Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

RSA 461-A:11, I(a) permits a court to modify a parenting plan only when the parties agree to specific modification terms. Because the parties here disagreed about specific modification terms, they did not “agree to a modification,” and the trial court did not have authority to modify the parenting plan pursuant to RSA 461-A:11, I(a). Accordingly, because RSA 461-A:11, I(a) did not empower the trial court to modify the parenting plan, and because the record contained insufficient findings to permit the New Hampshire Supreme Court to determine whether the trial court properly modified the plan pursuant to RSA 461-A:11, I(c), the trial court’s order was reversed to the extent that modification of the parenting schedule was ordered pursuant to RSA 461-A:11, I(a). The Supreme Court also vacated the order to the extent that modification of the parenting schedule was ordered pursuant to a different subparagraph of RSA 461-A:11, I, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Kelly & Fernandes-Prabhu" on Justia Law

Plaintiff DirecTV, Inc. appealed a superior court decision denying a petition for property tax abatement for the tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009. The property at issue was located in New Hampton and used by DirecTV as a satellite uplink facility. On appeal, DirecTV argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) ruled that satellite antennas and batteries used to provide backup power constituted fixtures; and (2) determined the value of the property. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded after review that the antennas and batteries were not fixtures, and therefore, taxable as real estate. The Court reversed the superior court on that issue, vacated its decision on the valuation of the property, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DirecTV, Inc. v. Town of New Hampton" on Justia Law

Based on the facts of this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment, because the superior court gave no explanation for denying plaintiff’s contractual lien claim. Plaintiff Harvey Garod appealed a superior court order dismissing his conversion action against defendants R. James Steiner and Steiner Law Offices, PLLC. Plaintiff was retained by a client to pursue a personal injury action. In connection with the representation, the client signed plaintiff’s standard engagement contract. Plaintiff worked for the client for two years before being discharged without cause. The client subsequently hired defendants, who filed an action (underlying action) on behalf of the client. Defendants ultimately settled the underlying action on the client’s behalf. After the settlement of the underlying action, the client filed a motion to order that the settlement check be made “payable solely to [the client] and her counsel, R. James Steiner. On the same day, the plaintiff filed a series of motions in the underlying action, including a second motion to intervene wherein he asserted that he possessed a contractual lien, a motion for interpleader, and a motion to foreclose lien. The client objected to all these motions, and the court denied all of them without explanation. Plaintiff then filed suit against defendants, again alleging that he had an enforceable contractual lien for fees against the defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the action, which was ultimately granted. In reversing the superior court’s order, the Supreme Court was persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that he may have had a valid lien, and the contract signed by the client was enforceable against defendants because defendants were aware of his lien at the time they were retained, and because the client should not be required to pay both lawyers’ fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Garod v. Steiner Law Office, PLLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of New London (Town) appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to petitioners Robert Carr and Raoul & Karen, LLC (Raoul & Karen), in their appeal of the Town’s denial of their request for a property tax abatement pursuant to RSA 76:16 (Supp. 2016). During the 2014 tax year, Carr owned property in the Town which he sold to Raoul & Karen. The house on the property was struck by lightning and burned to the ground on July 1, 2014, leaving only a few outbuildings on the property. As a result of the house’s destruction, the petitioners could not use it for 272 of the 365 days of the 2014 tax year. The Town assessed the house at $688,000 for that tax year. In the previous year, RSA 76:16 came into effect that provided for prorated tax assessments for buildings damaged under certain conditions. Petitioners did not apply for a proration of their property tax assessment, rather, they petitioned the Town for property tax abatement under RSA 76:16 in January 2015, six months after the home’s destruction. The Town did not dispute that petitioners filed their application for abatement under RSA 76:16 in a timely manner, but the Town denied petitioners’ application because they had not timely filed for proration under RSA 76:21. The trial court construed RSA 76:21 in petitioners’ favor, and ruled that the statute did “not limit taxpayers’ ability to apply for abatement under RSA 76:16.” The court then evaluated whether petitioners had shown “good cause” for abatement, and concluded that they had. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in petitioners’ favor. The Town appealed, but finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carr & Town of New London" on Justia Law

