Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Delaware corporation, Northern Natural Gas Company, sued another Delaware entity, Centennial Resource Production, LLC, in Nebraska for breach of contract. The dispute arose after Centennial, due to a cold weather event in Texas, was unable to use its reserved pipeline capacity and refused to pay the corresponding invoice. The district court concluded it had personal jurisdiction over Centennial based on Centennial's contractual consent and sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska during the formation and implementation of their business relationship.Centennial appealed, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Centennial consented to personal jurisdiction in Nebraska by joining Northern's Master Escrow Agreement that contained an express consent to jurisdiction in Nebraska and waived the personal jurisdiction defense. The court found that the Service Agreement, Joinder Agreement, and Master Escrow Agreement became one unitary unseverable agreement through the plain language of the Tariff. The court concluded that the forum selection clause found in the Master Escrow Agreement applied equally to the Service Agreement as one unitary agreement. Thus, due process was satisfied when Centennial consented to personal jurisdiction by entering into a contract that contains a valid forum selection clause, and Nebraska was not a forum non conveniens. View "Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Centennial Resource Prod." on Justia Law

In this case, Chuck McKay appealed the dismissal of a complaint he filed seeking declaratory relief regarding the Republican Party primary election for a county commissioner position in Saline County, Nebraska in 2022. The district court had dismissed McKay's complaint on the grounds that the exclusive remedy for his claims was an election contest under Nebraska law.McKay alleged that Anita Bartels, the county clerk, had unlawfully altered the boundary of the district in which he was a candidate, which affected the outcome of the election. According to McKay, when votes from the area that Bartels added to the district were disregarded, he would have won the election. Furthermore, McKay contended that Bartels did not meet residency requirements to serve as county clerk, rendering her actions null and void.Despite McKay's assertions that he was not contesting the election, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that his complaint effectively sought to do so. The court noted that the election contest statutes were generally the exclusive means for challenging election results. McKay had failed to provide any reasons why an election contest did not provide him with a full, adequate, and serviceable remedy for his claim. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of McKay's complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim entitling him to declaratory or equitable relief. View "McKay v. Bartels" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nebraska recently ruled on a dispute between the Nebraska Journalism Trust (NJT) and the Nebraska Department of Environment and Energy (NDEE) over the cost of providing public records. NJT had requested email records from NDEE relating to certain environmental topics, and was given an estimated cost of $44,103.11, mainly for the time spent by non-attorney staff to review the requested records. NJT filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the cost estimate included charges unauthorized by Nebraska law.The court ruled that a requester of public records who is provided with a fee estimate that contains unauthorized charges may indeed file for a writ of mandamus. The court also clarified that the party seeking a writ of mandamus has the burden of proving that the fee estimate includes unauthorized charges, after which the public body must show that the fees charged are authorized by law.However, the court found that the plain language of Nebraska law permits a public body to charge a fee for time spent by non-attorney employees, in excess of four cumulative hours, reviewing requested public records. The court thus concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the law, vacated its writ of mandamus and its order awarding attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nebraska Journalism Trust v. Dept. of Envt. & Energy" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a decision holding Allen Crow, a corporate officer, personally liable for unpaid use taxes of his former corporation, Direct Media Marketing, Inc. The court determined that Crow failed to rebut the presumption of correctness of the amount of use taxes assessed against Direct Media. The court further found that Crow was a responsible officer of Direct Media and willfully failed to pay Direct Media's use taxes, making him personally liable for the tax deficiency.Despite the Department of Revenue's significant delay in pursuing proceedings against Direct Media and Crow, the court did not find compelling circumstances or demonstrated prejudice that would warrant equitable relief. The court held that the doctrine of laches, which bars a party from relief due to delay, could not be applied against the government in its efforts to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. The court concluded that the delay did not absolve Direct Media and Crow of their liability. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order upholding the order of the Tax Commissioner that held Crow personally liable for Direct Media's unpaid taxes. View "Crow v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in a dispute involving property tax assessment after a real estate property was damaged by fire due to arson. The issue at the core of the case was whether a fire caused by arson could be considered a "calamity" under state law, thus entitling the property owner, Inland Insurance Company, to a reduction in their property's assessed value.The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) had upheld the decision of the Lancaster County Board of Equalization, maintaining the assessed value of the property without considering the damage caused by the fire as a calamity. The TERC interpreted the word "calamity" as referring only to natural events.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed with TERC's interpretation of the term "calamity." The court held that the term, as used in state law, encompasses any disastrous event, not just natural disasters. The language of the law, the court reasoned, did not limit calamities to natural events. The court therefore reversed TERC's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not consider the Board of Equalization's cross-appeal, which argued that certain tax statutes were unconstitutional, due to a procedural issue. View "Inland Ins. Co. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

