Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Keranos sued 49 parties for infringing three patents by using a specific type of flash memory technology developed by SST, called “SuperFlash,” that implements a split-gate flash memory design. Keranos, which was formed weeks earlier, obtained the rights to the asserted patents from UMC, through an “Exclusive Patent License and Royalty Agreement.” UMC continued to hold the legal title to the asserted patents, all of which expired in 2006-2008. Keranos did not join UMC as co-plaintiff. SST and certain defendants then sued Keranos, UMC, and others, seeking declaratory judgments of noninfringement and invalidity of the same patents. The cases were consolidated into two cases. Following a joint Markman hearing, the district court regrouped the defendants into two new cases: case 00017 pitting Keranos, UMC, and individuals against the manufacturers of the accused products, and case 00018, pitting Keranos against the alleged customers of the accused products who incorporated those products into larger products for sale. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Keranos has standing to sue for infringement of the asserted patents, but vacated and remanded for consideration of Keranos’s motions for leave to amend infringement contentions based on the local patent rules. View "Keranos, LLC v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

In April 2011, while its patent application was pending with the USPTO, U.S. Water Services, which “sell[s] water treatment and purification equipment, materials, and services,” especially “to ethanol process technologies,” sued its competitor, ChemTreat, for misappropriation of trade secrets. In October 2011, the USPTO issued the 244 patent covering a method to reduce the formation of insoluble scale deposits during the production of ethanol using enzyme, phytase, in its “pHytOUT® system.”Three days before U.S. Water and ChemTreat settled the misappropriation claim, ChemTreat filed counterclaims requesting declaratory judgments of noninfringement and invalidity of the 244 patent. The suit was filed before the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284, took effect, so the counterclaims independently did not establish appellate jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit. The district court granted ChemTreat summary judgment as to the noninfringement counterclaim and dismissed the invalidity counterclaim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Evaluating the “totality of [the] circumstances,” the district court did not err in finding the misappropriation action, together with U.S. Water’s statements to its customers and supplier, produced an objective, “reasonable apprehension of suit,” and did not err in concluding declaratory judgment subject matter jurisdiction existed. The decision did not constitute an advisory opinion. View "U.S. Water Servs., Inc. v. ChemTreat, Inc." on Justia Law

Attorney John Cogswell appealed the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction. Acting on behalf of Predator International, Inc., Cogswell filed a lawsuit in April 2009 against Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc. and Industrias El Gamo, S.A. (collectively, Gamo). The original complaint alleged patent infringement and other claims. When it appeared that Lee Phillips, a co-inventor of the patent at issue, was asserting that he still owned half the patent, Cogswell moved to dismiss the infringement claim, explaining that Predator would litigate ownership in state court with the expectation of reviving the patent-infringement claim once it had established its ownership. The state litigation expanded after Gamo purchased Phillips’s interest in the patent. Cogswell then moved in federal court to supplement Predator’s complaint with a challenge to Gamo’s claimed interest in the patent and moved to amend the complaint by reviving the patent-infringement claim. The district court denied the motion. Eventually the district court imposed a Rule 11 sanction on Cogswell for filing the motion to supplement and amend Predator’s complaint, justifying the sanction on grounds that he was forum shopping on the claims he wished to add, his motion came too long after he had learned of Gamo’s purchase of Phillips’s interest in the patent, and nothing had changed to justify his reinstating the patent-infringement claim. The Tenth Circuit reversed: the motion to supplement and amend was not unwarranted under existing law. View "Predator International v. Gamo Outdoor" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a patent dispute involving Amity's patent for a device that dispenses both toothpicks and tablets and Market Quest's alleged infringement of the patent. The court concluded that this case arises under the patent laws and therefore falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the appeal, but concluded that, had this appeal been filed with the Federal Circuit at the time it was filed with this court, the Federal Circuit would have had jurisdiction. And because this appeal is neither frivolous nor is there any indication that it was filed in bad faith, the court concluded that transfer is in the interest of justice. Therefore, the court ordered the matter transferred to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631. View "Amity Rubberized Pen Co. v. Market Quest Grp." on Justia Law

Versata successfully sued SAP for infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed a damages award, but vacated an injunction, and remanded. Meanwhile, SAP petitioned the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to institute covered business method (CBM) review --an administrative review procedure established in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), 125 Stat. 284 (2011), asserting that key claims were unpatentable and invalid. While the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) was conducting CBM review, Versata sued to set aside the decision to institute review. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction: “AIA’s express language, detailed structure and scheme for administrative and judicial review, legislative purpose, and nature of administrative action evince Congress’s clear intent to preclude subject matter jurisdiction over the PTAB’s decision to institute patent reexamination.” The court state that “the decision to institute post-grant review is merely an initial step in the PTAB’s process to resolve the ultimate question of patent validity, not a final agency action. . . . Plaintiff retains an alternative adequate remedy through appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; Versata’s attempt to obtain judicial review was addressed to the decision to institute stage, so the court was correct in barring judicial review, 35 U.S.C. 324(e). View "Versata Dev. Grp. v. Lee" on Justia Law

