Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Dakota Supreme Court
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Darilyn Baker, individually and on behalf of a class of more than 500 persons similarly situated, appealed dismissal of her class action against Autos, Inc. d/b/a Global Autos, Robert Opperude, James Hendershot, RW Enterprises, Inc., and Randy Westby, for claimed violations of the North Dakota Retail Installment Sales Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 51-13, and state usury laws. Baker also appealed an order denying her motion to amend the judgment. Baker argued the retail sellers failed to make required disclosures of certain finance charges and late fees in retail installment contracts and they lost their regulated lender status and were subject to state usury laws. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the retail installment contracts failed to disclose loan fees as finance charges, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Baker v. Autos, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Mary Orwig appealed three district court orders finding her in contempt of court and an order denying her motion to vacate the contempt orders. The charges stemmed from divorce and business proceedings. In September 2016, Steven Orwig sued Mary for divorce. The Orwigs co-owned Orwig’s Livestock Supplements, Inc.; Orwigs Tubs International, Inc.; and MVP Transport, Inc. (“Corporations”). Before the divorce lawsuit, the Corporations sued Mary, alleging she made unauthorized transactions on the Corporations’ behalf, including opening credit card accounts in the Corporations’ names and using them for personal use. The Corporations also alleged Mary wrongfully detained and controlled their property. The Corporations requested the district court to enjoin Mary from transacting business on behalf of the Corporations and to remove her as an officer and director of the Corporations. In December 2016, the court ordered her to return corporate property in her possession. In February 2017, the Corporations moved for contempt against Mary, alleging she violated the preliminary injunction and order to return corporate property and continued taking actions adverse to the Corporations. In May 2017, Steven moved for an order to sell the parties’ Arizona real property, claiming its sale would resolve the parties’ financial problems. Mary opposed the sale, claiming that since 2014 she spent a majority of her time residing on the property. After a June 2017 hearing on the parties’ motions, the district court issued a July 31, 2017, order finding Mary in contempt of the December 2016 order to return corporate property. The court ordered her to return certain corporate property, including credit card and tax information. The court also ordered the sale of the Arizona property. At a September 28, 2017, hearing, the district court found Mary in contempt for impeding the sale of the Arizona property. The October 9, 2017, order required Mary to allow the parties’ realtor on the property within two weeks. The order also stated another hearing would be scheduled within three weeks to address Mary's compliance with the court’s earlier orders. The district court found Mary in contempt of the October 9, 2017, order at a October 19, 2017, hearing. Steven's attorney informed the court Mary continued to deny access to the Arizona realtor. The court issued its contempt order on November 13, 2017, ordering Mary to pay the other parties’ attorney’s fees and stated Mary “shall be imprisoned for a period of six (6) months, or until compliance with the aforementioned Order is achieved, whichever is shorter.” After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Mary failed to timely appeal two of the contempt orders, and dismissed her appeal of those orders. The Court reversed and remanded the remaining contempt order. The Court affirmed the order denying the motion to vacate. View "Orwig v. Orwig" on Justia Law

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Aaron Cockfield appealed dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the City of Fargo to reinstate him as an employee. Cockfield was employed by the City’s Solid Waste Department. In 2017, Cockfield was asked to perform a specific task within the scope of his employment. Cockfield refused to do it. Cockfield’s acting route supervisor, Shawn Eckre, approached Cockfield to talk about it. Cockfield was seated when Eckre approached, Cockfield stood up and pushed Eckre, and the push caused Eckre to fall against a wall. Cockfield was informed his conduct violated City policy, including the workplace violence policy. Cockfield was given an opportunity to provide an explanation of the incident. Cockfield did not deny refusing to perform the requested work, and he admitted he had pushed Eckre. At the conclusion of the meeting, Ludlum advised Cockfield the City was terminating his employment. Cockfield was told the reason for his termination, and he was provided with written notice of the termination. The Fargo Civil Service Commission upheld the termination. Following a hearing, the City Commission upheld the termination. Cockfield argues the district court abused its discretion by concluding he was provided with adequate pre-termination due process. The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with Cockfield's contentions, and affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing his request for mandamus relief. View "Cockfield v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

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Shirley Linn appealed a district court order denying her petition seeking a distribution of trust assets, after the court concluded the unambiguous language of the trust agreement did not compel the requested distributions. Stephen Linn, Deborah Wagner, and Mark Wagner cross-appealed the district court’s denial of their request for a recovery of their attorney fees incurred in responding to Shirley Linn’s petition. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trust agreement’s language was ambiguous, and reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings with the district court. View "Trust of Linn" on Justia Law

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Robert and Laurie Banderet and other plaintiffs (“Landowners”) appealed a judgment dismissing their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Sargent County Water Resource District and Ransom County Water Resource District relating to a drainage project. The Landowners had sought a judgment declaring: (1) the Drain 11 project could not be funded as maintenance within six years at $4 per acre being assessed to the Landowners; (2) the Landowners were entitled to a hearing and vote on the project; and (3) benefited properties in Ransom County had to be included in the Drain 11 assessment district. The Landowners requested a permanent injunction restraining the Sargent County Water Resource District from proceeding with the Drain 11 project. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Landowners were not entitled to equitable relief, and the district court properly dismissed the Landowners’ complaint. View "Banderet,et al. vs. Sargent Count Water Resource District, et al." on Justia Law

