Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on the scope of the New Mexico State Engineer’s regulatory authority over use of surface water in New Mexico when it has been diverted from the Animas River into an acequia in Colorado and accessed from that ditch by Petitioners and others in New Mexico. After review, the Court rejected petitioners’ arguments that the State Engineer lacked statutory authority over waters initially diverted outside of New Mexico and had no jurisdiction to enjoin petitioners from irrigating an area of farmland not subject to an existing adjudicated water right or a permit from the State Engineer. The Court held that the State Engineer was authorized by New Mexico law to require a permit for new, expanded, or modified use of this water and to enjoin any unlawful diversion. View "State Engineer v. Diamond K Bar Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

Lenard E. Noice worked as a conductor for Petitioner BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). He fell from a BNSF train that was moving at speed and perished. Respondent, Lenard Noice II, acting as personal representative for Noice (the Estate), filed a wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employee’s Liability Act (FELA), asserting, among other claims, that BNSF negligently permitted the train from which Noice fell to operate at an excessive speed. The undisputed facts established that the train from which Noice fell never exceeded the speed limit for the class of track upon which it was operating. BNSF moved for summary judgment arguing that the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim was precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The district court accepted this argument and dismissed the Estate’s FELA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that FRSA did not preclude a FELA excessive-speed claim. Because FRSA contained no provision expressly precluding the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim and because permitting the Estate’s FELA claim to proceed furthered the purposes of both statutes, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Mary Herrera, when acting as the Secretary of State, terminated the employment of two employees of the Secretary of State’s office, James Flores and Manny Vildasol. In separate actions, Flores and Vildasol each asserted a Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claim against Herrera in her individual capacity. Herrera left office; nevertheless, Flores and Vildasol sought to proceed with their individual-capacity WPA claims against her. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the WPA would allow for a state employee to assert a claim against a state officer in that officer's individual capacity. The Court of Appeals concluded that the WPA allowed the employees to continue their suit, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Court of Appeals. On remand, the Supreme Court instructed the courts to dismiss Flores’s individual-capacity claim against Herrera and, with respect to Flores’s official-capacity claim against Herrera, to enter a substitution order. InVildasol’s case, the Court instructed the trial court to dismiss Vildasol’s individual-capacity claim against Herrera and to proceed with Vildasol’s claim against the Secretary of State’s office. View "Flores v. Herrera" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of San Felipe (Pueblo) appealed a Court of Appeals decision declining to extend the Pueblo immunity from suit. Hamaatsa, Inc. (Hamaatsa) owned land in Sandoval County. Adjacent to Hamaatsa’s property was land owned in fee by the Pueblo. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) conveyed to the Pueblo, in fee simple, the land at issue on December 13, 2001. The property, adjacent and contiguous with reservation land, was not then held in trust by the federal government as part of the Pueblo’s reservation. In its 2001 conveyance to the Pueblo, the BLM reserved an easement and right-of-way over, across the parcel at issue here ( “932 Roads” or “R.S. 2477 Roads,”). The BLM purported to quitclaim its interest in one particular R.S. 2477 to the Pueblo. Hamaatsa used Northern R.S. 2477 on the Pueblo’s property to access its land. In August 2009, Hamaatsa received a letter from the then Governor of the Pueblo stating that Hamaatsa had no legal right of access across the Pueblo’s property and that Hamaatsa’s use of Northern R.S. 2477 was a trespass. Hamaatsa continued to use the road and filed suit requesting that the district court declare that the Pueblo cannot restrict use of the road. The Pueblo moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing its immunity deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear Hamaatsa's case. The Supreme Court agreed the district court lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case for dismissal. View "Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe" on Justia Law

Petitioners, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 18, AFL-CIO, Locals 1461, 2260 and 2499 (AFSCME), brought a declaratory-judgment action challenging the grandfather status of Respondent’s Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County (County Commission), local labor relations board. Both the trial and appellate courts rejected AFSCME’s claims. In its review, the New Mexico Supreme Court focused on the statutory jurisdictional prerequisites of New Mexico’s Declaratory Judgment Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1975), and held that AFSCME’s claims were not ripe, and AFSCME failed to assert an injury-in-fact. Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate AFSCME’s declaratory-judgment action. The case was remanded to the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals also lacked jurisdiction, and its opinion was vacated. View "AFSCME v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bernalillo Cty." on Justia Law

In a certified appeal, the issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's consideration was whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied to actions under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA), an issue of first impression in New Mexico. Alice Brice (Decedent) died in an automobile accident in 2006, when her 2002 Toyota Camry suddenly accelerated into a highway intersection, collided with a tractor-trailer, and burst into flames. The Estate of Alice C. Brice (Plaintiff) filed a wrongful death lawsuit in 2010, asserting products liability and various other claims against the car manufacturer, the dealer, and others (Defendants). Because this wrongful death action was filed three years and eleven months from the date of Decedent’s death, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants prevented Plaintiff from obtaining knowledge about the cause of action, that Defendants were aware of the sudden acceleration problem in its vehicles for most of the decade preceding 2010 and well before Decedent’s 2006 accident, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed these problems until February 2010 when the sudden acceleration problems drew public attention and led to congressional hearings. Plaintiff contended that it had no way to discover its wrongful death cause of action before February 2010. Plaintiff asserted therefore that after discovering its cause of action, it promptly filed its wrongful death suit on August 31, 2010. The district court granted Defendants' motion. After review, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment could apply to toll the statutory limitations period for a wrongful death claim if a defendant has fraudulently concealed a cause of action, thereby preventing that defendant from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense until the plaintiff learned or, through reasonable diligence, could have learned of the cause of action. Accordingly the Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Brice v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, acting as trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital 1 Inc. Trust 2006-NC4 (Deutsche Bank), filed a complaint seeking foreclosure on Respondent Johnny Johnston's home (Homeowner), and attached to its complaint an unindorsed note, mortgage, and land recording, both naming a third party as the mortgagee. Deutsche Bank later provided documentation and testimony showing that :(1) a document assigning the mortgage to Deutsche Bank was dated prior to the filing of the complaint but recorded after the complaint was filed; (2) Deutsche Bank possessed a version of the note indorsed in blank at the time of trial; and (3) a servicing company began servicing the loan to Homeowner on behalf of Deutsche Bank prior to the filing of the complaint. After receiving this evidence, the district court found that Deutsche Bank had standing to foreclose on Homeowner’s property. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that “standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a cause of action,” and concluded that the evidence provided by Deutsche Bank did not establish its standing as of the time it filed its complaint. The Supreme Court held that standing was not a jurisdictional prerequisite in this case. Nonetheless the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion that the evidence provided by Deutsche Bank did not establish standing. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Johnston" on Justia Law

Environmental contamination from Shell Western Exploration and Production, Inc. and Shell Oil Company's operations was discovered in Hobbs. Residents near the area brought a toxic tort action against Shell for personal injury damages, alleging the contaminants cause their autoimmune disorders. Plaintiffs challenged the district court's exclusion of the scientific evidence and expert testimony they offered in support of their theory, and they challenged the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Shell. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court applied an incorrect standard of admissibility in its evidentiary rulings, and that plaintiffs' causation evidence should have been admitted. Because summary judgment to Shell's culpability for autoimmune disorders was granted because of this improper exclusion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Acosta v. Shell W. Expl. & Prod., Inc." on Justia Law