Celgard is a developer and manufacturer of battery membranes, used to separate chemical cell components in lithium-ion batteries, preventing contact between the positive and negative electrodes. The patents concerns a separator technology that uses a ceramic composite coating that helps prevent electrical shorting. This technology is used in rechargeable batteries in electronic vehicles and consumer electronic devices such as laptops and cellular phones. Celgard is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. SKI is a manufacturer of separators for use in lithium-ion batteries. SKI mainly supplies the separators to third-party manufacturers, but also manufactures batteries that include the separators it produces. SKI’s principal place of business is in Seoul, Korea. All of SKI’s design, manufacturing, and sales operations are based in Korea. Celgard sued SKI for infringement. Celgard sought to establish the district court’s jurisdiction based on allegations that SKI purposefully directed activities at the forum state through sales and offers for sale of its accused separators to residents of North Carolina. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, under either a purposeful-direction theory or a stream-of-commerce theory, noting an absence of evidence that SKI ever sold or offered for sale the accused products in North Carolina. View "Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

SpeedTrack’s patent, entitled “Method for Accessing Computer Files and Data, Using Linked Categories Assigned to Each Data File Record on Entry of the Data File Record,” describes methods for searching and accessing files stored on a computer system. The claimed methods require use of: “category descriptions,” corresponding to stored files; a “file information directory” containing information linking “category descriptions” to specific system files; and a “search filter,” to locate files that have “category descriptions” matching those in the filter. SpeedTrack sued, alleging that Walmart’s online retail website infringed the patent by permitting visitors to search for available products by selecting pre-defined descriptive categories. Walmart licensed and used Endeca’s software to achieve this functionality. After reexamination by the PTO, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement , finding that, because the accused Endeca software uses numerical identifiers instead of descriptive words, users did not use “category descriptions” required by the patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction. Speedtrack later sued Office Depot. The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law, finding that SpeedTrack’s claims were barred by res judicata and under the “Kessler doctrine,” which bars suits against customers for use of a product previously found not to infringe in a suit against the product’s supplier. View "SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

Gaymar ‘s patent is directed to a patient temperature control system, including a blanket that can conductively warm or cool the patient. In 2008, Gaymar sued CSZ, asserting that CSZ’s Blanketrol device infringed claims of the patent. The PTO granted CSZ’s inter partes reexamination request and issued a first Office Action rejecting all claims of the patent as anticipated or obvious over prior art cited in CSZ’s request. The district court denied Gaymar’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted CSZ’s motion to stay the case pending the conclusion of the reexamination. The PTO reaffirmed its rejection of all claims of the patent. Gaymar filed an express abandonment of all claims in 2010, and the PTO concluded the reexamination, cancelling all of the claims. The district court lifted the stay. CSZ unsuccessfully sought attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, alleging that Gaymar’s litigation position was frivolous and that Gaymar had engaged in litigation misconduct. Following the Supreme Court’s 2014, decision, Octane Fitness, CSZ unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of a lack of objective baselessness, but reversed the exceptional case finding insofar as it was based on CSZ’s purported misconduct. View "Gaymar Indus., Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Fluorescent lamp fixtures typically regulate electric current by an electronic ballast, which maintains current levels high enough to start the lamp but prevents current from reaching destructive levels. When a lamp is removed from its holders or when a filament is broken, current provided by the ballast ceases to flow and dissipates back into the ballast, which can destroy the ballast and create an electric shock hazard. LB’s 529 patent discloses an electronic ballast able to shield itself from destructive levels of current. LB sued ULT, asserting infringement. ULT argued that the term “voltage source means” is governed by 35 U.S.C. 112 and that the claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 12 as indefinite because the specification fails to disclose what structure corresponded to the “voltage source means” limitation. The district court concluded that the term “voltage source means” had sufficient structure. A jury awarded LB $3 million in damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that claim construction is an issue of law that it reviews de novo. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its holding in Teva Pharmaceuticals (2015), that while the ultimate question of claim construction is a legal question, there may be underlying “subsidiary” factual findings related to the extrinsic record that are reviewed for clear error. On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Because the district court’s factual findings demonstrate that the claims convey sufficient structure, it was correct to conclude that the term “voltage source means” is not governed by section 112. View "Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics, NA" on Justia Law

INTTRA owns patents relating to online methods for coordinating containerized shipping. GT sought a declaratory judgment that INTTRA’s shipping methods patents were invalid. While the case was pending, GT petitioned the PTO to review the patents as covered-business-method patents. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted review, but granted INTTRA leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that section 325(a)(1) barred the reviews because of the civil action. GT argued that INTTRA had waived that objection by not presenting it within the 14 days allowed by the rule giving a right to seek reconsideration. The Board granted INTTRA’s motion and “terminated” proceedings, without addressing patentability, reasoning that section 325(a)(1) is a statutory limit on Board “jurisdiction.” The Federal Circuit dismissed and denied mandamus relief. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. 325 declares that “review may not be instituted . . . if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner … filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” GT identified nothing that precludes the Board from reconsidering an initial institution decision or invoking the 325(a)(1) bar on its own, or inviting the patentee to file a motion after more than 14 days. View "GTNX, Inc.. v. INTTRA, Inc." on Justia Law