Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Jonathan Wolfgram appealed a superior court order affirming a decision by respondent the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS), to retain notations on petitioner’s motor vehicle record referring to his certification and decertification as a habitual offender, despite the fact that the convictions that led to his habitual offender certification had been annulled. Petitioner argued that, because the habitual offender notations revealed the fact of his annulled criminal convictions, allowing DOS to retain the notations on his motor vehicle record defeated the purpose of the annulment statute. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, reversed and remanded. View "Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kathleen Nawn-Benoit and Thomas Benoit appealed a superior court order granting the summary judgment motion filed by defendants Ronald and Rita Delude, and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. In July 2014, over the objections of several lot owners in the parties' subdivision, plaintiffs obtained a variance to build a single-family residence on property designated as Common Land in their original 1974 plans. A "Declaration of Covenants" was recorded with the development plan, making all lots in the development subject to the Declaration, and the intention of the Developer to create "open spaces and other common facilities for the benefit of [that] community." In January 2015, plaintiffs brought a petition against the residents of the subdivision seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Declaration was unenforceable; (2) an order that they acquired title to the Common Land “free and clear of the Declaration through adverse possession”; and (3) to the extent that the Declaration was deemed enforceable, an order requiring defendants to form a homeowners' association, purchase the Common Land from plaintiffs “at its fair market value,” and reimburse them for their “out-of-pocket expenses . . . , including real estate taxes.” The trial court concluded that “[b]ecause the undisputed material facts and the applicable law apply equally to the [plaintiffs’] claims asserted against all of the other [defendant]-lot owners, they are likewise entitled to summary judgment.” The court subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Benoit v. Cerasaro" on Justia Law

Defendant Michelle Willette appealed a circuit court decision issuing a writ of possession in favor of plaintiff, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). In February 2013, Freddie Mac purchased Willette's property through a foreclosure sale. Freddie Mac subsequently filed a landlord and tenant writ in the district division seeking possession of the premises. After a hearing, Willette filed the required recognizance with the district division and then filed a title action in superior court. In April 2014, Freddie Mac removed the title action from the superior court to the federal district court. The federal district court granted Freddie Mac’s motion to dismiss Willette’s title action. Afterward, Freddie Mac filed a motion in superior court for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied. Freddie Mac then requested a hearing in the district division on the merits of its possessory action. At the hearing, Willette argued that the district division lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession. The district division disagreed and issued the writ. On appeal, Willette argued that the district division erred in issuing the writ of possession because: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over the possessory action; and (2) Freddie Mac failed to obtain judgment pertaining to its possessory action in both the superior court and the federal district court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Willette" on Justia Law

Respondents Marco Dorfsman and the University of New Hampshire Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (Union), appealed a superior court order granting the petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioners the University System of New Hampshire Board of Trustees and the University of New Hampshire (collectively, UNH). The superior court vacated the arbitrator’s decision that UNH had violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Union by terminating Dorfsman’s employment for engaging in an act of “moral turpitude.” Dorfsman was an Associate Professor and the Chair of the Language, Literature, and Culture Department at UNH. In December of that year, he intentionally lowered the evaluations that students had given a certain lecturer by erasing markings on the evaluations; if the highest ranking had been given, he entered a different and lower rating. In May 2013, UNH terminated Dorfsman’s employment for this conduct, which UNH determined constituted an act of “moral turpitude” within the meaning of the CBA. Dorfsman and the Union grieved his termination, and, pursuant to the CBA, the parties submitted to binding arbitration to resolve that grievance. On appeal, respondents argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s decision, the issues were not ripe for judicial review, and the arbitrator did not exceed his authority when he found that UNH lacked just cause to terminate Dorfsman’s employment. Respondents did not challenge the arbitrator’s finding that Dorfsman’s conduct constituted “moral turpitude” within the meaning of the CBA. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "University System of New Hampshire Board of Trustees v. Dorfsman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Farrelly appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Concord police officers Walter Carroll and Eric Pichler and the City of Concord (city), on grounds that defendants were entitled to official and vicarious immunity. Plaintiff was charged with harassing his ex-girlfriend. Carroll and Pichler drafted the criminal complaint against the plaintiff. Ultimately, the charges against plaintiff were dropped. Plaintiff brought claims against the defendants for: (1) malicious prosecution (count I); (2) false imprisonment (count II); (3) violation of his rights of free speech and against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New Hampshire Constitution (count III); and (4) negligence (count IV). The court rejected the defendants’ arguments based upon RSA 594:13 and RSA 594:10, and found that the warrantless arrest was unlawful. However, the court ruled that the defendants were immune from suit. The court granted summary judgment to the city on count IV (negligence) because it concluded that the exception to municipal immunity found in RSA 507-B:2 (2010) does not apply, as the claim asserted therein has no nexus to cars or premises. This case presented a question of whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in "Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co.," (156 N.H. 202 (2007)) applied to intentional torts. The Court concluded that it did, and that the language set forth in "Huckins v. McSweeney," (166 N.H. 176 (2014)) had to be interpreted consistently with the standard articulated in Everitt. Although the Court found this to be a close case, the Court ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Farrelly v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Respondents Mesiti Development, Inc., JVL Construction Company, Inc., and Brook Hollow Corporation, appealed a superior court order dismissing their counterclaims against petitioner Town of Londonderry. In 2012, the Town filed a bill of interpleader to determine whether $264,517.02 in surplus impact fees collected under the Town’s impact fee ordinance should have been refunded to the developers who paid the impact fees or to the current owners of the properties for which the fees had been paid. Although the Town’s impact fee ordinance specifies that the current owners are entitled to the refunds, the Town sought to confirm that the ordinance is consistent with the impact fee statute. The bill listed seventeen properties and their respective impact fee payors and current owners. Additional parties intervened thereafter. Several parties, including the respondents, moved to add counterclaims alleging, among other things: (1) violations of RSA 674:21, V; (2) negligence; (3) violation of fiduciary duties owed to impact fee payors; (4) violation of the public trust in government; and (5) violation of the municipal budget law. The Town filed a motion to dismiss these counterclaims, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the order dismissing these claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Development, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Terrie Harman appealed a circuit court order denying her and her ex-husband Thomas McCarron's request to un-do their divorce. The parties were married in 1989. In July 2014, they were granted an uncontested decree of divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences that caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In March 2015, they jointly filed a “Petition to Change Court Order,” stating that they have “reconciled and therefore request the [trial court] to approve the attached agreement to vacate the July 1, 2014 divorce decree.” The attached agreement, signed by both parties, stated that they “agree that the . . . 2014 divorce decree shall be vacated in full and in all respects.” The trial court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that because New Hampshire courts “have authority to set aside, vacate, modify or amend their orders,” and have vacated final divorce decrees upon the request of one of the parties, the trial court erred in ruling that it had no authority to vacate the parties’ divorce decree. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that in the absence of a statute authorizing the trial court to vacate a final divorce decree on the ground of the parties’ reconciliation, the trial court did not err in concluding that it had no such authority. View "In the Matter of Harman & McCarron" on Justia Law