Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was born prematurely by emergency cesarean section at New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. (HHC) in June 2005. He was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit and discharged in stable condition in August 2005. In January 2007, more than 90 days after the claim arose, without first obtaining leave of court as required by General Municipal Law 50-e (5), plaintiff served a notice of claim against HHC alleging negligence and malpractice arising out of failure to properly treat and manage his mother's prenatal care and failure to obtain informed consent with regard to plaintiff's care. The notice claimed that plaintiff sustained brain damage, cognitive defects, developmental, speech and psychomotor delays, fetal and respiratory distress and seizure disorder. Plaintiff filed suit in August 2008, but waited until December 2010, to seek permission to serve late notice of claim. The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal, finding unreasonable an excuse that counsel waited because he needed to receive medical records from HHC. The court held that plaintiff failed to establish "that the medical records put HHC on notice that the alleged malpractice would subsequently give rise to brain damage as a result of birth trauma and hypoxia," The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the medical records must do more than "suggest" that an injury occurred as a result of malpractice in order for the medical provider to have actual knowledge of essential facts. View "Wally G. v NY City Health & Hosps. Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and two counts of assault in the first degree. Defendant, who was fifteen years old at the time of the crime, challenged the judgment of conviction on direct appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by withholding information from an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant received meaningful and effective representation; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., the Court of Appeals held that, where parties include a New York choice-of-law clause in a contract, such a provision demonstrates the parties’ intent that courts not conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis. In the instant case, Plaintiff was a New York not-for-profit corporation that administered a retirement plan and a death benefit plan. Decedent was enrolled in both plans. Decedent named Appellants as beneficiaries. Both plans stated that they shall be governed by and construed in accordance with New York law. After Decedent died, a Colorado court admitted his will to probate. Plaintiff was unsure to whom the plan benefits should be paid after Decedent’s death and commenced a federal interpleader action against Decedent’s Estate, the personal representative (PR) of the Estate, and Appellants. A federal district court directed Plaintiff to pay the disputed funds to the PR, concluding that Colorado’s revocation law terminated any claims to the plans by Appellants. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered by extending the holding in IRB to contracts that do not fall under Gen. Oblig. Law 5-1401 and clarifying that this rule obviates the application and both common-law and conflict-of-laws principles and statutory choice-of-law directives, unless the parties expressly indicate otherwise. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including individual residents of the Village of Painted Post, commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the Village and others (collectively, Respondents), asserting that the Village failed to comply with the strict procedural mandates of the State Environmental Quality Review Act by entering into a bulk water sale agreement with a subsidiary of Shell Oil Co. providing for the sale of 314 million gallons of water from the village water system and by approving a lease agreement with a railroad for the construction of a water transloading facility. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that Petitioners lacked standing and failed to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing after finding that one of the individual petitions had standing. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the petition on the ground that the individual petitioner lacked standing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division, in concluding that the individual petitioner at issue lacked standing, applied an overly restrictive analysis of the requirement to show harm “different from that of the public at large.” View "Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Post" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Alberta, Canada, commenced an action against Defendants in a New York federal court asserting various RICO claims stemming from a dispute over control of an oil field in Siberia. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that a United States federal court could not provide relief. Within six months of the federal action’s termination, Plaintiff refiled in Supreme Court claims arising from the same transaction. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was untimely because Plaintiff’s injuries accrued in Alberta, and Plaintiff’s claim was untimely under Alberta law. Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint as time-barred, concluding that New York’s borrowing statute required her to apply Alberta's shorter limitations period to determine if Plaintiff’s state court action was timely. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that New York’s savings statute permitted the “new” state court action because its “prior” federal court action was timely under the borrowing statute. View "Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Blavatnik" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a transaction between a bank located in United Arab Emirates and a partnership which had its headquarters in Saudi Arabia. The bank sued the partnership to collect an alleged debt and chose to do so in New York Supreme Court. The partnership filed a third-party complaint against a citizen of Saudi Arabia (“citizen”) and a bank headquartered in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The citizen moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens. After the issue was briefed and argued at Supreme Court, the court dismissed both the complaint and the third-party complaint on forum non conveniens grounds. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, Inc. prohibited the dismissal of the main action on forum non conveniens grounds in the absence of a motion seeking that relief and that the dismissal of the third-party complaint was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) VSL did not bar Supreme Court from dismissing the complaint under the circumstances of this case; and (2) Supreme Court was correct as a matter of law in dismissing both the complaint and the third-party complaint. View "Mashreqbank PSC v. Ahmed Hamad A1 Gosaibi & Bros. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a)(4), which allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty. John Kapon was the CEO of Acker, Merrall & Condit Company (AMC), a retailer and auctioneer of fine and rare wines, and the employer of Justin Christoph. In 2008, William Koch commenced an action against AMC in Supreme Court concerning alleged counterfeit wine that Rudy Kurniawan had consigned to AMC and that AMC had sold to Koch. In 2009, Koch commenced a fraud action in California against Kurniawan, alleging that Kurniawan had sold Respondent counterfeit wine through AMC’s auctions and sales. In 2012, Koch, seeking disclosure in the California action, served subpoenas on Kapon and Christoph (together, Petitioners). Petitioners filed motions to quash the subpoena, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that the requested deposition testimony was irrelevant to the prosecution of the California action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the subpoenas satisfied the notice requirement of section 3101(a)(4); and (2) in moving to quash the subpoena, Petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that their deposition testimonies were irrelevant to the California action. View "Kapon v. Koch" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) adopted amendments to regulations pertaining to the protection of endangered and threatened species. The amendments established a formal process through which individuals could obtain a permit to allow for the incidental taking of a threatened or endangered species. Before the agency implemented the regulations at issue, the Town of Riverhead and Twon of Riverhead Community Development Agency (collectively, Riverhead) challenged the amendments. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, finding that Petitioners did not have standing. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing based on their failure to allege an injury in fact and that Petitioners’ substantive challenges were not yet ripe. The Court of Appeals held that Petitioners could proceed with three of their procedural claims, as they alleged a sufficient injury regarding these claims, but Petitioners lacked standing with respect to the substantive causes of action, as those claims were not yet ripe. View "In re Ass'n for a Better Long Island" on Justia Law