Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Angus Kennedy owned real property and mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In 1960, Angus and his wife, Lois, executed two deeds conveying the surface and “excepting and reserving unto the parties of the first part, their heirs, successors or assigns, all right, title and interest in and to any and all . . . minerals in or under the foregoing described lands.” Lois did not own an interest in the property when Angus and Lois Kennedy executed the deeds. Angus died in 1965, and Lois died in 1980. Angus and Lois did not have children together. Angus had six children from a previous marriage. Angus' heirs executed numerous mineral leases for the property. Lois had one child, Julia Nevin, who died in 1989. In 2016 and 2017, Julia Nevin’s surviving husband, Stanley Nevin, executed mineral leases with Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. In 2018, Stanley sued the successors in interest to Angus, alleging Lois owned half of the minerals reserved in the 1960 deeds. In response, the Angus heirs claimed Angus did not intend to reserve any minerals to Lois because she did not own an interest in the property conveyed in the 1960 deeds. The district court granted Northern Oil’s motion to intervene. Northern Oil appeals the quiet title judgment deciding Northern Oil did not own mineral interests in the McKenzie County property, arguing the district court erred in concluding the deeds at issue were ambiguous as to whether Angus intended to reserve minerals to his wife, Lois. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nevin, et al. v. Kennedy, et al." on Justia Law

Travis Iversen appealed a judgment entered in favor of appellee, Larson Latham Huettl, LLP (hereafter “LLH”), and an order denying relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j). Iversen was an attorney employed by LLH from February 2019 until July 2021. Iversen asserts that Tyrone Turner, an LLH partner, told Iversen that “you can only do the work that we give you.” After Iversen terminated his employment with LLH, LLH requested that Iversen refund it $35,772.63 for overpayment. LLH argues that Iversen owes this debt to LLH because he had not been credited with sufficient billable hours to justify the compensation he received under the employment agreement. Iversen refused to pay the deficiency, and LLH then sued Iversen. The district court issued a memorandum opinion granting LLH’s motion for summary judgment. Before judgment was entered, Iversen filed a “motion for reconsideration” citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j). The district court denied Iversen’s motion. Iverson argued that several genuine issues of material fact remained, precluding summary judgment. He also argued the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion under Rule 59(j). Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and the order denying Iversen’s Rule 59(j) motion. View "Larson Latham Huettl, LLP v. Iversen" on Justia Law

L&C Expedition, LLC (“L&C”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of International Fidelity Insurance Company (“IFIC”) and denying summary judgment to L&C. L&C contracted with Unlimited Excavating (“Unlimited”) to perform work on a residential development project. Unlimited completed its work in November 2016 and received final payment in July 2017. In 2019, L&C learned of major problems in the construction and notified Unlimited it needed to make repairs. Unlimited did not make the repairs and L&C demanded IFIC arrange for performance of Unlimited’s work per the terms of the performance bond. IFIC refused to arrange for performance. L&C subsequently initiated suit against IFIC in May 2020 arguing L&C is entitled to recover $393,000 under the terms of the performance bond. The performance bond provided the following: “[a]ny suit under this bond must be[] [i]nstituted before the expiration of two years from the date on which final payment under the subcontract falls due.” The parties do not dispute the district court’s finding L&C initiated its action outside the limitation period provided within the terms of the bond. L&C argued the district court erred in finding a contractual limitation on the period to assert a claim was enforceable, erred in failing to apply N.D.C.C. § 9-08-05 to preclude modification of the applicable statute of limitations, and erred in interpreting N.D.C.C. § 22-03-03 as providing an exception to the prohibition against modifying the applicable statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "L&C Expedition, et al. v. Swenson, Hagen and Co., et al." on Justia Law

Brian and April Szostak appealed a district court’s order granting a second motion for sanctions, and the court’s finding of facts, conclusions of law, and order for judgment and judgment. Panther Pressure Testers Inc., and Kirk Wold sued the Szostaks alleging the Szostaks and Wold formed a company named Szostak Services, LLC. Panther and Wold alleged Wold was a member of Szostak Services and the company breached their contract by failing to recognize him as a member. Panther and Wold claim the Szostaks were unjustly enriched after Panther and Wold erroneoysly deposited funds into a Szostak Services bank account and the Szostaks refused to return the funds. The Szostaks answered and counterclaimed. The Szostaks served discovery responses, but did not provide requested documents. Panther and Wold moved for sanctions due to Szostaks’ non-compliance with the district court’s order compelling discovery. At a deposition, for which a subpoena duces tecum was issued, April Szostak revealed she and her husband had 12 boxes of documents pertaining to Szostak Services, but Szostak Services did not bring any documents to the deposition. Panther and Wold moved again for sanctions, requesting the district court enter a default judgment against the Szostaks and dismiss their counterclaims. The Szostaks argued the court abused its discretion by granting Panther and Wold’s second motion for sanctions and entering default judgment. The Szostaks also argued the court erred in its determination of damages. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the default judgment. View "Panther Pressure Testers, et al. v. Szostak, et al." on Justia Law