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Mari Bindas appealed an order terminating Michael Bindas’ spousal support obligation. The parties filed a marital termination agreement, agreeing to spousal support and distribution of the marital estate. The parties agreed Michael Bindas would pay spousal support to Mari Bindas in the amount of $3,200 per month until she was 62 years old. The parties further agreed the spousal support would continue until the death of either party, Mari Bindas remarried, or the payment on February 1, 2023, had been made. The district court approved and adopted the parties’ termination agreement in its order. In November 2009, a judgment was entered incorporating the parties’ entire agreement. In January 2018, Michael moved to modify his spousal support obligation, arguing the spousal support should be terminated under N.D.C.C. 14-05- 24.1(3) because Mari had been habitually cohabiting with her boyfriend for more than one year. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the parties’ written agreement satisfied the “[u]nless otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing” exception to N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1(3); the statute did not require termination of Mari’s spousal support upon a finding of cohabitation. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting Michael Bindas’ motion to modify spousal support, and misapplied the law by concluding it was required to terminate the spousal support under N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1(3). View "Bindas v. Bindas" on Justia Law

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Eric Smith appealed district court orders and judgment related to child custody, dismissal of motions for contempt and the court finding him a vexatious litigant. In November 2015, Smith commenced an action to determine primary residential responsibility, decision-making authority and child support. The first judgment was entered on January 8, 2016. Smith has represented himself since the district court entered the initial order. From January 2016 to date, over four-hundred docket entries appeared, including seven motions for contempt by Smith against Emily Erickson or her attorney, two requests for review by the district court, and several letters and communications from Smith to the referees or judges assigned to the matter. On January 5, 2018, a referee issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order for amended judgment granting Erickson primary residential responsibility and decisionmaking authority over the child. Smith requested review by a district court judge. On February 28, 2018, the district court found Smith in contempt for nonpayment of child support and issued an order with amended findings. On March 29, 2018, Smith filed a notice of appeal from the “final judgment issued on March 16, 2018.” No orders or judgments exist for that date. On April 23, 2018, the district court issued an order finding Smith a vexatious litigant and prohibiting him from filing new documents in the case without leave of court. Smith filed three additional notices of appeal, in total citing to seven separate orders and judgments. Smith submitted a one-page brief in support of the multiple notices of appeal. Smith did not file transcripts. The North Dakota Supreme Court held oral argument on November 21, 2018, and Smith did not appear. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders and judgment regarding parenting responsibility, contempt and finding Smith a vexatious litigant. View "Smith v. Erickson" on Justia Law

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In August 2016, Riley Kuntz submitted written requests for documents under the North Dakota open records law to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation ("BCI"), the Department of Transportation ("DOT"), and the Criminal Justice Information Sharing ("CJIS") Director, seeking records relating to an agreement with "the FBI authorizing or allowing the search of any ND Driver License or non-photo identification database pursuant to a request from any government agency for the purposes of FACE or FIRS or NGI-IPS." BCI denied his request; the DOT provided a two-page attorney general opinion. In December, Kuntz submitted a request under FOIA to the federal Government Accountability Office ("GAO") requesting records related to an agreement between the FBI and any government agency authorizing the search of the North Dakota driver license information databases. In a February 2017 letter, the GAO responded and confirmed the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the FBI, CJIS, Attorney General, and BCI concerning searches of the North Dakota Attorney General BCI facial recognition photo repository. However, because the GAO obtained the MOU from the FBI, the GAO informed him it was GAO policy not to release records from its files that originated in another agency or organization. In July 2017, Kuntz submitted written requests under the open records law to the North Dakota Attorney General, BCI, CJIS Director, and DOT, stating in part seeking the MOU between the FBI, Criminal Justice Information Services Division and ND Attorney General. BCI requested clarification on Kuntz's request; the DOT requested payment of a fulfillment fee. Kuntz replied to the DOT but did not pay the fee. In September 2017, Kuntz commenced the underlying lawsuit, naming as defendants the State, the BCI, the CJIS Director, the DOT, the North Dakota Attorney General, the Deputy Director of BCI, and the individuals who responded to Kuntz's records requests (collectively, the "State"). The parties did not dispute on appeal that while the state Solicitor General accepted service on behalf of the defendants in this case, Kuntz did not personally serve any of the defendants in their individual capacities. Kuntz's complaint claims violations of state open records laws; alleges claims for fraud, federal civil rights violations and attorney's fees; and also seeks declaratory relief. His complaint essentially claims the State, through its various agencies, had denied the existence of, or failed to respond to his open records request for, the specified MOU document. Kuntz appealed when the district court granted the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing his claims with prejudice against the State defendants. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in dismissing his open records law claim under N.D.C.C. 44-04-21.2. However, the court did not err in dismissing his remaining claims and in denying his motions for default judgment, to amend the complaint, and to award sanctions. View "Kuntz v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

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Larry and Julie Schindler and the estate of Eugene Weisbeck appealed a judgment dismissing their action to reform warranty deeds and quiet title in themselves to certain Morton County, North Dakota property. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court could not determine whether the district court correctly applied the law, it reversed and remanded for further development of the record. View "Schindler v. Wageman" on Justia Law

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Trina Iverson appealed a district court order finding a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility had not been established with regard to the parties' two youngest children, G.I.H. and G.O.H. Iverson also claimed the district court erred when it denied her motion to amend the findings and order. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded a prima facie case was been established for G.I.H. and G.O.H., it was unnecessary to determine if the district court erred when it denied Iverson's motion to amend the findings and order. The Court concluded Iverson established a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility of G.I.H. and G.O.H. and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, it reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings to determine if modification of primary residential responsibility for G.I.H. and G.O.H. was appropriate. View "Heidt v. Heidt" on Justia Law