Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Nicole and Jeremy had three children, born in 2001, 2004, and 2005, and lived in Missouri. In 2007, Madysen, then 6 years old, reported that Jeremy had been sexually abusing her for more than a year. Jeremy was arrested. Nicole moved with the children to Nebraska and filed for divorce. The 2007 dissolution granted sole custody of the children to Nicole and stated that Jeremy “shall not have any parenting time.” The court ordered Jeremy to pay $50 per month in child support. IPursuant to a plea agreement, Jeremy was sentenced to 16 years’ confinement. Nicole married William in 2013; they sought adoption by a stepparent and to terminate Jeremy;s parental rights. Jeremy opposed the adoptions. The petitions asked the court to find that Jeremy had abandoned the children under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-104, such that Jeremy’s consent was not required. Jeremy’s mother had consistently paid the ordered child support; Jeremy had sent the children cards. The court ordered that Jeremy’s consent was not required. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the record did not support a finding upon clear and convincing evidence that Jeremy had abandoned his children. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Court of Appeals had also lacked jurisdiction. The order was not final, pending an order on the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of Madysen S." on Justia Law

Lindner sued the City of La Vista, challenging ordinance No. 979, creating an off-street parking district adjoining a Cabela’s store, as unconstitutional. The district court found that the action was time barred and dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, stating that is was not apparent from the face of Lindner’s complaint when Lindner’s cause of action accrued. On remand, the court accepted evidence and determined that the four-year catchall limitations period, Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-212, applied and that Lindner’s action accrued more than four years before he filed suit. The court identified the dates when the city opted to pay for the cost of off-street parking through general revenues and sales tax revenues, enacted ordinance No. 983 authorizing the issuance of bonds, issued the bonds, and first paid on. Each of these events occurred greater than four years before Lindner filed his complaint. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The district court correctly identified the three undisputed dates when the city chose the funding mechanism to be used and implemented that decision. Even if using the latest event, October 16, 2006, as the date upon which - Lindner’s claim accrued, Lindner’s December 16, 2011, complaint was filed more than four years after the action accrued. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law

The Lindsays were minority shareholders of the 304 Corporation; its principal asset was Mid City Bank. In 2010, the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance and the FDIC began an examination of the bank. In 2011, the Department appointed the FDIC as the bank's receiver, stating that “‘large commercial real estate loan and poor management practices . . . led to a deterioration of the bank’s capital’” so that there was “‘no option but to declare the insolvent institution receivership.’” The bank reopened and regained good standing. In 2014, the FDIC filed suit, alleging that Fitl “was grossly negligent and breached his fiduciary duties,” 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(2)(A)(i). The Lindsays also filed suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The court dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The Lindsays’ claims are similar to all other shareholders’ claims and did not arise from a special duty, since the injury was not “separate and distinct.” The district court correctly concluded that the Lindsays’ claims were derivative in nature and that as a result of the FDIC lawsuit, the Lindsays had no standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. View "Lindsay v. Fitl" on Justia Law

In May 2013, Deines filed a complaint seeking to recover earned commissions from his former employer under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act. Essex filed an answer which, among other things, alleged Deines had been paid all commissions he was owed. After the case had been pending for approximately 15 months, the trial court issued a notice of intent to dismiss. The notice required the parties to take certain action within 30 days or the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution. No action was taken within the prescribed time and the court entered an order dismissing the case for want of prosecution. Deines subsequently filed a successful motion to reinstate the case. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed an appeal. The order was neither a judgment nor a final order. View "Deintes v. Essex Corp." on Justia Law

The juvenile court granted the Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Jackson after finding that he had suffered head injuries at home. Jackson was placed with his maternal grandmother, Erin, and her husband, Paul, where he remained in foster care for the next two and a half years. The Department later removed Jackson from his placement with Erin and Paul and placed him with other foster parents. Erin and Paul filed a motion for placement requesting an order that the Department place Jackson back with them and also filed a motion to intervene. The court granted Erin and Paul’s motion to intervene but denied their motion for placement, finding that the State had met its burden of proof that its placement plan was in the best interests of Jackson. Erin and Paul filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the court’s order. The motion was denied. Erin and Paul appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Erin and Paul had no right to take an appeal under the circumstances, and therefore, they had no standing. View "In re Interest of Jackson E." on Justia Law

The juvenile court granted the Department of Health and Human Services temporary custody of Jackson after finding that he had suffered head injuries at home. Jackson was placed with his maternal grandmother, Erin, and her husband, Paul, where he remained in foster care for the next two and a half years. The Department later removed Jackson from his placement with Erin and Paul and placed him with other foster parents. Erin and Paul filed a motion for placement requesting an order that the Department place Jackson back with them and also filed a motion to intervene. The court granted Erin and Paul’s motion to intervene but denied their motion for placement, finding that the State had met its burden of proof that its placement plan was in the best interests of Jackson. Erin and Paul filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the court’s order. The motion was denied. Erin and Paul appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Erin and Paul had no right to take an appeal under the circumstances, and therefore, they had no standing. View "In re Interest of Jackson E." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse that resulted in the death of an infant in her care. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that evidence of the infant’s prior injuries while in her care should have been excluded as prior bad acts under Neb. R. Evid. 404. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial on the basis of allowing the admission of the prior injuries, as the prior injuries were inextricably intertwined with the charged crime; (2) there was no misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument; (3) Defendant’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "State v. Cullen" on Justia Law

In 2009, Bonnie Nichols and Margie Nichols were married in Iowa. In 2012, Bonnie filed a complaint in a Nebraska court to dissolve the union. Margie filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that a Nebraska court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex marriage. The district court granted Margie’s motion to dismiss for subject matter jurisdiction. The district court’s order purported to dismiss Bonnie’s complaint if Bonnie failed to amend it within fifteen days. Bonnie did not file an amended complaint, and the district court did not enter a judgment dismissing the action. Bonnie appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Bonnie appealed from a conditional order and not a final judgment, and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Nichols v. Nichols" on Justia Law

RFD-TV, LLC, a television programming service, executed an affiliation agreement with Sunflower Broadband Corporation that granted Sunflower a nonexclusive right to distribute RFD programming to Sunflower’s subscribers in Kansas in exchange for a fee. Knology, Inc., subsequently purchased Sunflower’s assets. Prior to this purchase Knology was providing cable service to subscribers in South Dakota. Knology later became a wholly owned subsidiary of WOW! Cable. Two years later, Knology and WOW ceased distribution of RFD programming and did not pay fees. RFD sued Knology and WOW (collectively, Appellees) for breach of contract. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the minimum contacts requirement between Appellees, as nonresident defendants, and the State had not been met. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) erred in dismissing the case with prejudice. View "RFD-TV v. WildOpenFence Fin." on Justia Law

Russell Reichert sued Sherry Hara in small claims court, claiming that Hara owed him for a $4,000 loan he gave her. The court found the transaction was a loan and entered judgment for Reichert. Hara subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the district court, alleging that the $4,000 was a gift and not a loan. The district court dismissed Hara’s complaint, concluding that the action was barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) claim preclusion, but not issue preclusion, applies to small claims court judgments; and (2) the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied in this case, and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed Hara’s action. View "Hara v. Reichert" on Justia Law