A maternal great-grandmother and a maternal step great grandfather appealed after a circuit court dismissed their petition for visitation with their minor great-grandchild. The circuit court found, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed, that the great-grandparents lacked standing to bring suit. View "Petition of Willeke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Beverly Cluff-Landry appealed a Superior Court order dismissing her case against defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester d/b/a St. Christopher School (the school). Two new students enrolled in the Pre-K program at the beginning of the 2011-2012 academic year, each of whom exhibited defiant behaviors, including “daily kicking, hitting, slapping, punching, spitting, biting, screaming, throwing things, and verbal abuse. Plaintiff reported to the principal “her concerns that the school was not adequately set up to handle [one of the students] due to his unsafe behaviors and the school’s inability to keep the other students safe, and that the behavior was in violation of the student-parent handbook.” In response to the plaintiff’s concerns, the principal “simply laughed.” The plaintiff continued to complain to the principal about the student, but the principal took no action. After the parents of a student complained that the defiant student was bullying their daughter, the principal expelled the defiant student. Thereafter, the principal’s alleged retaliation toward the plaintiff “escalated.” The principal ultimately placed the plaintiff on a “Teacher Improvement Plan.” She was given notice of the school’s intent to not renew her contract for the following school year in April; plaintiff’s last day of work was June 15, 2012. Plaintiff filed suit against the school alleging: (1) violations under the New Hampshire Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, by failing to renew her contract after she reported violations of school and public policies; (2) wrongful discharge, for failing to renew her contract; and (3) slander, based upon the principal’s comments to A&T. The school moved to dismiss, arguing that: (1) plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient to support a violation of the Act; (2) the wrongful discharge claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and also failed because the plaintiff’s employment was governed by a one-year contract; and (3) the alleged defamatory statements were not actionable because plaintiff consented to their publication. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the school’s motion. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cluff-Landry v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester" on Justia Law

The decedent, Kathleen Mullin, a resident of Hancock, New Hampshire, died intestate in 2014. Her heirs at law were her three siblings: Michael Mullin, J. Stanley Mullin, Jr., and appellant Patricia Jackle. All of the heirs at law were California residents, as was the appellee Laura Bushley, a trustee. From 2008 until her death, the decedent lived in Hancock and owned real property there. She also owned real property in California, where she had lived for many years prior to 2008. Although the decedent did not have a will, in 2012, while in California, she executed a trust document (Trust) that had been drafted by a California attorney. The Trust contained a choice of law provision, stating that the laws of California governed the validity, construction, and administration of the Trust, except that all matters relating to real property were governed by the laws of the situs of that real property. Appellant filed an Inventory of Fiduciary listing the decedent’s estate as consisting of approximately $2.5 million worth of real estate and personal property. In August, the appellee filed an objection to the Inventory, claiming that it listed property that was owned by the Trust. Appellee filed suit in California seeking to transfer title to the decedent’s property to the Trust. Appellant objected to the transfer, challenging the suit on multiple procedural and jurisdictional grounds. The circuit court denied appellant’s motion, ruling: (1) that the court was “unable to make a ruling on the requests of the [appellant] regarding the legal and equitable title to the property or to declare that the situs of the property . . . is New Hampshire without appropriate testimony and evidence”; (2) that jurisdiction over the Trust was “properly before” the California court, and that California law must apply except with respect to the New Hampshire real estate; and (3) that the California court was “a more convenient forum” to hear the matter because “[e]vidence and witnesses would more easily be available” there, the decedent “lived in California for many years and utilized services of a California attorney and California financial advisor,” the Trust “was drafted in California,” and the “trustee and all three heirs-at-law, including the [appellant], are residents of California.” This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s motion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Estate of Kathleen Mullin" on Justia Law

On January 30, 2016, the Town of Deerfield held a deliberative session. During the session, two petitioned warrant articles, titled Article 16 and Article 17, were considered and amended. Following the amendment of the two articles, petitioner Harriet Cady filed a petition for injunctive relief against the Town requesting an immediate hearing on the grounds that the alterations violated RSA 40:13, IV(c). The Town objected and moved to dismiss. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, concluding that the amendments to Articles 16 and 17 did not “remove or eradicate the subject matter of the original articles” and thus did not violate RSA 40:13, IV(c). Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cady v. Town of Deerfield" on Justia Law

