Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Samuel Provenza, formerly employed as a police officer by defendant Town of Canaan (Town), appealed a superior court order: (1) denying his petition for declaratory judgment and “request for temporary and permanent injunctive and other relief”; and (2) granting the cross-claim of the intervenor, the Valley News. Provenza sought to bar public disclosure of an investigative report commissioned by the Town as a result of a motor vehicle stop in which he was involved while still employed by the Town as a police officer; the Valley News sought release of the report under RSA chapter 91-A, the Right-to-Know Law. See RSA ch. 91-A (2013 & Supp. 2021). Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Provenza v. Town of Canaan" on Justia Law

Respondent K.C. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her to involuntary admission to the New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) for a two-year period, to be discharged when clinically appropriate. On appeal, respondent contended NHH presented insufficient evidence at the hearing to support the circuit court’s order. Respondent was diagnosed with bipolar I disorder with manic, psychotic features. She had contacted police in the previous year 300-400 times, believing someone was hacking her phone and “rerouting her to people in black ops.” She had two active protective orders preventing her from contacting her ex-husband and another man, and there was outstanding criminal complaints from her violating those orders. Respondent was admitted to NHH, whereupon she was evaluated by psychiatrists, and the decision was ultimately made to have her committed. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court’s order, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding the evidence presented at respondent’s hearing was sufficient on which to have her involuntarily committed. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

Defendants GMPM Company and 479 Maple Street, LLC, appealed a circuit court order granting the petition for wrongful eviction filed by plaintiff Melissa Natal. On appeal, defendants argued the circuit court erred by determining that its property was not a “shared facility” as defined by RSA 540-B:1 (2021). Specifically, defendants argued RSA 540-B:1 did not require that an owner occupy the premises, but, rather, only that an owner have access to the common areas for the purposes of cleaning, maintaining, and monitoring the premises. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, for property to qualify as a shared facility under RSA 540-B:1, the owner had to reside at the premises with the occupants. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Natal v. GMPM Company & al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Bisceglia appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants' the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (collectively the State). The court ruled that the State was immune from liability for plaintiff’s negligence claim under New Hampshire’s recreational use statute. Plaintiff and her family visited a historic lighthouse situated on land in New Castle, which was owned by the United States. That federal land was adjacent to Fort Constitution, which was owned and operated by the State. While plaintiff was standing on the federal land next to the outer wall of Fort Constitution, a portion of the wall fell on top of her, causing her substantial injuries. The trial court determined that because the State “held Fort Constitution out to the public at no charge” and the wall “was maintained as part of the historic site for the use and enjoyment of the public,” RSA 508:14, I, shielded the State from liability, “regardless of whether Plaintiff was physically on [the State’s] property at the time of the injury.” The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding it was undisputed that plaintiff did not use the State’s land; the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment based on RSA 508:14, I. View "Bisceglia v. New Hampshire Secretary of State & al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff B&C Management (B&C) appealed a superior court order ruling that 911 audio recordings were exempt from disclosure under the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law, and denying its request for equitable discovery of a 911 audio recording in the possession of defendant New Hampshire Division of Emergency Services and Communications (the Division). On June 16, 2019, a 911 call was placed to the Division, reporting that a guest was injured in a trip-and-fall incident at B&C’s Fireside Inn in Nashua. Subsequently, the guest’s attorney sent a letter to B&C indicating an intent to investigate the fall. This letter did not demand a sum for settlement, and the guest had not filed a lawsuit. B&C submitted a request to the Division under the Right-to-Know Law for the audio recording of the 911 call. The Division denied this request. Then, B&C filed an action in the superior court seeking to compel the release of the 911 audio recording pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law, or, in the alternative, pursuant to the court’s equitable powers. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied B&C’s requests. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded B&C did not demonstrate the trial court erred by ruling that it was not entitled to the 911 recording under the Right-to-Know Law. Further, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that B&C failed to show why the trial court should have granted its request for equitable discovery. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "B&C Management v. New Hampshire Division of Emergency Services" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court arose from the New Hampshire Division of State Police's decision to terminate State Trooper Thomas Owens after an internal investigation. The Trooper appealed his termination to the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB), which reinstated him. The Division appealed, arguing that the PAB’s reinstatement of the Trooper was unjust and unreasonable because he was no longer qualified to be a state trooper. It also argued that the PAB erred as a matter of law when it reinstated the employee in contravention of public policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Chenard appealed a superior court ruling that he operated or maintained a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114. Plaintiff Town of Lincoln (town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for costs and attorney’s fees. Defendant owned the property at issue, consisting of four lots located in the town's "General Use" zoning district, which allowed junk yards only by special exception. The properties contained “large amounts of personal belongings” stored “both outdoors and in a number of sheds, which are generally in a dilapidated condition.” During its view of the properties, the court observed “old or used scrap metal including numerous machine or automotive parts, tires, wheels, cables and wiring, woodstoves, snowplows, construction debris, steel drums, plastic barrels, and other detritus.” In addition, the court observed “several automobiles that did not appear to be in working order, as well as old snowmobiles, lawnmowers, and ATVs, an old boat, and two semi-trailers.” All of the materials stored on defendant’s properties belonged to him and were stored there for his personal use. Defendant did not have a license to operate a junk yard business, nor did he have a special exception from the town. The superior court ultimately ordered