In this case, John Edward Griffith II and Christina M. Griffith sued LG Chem America, Inc., and Shoemaker’s Truck Station, Inc., after lithium-ion rechargeable batteries purchased at a Shoemaker's Truck Station store in Nebraska exploded in Mr. Griffith's pocket in Pennsylvania, causing him serious burns and permanent injuries.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that Nebraska lacked personal jurisdiction over LG Chem America, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. The court found that LG Chem America had no substantial connection to Nebraska related to the case. The company's activities in Nebraska, which included renting warehouse space for the storage of petrochemical products and selling those products to two customers in the state, were unrelated to the sale and distribution of the lithium-ion batteries at issue in the case.The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to apply Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations to the Griffiths' negligence and loss of consortium claims, given that the injury occurred in Pennsylvania. The court found that Pennsylvania had a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties than Nebraska, where the batteries were purchased. As a result, the Griffiths' claims, filed more than two years after the injury, were time-barred under Pennsylvania law. View "Griffith v. LG Chem America" on Justia Law

This case revolves around a long-standing dispute between two Nebraska families, the Zeilers and the Reifschneiders, over rights to divert water from their neighboring farmland. The dispute lead to a consent judgment in 1988, where Zeiler's father was ordered to remove a dike and level the area to a uniform elevation to allow for the drainage of surface waters from the Zeiler property to the Reifschneider property. Years later, Michael Zeiler filed a contempt action against Kenneth E. Reifschneider, alleging that Reifschneider had violated the consent judgment by raising the elevation level along the property boundary line, causing water to pool on Zeiler's farmland. The district court found Reifschneider in contempt, concluding he had willfully violated the consent judgment.However, the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that Zeiler lacked standing to pursue the contempt action because the consent judgment did not impose any obligations on Reifschneider. The judgment was a compromise conclusion to the earlier litigation between Reifschneider and Zeiler's father, where the defendant provided consideration in exchange for the plaintiff's dismissal of suit. The court clarified that its decision determined only that Zeiler lacked standing to pursue a contempt action, and made no evaluation of whether Zeiler would have standing or could obtain relief against Reifschneider via a different legal theory. View "Zeiler v. Reifschneider" on Justia Law

In this case, Christopher Mathiesen, the owner of a limited liability company, appealed a court's order dismissing his complaint against Kristi Kellogg, who was alleged to be a co-owner of the company. The court dismissed the complaint after it was consolidated with another case involving the same parties and the same basic underlying facts. The main issue was whether the Nebraska Supreme Court had jurisdiction over Mathiesen's appeal of the order dismissing his complaint. The court found that it did not have jurisdiction because the order was not a final order that decided all the claims between all the parties. Instead, it was an order that only dismissed some of the claims and did so without the required express direction for the entry of judgment and express determination that there was no just reason to delay an appeal. The court also held that when cases are consolidated in Nebraska, they become a single case, and so the order dismissing the complaint did not fully dispose of the entire case. As a result, the court dismissed Mathiesen's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mathiesen v. Kellogg" on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Kelley L. and Richard L., sought to have Richard adopt Kelley's daughter, Kate S., without the consent of the child's biological father, Dustin S., alleging that Dustin had abandoned Kate. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the County Court's decision, which denied the adoption petition, holding that Dustin had not abandoned Kate. The Supreme Court found that, although Dustin could have done more to be involved in Kate's life and did not fully comply with court-ordered reunification therapy and child support payments, the evidence suggested that Kelley had hindered Dustin from having meaningful contact with Kate. Therefore, they found that Dustin had not demonstrated a "settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims" to Kate. The court also noted that the county court's reference to unresolved proceedings in the District Court did not constitute an error, as it simply acknowledged another potential route to adoption without Dustin's consent if his parental rights were subsequently terminated in those proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Kate S." on Justia Law

In this Nebraska case, the appellant, Christian G., filed a motion to vacate a domestic abuse protection order issued against him, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the court erred in excluding his affidavit, which sought to prove he did not receive timely notice of the hearing. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that by filing a request for a hearing on the protection order, Christian made a general appearance in court, thereby conferring the court personal jurisdiction over him. The court also held that while an affidavit may be used in motion practice, including for preliminary, collateral, and interlocutory matters, it is not exempt from the rules of evidence. The court determined that the portion of Christian's affidavit that contained hearsay was correctly excluded by the district court because Christian did not properly limit his offer to the admissible parts of the affidavit. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the district court's ruling that denied Christian's motion to vacate the protection order. View "K. v. G." on Justia Law