The City of Rochester’s Department of Public Works owned and operated the Rochester Water System, which provided water to residents of the City. The City operated three water storage tanks, one of which is the Rochester Hill Water Storage Tank (the Tank). Whitman & Howard n/k/a AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (AECOM) designed the Tank and oversaw its construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron n/k/a CB&I, Inc. (CB&I). CB&I completed the Tank in 1985, and it was placed into service that same year. In June 2009, the City contracted defendant Marcel A. Payeur, Inc. (Payeur) to service the Tank by recoating the Tank’s interior and exterior, installing a mixer, and modifying the Tank to accommodate the mixer. Defendant Wright-Pierce performed the engineering and design work for the modification project. Payeur substantially completed the modification, under Wright-Pierce’s supervision, in November 2009. In December 2011, the Tank developed a leak. The City had to evacuate nearby residents, drain the Tank, and remove it from service. The City inspected the Tank and discovered that Payeur had failed to properly construct the modifications in accordance with Wright-Pierce’s design. The City filed suit against Payeur in November 2012, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and unjust enrichment. In April 2014, the City named CB&I, AECOM, and Wright-Pierce as additional defendants. The City’s amended complaint alleged that Wright-Pierce had failed to properly supervise Payeur’s 2009 modification work; it also alleged that, in 1985, CB&I had failed to properly construct the Tank in accordance with AECOM’s design, and AECOM had failed to adequately monitor CB&I. CB&I and AECOM moved to dismiss the City’s claims against them, arguing that the claims were time-barred. The superior court dismissed the City’s claims against CB&I and AECOM pursuant to a six year statute of limitations in effect when CB&I and AECOM substantially completed their contract with the City. The City appealed, arguing the superior court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of “nullum tempus occurrit regi (“time does not run against the king”). Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants N.C. and Alethea Young, Ph.D., appealed superior court orders denying Dr. Young’s motion to quash a subpoena for N.C.’s psychological records issued by appellee, the New Hampshire Board of Psychologists (Board), and dismissing N.C.’s petition for a declaratory judgment to prevent the Board from obtaining the records. N.C. has been a patient of Young for many years, attending at least two therapy sessions per week since the age of two. In August 2013, when N.C. was still a minor, she informed Young that her father, S.C., had physically and emotionally abused her. According to Young, throughout her treatment of N.C., she witnessed what she described as S.C.’s aggressive and humiliating treatment of his daughter, both in public as well as in therapy sessions. In September, S.C. filed a written complaint against Young with the Board. The complaint alleged that Young had breached her professional obligations by: (1) becoming personally over-involved with N.C., thus sacrificing her objectivity; (2) providing counseling to both S.C. and his daughter, thus creating an insurmountable conflict of interest; (3) violating RSA 169-C:29 (2014) by failing to timely report suspected abuse of a child to DCYF; (4) violating RSA 633:1, I-a (2007) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) by detaining and concealing N.C., who was a minor at the time, from S.C. when she drove N.C. to Vermont without S.C.’s knowledge or consent; and (5) failing to respect S.C.’s wishes that she no longer treat his daughter. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in enforcing the subpoena because the Board failed to establish that it had just cause to issue the subpoena. Appellants also contended that, even if just cause existed to issue the subpoena, once they objected, the subpoena could not be enforced by the court because the Board failed to sustain what, in their view, was the additional burden necessary to pierce the patient’s privilege by showing that there was a reasonable probability the records were relevant and material and that the Board had an essential need for them. Furthermore, appellants argued that, even if the Board met the burden necessary to pierce the privilege, the court erred in not conducting an in camera review of the records before ordering compliance with the subpoena in order to limit the scope of disclosure. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with appellants that the statute required a court order to obtain a patient’s records when there was an objection to compliance with a subpoena based upon a claim of privilege. However, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the privilege must yield to the Board’s proper exercise of its regulatory responsibilities with regard to its licensee, Dr. Young. View "N.C. v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists" on Justia Law