Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

United sued Tile Tech (TT), claiming infringement of its patent, entitled “Support Pedestal Having an Anchoring Washer for Securing Elevated Surface Tiles.” United served its first discovery requests. TT missed the deadline. United granted 20 additional days to respond. TT requested two additional extensions before serving responses, which were deficient. TT postponed a conference on the matter three times, then failed to respond by an agreed-upon date for supplementing its responses. After additional delays, United filed a Motion to Compel. TT never responded to the Motion, but served supplemental responses, still deficient, and later served a third supplement. The district court ordered TT to respond, imposed monetary sanctions, and warned that it would enter default judgment if TT did not comply by October 12. TT failed to respond. On October 12, United moved for default judgment. TT responded that it had not known the response deadline; that it had produced a set of supplemental responses; and that it required an expert opinion to fully respond, which would be forthcoming. On November 2, TT served supplemental responses, which disclosed its destruction of a previously undisclosed mold used to make one key component of the disputed support pedestal. United sought spoliation sanctions and added a claim for unfair competition, to which TT never responded. The Federal Circuit affirmed default judgment with relief for all of United’s claims, and a permanent injunction. View "United Construction Products, Inc. v. Tile Tech, Inc." on Justia Law

Bosch sued Cardiocom, alleging infringement of two patents. Cardiocom petitioned for inter partes review of those patents. The petitions were denied because Cardiocom failed to show a reasonable likelihood that any of the challenged claims was unpatentable. Medtronic (Cardiocom’s parent company) then filed petitions seeking inter partes review of the same patents, listing Medtronic as the sole real party in interest. Bosch argued that Medtronic had failed to name Cardiocom as a real party in interest as required by 35 U.S.C. 312(a)(2). The Patent Board granted additional discovery regarding Cardiocom’s status, then dismissed, “persuaded … that Medtronic [was] acting as a proxy for Cardiocom.” The Board cited evidence that Cardiocom was the defendant in the infringement suits, that Cardiocom had filed its own petitions for inter partes review, that Cardiocom communicated with Medtronic while Medtronic’s petitions were being prepared, and that Cardiocom paid some of the fees for preparing Medtronic’s petitions. In November 2015, the Federal Circuit dismissed Medtronic’s appeals for lack of jurisdiction and denied mandamus relief, but later recalled the mandate, following the Supreme Court’s 2016 Cuozzo decision. The court subsequently reaffirmed. The Board’s vacatur of its institution decisions and termination of the proceedings constitute decisions whether to institute inter partes review and are “final and nonappealable” under section 314(d). Nothing in Cuozzo is to the contrary. View "Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

AVC manufactures cooling systems for integrated circuits. Asetek’s patents are directed toward liquid computer cooling systems to cool integrated circuits. Asetek brought infringement lawsuits against other competitors and sent a letter accusing AVC of infringement, based on Asetek’s mistaken belief that AVC manufactured Liqmax 120s. AVC responded that it did not manufacture Liqmax 120s, but requested a meeting. Asetek responded that if AVC was not making Liqmax 120s there was no reason to meet; that it had unsuccessfully tried to cooperate with AVC previously; and that it does not license its patents. The letter stated, “Please be advised that Asetek believes that AVC is likely selling other infringing products” and that Asetek enforces its IP. A meeting ultimately occurred ; Asetek offered AVC a license at a royalty rate of 16%. AVC then filed suit alleging that AVC had designed and built certain liquid cooling products and seeking a declaration that its products did not infringe the Asetek patents and that those patents are invalid. Accepting Asetek’s assertion that it did not know that those products existed before AVC’s complaint, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit reversed. AVC alleged sufficient facts that, “under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” View "Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S" on Justia Law

Dr. Arunachalam owns the 178 patent, which has been undergoing reexamination since November 2008. In 2014, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the rejection of claims 9– 16, but designated a new ground of rejection for claim 16. Arunachalam elected to reopen prosecution of the claims, after which the examiner issued a final rejection in June 2015. Rather than appeal the examiner’s final rejection to the Board, Arunachalam appealed to the Federal Circuit, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to hear a non-final appeal from the Patent Office. A patent owner dissatisfied with an examiner’s rejection of a claim in reexamination may proceed with a two-step appeals process. First, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 134(b) (2002), a patent owner in any reexamination proceeding may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Board. If the patent owner is dissatisfied with the Board’s final decision, the patent owner may appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, 35 U.S.C. 141. View "In re: Arunachalam" on Justia Law

Diamond sued the auto companies, alleging infringement of its patents. The district court dismissed the actions finding that agreements between Diamond and Sanyo, the original assignee of the patents-in-suit, did not confer patentee status on Diamond, allowing Diamond to sue without joining Sanyo. The court later held that nunc pro tunc agreements executed by Diamond and Sanyo after its decision in Diamond did not affect its determination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The original agreements did not convey all of the substantial rights in the patents to Diamond. Precedent bars consideration of the subsequent agreements. View "Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am." on Justia Law

