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded, instructing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the motion for adjudication while remanding the rest of the case to state court. View "Ray v. Tabriz" on Justia Law

In 2019, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218 (AB 218), which allowed plaintiffs to bring childhood sexual assault claims against public entities within a three-year window, even if those claims were previously barred by statutes of limitations or claim presentation requirements. A.M.M. filed a complaint against the West Contra Costa Unified School District, alleging sexual assaults by a District employee from 1979 to 1983. The District argued that reviving such claims constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds under the California Constitution. The trial court overruled the District’s demurrer, leading the District to seek writ review.The trial court sustained the demurrer for the first three causes of action but overruled it regarding the gift clause argument. The District then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to sustain the demurrer in its entirety. The appellate court issued an order to show cause, and both parties filed responses, including amicus curiae briefs from various entities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of the claim presentation requirement did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The court reasoned that the waiver did not create new substantive liability but merely removed a procedural barrier to existing claims. The court also found that AB 218 served a valid public purpose by providing relief to victims of childhood sexual assault, aligning with the state’s interest in public welfare. Additionally, the court ruled that the District lacked standing to assert due process claims under both the federal and California Constitutions. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Shelly Blackston underwent a liposuction procedure performed by Dr. Alva Roy Heron, Jr. in Virginia. During the procedure, she experienced severe pain, which Dr. Heron attempted to alleviate with additional anesthesia. After returning to her home in Maryland, Blackston continued to suffer pain and developed an infection, leading to hospitalization and multiple surgeries. She filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County held a five-day trial, after which the jury found in favor of Blackston on both claims. The jury awarded her $2,300,900 in damages, including $2,000,000 in non-economic damages. Petitioners filed post-trial motions, including a motion for statutory remittitur, arguing that Maryland’s cap on non-economic damages should apply. The circuit court granted the motion in part, reducing the non-economic damages to $755,000, consistent with Maryland’s statutory cap.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that Virginia’s damages cap applied because the injury occurred in Virginia where the procedure took place. The court reasoned that the infection, which constituted the injury, was introduced during the surgery in Virginia.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that Virginia substantive law applied under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, which requires the application of the law of the state where the last element of the tort occurs. The court found sufficient evidence that Blackston suffered a cognizable injury during the surgery in Virginia, making Virginia’s damages cap applicable. Thus, the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland was affirmed. View "Doctor's Weight Loss Centers, Inc. v. Blackston" on Justia Law

In 2017, Roy Moore, a Republican candidate for a U.S. Senate seat in Alabama, faced allegations of sexual misconduct with minors. Following his election loss, Moore filed a defamation lawsuit against Guy Cecil, Priorities USA, and Bully Pulpit Interactive LLC. The claims involved tweets by Cecil, a press release by Priorities USA, and a digital ad. Moore argued that the tweets were defamatory and that the press release and digital ad falsely labeled him a "child molester" and "child predator."The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the tweet-based claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, as Cecil had no significant contacts with Alabama. The court also dismissed the press release and digital ad claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that Moore did not sufficiently allege actual malice, a requirement for defamation claims involving public figures. The court allowed Moore to amend his complaint, but the amended complaint was also dismissed for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the tweet-based claims, agreeing that Cecil's tweets were not aimed at Alabama but rather at a national audience. The court also upheld the dismissal of the press release and digital ad claims, finding that Moore failed to allege facts showing that the defendants acted with actual malice. The court noted that ill-will or improper motive does not equate to actual malice, which requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, affirming the lower court's decision. View "Moore v. Cecil" on Justia Law

Jessica Gehner was implanted with a Cook Medical inferior vena cava (IVC) filter in Ohio. She later experienced abdominal pain, and a CT scan in March 2013 revealed that the filter had perforated her IVC. Her doctors recommended the filter's removal, which occurred in April 2013, but a fragment was left behind due to the filter fracturing. Gehner filed a lawsuit in May 2016 against Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical LLC, and William Cook Europe APS, alleging products liability and implied warranty claims. The defendants argued that her claims were time-barred under Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was converted to a summary judgment motion. The court concluded that Gehner's claims were time-barred, as she was informed by her doctors in March 2013 that the IVC filter caused her injury, starting the statute of limitations clock. Gehner contended that she was unaware of the defect until 2016 when her mother saw a television commercial about defective IVC filters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under Ohio law, the statute of limitations for product liability claims begins when the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority of an injury related to the product or when the plaintiff should have known of the injury through reasonable diligence. The court found that Gehner was aware of her injury and its relation to the IVC filter by April 2013 at the latest. The court rejected Gehner's argument that the statute of limitations should start when she learned of the defect, noting that awareness of the injury itself was sufficient to start the clock. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Gehner's claims were indeed time-barred. View "Gehner v. Cook Medical, LLC" on Justia Law