defendant to end his violation of RSA 236:114 and abate the nuisance by a certain date and, if he failed to do so, authorized the town to impose a civil penalty of up to $50 per day for every day the nuisance continued and until such time as the nuisance was abated to the town’s satisfaction. The trial court denied the town’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. Finding that the trial court did not err in finding that provisions of RSA 236:111-:129 applied to defendant’s properties, and that defendant was operating or maintaining a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114, and that the town was not entitled to attorney's fees, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Lincoln v. Joseph Chenard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott Paine appealed a superior court decision granting judgment on the pleadings for his employment discrimination claim against defendant, Ride-Away, Inc. Plaintiff suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) for many years, which substantially limited a major life activity. He was employed by defendant at its facility in Londonderry, New Hampshire as an automotive detailer in May 2018. In July 2018, his physician prescribed cannabis to help treat his PTSD, and plaintiff enrolled in New Hampshire’s therapeutic cannabis program. Plaintiff submitted a written request to defendant for an exception from its drug testing policy as a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Plaintiff explained that he was not requesting permission to use cannabis during work hours or to possess cannabis on defendant’s premises. Plaintiff was informed that he could no longer work for the company if he used cannabis. After plaintiff notified defendant that he was going to treat his PTSD with cannabis, his employment was terminated in September 2018. Plaintiff sued for employment discrimination, based on defendant’s failure to make reasonable accommodation for his disability. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that, because marijuana use was both illegal and criminalized under federal law, the requested accommodation was facially unreasonable. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion. The sole question before the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether the court erred in ruling that the use of therapeutic cannabis prescribed in accordance with New Hampshire law could not, as a matter of law, be a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability under RSA chapter 354-A. The Supreme Court held the trial court erred in determining that the use of therapeutic cannabis prescribed in accordance with RSA chapter 126-X could not, as a matter of law, be a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability under RSA chapter 354-A. "[P]laintiff’s disability is PTSD, not the illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Paine v. Ride-Away, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent-father Nedim Suljevic appealed a circuit court order denying his motion for the court to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over the parties’ custody dispute pursuant to New Hampshire’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and granting petitioner-mother Senay Akin's petition to enforce the parties’ Turkish child custody order. The parties, who both have or previously had Turkish citizenship, were married in December 2010 and had a daughter the following year. According to Mother, the parties married in New Hampshire, and when she was pregnant with their daughter, she moved to Turkey while Father continued to reside in the United States. The parties’ daughter was born in Turkey in December 2011 and, until the events giving rise to this proceeding occurred in 2019, lived in Turkey continuously, attending school and receiving medical care there. The parties were divorced by a Turkish court in January 2015; the decree granted Mother sole custody of the child and allowed Father to have visitation with her. In 2019, Mother agreed that the daughter could spend July and August in the United States to visit Father. However, at the end of this two-month visit, Father refused to return the daughter to Mother. Mother made repeated overtures to Father for the daughter’s return, but he refused her entreaties. Mother accepted employment in Massachusetts during the 2020-2021 timeframe so that she could visit the daughter. During this time, Father continually rejected Mother’s requests for the daughter’s return to her custody. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic and difficulty finding a suitable attorney, Mother did not bring a court action for the daughter’s return until filing the underlying petition for expedited enforcement of a foreign child custody order in April 2021. Father was served with Mother’s petition, and then filed his own motion at issue here. As grounds for his motion, Father argued Mother physically abused the daughter while in the Mother's custody. Mother objected to Father’s motion, asserting that he had “refused repeatedly to return [her] daughter” and had issued threats. Mother asserted that Father “should not be allowed to litigate in New Hampshire when the Turkish order controls custody.” After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's decision to deny Father's request, and to grant Mother's petition to enforce the parties' Turkish child custody order. View "In the Matter of Akin & Suljevic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Patricia Crowe appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to defendant Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC (Appalachian), on Crowe’s claim that Appalachian violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and RSA chapter 354-A by refusing to accommodate her sciatica. Crowe worked at Appalachian as an assembler, which required her to have the ability to bend, lift and turn freely. After a trip to the emergency room, Crowe returned to work and informed her supervisor she had been diagnosed with sciatica. Crowe requested the ability to sit until her pain subsided and she could resume standing. Appalachian requested a doctor’s note explaining her condition; she obliged with the emergency room discharge instructions that stated, “NO LIFTING, BENDING OR STOOPING FOR 1 WEEK.” After reviewing the discharge instructions, Appalachian sent Crowe home until she was released to work by her doctor. On June 1, 2017, after Crowe missed work for eight days without providing an update on her condition, Appalachian determined that she had voluntarily quit. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appalachian on the ground that Crowe had not established she was a “qualified individual” under the ADA or RSA chapter 354-A. On appeal, Crowe argued that she could have performed the essential functions of her job if Appalachian had not sent her home and, instead, continued to allow her to sit as requested. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that an employer, did not need to provide futile or ineffective accommodations. "Once Crowe was on leave, Appalachian was entitled to rely on the doctor’s evaluation that Crowe was unable to return to work. ... although a request for leave can, in some circumstances, trigger an employer’s obligation to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA, Crowe’s doctor’s inquiry about the availability of FMLA was not such a request." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly determined that Appalachian was entitled to summary judgment on Crowe’s ADA and RSA chapter 354-A claims. View "Crowe v. Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC" on Justia Law