Heartland, an LLC organized and existing under Indiana law is headquartered in Indiana. Kraft, organized and existing under Delaware law, has its principal place of business in Illinois. Kraft filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware alleging that Heartland’s liquid water enhancer products infringe Kraft’s patents. Heartland moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or to transfer venue to the Southern District of Indiana. Heartland alleged that it is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence there, has not entered into any supply contracts in Delaware or called on any accounts there to solicit sales, but admitted it ships orders of the accused products into Delaware. In 2013, these shipments, 44,707 cases of the product, generated at least $331,000 in revenue, and were about 2% of Heartland’s total sales of the accused products. The Magistrate Judge determined that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Heartland for claims involving the accused products and rejected Heartland’s arguments that 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. 1391 negated precedent governing venue for infringement suits. The district court denied Heartland’s motions. The Federal Circuit denied Heartland’s petition for mandamus to either dismiss or transfer the suit. View "In re: TC Heartland LLC" on Justia Law

Rembrandt sued, alleging that JJVC’s Acuvue Advance® and Oasys® contact lenses infringed Rembrandt’s patent. Rembrandt relied on expert testimony from Dr. Beebe, who presented test results, to prove that the accused lenses met the “surface layer” and “soft” claim limitations. During cross-examination, Beebe drastically changed his testimony regarding his testing methodology. JJVC relied on expert testimony from Dr. Bielawski that its lenses did not meet the “surface layer” limitation, but did not present expert testimony concerning the “soft” limitation. In his testimony, Bielawski impugned Beebe’s credibility. The court ultimately struck Beebe’s testimony regarding the testing and granted judgment as a matter of law that Rembrandt failed to prove that the accused lenses were “soft.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. After trial, Rembrandt received information suggesting that Bielawski testified falsely. Although the court denied Rembrandt’s request for post-trial discovery, Rembrandt received much of what it sought from Bielawski’s employer, the University of Texas, through an open records request. The parties no longer dispute that Bielawski testified falsely on material issues. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. The district court erred in requiring proof that JJVC or its counsel was complicit in Bielawski’s false testimony. View "Rembrandt Vision Techs., L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc." on Justia Law

MPHJ’s 381 patent, entitled “Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Virtual Copying,” issued in 2004 and discloses a method and system that “extend[] the notion of copying . . . to a process that involves paper being scanned from a device at one location and copied to a device at another location.” “What makes Virtual Copier as simple as its physical counterpart . . . is the fact that it replicates the identical motions that a user who is making a copy using a physical photocopier goes through.” On inter partes review initiated by HP, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims not patentable as anticipated and one claim (13) not unpatentable as anticipated. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting HP’s argument that the PTO should have reviewed claim 13 to determine whether it was unpatentable as obvious. The court stated that it cannot review the decision not to institute. View "HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC" on Justia Law

Cardpool sued for infringement of its patent entitled “System and Method for Brand Name Gift Card Exchange.” Plastic Jungle’s defenses were obviousness, 35 U.S.C. 103, and that the claimed subject matter was patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. The court agreed as to ineligibility and dismissed. Before an appeal was decided, Cardpool sought ex parte reexamination, 35 U.S.C. 304. Before reexamination was completed, the Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion the judgment of ineligibility under section 101. The PTO issued a Reexamination Certificate in 2014, finding amended claims and new claims patentable under section 103. The Federal Circuit then granted rehearing, vacated its summary affirmance of section 101 invalidity, and remanded to the district court, but declined to vacate the invalidity judgment. The district court declined the parties’ joint request for vacatur of its invalidity determination, stating that no Article III court had reviewed the Cardpool reexamined claims. The Federal CIrcuit affirmed: the denial was within the district court’s discretion and the premise of the motion was both speculative and inaccurate. The district court’s final judgment as to an original group of claims does not automatically render that judgment res judicata as to new claims granted upon reexamination. View "Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, patent-holder plaintiffs market drugs and have patents in the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations publication (Orange Book), 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1). Mylan filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA), 21 U.S.C. 355(j), seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of the drugs, certifying that the Orange Book patents are invalid or would not be infringed by the proposed drugs. The plaintiffs sued in Delaware under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A). Mylan is incorporated in, and has its principal place of business in, West Virginia and submitted its ANDAs in Maryland; it intends to direct sales into Delaware, among other places, once it has FDA approval. Mylan sent notices to the plaintiffs in New York, Ireland, Delaware and Sweden. One plaintiff is incorporated in Delaware, the U.S. subsidiary of another has its principal place of business in Delaware. Both have sued others for infringement in Delaware. Each district court concluded that Delaware had sufficient contacts related to the subject of these cases to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Mylan. The judges disagreed about whether Delaware could exercise general personal jurisdiction (independent of suit-related contacts) on the ground that Mylan consented to jurisdiction in registering to do business. Each declined to dismiss. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the issue of specific jurisdiction, declining to address general personal jurisdiction. View "Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law