John and Tammy Sadek appealed orders denying their post-judgment motion and sanctioning their attorney under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11. Jason Weber was a Richland County, North Dakota sheriff’s deputy. Sadek acted as a confidential informant for Weber. Sadek was later found in the Red River with a gunshot wound to his head and a backpack full of rocks tied to his body. Sadek’s parents sued Weber and Richland County alleging Weber deceived Sadek by telling Sadek he faced a lengthy prison sentence. They also alleged Weber negligently caused Sadek’s death by failing to adequately train and protect him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weber and Richland County: the misrepresentation underlying the deceit claim was a prediction of a future event and therefore not actionable as deceit as a matter of law; as to the negligence claim, there was no evidence to establish Weber’s conduct was the proximate cause of Sadek’s death. In the first appeal ("Sadek I"), the Sadeks argued a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Weber’s conduct caused Andrew Sadek’s death. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the evidence only presents a timeline of events and a request that a jury be allowed to speculate what happened as a result of that string of events." The Court's mandate affirming the dismissal judgment was issued on October 7, 2020. In 2022, the Sadeks filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) but requested relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. The Sadeks argued the district court made a mistake by relying on “bad faith” representations by Weber who “successfully hoodwinked [the district court] and obtained a Judgment of Dismissal.” Yet the Sadeks claimed they were entitled to summary judgment because “no triable issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants owed a duty of care to Andrew under the Statute.” The brief was accompanied by a list of signatures “verifying” they agreed with on Supreme Court Justice's dissent in Sadek I. The district court entered an order denying the Sadeks’ post-judgment motion, characterizing it as "baffling and bizarre." After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders and granted the Appellees’ motion for sanctions. View "Sadek, et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Alonna Knorr, formerly known as Alonna Knorr Norberg, appealed a money judgment entered in favor of Jon Norberg for Knorr’s share of unpaid expenses assigned to her under the divorce judgment. Knorr argued the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss or vacate the order granting Norberg’s motion to amend the judgment because the parties had a global settlement agreement that resolved the issues in this case. In Knorr v. Norberg, 2022 ND 139, 977 N.W.2d 711, the North Dakota Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded for the district court to consider the settlement agreement and for an explanation of the basis for its decision. View "Norberg v. Norberg, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Eagle Crest Apartments, LLC, et al. appealed a judgment awarding UMB Bank N.A. more than $21 million in an action for breach of contract, foreclosure, fraudulent transfers, and deceit. The Defendants raised a number of issues on appeal. The North Dakota limited review to the issues raised in defendants' motion for a new trial, and concluded the district court did not err when it entered a deficiency judgment and pierced the Defendants’ corporate veils. View "UMB Bank N.A. v. Eagle Crest Apartments, et al." on Justia Law

T.K. (mother) appealed an order denying her petition to terminate D.D.G.’s, parental rights to the children J.J.G., M.K.G., and O.J.G and from an order denying her motion for a new trial. T.K. and D.D.G., the father, had three children together: J.J.G. born in 2008; M.K.G. born in 2009; and O.J.G. born in 2014. In September 2021, the mother petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights, alleging the father abandoned the children. She alleged the father has a history of drug use, he abused her in front of the children, he has not seen or communicated with the two younger children for three years, he had one visit with the oldest child in 2019 and another visit in 2020, and he has not provided any financial support for the children. An evidentiary hearing was held; and the mother, father, and other relatives testified. The district court denied the mother’s petition, concluding there was not clear and convincing evidence the father abandoned the children. The mother moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59. T.K. argued the district court erred by failing to terminate D.D.G.’s parental rights, there was clear and convincing evidence he abandoned the children, and the court erred by denying her motion for a new trial. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial. View "Interest of J.J.G., M.K.G. & O.J.G." on Justia Law

Thomas Burckhard appealed a judgment entered following consideration of Larson Latham Huettl LLP’s motion for summary judgment. Burckhard began employment with Larson Latham Huettl LLP (hereinafter LLH) in January 2019. In May 2019 Burckhard signed an employment contract, under which Burckhard agreed he would receive compensation based upon projected hours billed. Any overpayment resulting from a deficiency between the projected hours he would bill and the actual hours he billed would be considered a debt owed by Burckhard to LLH. Burckhard’s employment with LLH ended on August 15, 2020. At that time, Burckhard was paid for 697.88 projected billable hours more than his actual billable hours resulting in an overpayment of compensation in the amount of $29,885.38. LLH filed suit alleging breach of contract seeking to recover the excess compensation plus pre-judgment interest. The district court granted LLH’s motion finding there were no issues of material fact and LLH was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burckhard appealed, arguing summary judgment was improper because the contract’s purpose was frustrated, the contract is unconscionable, the contract fails for lack of consideration, LLH waived its right to obtain payment, there is a genuine dispute as to the amount of the damages, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Burckhard additional time for discovery. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined Burckhard failed to prove there was a genuine dispute as to any material fact. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of LLH and properly dismissed all of Burckhard’s affirmative defenses. View "Larson Latham Huettl, LLP v. Burckhard" on Justia Law

Otter Tail Power Company provided electric service to the City of Drayton, North Dakota under a franchise agreement. In August 2019, Drayton annexed to the city property known as McFarland’s Addition. In November 2019, an entity purchased a portion of McFarland’s Addition with the intention of building a truck stop. In April 2020, Drayton passed a resolution requiring Otter Tail to provide electric service to McFarland’s Addition. Nodak Electric Coop provided service to rural customers outside of Drayton, and did not provide services to customers in McFarland’s Addition. Nodak did not have a franchise from Drayton to provide electric service in the city. Nodak filed suit against Otter Tail, requesting the Public Service Commission to prohibit Otter Tail from extending electric service to McFarland’s Addition. Nodak alleged Otter Tail’s service would interfere with Nodak’s existing service and be an unreasonable duplication of services. In response, Otter Tail claimed the PSC lacked jurisdiction over Drayton’s decision on which provider could extend service within the city. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the PSC lacked jurisdiction to rule on Nodak’s complaint, and reversed and vacated the PSC’s order: Otter Tail’s motion to dismiss should have been granted. View "Nodak Electric Coop. v. N.D. Public Svc. Commission, et al." on Justia Law